Pecuniary penalties
34 The present case is one in which pecuniary penalties should be imposed. In determining the appropriate penalty, the Court is required to have regard to "all relevant matters" which include the nature and extent of the relevant act or omission and of any loss or damage suffered as a result of the act or omission; the circumstances in which the act or omission took place; and whether the person has previously been found by a court in relevant proceedings to have engaged in similar conduct: s 224(2) of the ACL.
35 Separately from the requirements imposed by s 224(2) and its predecessor (s 76E of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth); see also s 76), the Court has identified a number of factors that should be taken into account when making the evaluative judgment required to arrive at an appropriate penalty: Trade Practices Commission v CSR Limited [1991] ATPR ¶41-076; NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285; J McPhee & Son (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000) 172 ALR 532; [2000] FCA 365. Some of these factors may not be relevant in every case; some overlap the specific matters required to be taken into account by s 224(2). The parties have made submissions referable to these factors.
36 In Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2012) 287 ALR 249; [2012] FCAFC 20 (Singtel) at [62], the Full Court stressed that, in relation to offences of calculation by a corporation where the punishment is a fine, the fine must be fixed so that it is not seen by the offender or others as an acceptable cost of doing business. The Full Court said (at [63]):
[63] Generally speaking, those engaged in trade and commerce must be deterred from the cynical calculation involved in weighing up the risk of penalty against the profits to be made from contravention…
37 The Full Court's observations in Singtel were noted with approval French CJ, Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 640; [2013] HCA 54 at [66]. Their Honours said that general and specific deterrence must play a primary role in assessing the appropriate penalty in cases of calculated contravention of legislation where commercial profit is the driver of the contravening conduct.
38 Section 224(1) of the ACL recognises that the Court may order the contravener to pay to the Commonwealth a pecuniary penalty in respect of each act or omission, as the Court determines to be appropriate. Even so, the Court must have regard to the "totality principle" to ensure that the penalties imposed are just and appropriate. In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2010) 188 FCR 238; [2010] FCA 790 at [229]-[230], Middleton J said:
[229] Application of the totality principle requires the Court to review the entirety of the conduct and to determine whether the proposed penalty is appropriate "as a whole". The purpose of the exercise is to ascertain whether the proposed penalty is just and appropriate for the entirety of the contravening conduct, looking at the degree of misconduct involved.
[230] The rationale underlying the totality principle is to ensure that the proposed penalty is not out of proportion with the conduct giving rise to the contraventions when viewed collectively, and to ensure the penalty is accordingly just and appropriate from the perspective of that collective assessment.
39 The applicant submits that the respondent engaged in two separate and distinct courses of conduct. The first course of conduct was the six occasions in the relevant period when Microsourcing, at the direction and with the authority of the respondent, posted the fabricated testimonials on the Internet. The second course of conduct was attempting to induce and inducing franchisees to contravene s 29(1)(e) of the ACL by posting fabricated testimonials.
40 The applicant submits that the first course of conduct was less serious than the second course of conduct, for two reasons. First, the purpose behind the instructions given to Microsourcing was to provide examples to franchisees of a step-by-step method of posting a testimonial. Secondly, the second course of conduct had the potential to lead to a much larger number of contraventions of the ACL. In this connection, the respondent had, as I have noted, up to 64 franchisees and its inducements were directed to all franchisees. The conduct was deliberate.
41 I would accept that, overall, the second course of conduct was more serious in relation to its potential to adversely affect a large number of consumers. It was also attended by an obviously dishonest purpose. I accept that the instructions given by the respondent to Microsourcing do not appear to be attended with the same dishonest purpose. With respect to the second course of conduct, I refer, in particular, to the email from Mr Burchell on 7 February 2012 (see [18] above) which requested franchisees to deliberately engage in covert practices to ensure that the fabricated reviews came from different IP addresses. Further, the examples given in Mr Burchell's email encouraged franchisees to compare Electrodry Carpet Cleaning's services favourably against the services of other providers, thereby seeking to gain a dishonest advantage over other traders. Further, one example also spoke, falsely, of the fact that "the customer" had derived a health benefit from the services allegedly provided by Electrodry Carpet Cleaning.
42 Nevertheless, even though the second course of conduct occurred in more aggravating circumstances, the fabricated testimonials posted by Microsourcing, once posted and searchable, were no less false than the fabricated testimonials posted by the two franchisees, and had an equal capacity to mislead or deceive consumers.
43 All the testimonials were posted on online review websites and were easily accessible to Australian consumers of the kinds of services provided by Electrodry Carpet Cleaning. The authors of the testimonials were not consumers of Electrodry Carpet Cleaning's services, had not been provided with such services and had not, as consumers, formed the favourable opinions that the testimonials represented. The testimonials were intended to convey, and no doubt did convey, that they stood as an independent and critical assessment of Electrodry Carpet Cleaning's services. They were, of course, nothing of the sort. Just as with other forms of false or misleading advertising, the fabricated testimonials had the potential to mislead a large number of consumers, divert customers from law-abiding competitors, and generate a positive perception of Electrodry Carpet Cleaning that was based on falsehoods: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Pepe's Ducks Ltd [2013] FCA 570 at [27] (Pepe's Ducks).
44 There is a real possibility that consumers were misled or deceived by these testimonials. However, the extent to which they were, and the extent to which the respondent benefited as a result, are not known. Similarly, the extent to which, as a result of the conduct, the respondent gained an unfair advantage over its trade rivals, is not known. It does not follow, however, that I should proceed on the footing that the respondent did not gain a benefit or that consumers were not misled or deceived, or that trade rivals were not injured.
45 The Electrodry Carpet Cleaning franchised business is an established one. The respondent's total sales for the 2013 and 2014 financial years were in excess of $20.7 million. The respondent's estimated gross profit (revenue from sales less costs of goods sold) for the same period was in excess of $18.1 million. In the 2012 financial year, the respondent's net operating profit was $304,306. In the 2013 financial year, it was $126,042. In the 2014 financial year, the respondent incurred a net operating loss of $1,073,120.
46 The respondent's conduct was deliberate, systematic, covert and extended over a five month period. The conduct involved senior management (whether employed or contracted) of the respondent. I refer in particular to the involvement of Mr Handa and Mr Burchell.
47 The respondent did not have in place any policy, program or training to address compliance with competition and consumer laws.
48 Further, in November 2001, the applicant obtained by consent a declaration that the respondent had contravened the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) by distributing brochures with GST-exclusive prices. However, this resulted from a voluntary disclosure by the respondent of the conduct, of which the applicant had not otherwise been aware.
49 On the other side of the scale, the respondent has co-operated with the applicant in attempting to resolve the proceeding, including, as I have said, by meeting with the applicant and its representatives to seek to agree on admissions of contravention. By doing so, the respondent has avoided putting the applicant to the additional costs of preparing the case for hearing and conducting a trial. The respondent recognises the fact that contraventions have occurred and has demonstrated an acceptance of responsibility and a willingness to facilitate the course of justice: Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339; [2002] HCA 6 at [11]. In the circumstances, a substantial discount for co-operation is warranted. However, I wish to make clear that, but for that co-operation, I would have imposed significantly greater pecuniary penalties than the ones that I will impose.
50 Although, in some cases, a single penalty has been assessed for a given course of conduct (see, for example, Pepe's Ducks at [39]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v P & N Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 6 at [54]), I have come to the view that separate penalties should be imposed for the separate contraventions. In doing so, it will of course be necessary to take into account the totality principle. In this connection, I accept that the contravening conduct reflects the two broad courses of conduct which the applicant has identified. As I have noted, I also accept that the second course of conduct exhibits a higher degree of seriousness than the first course of conduct.
51 In relation to the first course of conduct, the respondent will be ordered to pay a pecuniary penalty of $10,000 in respect of the publication of each of the six fabricated testimonials, resulting in an aggregate penalty of $60,000 for this course of conduct.
52 In relation to the second course of conduct, the respondent will be ordered to pay:
(a) a pecuniary penalty of $20,000 in respect of the publication of each of the four fabricated testimonials it induced the two franchisees to publish; and
(b) a pecuniary penalty of $75,000 in respect of the respondent's attempts to induce other franchisees to post fabricated testimonials,
resulting in an aggregate penalty of $155,000 for this course of conduct.
53 The respondent requests that the penalties be paid by way of a payment schedule. The applicant supports an appropriate order being made.