Compensation by way of weekly payments and the costs of any benefits payable under Division 2 of Part VI of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 are not to be paid by the employer to the worker.

Workers compensation - Section 81A referral - Whether a gap in certification pursuant to s 69(13) - Provision of certificates to insurer and not employer - Whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction - Whether a reasonably arguable case exists.

Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988; ss 3, 25, 42, 69, 81A, 131, 143;

Racial Discrimination Act 1975, s 18D.

Care Assessment Consultants Pty Ltd t/as Care Forward ABN 67098161105 v LMN [2024] TASCAT 239;

Dale v Cigarette & Gift Warehouse (Franchising) Pty Ltd [2026] TASSC 5;

Lamont v MRD Supermarkets Pty Ltd [2016] TASSC 16;

Vos Construction and Joinery Pty Ltd v Norton-Smith [2016] TASSC 38;

St Helens Oysters Pty Ltd v Coatsworth [2007] TASSC 90;

State of Tasmania (Department for Education, Children & Young People) v ENX [2025] TASCAT 124;

M v Allianz Australia Services Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2019] TASWRCT 35;

Kean v Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Corporation (1998) 71 SASR 42;

Bropho v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2004] FCAFC 16.

This decision has been anonymised for the purposes of publication.

1. On 21 March 2025, the worker made a claim for compensation for a psychological injury. In her claim form she indicated "I was harassed by my manager on multiple occasions. This made me feel anxious and depressed and constant stress". The worker asserted that her psychological injury had occurred on 3 March 2025.
2. The worker also provided an initial prescribed workers compensation medical certificate dated 3 March 2025 with her claim form. This certificate indicated a provisional diagnosis of an adjustment disorder with the worker being certified as incapacitated from 3 March 2025 to 17 March 2025.
3. The claim for compensation was accepted and the employer paid workers compensation.
4. The worker obtained a workers compensation medical certificate dated 13 May 2025 indicating a period of capacity to 9 June 2025. This certificate was served on the employer on or about 13 May 2025.
5. On 15 June 2025, the employer was advised that the worker's treating psychologist had recommended that she not attempt contact with the employer from that time.
6. The employer did not receive any further medical certificates from the worker from the certificate of 13 May 2025 until 25 August 2025. Due to the employer's autopay system not being updated with continuing medical certificates, the worker continued to receive her payments.
7. On 28 August 2025, when the worker's workers compensation payments ceased as a consequence of her non-provision of ongoing prescribed medical certificates, it was ascertained that the worker had been providing workers compensation medical certificates directly to the insurer instead of the employer.
8. On 28 August 2025, the worker sent through workers compensation medical certificates covering the duration of her claim.
9. As a consequence of this action, there was a gap of 80 days between the last provided medical certificate of 13 May 2025, certifying incapacity to 9 June 2025, and the employer being provided with continuing medical certificates on 28 August 2025.
10. The circumstances surrounding the worker's provision of her medical certificates to the insurer and not to the employer is a matter of contention between the parties which will be referred to in greater detail subsequently in this decision.

1. The employer elected to dispute its ongoing liability to pay compensation to the worker in respect of her claim and on 19 November 2025 referred the dispute to the Tribunal pursuant to s 81A of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal 1988 (the Act).
2. The employer relied upon s 69(13) of the Act which provides:

69. Amount of compensation in case of incapacity > > ... > > (13) If the period specified in a medical certificate provided by a worker under this section expires and the worker provides a further certificate more than 14 days after the expiration of that specified period, the employer, on receipt of the subsequent certificate, may treat that certificate as a claim for compensation to which section 81A applies.

3. To utilise s 69(13), the employer relied upon what it says was the gap in certification of more than 14 days after the expiration of the specified period of incapacity in the certificate dated 13 May 2025 (being 9 June 2025), and the delivery of the further certificates on 28 August 2025 being a period of 80 days.

1. The employer's s 81A referral was first listed before the Tribunal for 10 December 2025. However, on the afternoon of 9 December 2025, the worker provided to the employer and the Tribunal documents she wished the Tribunal to consider during the hearing scheduled for the following day.
2. At the hearing on 10 December 2025 the worker adamantly asserted that she had received advice from the insurer that it was permissible for her to provide her ongoing workers compensation medical certificates certifying her ongoing incapacity directly to the insurer rather than the employer based on the advice from her psychologist.
3. In light of the Tribunal's and the employer's receipt of the materials from the worker on 9 December 2025 and the indications made by the worker in the hearing on 10 December 2025, it was agreed that after the employer had put into evidence the material upon which it relied with its s 81A referral, the continued hearing of the referral would be adjourned to enable the worker to provide her evidence in response to the referral and for the employer to provide any further response it desired to.
4. The directions were complied with by the parties by 19 January 2026 when a further directions conference was conducted. At this directions conference the worker indicated that evidence provided by the employer relating to the insurer's search for records of her telephone discussions with insurer representatives in which she had received advice to only provide her ongoing workers compensation medical certificates to the insurer, were not a complete examination of all of these phone calls. She asserted that the insurer had advised her that further searches were being undertaken, particularly in relation to another telephone number the worker had purportedly been using to contact the insurer in the relevant period.
5. In light of these indications, further directions were given regarding the insurer's provision of further evidence relating to the worker's telephone contact with the insurer during the June/July period of 2025.
6. On 1 March 2026, the worker provided to the Tribunal a copy of a transcript of a telephone conversation she had with an insurer representative on 6 June 2025. A copy of this transcript was also provided to the Tribunal by the employer on 2 March 2025.
7. During a directions conference on 2 March 2026, the worker asserted that she had ongoing discussions with the insurer regarding her telephone contact with the insurer during which she had received advice from the insurer that it was permissible to provide her workers compensation medical certificates to the insurer rather than to the employer directly.
8. Counsel for the employer indicated that she was unaware of any such further communications with the insurer. As a consequence of this, the directions conference was adjourned to the afternoon of 4 March 2026 to enable the employer to obtain and provide any further evidence in relation to these issues.
9. On 4 March 2026, prior to the commencement of the adjourned directions conference, the employer provided a statement of Ms J Scott, a service manager at the insurer. With the consent of the worker, this statement was tendered into evidence during the hearing.
10. Prior to the conclusion of this directions conference, the worker made further assertions that she had received advice from Ms Lees of the insurer that during the relevant period the insurer had updated its communications systems which meant it was possible that not all telephone recordings were available. As this issue had not previously been raised by the worker, and had not been addressed by Ms Lees, given the lengthy duration of the evidence gathering processes in relation to these issues, and the prejudice to the employer of any further adjournments, I determined that no further evidence would be received, and I reserved my decision.

1. The evidence relied upon by the employer in its referral of 19 November 2025 was the following:

(i) Workers compensation claim form dated 21 March 2025;

(ii) Initial workers compensation medical certificate dated 3 March 2025;

(iii) Continuing workers compensation medical certificates dated 10 June, 8 July, 7 August, 4 September 2025.

(iv) Notice to the worker pursuant to s 81A(1)(a) and (b);

(v) Statement of evidence of Rosanne Brash dated 17 November 2025.

1. The employer also put into evidence the statement of Ms S Lees, a case manager at the insurer and who was managing the worker's claim.
2. The employer also put into evidence the transcript of the telephone discussion between the worker and Ms E Rathbone of the insurer from 10:11am on 6 June 2025.
3. The employer also put into evidence the statement of Ms J Scott, a service manager at the insurer dated 3 March 2026.
4. As this evidence was only relevant to the s 69(13) jurisdictional question, I determined that leave for it to be tendered by the employer pursuant to s 81A(2AA) was not required.

1. The worker put in to evidence the material she had provided to the Tribunal on 9 December 2025 and her statement of 17 December 2025.

1. In all of the evidence she has provided to the Tribunal, the worker has maintained her adamant indications that in June of 2025 while she was really struggling with her mental health, suffering panic attacks and having suicidal thoughts, her psychologist advised her to avoid all contact with the employer as this was triggering her symptoms. The employer has acknowledged this.
2. The worker further indicated that in telephone contact with the insurer representative in June 2025 at around the time her medical certificate was due, the worker told the insurer representative what her psychologist had told her about contact with the employer, and that the insurer representative told her that the worker could send any medical certificates to the insurer and they would be forwarded on to the employer.
3. The worker indicated that this was not her usual case manager Ms Lees, but that she had phoned the usual telephone number for the insurer.
4. Subsequently the worker sent each of her ongoing medical certificates after that of 13 May 2025 to the insurer.
5. The worker confirmed receipt of a letter from the insurer dated 19 June 2025 advising her that her workers compensation claim had been accepted.
6. The worker further asserted that she continued to provide her medical certificates to the insurer thinking that these were being forwarded to her employer. She did this between June 2025 and 28 August 2025.
7. On or about 25 August 2025, the worker ceased being paid weekly benefits and when she made contact with the employer's pay office to ascertain why this was so, she was informed that as the employer had not been receiving medical certificates certifying her as incapacitated for work, her payments had ceased.
8. Upon this receiving this advice, on 28 August 2025 the worker sent all of her ongoing medical certificates dated 10 June, 8 July and 7 August to the employer. These certificates covered all periods of incapacity to 28 August 2025.
9. The worker stated that she subsequently spoke to Ms Lees who indicated that she believed the insurer representative she had dealt with in relation to this issue was called Stevie and that she requested transcripts of the recording of the call and sought other file notes which might have been available.
10. The worker stated that as most of her dealings in relation to her workers compensation claim were with the insurer it was reasonable for her to rely on what she had been told by the insurer representative in that she could send the medical certificates to the insurer on behalf of the employer.
11. The worker submitted that based on all of these matters, the employer cannot establish that there is a gap in the provision of medical certificates of greater than 14 days and thus s 69(13) is not enlivened to enable the s 81A referral to be determined. This means that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction hear the referral.
12. In Ms Lees' statement, she has indicated that it is not the insurer's regular policy and it is communicated by the insurer to all workers who have made claims for compensation, that they have an obligation to provide their workers compensation medical certificates to their employer as well as to the insurer. This was indicated to the worker in the insurer's correspondence of 19 June 2025.
13. Ms Lees indicated that the insurer's service manager, Ms J Scott had undertaken a review of all of the telephone transcripts of phone calls between the worker and the insurer in May, June and July of 2025 and that Ms Scott had advised her that these searches did not reveal any conversations that had taken place between the worker any insurer claims manager or insurer employee during which the worker was told by the insurer to send the workers compensation medical certificates to the insurer and not her employer.
14. One telephone call in June 2025 was ascertained to have occurred between the worker and the insurer, but this had only sought approval for treatment from a psychologist.
15. Ms Lees indicated that she had reviewed all file notes on the worker's file with none indicating that the worker was ever told she could serve her medical certificates on the insurer and not the employer. Ms Lees said it would be very unusual for the insurer to say that to any worker, given the requirements of the Act.
16. Ms Scott's evidence was that she has undertaken a review of its phone transcripts against the worker's mobile phone number and had only located one conversation which had occurred on 6 June 2025 and the worker, and two insurer claims managers. This phone conversation was related to approval for treatment from a psychologist.
17. It was confirmed that this related to the transcript which was also in evidence before the Tribunal.
18. Ms Scott also indicated that after contact from the worker, a search was also undertaken on a landline phone number provided by the worker which was that of her parents where she had been residing for some period of time during the relevant period.
19. Ms Scott indicated that she had also located a conversation in April of 2025 when Ms Lees had a telephone discussion with the worker confirming that the worker was required to send all medical certificates to her employer and that it was important to have no gaps.
20. Ms Scott also gave evidence that she had ascertained that on 19 May 2025, Ms Lees received an email from Honeysuckle Health which is a psychological counselling provider. This organisation provided a summary of their initial assessment of the worker and included in the summary that the worker had reported that she had been sending all medical certificates, invoices and referrals directly to the employer. It was advised that they had provided the worker with the general insurer email address so she could send those documents to the insurer as well.
21. Ms Scott indicated that her searches for telephone contact by the worker to the insurer on the landline phone number provided in the May, June and July period of 2025 had not revealed any outgoing or incoming telephone calls from that landline number such that there are no such phone records.
22. Ms Scott also indicated that she had reviewed the file notes of the worker's file and there were no file notes indicating that the worker was told she could serve her medical certificates on the insurer and not the employer.

1. The obligation is on a worker to provide certificates of incapacity to the employer. The Act does not permit certificates to be provided to any other entity.
2. As was stated by Senior Member Jack in Care Assessment Consultants Pty Ltd t/as Care Forward ABN 67098161105 v LMN [2024] TASCAT 239 at [27]:

It is the responsibility of the worker to provide ongoing certification to the employer. An employer may or not decide to take advantage of the opportunity to dispute its ongoing liability to pay compensation where s 69(13) applies. It is not under any obligation to make enquiries of the worker for further certification if it decides to take that opportunity.

3. Although the employer has acknowledged that the worker's treating psychologist had advised her not to have any communications with the employer which purportedly lead the worker to provide her ongoing certificates to the insurer rather than the employer in the June, July and August period of 2025, on the evidence before me I am not satisfied on the balance of probability that any representative of the insurer told the worker in this period that she should only provide her certificates to the insurer rather than the employer and the insurer.
4. There is no dispute that the worker received a letter from the insurer dated 19 June 2025 when her claim was accepted. The content of this letter which was put into evidence by the worker, clearly indicates under the heading of "Your obligations", that "all certificates must be provided to your employer and QBE".
5. Although the worker has adamantly indicated that she received this advice from the insurer, given the insurer's long involvement in the management of workers compensation claims in Tasmania, I find it improbable that any representative of the employer would have advised the worker to only provide her certificates to the insurer.
6. As was stated by Jago J in Dale v Cigarette & Gift Warehouse (Franchising) Pty Ltd [2026] TASSC 5 at [54]- [55]:

Section 69(13) clearly requires a two-step process. The worker must provide the certificate, and the employer must receive the certificate. The critical event that enlivens s 69(13) is the receipt of the subsequent certificate. It is the receipt of the subsequent certificate that entitles the employer to treat the certificate as a claim for compensation to which s 81A applies. If the worker provides the certificate, the worker is in control of when the insurer receives it and is therefore fully aware of the operation of any relevant time frames. Because of the prospect that satisfaction of the s 69(13) criteria gives rise to the employer being able to treat a medical certificate as, in effect, a new claim which permits reliance upon s 81A of the Act, certainty is required as to the mechanism by which the relevant certificates are to be provided and received. Such certainty lies in the section being applied in accordance with its unambiguous wording. > > If there is to be any movement away from the obvious requirements of the section, it must be with the clear and unambiguous authorisation and agreement of all parties. That is, the worker must expressly authorise a third party to provide the certificates to the employer on his/her/their behalf and the employer must specifically authorise the third party to receive the certificates on its behalf, or at the very least, agree that it will receive the certificates from the third party rather than directly from the worker. ...

7. On the evidence before me there was no clear, unambiguous authorisation and agreement of all parties to move away from the obvious requirements of s 69(13).
8. The obligation was on the worker to provide her certificates to the employer and the employer must receive them to enliven s 69(13). On the facts of this case, this has not occurred.
9. Nowhere in the Act is it indicated that medical certificates are to be provided to anyone other than the employer. See for example s 69(1) and s 143(L) of the Act.
10. Although the evidence clearly indicated that the worker continued to receive payments up to 25 August 2025, in the absence of the employer receiving prescribed medical certificates covering her incapacity as a consequence of the worker's payments being made through an autopay system, there was no argument that this created an implication of an agreement that allowed movement away from the requirements of s 69(13) to permit the insurer to receive the certificates in the place of the employer.
11. Based on these findings, I am satisfied that the period of incapacity specified in the medical certificate dated 13 May 2025 had expired on 9 June 2025, and that the worker provided the certificates dated 10 June, 8 July and 7 August 2025 to the employer on 28 August 2025, which was more than 14 days after the expiration of the specified period of incapacity in the certificate of 13 May 2025.
12. I therefore find that the employer is able to treat the certificates received on 28 August 2025 as a claim for compensation to which s 81A of the Act applies pursuant to s 69(13).
13. I find that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the employer's s 81A referral.

1. The employer disputes its ongoing liability to pay compensation to the worker on the basis indicated in the referral. The grounds for the dispute informed to the worker were:

(i) The employer disputes the factual basis of the initial incapacity and injury and therefore says that the worker has not suffered an injury which is a disease and to which her employment contributed to a substantial degree within the meaning of s 3(2A) and s 25(i)(b); and further or in the alternative;

(ii) That if the worker is suffering from an injury which is a disease which an illness of the mind or a disorder of the mind, it arises substantially from:

(a) Reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner by the employer in connection with the worker's employment (s 25(1A)(c); and further or in the alternative;

(b) Reasonable action taken in a reasonable manner by the employer to discipline or counsel the worker (s 25(1A)(a).

1. The employer relies upon the statement of evidence of Rosanne Brash dated 17 November 2025 to assert:

(vii) A function was held on 24 February 2025. This involved a luncheon event celebrating the Employer's 80th birthday celebrations. > > (viii) The Manager of the site believed the execution of the event had been sloppy. The Manager then sent an all staff email providing general feedback on the event and identified some areas of delivery that needed improving the next time an event of that nature was delivered. > > (ix) Ms Tutt was not personally mentioned in the email, and the feedback was general in nature. > > (x) On 3 March 2025, the Employer received a complaint from Ms Tutt regarding alleged inappropriate workplace behaviour. The complaint was acknowledged, and Ms Tutt was offered EAP. > > (xi) A meeting was arranged to discuss the complaint in further detail and the Employer conducted an investigation. > > (xii) A meeting was held on 19 March 2025. Ms Tutt said her feelings had started in October 2024 when she was removed from fire safety training. Ms Tutt said following the function the email was sent but acknowledged she was not directly referenced in the email. > > (xiii) Ms Tutt requested a further meeting to discuss her concerns which went ahead on 25 March 2025. > > (xiv) On 28 March 2025 the Employer met with the Manager to obtain her response. > > (xv) Ms Tutt remained incapacitated for any work. > > (xvi) The investigation concluded and Ms Tutt was advised on 14 May 2025 that it did not find sufficient evidence to establish that a breach of workplace practices had occurred. > > (xvii) There is nothing to substantiate Ms Tutt's allegations in the claim form that her manager has harassed her at all, let alone on multiple occasions. Based on the employer's investigations, it disputes and denies that this occurred.

2. Both in the material provided to the Tribunal by the worker on 9 December 2025 and in her statement provided on 17 December 2025, the worker has stated:

15. The only statement evidence presented by the employer to support the allegations is the statement of Rozanne Brash dated 18 November 2025. The employer has not provided statement evidence from any of the witnesses who were specifically involved in any of the issues, including from Robyn Jones, my manager, and the person who caused my work-related injury. > > 16. The workers compensation claim form refers to my injury having occurred due to harassment by my manager on multiple occasions. My manager was Robyn Jones. I used the word "harassment" to describe the negative interactions I had with my manager over a period of time from approximately October 2024. The circumstances were further outlined in my email to Maryann D'Costa, the Operation Manager of Baptcare, on 3 March 2025. The effect on me, of those interactions, was that I felt anxious and depressed and constantly stressed. > > 17. I had raised my workload concerns with Robyn Jones (Program Manager) numerous times, in face-to-face conversations, as I was struggling to cope with the physical tasks, the administration tasks, as well as planning activities and outings. My coworker Paul Beckett did not like to share the load, leaving me to shoulder the responsibilities of making sure these things were complete and up to date. I spoke to Robyn Jones about this, but nothing changed. > > 18. The allegations contained in my email to Maryann D'Costa, on 3 March 2025, where the subject of an internal investigation by the employer. Ultimately, the employer determined that there was insufficient evidence to establish a breach of workplace practices. The investigation outcome, and all material considered by the employer, have not been provided as evidence to TASCAT. The only evidence is that of the outcome which is described in the statement by Rozanne Brash who was not involved in the investigation. > > 19. The statement evidence from Rozanne Brash of the outcome of the investigation relates to a workplace relations issue. Determining that there was insufficient evidence to establish a breach of workplace practices is not the same as investigating a workers compensation claim to establish whether the actions of the employer caused a work injury or that it establishes whether the action of the employer were reasonable or undertaken reasonably. The statement by Rozanne Brash, so far as its reference to the investigation outcome, should be ignored as not being relevant to determining whether I was injured at work. > > 20. The only comment in Rozanne Brash's statement about the specific interactions I had with Robyn Jones noted that I complained about being removed from fire safety training, about being overworked and about being ignored by Robyn Jones. The statement merely states is that Robyn Jones denies that she was ignoring me. This is the only evidence of a factual dispute. > > 21. The multitude of issues raised by me in my email to Maryann D'Costa, on 3 March 2025 are not addressed in any detail in the statement by Rozanne Brash. > > 22. As such the circumstances referred to in email to Maryann D'Costa, on 3 March 2025 should be regarded as uncontroverted evidence of those facts. > > Medical evidence and cause > > 23. My medical condition and its cause are evidenced by my medical certificates and the letter from my treating psychologist to QBE dated 18 November 2025. > > 24. The employer has not provided any evidence that I am not suffering from psychological injury, or that my psychological injury has been caused by factors external to my employment. The letter from Altius Psychology to QBE has been filed by me with TASCAT. > > Interaction on 24 February 2025- Whether reasonable action undertaken reasonably > > 25. The statement by Rozanne Brash refers to a function which was held at "Orana" on 24 February 2025 and to an "all staff" email providing feedback about that event. The statement describes the feedback as "general" and that it identified areas needing improvement. Further the statement notes that I was not referred to directly in the email. The email itself was not attached to the statement but has been filed by me with TASCAT. > > 26. Contrary to the indications in the statement by Rozanne Brash, the email included the following words - "The meals served up looked like slop on a plate, gravy was spilling over the plates, looks like something that would be served in prisons." > > 27. These words could not be described as general in nature, nor can they be described as identifying areas needing improvement. Further, as I was the person in charge of the service of the meals, while I was not specifically named, it is quite clear that responsibility for the failure had been directed primarily at myself, and in a most humiliating and public way. > > 28. The action by the employer was not reasonable from an administrative point of view, but if it was, it was not undertaken in a reasonable manner. It is not reasonable to humiliate or denigrate staff. > > 29. The action by the employer was not to discipline or counsel me, but if it was it was not undertaken in a reasonable manner. It is not reasonable to humiliate or denigrate staff.

1. It is now well established that for an employer to successfully dispute a claim pursuant to s 81A of the Act, the employer must establish that it has a reasonably arguable case in relation to the dispute.
2. The onus rests with the employer - Lamont v MRD Supermarkets Pty Ltd [2016] TASSC 16 and it is established that the employer's case need not be strong or compelling, but it must at least be reasonably arguable - See Vos Construction and Joinery Pty Ltd v Norton-Smith [2016] TASSC 38.
3. The test for whether a reasonably arguable case exists was stated authoritatively by Evans J in St Helens Oysters Pty Ltd v Coatsworth [2007] TASSC 90. In this decision, his Honour stated:

A case will not be reasonably arguable unless the case itself is reasonable in the sense that there is a reasonable prospect of the claim being rejected following a final hearing...the very notion of a "reasonably arguable case" like the very notion of a prima facie case, includes a final determination of a disputed question of fact...on the face of s 81A, a reasonably arguable case would exist concerning the liability of an employer to pay a worker if it is reasonably arguable on the material available in relation to the claim or identified deficiencies or weaknesses in the claim that following a contested hearing it may be rejected.

1. Applying the test for whether a reasonably arguable case exists, I am satisfied on the evidence provided by the employer that they have established the existence of a reasonably arguable case.
2. There are several factual disputes between the material provided by the employer and the worker's response, particularly in her statement of 17 December 2025. Of particular relevance being the employer's dispute that the worker was harassed by her manager as the worker has asserted. These disputes are not able to be reconciled in a s 81A referral.
3. With regard to the worker's assertions that the action by her employer towards her were not undertaken in a reasonable manner, it is well settled that questions of reasonableness of administrative or other management action require findings of fact before they can be finally determined.
4. The phrase "taken in a reasonable manner" was dealt with in the Tribunal's recent decision of State of Tasmania (Department for Education, Children & Young People) v ENX [2025] TASCAT 124 where the decision of M v Allianz Australia Services Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2010] TASWRCT 35, a decision of then Chief Commissioner Webster was referenced. In M v Allianz Australia Services Pty Ltd (No. 2) (supra), Chief Commissioner Webster, as he then was, cited the following passage of Belby J in Kean v Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Corporation (1998) 71 SASR 42 where at page 63 his Honour stated the following:

In this case where administrative action is taken in a reasonable manner is very much a question of objective fact, and is to be determined against the ordinary standards of reasonable employers in all the circumstances of the case. Whether administrative action is reasonable or is taken in a reasonable manner depends first on the findings of the primary facts as to what occurred in the taking of the administrative action, namely what decision was made, who made it, and why it was made, what was done, what was omitted to be done, and the factual background against which the decision was made or implemented. > > Although it is a finding of fact as to whether the action was taken in a reasonable manner, that fact depends in part on inferences to be drawn from the primary facts, or the weight to be given to particular primary facts and on the fact finder's assessment of what is reasonable in all of the circumstances.

5. It is therefore necessary for findings of fact to be made in determinations of what action in relation to the worker was reasonable, which on the authority cited previously, it is not a matter for the Tribunal to determine in a s 81A hearing, but rather in a fully contested hearing following an application pursuant to s 42 of the Act.
6. The authorities cited in State of Tasmania (Department for Education, Children & Young People) v ENX (supra) also support the proposition that a determination of whether administrative action is taken in a reasonable manner is a question of objective fact and not subjective assessment - See Bropho v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2004] FCAFC 16 where, when dealing with the interpretation of s 18D of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, French J stated at [79]:

In this context, that means a judgement independent of what the actor thinks is reasonable.

7. For all of these reasons, I am satisfied that the employer has established a reasonably arguable case to dispute the worker's claim for compensation.

1. Compensation by way of weekly payments and the cost of any benefits payable under Division 2 of Part 6 of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 are not to be paid by the employer to the worker.