(a) Annual leave
8 Prior to its repeal on 1 July 2009, s 232(2) of the Workplace Relations Act provided that '[an] employee is entitled to accrue an amount of paid annual leave, for each completed 4 week period of continuous service with an employer, of 1/13 of the number of nominal hours worked by the employee for the employer during that 4 week period'. Section 232 was contained in, and formed part of, Part 7 which was entitled 'The Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard' ('the Standard'). Why does this matter? Because the Standard was said in s 717 to be an 'applicable provision' and item 2 of the table in s 718(1) conferred upon an 'employee' (of which, more later) a right to apply for a remedy for breach of such an 'applicable provision'. The remedy was not specified but this is of no moment because of s 720. According to it '[if] an employer is required by an applicable provision…to pay an amount to an employee…the employee…may, not later than 6 years after the employer was required to make the payment…sue for the amount of the payment in an eligible court'. What was an eligible court? Section 717 told one that the concept of an eligible court included 'the Court' and that expression in turn was defined, 589 pages beforehand, in s 4, to mean the 'Federal Court of Australia'. This Court, therefore, had jurisdiction under the former Workplace Relations Act to entertain a suit for unpaid annual leave entitlements arising from s 232.
9 The terms of the Standard were in most cases minimum standards which could not be bargained away by contract (cf ss 171(1), 172(2), 173). That said, however, they did not apply prior to 27 March 2006 when the Standard was first inserted into the Workplace Relations Act because they did not exist. This is not a trivial observation for prior to the coming into effect of the amendments wrought by the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) (hereafter, 'the Work Choices Amendments'), the Workplace Relations Act did not seek to regulate the industrial affairs of all employers and employees but was much more limited in its scope. Further, that Act was itself repealed on 1 July 2009 and replaced by the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). It follows that, on its own terms, s 232 only governed the claims of the agents for annual leave to the extent that those claims fell in the period between 27 March 2006 and 1 July 2009. In fact, only one of the agents, Mr Perez, was engaged by Combined during any period after 27 March 2006 and even that came to an end shortly thereafter on 12 October 2006. It follows that the claims for annual leave under s 232 are a minor part of this case. There is a further factor limiting the relevance of the s 232 claim, to which I will return below, relating to the manner in which Mr Perez's entitlements under the Standard interact with his claims under the Award.
10 The repeal of the Workplace Relations Act and its replacement with the Fair Work Act has no impact on that analysis. So much would have been plain under s 8 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) which for over a century has provided that the repeal of an Act does not 'affect any right privilege obligation or liability acquired accrued or incurred under any Act so repealed'. Recent Parliaments have been prolix and obscure and are not satisfied with the clarity of thought or diction on display in s 8. One begins instead with the torpid bulk of Sch 2 to the Fair Work (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 2009 (Cth) ('the Transition Act') which by item 11(1) deems that the Workplace Relations Act 'continues to apply, on and after the WR Act repeal day, in relation to conduct that occurred before the WR Act repeal day' (the expression 'WR Act' meaning the Workplace Relations Act). Consequently, s 232 continues to apply to matters factually occurring prior to 1 July 2009. This Court has jurisdiction to entertain such claims by reason of item 21 of Part 5 of Sch 17 to the Transition Act which confers upon it jurisdiction in, inter alia, civil claims arising under the Workplace Relations Act. This Court has jurisdiction, therefore, to entertain claims for enforcement of the former Standard notwithstanding its repeal.
11 That leaves unexplained the claims for annual leave which relate to the period before 27 March 2006 when the Work Choices Amendments took effect. Until that day there was in force the Award, which was a federal award to which Combined was a respondent. Clause 22 provided for four weeks of annual leave to 'employees' to whom the Award applied. Leaving to one side for now Combined's argument that the Award, on its proper construction, only provided coverage to clerical and office workers which, even if they were employees, the agents were not, there are two questions which immediately arise: the first is how this Court comes to have jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the Award; the second is how the Award applies to the period prior to 3 June 1998, which is the date, according to cl 5 of the Award, when it came into force. The second question is not idle: several of the claims antedate the Award's making.
12 As to the question of how this Court had jurisdiction to enforce a federal award in force prior to 27 March 2006 the agents submitted that the answer was to be found in cl 107 of Sch 6 to the Workplace Relations Act as it stood on and after 27 March 2006. That answer was not developed. However, I believe the agents' submission was as follows: Sch 6 was headed 'Transitional arrangements for parties bound by federal awards'. By cl 4 of that schedule, awards which had existed immediately before 27 March 2006 continued in force. The award thus continued was to be known as a 'transitional award': cl 4(4).
13 Section 720 of the Act provided for an action by an employee for payment due by an employer under 'an applicable provision'. Section 717 included amongst the applicable provisions the terms of an award. Both of those provisions were contained in Part 14 which deals with enforcement. Why does that matter? Because cl 107 of Sch 6, which the agents invoke, extends the operation of Part 14 beyond the enforcement of awards to permit the enforcement of 'transitional awards'.
14 This argument is incorrect and I reject it. Upon the passage of the Work Choices Amendments the Parliament sought to expand greatly the coverage of its industrial regulation. Prior to 27 March 2006 the Workplace Relations Act had rested on a narrower constitutional basis. After 27 March 2006 the Act expanded to cover a much larger number of employers. Under s 6 of the Workplace Relations Act the concept of employer was expanded to include, in effect, any foreign, trading or financial corporation which employed staff. This represented an assertion of jurisdiction dependent upon the legal nature of the identity of the employer. Prior to 27 March 2006, jurisdiction had been asserted on the basis of awards made as a result of the conciliation or arbitration of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any State (I leave to one side the limited use of the corporations power in relation to the former Australian Workplace Agreements). This kind of jurisdiction did not depend on the identity of the employer but, rather, on the nature of the dispute.
15 When the Work Choices Amendments took effect there arose the practical necessity of continuing in existence the federal awards which had been made under the prior rÉgime. Not all parties to those awards were corporations. Since, after 27 March 2006, the Workplace Relations Act largely rested on the corporations power (I leave to one side the limited use of the trade and commerce power and the territories power in s 6) its ability to extend those awards using that power and, at the same time, varying those awards or authorising direct modification to them, was limited largely to those awards insofar as they dealt with corporations. To the extent that the awards bound parties who were not corporations the awards could be extended but only using the conciliation and arbitration power found in s 51(xxxv) of the Constitution. Of course, modification of those awards was circumscribed by the process of conciliation and arbitration.
16 The Work Choices Amendments therefore generated two kinds of transitional awards. The first was known as a 'pre-reform award' and this was a transitional object which applied to any employer which the Workplace Relations Act, in its post 27 March 2006 form, regulated, principally corporations. The second was known as a 'transitional award' and applied to the remaining employers (frequently individuals). It is the second kind of award which the agents invoke and it is a kind governed by Sch 6. Clause 4(2) makes plain that transitional awards apply only to 'excluded employers'; a term defined in cl 2 to mean an 'employer (within the ordinary meaning of the term) so far as the definition of employer in subsection 6(1) does not cover the employer'. In this case, Combined is a constitutional corporation so it is an employer to whom s 6 applies. In that situation, it cannot be an 'excluded employer'; ergo, Sch 6 is inapplicable.
17 However, the Award was also replaced with a 'pre-reform award'. This curiosity arises from the operation of Sch 4 to the Work Choices Amendments which by cl 4(3) provides:
The original award is taken to be replaced by an instrument (the pre-reform award) in the same terms as the original award that, on and from the reform commencement, has effect under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 and binds the following:
(a) each employer that was bound immediately before the reform commencement by the original award
18 The definition of 'award' in the Workplace Relations Act picks up a pre-reform award (see s 4). Consequently, its enforcement is the enforcement of an 'award' which is an 'applicable provision' in s 717. There are textual problems with the pre-reform award which I will shortly note but, since no point was taken by Combined about them, I will not resolve. The pre-reform award applies 'on and from the reform-commencement', that is, 27 March 2006. Combined did not seek to argue that in the period before 27 March 2006 the matter was directly governed by the Award as it then stood or to develop a submission that this Court may appear to have no jurisdiction to enforce such a claim. On that view of things, the fact that the Court had jurisdiction to enforce a pre-reform award did not give it jurisdiction to enforce the award which the pre-reform award replaced. It would then be necessary to identify a grant of jurisdiction to this Court in respect of former federal awards, the former explicit grant under the Workplace Relations Act having been repealed. An answer to that problem may lie in s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth); another answer, less palatable perhaps, is that the words in cl 4(3) 'on and from the reform commencement' mean 'before and after the reform commencement'. That reading might derive some comfort from s 527 of the Workplace Relations Act. However, it is not necessary to resolve this issue.
19 It seems to me that I should therefore proceed on the following basis:
(a) the claims for annual leave arising between 3 June 1998 and 27 March 2006 are governed by the Award applying (possibly questionably) as a 'pre-reform award' so that this Court has jurisdiction to hear and enforce the claims under the Workplace Relations Act;
(b) the claim for annual leave arising between 27 March 2006 and 26 October 2006 (made only by Mr Perez) is governed by the Award which, in that period, certainly was a pre-reform award. The period is also governed by the Standard applied by s 232(2) of the Workplace Relations Act. No party sought to explain how the issue of double application was to be resolved but it seems likely the answer lies in s 529 which will make applicable whichever is more generous;
(c) the claims for annual leave arising before 3 June 1998 (that is, before the Award came into force) do not seem susceptible of being maintained since the asserted right does not appear to exist. Combined took issue about this in relation only to the claims of Mr Trifunovski and Mr Peries. No point was taken about this in relation to the claim by Mr Perez.