Consideration
51 In my judgment, the construction advanced on behalf of Yarra Trams is the better construction of the 2019 Enterprise Agreement in relation to the circumstances in which meal time may be reduced below the rostered time.
52 The terms of clause 8.6 of Part Two and clause 23 of Appendix One of the 2019 Enterprise Agreement are the product of negotiation and compromise, and seek to balance the competing interests of Yarra Trams and its employees. The starting point must therefore be the text of the provisions, construed in their industrial context. Both clause 8.6 of Part Two, and clause 23 of Appendix One contain terms that relate to Yarra Trams' rostering of meal time, and the drivers' meal entitlements, and the clauses interact and must be read together. When construed together, some provisions are to be construed as leading provisions, and others as subordinate.
53 Clauses 8.6(a) and 8.6(b) oblige Yarra Trams to roster the length of the unpaid meal break for periods of time within the ranges specified. The minimum rostered meal break length is to be 40 minutes, which is consistent with the employees' entitlement to meal relief in clause 23.4 of Appendix One. Clause 23 uses the terms "meal relief" and "meal breaks". While the meanings of those terms are allied, and are capable of overlapping, I do not think the terms are used interchangeably. The term "meal relief" requires no elaboration. The "meal break" can be understood as the time allocated within which meal relief is to be given. The difference is illustrated in the use of the both terms in clause 23.2.
54 Clauses 23.1, 23.2, and 23.4 are important to the rostering and taking of meal breaks. Clause 23.1 provides that in the absence of specific arrangements, meal relief will be given, as far as practicable, at the rostered time. Clause 23.2 recognises that there will be unforeseen circumstances that might result in a driver working during a rostered meal break. There are two main obligations in clause 23 for present purposes. The first is that except in cases of emergency, or with the consent of the employee, no employee is to be required to work for more than 4 ¾ hours without meal relief. The second is that traffic employees are to be allowed a minimum of 40 minutes meal relief. These obligations affect the rostering of meal breaks.
55 Other obligations in clause 23 of Appendix One are also capable of affecting the rostering of meal time as part of Yarra Trams' schedule, such as -
(a) the requirement in clause 23.1 that, as far as practicable, meal relief will be given at the rostered time within five minutes travel from a depot or meal relief rooms provided by Yarra Trams;
(b) the requirement in clause 23.5 that, where practicable, meal relief shall be given in the order in which traffic employees have taken up duty on morning shifts, and in the order in which they finish duty on afternoon shifts, which presumably is the subject of rostering; and
(c) the possibility of a driver extending the meal break time by 10 minutes, as provided for in clause 23.6.
56 The first sentence of clause 8.6(c) provides that "meal breaks" will be rostered in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. Clauses 8.6(c), (d) and (f) provide for the circumstances in which the time available for the rostered meal break may be reduced to a minimum of 30 minutes. Although clause 8.6(f) refers to the "above provision", no party contended that this reference was to be restricted to clause 8.6(e). The context and history of the provision, and in particular its first emanation in clause 15 of Part Two of the 2009 Agreement, where the sub-clauses were not individually enumerated, strongly suggests otherwise. The addition in later versions of the clause of letters to identify sub-clauses is an example of inattentive lay drafting that should not be given such weight as to change the objective meaning of the provisions.
57 Absent any inconsistency, clauses 8.6(c) to (f) are to be construed in the context of clauses 23.1 and 23.4 of Appendix One. I do not consider that there is an inconsistency between these provisions that would invoke clause 2.3(b) of Part One. Rather, clause 8.6(c) when engaged operates as a qualification on clause 23.4, and the requirement to give a minimum of 40 minutes meal relief. A qualification need not amount to an inconsistency. As Bingham LJ remarked in Pagnan SpA v Tradax Ocean Transportation SA [1987] 3 All ER 565 at 574 -
It is a commonplace of documentary construction that an apparently wide and absolute provision is subject to limitation, modification or qualification by other provisions. That does not make the later provisions inconsistent or repugnant.
58 In my judgment, clauses 8.6(a) and (b) of Part Two are concerned with the rostering of unpaid meal breaks, but not the entitlement to meal relief, which is principally the subject of clause 23 of Appendix One, and qualified by clause 8.6(c). Clause 8.6(b) illustrates the point because it provides for a maximum length of meal break on Saturday and Sunday, but no minimum. Accordingly, I do not construe clause 8.6 as giving rise to an entitlement to meal relief for the duration of the rostered meal break time.
59 I have had regard to the objective history of clause 8.6 as part of the permissible context: see, City of Wanneroo v Holmes (1989) 30 IR 362 at 378 (French J); Short v F W Hercus Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 72; 40 FCR 511 at 518 (Burchett J), citing Saraswati v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 1 at 21 (McHugh J). That history includes clause 16.3 of the 2006 Agreement which expressly permitted the reduction to a minimum of 30 minutes of the time available for the rostered meal break in circumstances that included late running. The change brought about by the 2009 Agreement limited those circumstances to those that are now specified in clauses 8.6(c) and (d), and where late running is specifically excluded by clause 8.6(f). However, I do not regard that objective context as affecting the construction that I favour.
60 I will now address the submissions that were advanced in relation to whether there was a common understanding about the operation of clause 8.6 of Part Two of the 2019 Enterprise Agreement that should inform its construction. Most of the modern authorities that have considered a claim of a common understanding as an aid to construction of an industrial instrument have suggested that caution should be exercised.
61 One of the early cases was the decision of the Full Court of the Australian Industrial Court in Merchant Service Guild of Australia v Sydney Steam Collier Owners and Coal Stevedores Association (1958) 1 FLR 248, where evidence was received about the conduct of parties under the agreement in issue, and also under predecessor agreements. Spicer CJ at 251 cited the decision of the Privy Council in Watcham v Attorney-General of the East Africa Protectorate [1919] AC 533 as authorising reference to the conduct of parties under an agreement as an aid to construction of an instrument in the event of ambiguity. However, reference to post-contractual conduct as an aid to construction is no longer accepted as a general principle of contractual interpretation: Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner [2008] HCA 57; 238 CLR 570 at [35] (Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ); Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd [2009] NSWCA 407; 76 NSWLR 603 at [11]-[13] (Allsop P), [58] (Giles JA), and [306]-[335] (Campbell JA). The rejection of post-contractual conduct as an aid to contractual interpretation has undermined the authority of Merchant Service Guild of Australia v Sydney Steam Collier Owners and Coal Stevedores Association: see, Seaman's Union of Australia v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1976) 46 FLR 444 at 445 (J B Sweeney, Evatt and St John JJ); Printing & Kindred Industries Union v Davies Bros Ltd (1986) 18 IR 444 at 452 (Gray J); City of Wanneroo v Holmes at 378 (French J); Sheehan v Thiess Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1762 at [23] (Colvin J) (appeal dismissed: Theiss Pty Ltd v Sheehan [2020] FCAFC 198).
62 However, the way in which a workgroup or industry conducts itself under successive industrial instruments remains a permissible aid to the construction of a successor instrument in an appropriate case, as the decision of Tracey J in Transport Workers Union v Linfox [2014] FCA 829; 318 ALR 54 illustrates, where the terms of the provision under consideration had been consistently applied in the manner contended for by one of the parties, thereby giving rise to a common understanding. Transport Workers Union v Linfox, together with other authorities on this question were reviewed by Banks-Smith J in Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees' Association v Target Australia Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 1038 at [170]-[180].
63 In a series of decisions, Gray J emphasised the great care that must be taken in drawing upon a suggested common understanding as an aid to construction: Australian Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union v Prestige Property Services Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 11; 149 FCR 209 at [44]; Shop Distributive and Allied Employees' Association v Woolworths Ltd [2006] FCA 616; 151 FCR 513 at [31]; Health Services Union v Ballarat Health Services [2011] FCA 1256 at [77]. The reasons for caution before regard may be had to a suggested common understanding commence from the premise that it is the instrument itself that is to be construed, and any recourse to industrial practices said to amount to a common understanding are no more than part of the context in which the text of the instrument is to be construed. Industrial practices do not take the place of the terms of the instrument. There is also the need to maintain coherence with other principles, including that: (1) usually, recourse to extrinsic matters cannot displace the clear meaning of text; (2) the subjective understanding of individuals is rarely relevant to objective meaning; (3) this is also the case in relation to collective agreements where surrounding circumstances might have to rise to the level of being notorious or known by those intended to be bound by the instrument (Sheehan v Thiess Pty Ltd at [22] (Colvin J)); and (4) parties cannot by words or conduct contract out of, or waive the terms of an enterprise agreement, which has statutory force: Josephson v Walker (1914) 18 CLR 691 at 700 (Isaacs J); Metropolitan Health Service Board v Australian Nursing Federation [2000] FCA 784; 99 FCR 95 at [17]-[25] (French J); Textile, Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia v Givoni Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1406; 121 IR 250 at [25]-[35] (Goldberg J); ACE Insurance Ltd v Trifunovski [2011] FCA 1204; 200 FCR 532 at [135]-[142] (Perram J); Fair Work Ombudsman v Foot and Thai Massage Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 4) [2021] FCA 1242 at [892] (Katzmann J).
64 I do not consider the exchange of correspondence between the applicant and Yarra Trams in 2016 that was relied on by the applicant carries much weight in construing clause 8.6 of Part Two and clause 23 of Appendix One of the 2019 Enterprise Agreement. The letter from the applicant to Yarra Trams dated 27 June 2016 takes the form of a submission to Yarra Trams in relation to payment once the term of a scheduled meal break has ended, and the driver is awaiting the next run. The letter takes as an assumption that where drivers arrive late as a result of late running, some might choose to take a full rostered meal break, which was said to be for a minimum of 40 minutes. I do not consider that the contentions in the letter are sufficiently precise, or that the evidence of any practices that might be implicit in the letter are sufficiently strong to have any material influence over the question of construction that arises in this proceeding. Nor do I consider that the response from Yarra Trams of 29 July 2019 speaks to the question of construction. While Yarra Trams did say that it was its view that if a driver was late for a meal break due to late running and requested the full rostered meal break, Yarra Trams would make arrangements to allow the driver to take their full rostered meal break, this statement had a promissory flavour to it, and was not sufficiently connected to the proper construction of the relevant clause of the industrial instrument.
65 Standing back, the construction of clause 8.6 that I favour would not have absurd results: cf, Amcor Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union at [131] (Callinan J). The Agreement concerns running a tram network where late running is a normal everyday occurrence, so it seems improbable that rostered meal break times to accommodate minimum unpaid meal relief of 40 minutes meal breaks should lack the flexibility to reasonably accommodate it. Drivers are entitled to be paid for any time they work into their rostered meal break due to late running. As I have mentioned, there is no inconsistency between clause 8.6 of Part Two and clause 23 that falls to be resolved.
66 The final point is to return to the question that was fixed for separate trial, and to the terms of the question to the extent that it picks up the relevant paragraphs of the applicant's statement of claim. Paragraph 23 of the statement of claim alleges -
23. By proposing to breach … clauses 8.6(a), 8.6(b) and 8.6(c) of Part 2 of the Enterprise Agreement Yarra Trams proposes to contravene s.50 of the FW Act.
67 As I have endeavoured to explain, clauses 8.6(a) and (b) are concerned with rostering. There is no proposal by Yarra Trams to contravene those provisions. As for clause 8.6(c), it does not impose any relevant obligations on Yarra Trams in relation to meal relief, but operates as a qualification on other obligations, and in particular the obligation under clause 23.4 of Appendix One to allow a minimum of 40 minutes for meal relief.