Balguri v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 135

1. The applicant is a citizen of India (Court Book (CB) 23). He first arrived in Australia on 2 March 2017 as the holder of a Student (Temporary) (class TU) (subclass 500) visa (CB 25).
2. On 15 March 2019, the applicant applied to the Department of Home Affairs (Department) for the Student 500 Visa (CB 1-30). He proposed studying two courses: a Diploma of Human Resources Management and an Advanced Diploma of Management (CB 25).
3. On 30 April 2019, the delegate refused to grant the applicant the Student 500 Visa. The Department notified the applicant of its decision by way of email to his migration agent (CB 35), the authorised recipient as nominated on his visa application (CB 6). The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant met the requirements under cl 500.212 of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations), which requires that the applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student because the applicant genuinely intends to stay in Australia temporarily (CB 39-43).
4. On 20 May 2019, the applicant applied to the Tribunal seeking review of the delegate's decision (CB 44-45).
5. On 22 May 2019, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant acknowledging receipt of his application and inviting him to provide material or written arguments as soon as possible (CB 46-49).
6. On 11 February 2020, the applicant's migration agent wrote to the Tribunal to advise that the applicant had appointed a new migration agent as his authorised recipient (CB 55-56).
7. On 30 April 2020, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant by way to request that he complete the 'Request for Student Visa Information' form. (CB 57-60).
8. On 14 May 2020, the applicant wrote to the Tribunal to advise that he no longer wanted his migration agent to act as his authorised recipient. The applicant further requested additional time to complete the requested documents, identifying the lockdown caused by the pandemic as the cause of the delay (CB 66).
9. On 15 May 2020, the Tribunal granted an extension of time until 11 June 2020 (CB 68).
10. On 11 June 2020, the applicant emailed the Tribunal a copy of the requested documents (CB 69-88) including a Confirmation of Enrolment (CoE) which showed that he was enrolled in an Advanced Diploma of Business to be completed on 22 August 2021 (CB 88).
11. On 18 November 2020, the Tribunal invited the applicant to attend a hearing on 14 December 2020. It requested that at least seven days before the hearing date the applicant provide a copy of his current CoE and any evidence of his past studies in Australia (CB 92- 95).
12. On 25 November 2020, the applicant responded to the Tribunal with his completed Hearing Response form and a scan of his 'Provider Registration and International Student Management System' (PRISMS) records (CB 101-110).
13. On 10 December 2020, the applicant wrote to the Department requesting a 10-day postponement of the hearing, stating that he was unaware that he was required to submit the requested documents seven days prior to the hearing (CB 111).
14. On 11 December 2020, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant advising that his request had been granted (CB 112) and on 14 December 2020, the Tribunal advised the applicant that the new hearing date was set for 3 February 2021 by telephone (CB 113-115).
15. On 28 January 2021, the applicant's new migration agent wrote to the Tribunal to advise of their appointment as the applicant's authorised recipient. (CB 116-119).
16. On 3 February 2021, the applicant's migration agent provided a copy of the applicant's written submissions and supporting documents to the Tribunal (CB 125-171).
17. On 3 February 2021, the applicant attended the hearing before the Tribunal by way of telephone to give evidence and present arguments (CB 172-174).
18. On 28 June 2021, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate. The applicant was notified on the following day by way of email to his migration agent (CB 177-180).

1. The Tribunal summarised the background to the proceeding (TD [1-5]).
2. The Tribunal identified that the issue was whether the applicant complied with the genuine temporary entrant criterion as set out in cl 500.212 of Schedule 2 of the Regulations as prescribed by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) (TD [6]).
3. The Tribunal identified that in considering whether the applicant satisfied cl 500.212 (a) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations, it must have regard to the factors specified in Direction No. 69, 'Assessing the genuine temporary entrant criterion for student visa and student guardian visa applications', made under s 499 of the Act (TD [8]). The Tribunal noted that the factors in Direction No 69 were not a checklist, referring to Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 16; (2020) 274 FCR 646 (Kumar) (TD [9]). The Tribunal made the following findings and comments (TD [10-40]):

(a) circumstances in the applicant's home country: The Tribunal noted the applicant's evidence in relation to his circumstances in India ([TD 15]). The Tribunal recorded that his parents and sister lived in India and that he completed high school, a certificate and a bachelor's degree in India. The Tribunal noted that when asked about his employment in India the applicant said 'Not Applicable'. The Tribunal recorded that the applicant was set to inherit $1.1m worth of property in India from his father.

(b) circumstances in Australia: The Tribunal noted the applicant's circumstances in Australia (TD [16-17]). The Tribunal recorded that the applicant had been enrolled in a Diploma of Resource Management and Advanced Diploma of Management (Human Resources) at the time that his student visa was rejected on 30 April 2019. The Tribunal noted that the applicant had been employed as a burger maker and then as a parcel sorter and that in each job he earned a salary of $15,000 per annum. The Tribunal also recorded the applicant's annual living expenses as $19,440.

(c) applicant's immigration history: The Tribunal noted the applicant's immigration history (TD [18-19]). The Tribunal recorded that the applicant had made one overseas trip since his arrival in Australia in 2017. The Tribunal accepted that this trip was owing to his father's ill health and found that his lack of travel was unremarkable given border restrictions during the COVID pandemic.

(d) academic record and progress: The Tribunal considered the applicant's academic record in Australia and study progress since his arrival (TD [20-27]). The Tribunal recorded that the applicant had a total of seven enrolments in courses in Australia, one he had completed, five were recorded as cancelled and one was ongoing (TD [20]). The Tribunal noted two of the courses that were listed as cancelled were the courses that the applicant had identified as his proposed courses of study in his latest visa application (TD [22]). The Tribunal accepted the applicant's evidence that he had completed a course with the Fox Training Academy on 20 January 2020, despite there being no record of this (TD [24]). The Tribunal accepted that the applicant's study plans were interrupted by his father's stroke in 2017 and subsequent health deterioration. The Tribunal accepted that these events had an impact on the applicant's mental health and resulted in more family responsibilities. The Tribunal also accepted that the applicant had experienced loneliness and homesickness which could go some way toward explaining his poor study record and lack of academic progress (TD [25]). The Tribunal accepted that by continuing his most recent course, the applicant had demonstrated some improvement in his academic record (TD [26]). The Tribunal found, however, that he had not made significant academic progress considering he had arrived in Australia to study a Masters level course and since that time had only completed a General English course of one month's duration (TD [27]).

(e) value of the course to the applicant's future: The Tribunal considered the applicant's proposed courses of study (TD [28]). The Tribunal recorded that the applicant had not identified why he chose to study those courses or whether similar courses were available in India. The Tribunal recorded that the applicant's PRISMS records showed two long periods where he had not been enrolled in study while living in Australia on a student visa. The Tribunal noted that the applicant's latest course had been commenced one year after his visa had been rejected. The Tribunal recorded that the applicant had future plans to work in his father's business in India (TD [29]). The Tribunal accepted that as a result of his father's health, the applicant's mother had been taking care of the family business with the help of one employee (TD [30]).

(f) The Tribunal considered the applicant's evidence regarding his recent plans to start an e-commerce business delivering cakes to remote areas of India. The Tribunal recorded the applicant's claim that his latest course (Advanced Diploma of Business) would be necessary to this plan. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant could explain why this course would be of greater value than a master's course. The Tribunal accepted that the latest course might assist him with his new project, however identified that the course was not part of his original plan, nor was it contemplated in his student visa application (TD [31]). Ultimately, the Tribunal found that the delegate's decision was reasonable and appropriate given the applicant's academic circumstances at the time. It accepted that since then the applicant had improved his academic performance as he only had two months until completion of his latest course. The Tribunal also accepted that the applicant had invested a substantial amount of time and money into this course. It found that on this basis it would be unreasonable to deprive him of the opportunity to complete it (TD [32]).

1. The Tribunal weighed up the various factors and found that on the balance, the evidence was not sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant was a genuine temporary entrant (TD [33]). The Tribunal concluded at [36] of its decision that the applicant did not have a genuine interest in the subject matter of his studies and academic progression, and that he had not demonstrated any clear and substantial improvement that would likely arise from his proposed study, or that the proposed study held any value to his future plans.
2. Having accepted that it would be unreasonable to deprive the applicant of the opportunity to complete his latest course, the Tribunal noted the applicant had sufficient time to complete his course under his existing Bridging Visa. It stated the following as reasons for this course of action (TD [35]):

It is not the intention of the Tribunal that the time, money and energy the applicant has invested so far in this course should be thrown away even though on balance the Tribunal has concluded that the applicant is not a genuine temporary entrant for study and stay in Australia.

1. The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant the student visa (TD [41]).

1. The applicant applied to this Court for judicial review pursuant to s 476 of the Act on 24 July 2021. His application advanced four grounds of jurisdictional error.
2. The applicant filed an affidavit dated 23 July 2021, which attached a copy of the Tribunal's decision and included a number of statements which summarised the background of the matter and his claims for review.
3. On 19 August 2021, Registrar Van Der Westhuizen of this Court made procedural orders. These included an order that the applicant file and serve any amended application and any supplementary court book on or before 11 November 2021.
4. On 26 February 2025, the applicant attended a callover hearing before Registrar Rohan by way of telephone, in which further standard timetabling orders were made.
5. On 27 May 2025, I made further orders that the applicant file and serve any amended application, affidavit evidence and written outline of submissions by 18 July 2025. The applicant did not avail himself of this opportunity and did not file any further documents.
6. The matter was listed for hearing before me on 13 August 2025.
7. On 8 August 2025, the applicant in correspondence to the Court said that he was 'trying to reach my lawyer but they are not responding to me at the moment'. He requested an adjournment in order that he could 'try to reach someone who has better experience regarding my case'.
8. The Court granted the applicant the adjournment in order that he could seek legal representation notwithstanding the length of time since the application, and the matter was re-listed for 29 September 2025.
9. On 29 September 2025, the applicant appeared before this Court. He was unrepresented. The following documents were before this Court - the application for judicial review and the supporting affidavit of the applicant filed 24 July 2021 (read in Court), the Court Book (numbering 195 pages and marked as Exhibit 1R) filed 16 September 2021 and written submissions of the Minister filed 1 August 2025.

ASSISTANCE TO THE APPLICANT AS A LITIGANT IN PERSON

1. A court has an intrinsic duty to assist unrepresented litigants: Dietrich v R [1992] HCA 57; (1992) 177 CLR 292; Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375 per Beazley JA (Giles and Whealy JJA agreeing). At [309] to [316] in Hamod, Beazley JA outlined the relevant principles in ensuring there is the right balance between impartiality and assisting litigants in person (citations omitted):
   • The duty reposes in the individual judicial officer hearing a case.
   • The touchstone is that of fairness.
   • The duty requires that a person does not suffer a disadvantage from exercising the recognised right of a litigant to be self-represented.
   • Trial judges should ensure that litigants do not remain ignorant of fundamental procedures which if invoked may prove advantageous.
   • The court has an obligation to ensure a fair trial for all parties such that the impartial function of the judge should be preserved, and no advice should be given as to how rights should be exercised.
   • The unrepresented litigant should have sufficient information about the practices and procedure of the court so far as reasonably practicable for the purpose of ensuring a fair trial.
2. These principles apply in civil cases: Mortimer J in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392; (2015) 238 FCR 158 at [70] - [75]. Mortimer J referred to various authorities noting that what a judge must do to assist a litigant in person depends on the litigant, the nature of the case, and the litigant's intelligence and understanding of the case. She endorsed the approach of Smith J in Panagopoulos v Southern Healthcare Network (unreported, Sup Ct, Vic, 15 September 1997) at [9] who observed that while judges should maintain neutrality, the boundaries of legitimate intervention are flexible.
3. I confirmed that the applicant had a copy of the Court Book and the Minister's submissions (Tp 3.27-36 and 4.8-15). At the hearing, I outlined the role and processes of the Court and explained that jurisdictional error must be demonstrated if the applicant were to succeed in his application. I explained that jurisdictional error is a kind of serious legal error and outlined some common categories, noting that these categories were not exhaustive. I explained that the Court cannot undertake a merits review of the Tribunal's decision: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 (Wu Shan Liang) (Tp 2.40-3.12). The applicant confirmed that he understood.
4. During the hearing I took the applicant through the grounds for review advanced in the application, and provided the applicant with an opportunity to provide further particulars of each of the grounds, and to make oral submissions (in accordance with principles in BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384 per Feutrill J at [22] and [25]). It was also explained that further particularisation or submissions may assist his case.

CONSIDERATION - WAS THERE JURISDICTIONAL ERROR IN THE TRIBUNAL DECISION?

1. Section 476 of the Act provides that this Court has the same original jurisdiction as the High Court. The High Court, under s 75(v) of the Constitution, has original jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth.
2. A privative clause as defined at s 474 of the Act is final and not amenable to judicial review. The Court can grant relief if it can be established that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by a jurisdictional error: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476.
3. The role of judicial review was explained in Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 (Djokovic) per Allsop J, Besanko and O'Callaghan JJ at [17] as follows:

...an application for judicial review is one in which the judicial branch of government reviews, by reference to legality or lawfulness, the decision or decisions of the Executive branch of government, here in the form of a decision of the Minister. The court does not consider the merits or wisdom of the decision, nor does it remake the decision.

1. In LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321, the plurality of the High Court commented on some of the forms of jurisdictional error. The Court stated that jurisdictional error can refer to breach of an express or implied condition of a statutory conferral of authority [2-3] (footnotes omitted):

Because an express or implied condition of a statutory conferral of decision-making can take many different forms, and because breach can occur in many different circumstances, the categories of jurisdictional error are not closed.. Jurisdictional error on the part of a statutory decision-maker in making a decision can include: misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness.

1. The Court must review the lawfulness or legality of the Tribunal decision by reference to the applicant's complaints about the decision: Djokovic at [17].

1. The Tribunal was required to consider whether the applicant met the legislative criteria for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) (Subclass 500) visa.
2. Section 29(1) of the Act gives the Minister or its delegate power to grant a non-citizen a visa to travel to and enter or remain in Australia. The Regulations prescribe the criteria for classes of visas: ss 31(1) and 31(3) of the Act. A non-citizen must apply for a visa of a particular class: s 45 of the Act. The Minister considers whether an application is valid and then grants a visa if satisfied that criteria identified in s 65(1)(a) of the Act are met. This includes criteria prescribed by the Act or Regulations: s 65(1)(a)(ii) of the Act.
3. The criteria for a student visa are set out in cl 500.2 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. Relevantly to this matter cl 500.212 requires that:

The applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student because:

(a) the applicant intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily, having

regard to:

(i) the applicant's circumstances; and

(ii) the applicant's immigration history; and

(iii) if the applicant is a minor - the intentions of a parent, legal guardian

or spouse of the applicant; and

(iv) any other relevant matter; and

(b) the applicant intends to comply with any conditions subject to which the

visa is granted, having regard to:

(i) the applicant's record of compliance with any condition of a visa

previously held by the applicant (if any); and

(ii) the applicant's stated intention to comply with any conditions to

which the visa may be subject; and

(c) of any other relevant matter.

Grounds of jurisdictional error advanced by the applicant

1. The first ground advanced in the application was:

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal failed to apply relevant provision of cl.500.212 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations) and the genuine temporary entrant criterion and made legal mistakes.

1. At the hearing before me, the applicant was invited to provide particulars of this ground (Tp 5.7-12). He said that he had provided the Tribunal with information about his family circumstances and had sought one more chance to study (Tp 5.14-31). He claimed that the Tribunal did not take into consideration that he had not studied properly due to family and personal circumstances (Tp 6.31-46).
2. The Minister submitted that there was no legal mistake or jurisdictional error (Tp 11.39-43).
3. At the hearing before me, the applicant did not provide particulars of how he believed that the Tribunal had failed to apply the criteria in cl 500.212 correctly (Tp 8.1-5). I have nonetheless considered whether the correct legislation was applied, and whether the decision was legally reasonable. The issue of failure to consider evidence is assessed in Ground 2.
4. I accept that the Tribunal correctly identified the issues (TD [6]) and the relevant law, particularly cl 500.212 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations (TD [7]).
5. The Tribunal correctly stated that it was obliged to have regard to the factors in Direction 69 (TD [8]), which it annexed to the decision record (CB 187-192). The Tribunal summarised the factors as follows (TD [8]):

(a) the applicant's circumstances; and

(b) the applicant's immigration history; and

(c) if the applicant is a minor - the intentions of a parent, legal guardian or spouse of the applicant; and

(d) any other relevant matter

1. I do not consider that the decision was legally unreasonable, taking into account the following principles:
   • The characterisation of a decision as legally unreasonable is not easily made out: Djokovic at [33] citing Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 264 CLR 541 at [11], [52], and [135].
   • 'The correct approach is to ask whether it was open to the Tribunal to engage in the process of reasoning in which it did engage and to make the findings it did make on the material before it': Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 per Crennan and Bell JJ at [133] Their Honours further stated at [135] that:

Whilst there may be varieties of illogicality and irrationality, a decision will not be illogical or irrational if there is room for a logical or rational person to reach the same decision on the material before the decision maker. A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn.

• 'Unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification': Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 (Li) at [76].
• Discretionary powers must be exercised according to the 'rules of reason' and the 'canons of rationality', in that 'decisions must be reached by reasoning which is intelligible and reasonable and directed towards and related intelligibly to the purposes of the power': Li per French CJ.at [24]-[26].
• There is an area of "decisional freedom" within which reasonable minds may reach different conclusions about the correct or preferable decision: Li per French CJ at [28] and per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [66]. Such decisions will be within the bounds of legal reasonableness, that is, they will fall "within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law": Li at [105].

1. I accept the submissions of the Minister that the Tribunal 'comprehensively, genuinely and thoroughly' considered cl 500.212 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations, as well as Direction 69, and did not treat the factors as a 'checklist': Kumar.
2. I reach this finding on the basis that the Tribunal considered the evidence and reached rational conclusions founded on that evidence. The Tribunal considered the following factors (TD [15] - [40]):
   • the applicant's circumstances in his home country, including his family, high school education, completion of university education, lack of employment and current and potential future assets (at TD [15]);
   • the applicant's circumstances in Australia, including his course enrolment, employment history and his living expenses (at TD [16-17]);
   • the applicant's immigration history including his arrival date in Australia and overseas trips, his reasons for these trips and the impact of border restrictions when considering the extent of the travel (at TD [18-19]);
   • the applicant's academic record, including courses successfully completed, the impact of his father's health and his sister's divorce on his academic progress, and his emotional experiences of loneliness and homesickness (at TD [20-25]); and
   • the value of the applicant's course to his future prospects, including whether similar courses were available in his home country, how the course connected to his father's previous business involving the renting of construction material and machines, and his plans to establish an e-commerce business on return to his home country (at TD [28- 31]).
3. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant was a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student as required by cl 500.212 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations, taking into account these factors (TD [38]). The Tribunal considered that it appeared that he had applied for a student visa for the primary purpose of securing an extension of stay rather than due to a genuine interest in the subject matter. The Tribunal was not satisfied that he had demonstrated the value of his course to his future. The Tribunal was concerned about his lack of academic progress (TD [36]).
4. There does not appear to be any misconstruction in the way cl 500.212 or Direction No 69 was applied. The decision did not lack an evident and intelligible justification, considering the weighing up of factors (see for example TD [33]). It was open to the Tribunal to engage in the process of reasoning in which it did engage and to make the findings it did on the material before it.
5. To the extent that the applicant in this claim is simply disagreeing with the findings of the Tribunal, it is settled law that the Court cannot review the merits of the Tribunal decision. In Wu Shan Liang, the High Court said at 271-272:

When the Full Court referred to "beneficial construction", it sought to adopt an approach mandated by a long series of cases, the best exemplar of which is Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic (22). In that case, a Full Court of the Federal Court (Neaves, French and Cooper JJ) collected authorities for various propositions as to the practical restraints on judicial review. It was said that a court should not be "concerned with looseness in the language ... nor with unhappy phrasing" of the reasons of an administrative decision-maker (23). The Court continued (24):"The reasons for the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error".

These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed (25). In the present context, any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision. This has been made clear many times in this Court.

.. any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision. This has been made clear many times in this Court. For example, it was said by Brennan J in Attorney General (NSW) v Quinn (26):

"The duty and jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action do not go beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository's power. If, in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error. The merits of administrative action, to the extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power and, subject to political control, for the repository alone."

1. In Attorney-General v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-36:

The duty and jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action do not go beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository's power. If, in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error. The merits of administrative action, to the extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power and, subject to political control, for the repository alone.

1. In Abebe v Minister (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [195] the High Court found that the reviewing Court must distinguish a contention that depends upon the Court reviewing the merits of the Tribunal's decision rather than the process by which it arrived at its conclusion. Such a contention could not be advanced as a ground for the grant of prerogative relief.
2. It follows that disagreement with the merits of a decision, by the applicant, even emphatic disagreement, does not of itself give rise to jurisdictional error: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21; (1999) 197 CLR 611 at [40].
3. In summary, the findings were open to the Tribunal on the evidence and were logical and reasonable, noting the detailed consideration of the factors as applied to the applicant's circumstances. A decision maker is not required to accept uncritically an applicant's claims: Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1253; (1994) 52 FCR 437 per Beaumont J at 451.
4. No jurisdictional error arises in Ground 1.

That the Administrative Appeals Tribunal at paragraph - 25 observe that "The applicant also presented evidence of his sister's divorce, which also affected him. The Tribunal accepts the applicant's claim that he experienced loneliness and homesickness, and these events go some way toward explaining the applicant's poor study record and lack of academic progress" did not consider in his decision and made mistakes

1. At the hearing before me the applicant was asked to advance particulars in relation to this ground or to make further submissions (Tp 7.26). The applicant said that he explained to the Tribunal the reasons he could not study after 2018, but they still did not find in his favour and did not consider his inability to re-enrol. He said that he asked the officer for another chance after explaining the family circumstances (Tp 7.28-34). He emphasised that he had told the Tribunal about his inability to complete his course due to his family circumstances, sister's divorce and 'everything' (Tp 10.12-15).
2. At [25] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal referred to the applicant's written and oral evidence as well as documentary evidence that his father had suffered a 'significant health setback' in 2017 which obliged the applicant to return to India for 41 days. The Tribunal accepted that this interrupted the applicant's study plans. The Tribunal noted further that his father suffered further deterioration in health in 2020 which had a 'significant impact on the applicant's mental health' (TD [25]). The Tribunal noted that the applicant had significant family responsibilities and that he had been impacted by his sister's divorce as well as loneliness and homesickness. The Tribunal accepted that these events 'go some way toward explaining the applicant's poor study record and lack of academic progress'.
3. It is clear from [25] of the Tribunal Decision that the Tribunal took into consideration the applicant's difficult family circumstances and mental state in assessing the poor academic record. The Tribunal found however that the applicant had not made significant academic progress (TD [27]).
4. As contended by the Minister, the applicant's concern raised at hearing that the Tribunal did not consider the applicant's inability to re-enrol when his visa was cancelled, was not a claim raised by the applicant to the Tribunal (Tp 12.38-43). Such a claim does not appear in his evidence (CB 83-87). The Tribunal did consider his academic progress over the time he had been in Australia (TD [20-27]).
5. I am satisfied that the applicant considered relevant evidence. The weight to be given to the evidence was a matter for the Tribunal.
6. There was no jurisdictional error as advanced in Ground 2.

That the Administrative Appeals Tribunal at Paragraph- 34: "In coming to this determination, the Tribunal apprehends that [given that there is less than two months to run until completion of his current Advanced Diploma of Business (due for completion on 22 August 2021)] that under the terms of his existing Bridging visa, the Department will allow him sufficient time to wind up his affairs and to complete this course." that the applicant should allow study and accordingly able to get his student visa for the remaining term.

1. The applicant was asked if he wished to make submissions on this ground. He said that he wished to rely on his application (Tp 9.32-38).
2. It may be that in this ground the applicant was contending that if the Tribunal found that he should have sufficient time to wind up his affairs it should also be found that he was a genuine student. As set out earlier in this judgment, the Tribunal considered various factors before concluding that it was not satisfied that the applicant intended to stay genuinely in Australia temporarily. The way in which the Tribunal considered these factors and the weight to be accorded to those factors was a matter for the Tribunal. The discussion by the Tribunal at [34] related to what it apprehended the Department would do under the bridging visa, and was not relevant to the reasoning.
3. No jurisdictional error arises as expressed in Ground 3.

That the Administrative Appeals Tribunal at Paragraph- 35: "It is not the intention of the Tribunal that the time, money and energy the applicant has invested so far in this course should be thrown away even though on balance the Tribunal has concluded that the applicant is not a genuine temporary entrant for study and stay in Australia." Accepted applicant intention and investment but come to different conclusion and made legal mistake.

1. The applicant was asked at the hearing before me if he wished to further particularise this ground, but he said that he did not wish to do so (Tp 10.1-4). He did make some final comments that he wished to get his student visa back so that he could complete his course, and that his circumstances were not taken into consideration (Tp 10.12-11.6). These matters have already been considered in relation to Grounds 1 to 3 above. Without particulars the ground must otherwise be dismissed.
2. No jurisdictional error arises in Ground 4.

1. I am not satisfied that any of the grounds advanced by the applicant establish jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision.
2. The application filed on 24 July 2021 is dismissed.
3. The Court will hear the parties as to costs.

I certify that the preceding eighty-two (82) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Marquard.