Civil penalties
19 Pursuant to s 224(1)(a)(ii) of the ACL, if the Court is satisfied that a person has contravened a provision of Pt 3-1 of the ACL (which relevantly includes ss 29(1)(g) and 29(1)(m)), the Court may order the person to pay such pecuniary penalty in respect of each act or omission by the person to which the section applies, as the Court determines to be appropriate. The ACL does not empower the Court to impose a pecuniary penalty for a contravention of s 18 of the ACL.
20 Section 224(2) provides that, in determining the appropriate pecuniary penalty, the Court must have regard to all relevant matters including:
(a) the nature and extent of the act or omission and of any loss or damage suffered as a result of the act or omission; and
(b) the circumstances in which the act or omission took place; and
(c) whether the person has previously been found by a court in proceedings under Ch 4 or Pt 5-2 of the ACL to have engaged in any similar conduct.
21 From 1 September 2018, the maximum penalty for a corporation for each contravention under s 224 of the ACL increased from $1.1 million to the greater of:
(a) $10 million; or
(b) if the court can determine the value of the benefit obtained from the contravention - three times the value of the benefit; or
(c) if the court cannot determine the value of the benefit - 10% of the annual turnover of the corporation.
22 The impugned conduct the subject of this proceeding occurred after 1 September 2018.
23 In the present case, the benefit obtained by Optus from the contravening conduct cannot be determined. The maximum penalty per contravention is therefore $10 million or 10% of the annual turnover of Optus in the 12 months before each contravention, whichever is greater.
24 In Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2015) 258 CLR 482 (the Agreed Penalties Case), the High Court emphasised that the primary purpose of civil penalties is to secure deterrence. In contrast to criminal sentences, they are not concerned with retribution and rehabilitation but are "primarily if not wholly protective in promoting the public interest in compliance": Agreed Penalties Case at [55] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ; see also at [110] per Keane J. This point was also emphasised by the High Court in Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Pattinson (2022) 399 ALR 599 (Pattinson) at [15]-[16], [43], [45], [55] per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ.
25 The plurality in Pattinson affirmed (at [18]) the well-known statements of French J, as his Honour then was, in Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd [1991] ATPR ¶41-076; [1990] FCA 762 (CSR). In that case, his Honour listed several factors that informed the assessment of a penalty of appropriate deterrent value under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). His Honour stated:
The assessment of a penalty of appropriate deterrent value will have regard to a number of factors which have been canvassed in the cases. These include the following:
1. The nature and extent of the contravening conduct.
2. The amount of loss or damage caused.
3. The circumstances in which the conduct took place.
4. The size of the contravening company.
5. The degree of power it has, as evidenced by its market share and ease of entry into the market.
6. The deliberateness of the contravention and the period over which it extended.
7. Whether the contravention arose out of the conduct of senior management or at a lower level.
8. Whether the company has a corporate culture conducive to compliance with the Act, as evidenced by educational programs and disciplinary or other corrective measures in response to an acknowledged contravention.
9. Whether the company has shown a disposition to co-operate with the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the Act in relation to the contravention.
26 After setting out the above passage, the plurality in Pattinson stated at [19]:
It may readily be seen that this list of factors includes matters pertaining both to the character of the contravening conduct (such as factors 1 to 3) and to the character of the contravenor (such as factors 4, 5, 8 and 9). It is important, however, not to regard the list of possible relevant considerations as a "rigid catalogue of matters for attention" as if it were a legal checklist. The court's task remains to determine what is an "appropriate" penalty in the circumstances of the particular case.
(Footnotes omitted.)
27 The plurality in Pattinson considered the role of the prescribed maximum penalty as a yardstick in a civil penalty context, affirming (at [53]) the explanation provided by the Full Court of this Court in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Ltd (2016) 340 ALR 25 (Reckitt Benckiser) at [155]-[156]. See also Pattinson at [54]-[55].
28 In cases involving a very large number of contraventions, it may be unhelpful to seek to make a finding as to the precise number of contraventions, or to calculate a maximum aggregate penalty by reference to such a number: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd (2015) 327 ALR 540 at [18] and [82] per Allsop CJ; ABCC v CFMEU at [143] per Dowsett, Greenwood and Wigney JJ.
29 It is relevant to refer to the course of conduct principle, which was considered by the Full Court of this Court in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cement Australia Pty Ltd (2017) 258 FCR 312 at [421]-[428]. The Full Court (Middleton, Beach and Moshinsky JJ) stated at [424] that the course of conduct principle is a useful "tool" in the determination of appropriate civil penalties. The Full Court continued:
As we have already indicated, the principal object of the penalties imposed by s 76 of the [Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)] is that of specific and general deterrence. With this in mind, in a civil penalty context, the course of conduct principle can be conceived of as a recognition by the courts that the deterrent effect in respect of a civil penalty (at both a specific and general level) is measured by reference to the nature of the conduct for which it is imposed. It is therefore of paramount importance to identify whether multiple contraventions constitute a single course of conduct or separate instances of conduct, so as to ensure that an appropriate deterrent effect is achieved by the imposition of the penalty or penalties in respect of that particular conduct.
30 In relation to the course of conduct principle, in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Hillside (Australia New Media) Pty Ltd trading as Bet365 (No 2) [2016] FCA 698 (Hillside), Beach J stated at [25]:
… the "course of conduct" principle does not have paramountcy in the process of assessing an appropriate penalty. It cannot of itself operate as a de facto limit on the penalty to be imposed for contraventions of the ACL. Further, its application and utility must be tailored to the circumstances. In some cases, the contravening conduct may involve many acts of contravention that affect a very large number of consumers and a large monetary value of commerce, but the conduct might be characterised as involving a single course of conduct. Contrastingly, in other cases, there may be a small number of contraventions, affecting few consumers and having small commercial significance, but the conduct might be characterised as involving several separate courses of conduct. It might be anomalous to apply the concept to the former scenario, yet be precluded from applying it to the latter scenario. The "course of conduct" principle cannot unduly fetter the proper application of s 224.
31 The above passage was cited with approval by the Full Court in Reckitt Benckiser at [141].
32 In determining the appropriate penalty, it is relevant to consider steps taken to ameliorate loss or damage (such as payment of compensation) as potentially mitigatory considerations: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Woolworths Limited [2016] ATPR ¶42-251; [2016] FCA 44 at [166]-[167] per Edelman J; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v AGL South Australia Pty Ltd (2015) 146 ALD 385; [2015] FCA 399 at [38] per White J.
33 Co-operation with authorities in the course of investigations and subsequent proceedings can properly reduce the penalty that would otherwise be imposed. The reduction reflects the fact that such co-operation: increases the likelihood of co-operation in future cases in a way that furthers the object of the legislation; frees up the regulator's resources, thereby increasing the likelihood that other contravenors will be detected and brought to justice; and facilitates the course of justice: see, eg, Agreed Penalties Case at [46]; NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 at 293-294 (NW Frozen Foods).
34 In the Agreed Penalties Case, the High Court held that, in the context of civil penalty provisions, it was open to the Court to receive submissions, including joint submissions, as to an appropriate penalty. French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ (with whom Keane J agreed) stated at [46] that there is "an important public policy involved in promoting predictability of outcome in civil penalty proceedings" and that "the practice of receiving and, if appropriate, accepting agreed penalty submissions increases the predictability of outcome for regulators and wrongdoers". Their Honours stated that, as was recognised in Trade Practices Commission v Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd (No 5) (1981) 60 FLR 38; 37 ALR 256 and determined in NW Frozen Foods, "such predictability of outcome encourages corporations to acknowledge contraventions, which, in turn, assists in avoiding lengthy and complex litigation and thus tends to free the courts to deal with other matters and to free investigating officers to turn to other areas of investigation that await their attention".
35 Their Honours stated, at [57], that in civil proceedings there is generally very considerable scope for the parties to agree on the facts and their consequences, and that there "is also very considerable scope for them to agree upon the appropriate remedy and for the court to be persuaded that it is an appropriate remedy". In relation to civil penalty proceedings, their Honours stated at [58]:
Subject to the court being sufficiently persuaded of the accuracy of the parties' agreement as to facts and consequences, and that the penalty which the parties propose is an appropriate remedy in the circumstances thus revealed, it is consistent with principle and, for the reasons identified in Allied Mills, highly desirable in practice for the court to accept the parties' proposal and therefore impose the proposed penalty.
(Footnote omitted.)
36 Their Honours in the Agreed Penalties Case also made observations, at [60]-[61], regarding submissions by a regulator in such a context.