Primary judge's reasons
35 The Snowside parties do not contend that the primary judge erred in her Honour's identification of the relevant principles concerning costs orders. Her Honour summarised those principles at [46]-[50] of Boart (No 2).
36 In particular, her Honour noted that:
(1) the Court's power to make a costs order under s 43(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) involves the exercise of a broad discretion that must be exercised judicially: Boart (No 2) at [47];
(2) a person or entity granted leave under r 2.13 of the Rules has "no presumptive entitlement to costs", this being "an aspect of a grant of leave under r 2.13, with a concomitantly limited exposure to an adverse costs order": Boart (No 2) at [47] citing the two decision referred to at [7] above;
(3) the Court must look at all relevant circumstances: Boart (No 2) at [48] citing Gas2Grid Limited, in the matter of Gas2Grid Limited (No 2) [2010] FCA 1006; (2010) 80 ACSR 179 at [15];
(4) there is no general rule that objectors to schemes of arrangement ought to have their costs paid by the company: Boart (No 2) at [49], although in many members' schemes of arrangement and applications for approval of reductions of capital, the Court has allowed objectors their costs where their intervention has assisted the Court by the provision of an effective contradictor on issues relevant to the Court's exercise of power; and
(5) a broad-brush approach ought to be taken to questions of costs in these circumstances: Boart (No 2) at [50].
37 The primary judge identified the primary basis of the Snowside parties' initial intervention in the proceeding to oppose orders to convene the scheme meeting as follows (Boart (No 2) at [5]):
[T]heir contention [was] that they would be unfairly prejudiced if their shares were acquired under the scheme because they would lose standing to pursue proceedings commenced by them in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 7 June 2017 against BLY and its directors (Oppression Proceedings) (OP standing objection).
38 At [54], the primary judge concluded that the Snowside parties were entitled to their reasonable costs of prosecuting the "OP standing objection", saying:
[54] I am satisfied that the OP standing objection was an issue of substance which the Snowside parties properly raised in the context of BLY's application under s 411 having regard to (a) the [Trafalgar West Investments Pty Ltd v Superior Lawns Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] WASC 143; (2013) 94 ACSR 151] line of authority; and (b) their need to clarify the position was occasioned solely by the manner of re-domiciliation chosen by BLY which involved compulsory acquisition of the Snowside parties' BLY shares. The fact that the Court ultimately found that the Snowside parties would not lose standing to prosecute the Oppression Proceedings does not change the view that the Snowside parties have an entitlement to their reasonable costs of prosecuting that issue, subject to any disentitling conduct.
39 Thereafter, her Honour considered other factors relevant to the exercise of the costs discretion.
40 At [56] to [58], her Honour stated:
[56] The Court's overall impression of the Snowside parties was that they sought to delay the progress of the scheme proposal, "dragging it out", an impression which the Court made known to senior counsel for the Snowside parties at the case management hearing on 17 December 2018. The Court's impression was that the Snowside parties would rather have a fight than resolve material issues in an economical and efficient way so that the Court accepts that the Snowside parties did not conduct their appearance in a way that sought to contain costs.
[57] The Snowside parties' requests for adjournment of the first and second court hearings to enable evidence to be gathered and submissions to be made were based on the proposition that the nature of the scheme did not require prompt action. While it must be acknowledged that there will usually be more urgency attached to schemes occasioned by pending insolvency or schemes designed to effect a takeover, BLY is a public company whose securities are traded on the ASX. It is highly desirable that issues which might affect decisions to buy, sell or hold those securities be resolved promptly, in the interests of an efficient market for those securities.
[58] After the approach to determining the OP standing objection had been agreed at the first court hearing, the Snowside parties pressed for adjournment of that hearing so that they could examine the scheme booklet so that they could raise issues about the adequacy of disclosure. They had had the draft booklet for three business days and a weekend before the first court hearing. Since the Snowside parties had been shareholders of BLY for some time and they had taken an active part in the creditors' schemes of arrangement in 2017, material disclosure issues should have been obvious to them within that timeframe. Critically, the submissions made by the Snowside parties in relation to disclosure issues were not helpful to the Court in deciding whether to make orders under s 411(1). The issues identified by them at the first court hearing were addressed by disclosures already in the draft scheme booklet or in documents (such as the terms of issue of warrants) which had been on the public record for some time, some of which were attached to affidavits filed by the Snowside parties. The submission that the benefits to the major shareholders should be disclosed appeared to the Court to be fishing. The Court formed the impression that the Snowside parties' interest at the first court hearing was more in achieving delay in the dispatch of the scheme booklet than in securing full and fair disclosure.
41 At [60], her Honour concluded relevantly:
The Court notes that no order as to costs should be made in relation to the Snowside parties' appearance at the first court hearing. This is on the basis that the costs of the days identified [being 26 and 29 November and 3 December 2018] represented a just allowance having regard to the Snowside parties' participation in the proceedings to 3 December 2018 (and later in relation to the undertaking) and taking into account that BLY also incurred costs in that period referable to seeking Court approval to corrective disclosures related to the Snowside letter.
42 At [61] and following, her Honour gave separate attention to the Snowside parties' costs incurred after 3 December 2018, other than the costs in respect of settling the undertaking given by BLY. Her Honour found that the Snowside parties "significantly altered the landscape of these proceedings by issuing the Snowside letter".
43 As noted earlier, the text of the Snowside letter is set out in Boart (No 1) at [29]. Concerning franking credits, the letter stated:
Disadvantages of Redomiciliation
The disadvantages to you are:
…
If you are an Australian resident taxpayer any franking credits from Australian income of the Company cannot be utilised by the new Canadian holding company or passed through to its shareholders. …
44 Concerning the oppression proceeding and the possibility of one or more class actions, the letter stated:
Oppression Claim likely to be Defeated
Snowside has commenced legal proceedings against the Company and the Board claiming that the actions of the Company and the Board in events leading up to the Restructure treated the minority shareholders unfairly and oppressively, including in failing to adequately consider ways to preserve more value for the minority shareholders, preferring instead the interests of the Controlling Stakeholders.
It may be that the same arguments could be used to support a class action on behalf of the wider class of minority shareholders.
Our claim and any potential class action claims based on oppressive conduct will likely be defeated by the redomiciliation because existing shareholders of the Company will cease to be Company shareholders.
(Emphasis in original.)
45 At [62] of Boart (No 2), her Honour stated:
In Boart (No 1), the Court ultimately found that the Snowside letter had a tendency to mislead or was misleading in the following respects:
(1) The statement concerning loss of franking credits did not accurately reflect all of the relevant information in the scheme booklet, in particular, the qualifications in the independent expert's report (see [171]);
(2) The statement that the Snowside parties' claims in the Oppression Proceedings were "likely to be defeated" by the re-domiciliation was wrong (see [173]);
(3) It was misleading to suggest that the "same arguments" as raised in the Oppression Proceedings might be used as a basis for a class action when Mr Maurici had made no enquiries as to whether any such class action existed and he is not aware of any such proceedings or that anyone (including Snowside) has them in prospect (see [174]).
46 Paragraphs [171]-[174] of Boart (No 1) are as follows:
[171] In my view the statement concerning loss of franking credits has the capacity to mislead because it does not accurately reflect all of the relevant information in the scheme booklet. While the language used in the Snowside letter concerning the loss of franking credits is both literally true and tracks some language used in the scheme booklet, it is stated in terms which suggest immediate disadvantage. However, it may have the tendency to mislead because it does not acknowledge the qualifications in the independent expert's report as follows:
Given the Company's situation of financial distress discussed earlier with large debt outstanding and significant losses, the Company is unlikely to be able to pay a dividend until the debt level is significantly reduced and the financial performance improves significantly. In addition, any accumulated tax losses that can be used to offset against taxable income will further delay the creation of franking credits.
In our opinion, the disadvantage due to lack of franking credits is mitigated due to the Company's inability to pay dividends in the medium term.
[172] The primary matters of concern in the Snowside letter are its discussion of the Oppression Proceedings and the possibility of a class action on the basis of similar claims.
[173] For reasons previously given, the statement that the Snowside parties' claims in the Oppression Proceedings were "likely to be defeated" by the re-domiciliation are wrong. Moreover, as at 14 November 2018, the Snowside parties knew that that very question was to be the subject of argument in this Court on 26 November 2018, a fact not mentioned.
[174] Further, in my view it was misleading to suggest that the "same arguments" as raised in the Oppression Proceedings might be used as a basis for a class action when Mr Maurici had made no enquiries as to whether any such class action existed and he is not aware of any such proceedings or that anyone (including Snowside) has them in prospect. The fact that the Snowside parties were bringing their own proceedings added weight to the mention of a class action. In the context of a distressed company where the share price had fallen in the manner suggested by Mr Maurici over the period since the reconstruction (as he noted in the opening paragraphs of the Snowside letter), the suggestion that there might be a class action to which a shareholder might be joined is likely to be attractive. The statement that it was likely to be defeated by the re-domiciliation was therefore likely to have an impact. The Snowside parties now say that that statement could not have influenced the vote. I do not accept that: if they thought that, there was no point in putting this issue in the letter at all.
47 The reasons referred to at [173] are set out at [37]-[62] of Boart (No 1). In brief, the representation in the Snowside letter that the oppression proceeding was likely to be defeated by the re-domiciliation was based upon the contention that the Snowside parties must be members of BLY when the oppression proceeding is heard and judgment delivered. This proposition was based upon a series of decisions in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, referred to in Boart (No 1) as the Superior Lawn decisions, comprising Trafalgar West Investments Pty Ltd v Superior Lawns Australia Pty Ltd [No 2] [2012] WASC 169; Trafalgar West Investments Pty Ltd As Trustee for the Trafalgar West Investments Trust v Superior Lawns Australia Pty Ltd [No 2] [2013] WASC 143; (2013) 275 FLR 55; and Patrick Gerard Gladwyn Jebb As Trustee for the Trafalgar West Investments Trust v Superior Lawns Australia Pty Ltd [2017] WASC 335; (2017) 123 ACSR 388 (Superior Lawn decisions). After considering those decision in detail, at [58], her Honour concluded that the Snowside parties would not lose standing to prosecute the oppression proceeding to judgment if the scheme were implemented. At [61], however, her Honour acknowledged that the impact of the implementation of the scheme on the Snowside parties' standing and the Court's jurisdiction in the oppression proceeding could only be bindingly determined by the Supreme Court.
48 Returning to Boart (No 2), at [63] of her Honour's reasons, after referring to an acknowledgement by the Snowside parties that they did not cavil with the findings set out at [62], the primary judge rejected the Snowside parties' submissions to the effect that:
(1) the Court could not be satisfied that the misleading statements had any causative effect on the vote at the scheme meeting; and
(2) it was necessary for the Snowside parties to appear at the 21 December 2018 hearing to defend their conduct.
49 At [64]-[66], her Honour reasoned as follows:
[64] The Court accepts that in Boart (No 1), it was made clear (at [175]) that it could not be satisfied, in the absence of evidence from BLY members who had received and relied on the Snowside letter, that any BLY shareholder had relied on it in deciding how to exercise their vote. However:
(1) In Boart (No 1) at [175], the Court also made it clear that it could not be satisfied about the integrity of the vote having regard to its finding that statements in the Snowside letter were misleading and having regard to the proxy flows after the Snowside letter was sent to some BLY shareholders. It is for that reason that the Court accepted ASIC's submission that it might be appropriate to allow another vote before determining whether the headcount test should be dispensed with under s 411(4)(a)(ii)(A); and
(2) The Snowside parties' conduct in issuing the Snowside letter with the misleading statements in it was wrongful. So was the statement in the Snowside letter that "it was likely" that it would lose standing in the Oppression Proceedings. That later statement was made at time when the Snowside parties knew that this Court was fully seised of that issue and would adjudicate on it before the scheme meeting and authorise disclosures accordingly with a view to there being an informed vote at the scheme meeting.
[65] In the Court's view, any award of costs in relation to the hearings on 17, 19 and 21 December 2018 must take into account the causative role that the Snowside letter had in casting doubt on the integrity of the vote at the scheme meeting and creating a basis for BLY to make its application to dispense with the headcount test. Since the Snowside parties were not successful in defending their conduct which was wrongful, there is no basis for their suggestion that they are entitled to costs of defending it, albeit that BLY was not required to do so and it ultimately declined to take the opportunity to test the shareholders' will at a second meeting.
[66] That said, the Court also recognises that:
(1) In Boart (No 1) the Court found that there were areas in which disclosure in the scheme booklet could or should be improved if it were to seek a further shareholder vote, albeit that those areas were not such as would have prevented the Court making final orders had the statutory vote been achieved at the scheme meeting;
(2) BLY did not get the relief for which it applied under ss 411(4)(a)(ii)(A) or 411(4)(b) because it did not establish reliance on the misleading statement in the Snowside letter and accordingly, the Snowside parties successfully resisted that relief;
(3) The Court obtained some minor assistance from the Snowside parties' submissions in relation to dispensing with the headcount test, although the Court was assisted primarily by ASIC's submissions.
50 By these reasons, the primary judge drew a distinction between the question of whether the Snowside letter had influenced the vote at the scheme meeting (her Honour found that she could not make this finding) and the question whether the Snowside letter might have influenced the vote (her Honour found that this possibility could not be discounted).
51 In Boart (No 1) at [175], the primary judge said:
BLY ask[ed] the Court to infer from the flow of proxies that the Snowside letter unfairly influenced the vote. In the absence of evidence from members who received and relied on the letter, I cannot make that finding and I am not minded to exercise the power to dispense with the headcount at this time. However, impact on the integrity of the vote cannot be discounted because of the statements in the Snowside letter concerning the availability of franking credits, the Oppression Proceedings, the possibility of a class action on a similar basis and the flow of proxies after the Snowside letter was sent, compared to the flow before that time.