LEE J:
1 In this matter the applicant ("the ACCC") commenced a proceeding under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("the Act") seeking, inter alia,declarations and injunctions against the respondents in respect of conduct said to contravene the Act, alleged to have been engaged in by the first respondent ("Midland") and the second respondent ("Bristile"), the conduct of Bristile said to be conduct in which the third respondent ("Scott") was knowingly concerned.
2 The statement of claim recited that Midland and Bristile manufacture and supply clay brick products in Western Australia. It was alleged that between September 2001 and December 2001 Midland and Bristile made arrangements, or arrived at understandings, that had the purpose, effect or likely effect, of fixing, controlling or maintaining the price of certain clay brick products manufactured and supplied by Midland and Bristile. Section 45A of the Act states that such conduct is deemed to have the purpose, effect or likely effect, of substantially lessening competition and, therefore, it was alleged by that conduct Midland and Bristile each contravened s 45(2)(a)(ii) of the Act. It was also alleged that Midland gave effect to an arrangement or understanding and thereby contravened s 45(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.
3 A summary of relevant facts set out in statements of agreed facts is as follows.
4 At the time of the said conduct the revenue produced from sales of clay brick products in Western Australia was estimated to be between $119 million and $130 million per annum of which Midland received approximately 55% and Bristile approximately 45%. The two manufacturers constituted, in effect, a duopoly in the relevant market. Midland and Bristile segmented their customers into retail customers, trade builders, and major builders and applied differential prices to each segment.
5 Between May 2001 and June 2001, Midland and Bristile, acting independently, resolved to increase by approximately 3% the price each charged for clay brick products. Each gave notice that the increase would be implemented for retail customers from 1 July 2001; for trade builders from 1 October 2001; and for major builders from 1 January 2002. By newspaper advertisements, letters and personal contacts Midland and Bristile informed their customers, the general public and each other of the new prices and the dates of introduction thereof.
6 Between September 2001 and December 2001 a series of meetings and conversations took place between the Divisional General Manager of Midland ("Arndt") and Scott as General Manager, Marketing and Sales of Bristile. It was not in issue that the acts of Arndt and Scott constituted conduct by Midland and Bristile respectively.
7 At these meetings the prices to be charged by Midland and Bristile to trade builders and major builders were discussed and the outcome was that Arndt and Scott committed Midland and Bristile to implement and maintain the proposed price increases. They agreed that each would inform the other of any instance of which they became aware that Midland or Bristile had offered discounts or had failed to implement the increased prices. That is to say, neither Midland nor Bristile would seek to gain customers by offering to supply clay brick products to trade builders or major builders at prices below the fixed price. In addition, as a result of those meetings, Arndt and Scott committed Midland and Bristile to supply particular clay brick products, namely the "Maxibrick" manufactured by Midland and the "Verticore" manufactured by Bristile, to major builders at a price not below $570 per one thousand bricks ("the Maxibrick/Verticore price arrangement").
8 On 23 October 2001 Arndt instructed the relevant officer at Midland not to supply Maxibricks to major builders at a price below $570 per one thousand bricks without "clearing it" with Arndt and from October/November 2001 to January 2002, Midland gave effect to the Maxibrick/Verticore price arrangement.
9 The Court was informed that the ACCC did not receive a complaint from customers of Midland or Bristile and was unaware of the foregoing conduct until January 2002 when the Managing Director of the parent company of Midland informed the ACCC that possible contraventions of the Act had occurred by reason of the conduct of Midland. Thereafter Midland cooperated with the ACCC and, in particular, Arndt provided a written statement which set out in full his participation in the foregoing conduct. The ACCC commenced this proceeding on 27 June 2003. The ACCC decided that by reason of the cooperation of Arndt and the importance of his evidence to the ACCC case that Arndt not be joined as a respondent.
10 On 30 June 2003 the ACCC published its "Leniency Policy for Cartel Conduct" pursuant to which the ACCC announced that it would seek lesser penalties against corporations or individuals providing assistance and cooperation in the identification and prosecution of conduct by cartels that contravened the Act. In July 2003 Midland agreed to file a defence admitting contravention of the Act and the ACCC agreed to withdraw its application for the imposition of a pecuniary penalty against Midland. In due course Midland filed a defence which admitted salient pleadings in the statement of claim. Meanwhile, Bristile admitted relevant facts but denied that they had the consequence in law contended for by the ACCC and filed a defence accordingly. Subsequently, in December 2003, Bristile reached accord with the ACCC in which it admitted contravention of the Act and agreed that a statement of agreed facts and a joint submission on penalty be placed before the Court. Bristile agreed to seek leave to amend its defence to make full admissions.
11 Scott cooperated with the ACCC and voluntarily supplied a detailed written statement in respect of his conduct. Scott filed a defence admitting the relevant facts and later reached accord with the ACCC consenting to orders being made against him. Scott also agreed to seek leave to amend his defence to include further admissions as required.
12 I am satisfied by the statements of agreed facts filed that by reason of the acts of Arndt and Scott, Midland and Bristile are persons to whom ss 76(1)(a) and 80(1)(a) of the Act apply being persons who:
(a) engaged in conduct which contravened s 45(2)(a)(ii) of the Act by making an arrangement, or arriving at an understanding, in October and November 2001 that contained a provision that fixed, controlled or maintained the price of clay brick products manufactured by Midland and Bristile and supplied to trade builders from about 1 October 2001, and to some major builders from about 1 January 2002;
(b) engaged in conduct which contravened s 45(2)(a)(ii) of the Act by making an arrangement, or arriving at an understanding, in October and November 2001 that contained a provision that fixed, controlled or maintained the price of the "Maxibrick" clay brick manufactured by Midland and the "Verticore" clay brick manufactured by Bristile at $570 per 1000 bricks when supplied to some major builders.
13 I am also satisfied that between about November 2001 and January 2002 Midland gave effect to the latter arrangement or understanding and thereby contravened s 45(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.
14 With regard to Scott I am satisfied by the facts agreed that he is a person to whom s 76(1)(e) and s 80(1)(e) of the Act apply being a person who was knowingly concerned in the foregoing contraventions of the Act by Bristile.
Consent Orders
15 The temptation will always be present for major participants in a market to engage in "cartel conduct" to suppress competition and maximise revenue. Such conduct will be covert and hard to detect and allegations that corporations have engaged in such conduct will be difficult to prove. Accordingly, it can be understood why the ACCC has developed and published a policy to encourage disclosure of conduct that contravenes the Act in return for more lenient enforcement of the Act against the disclosing party. Similarly it can be understood why parties to enforcement proceedings commenced by the ACCC may see some advantage in having such proceedings finalised by consent orders.
16 Notwithstanding that in such proceedings the parties may inform the Court that they consent to particular orders being made, it remains the responsibility of the Court to determine that the orders made by the Court are the appropriate orders in all the circumstances. At the same time the Court will give due regard to the obvious public interest in the preservation of resources and the more efficient use of Court time that may flow from accords reached by the parties that obviate the need for a lengthy trial and for judicial time to be spent on preparation of detailed reasons for judgment.
17 As stated in Minister for Industry, Tourism & Resources v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 72 (at [77]):
'The position of the Court where prosecution and defence agree on the appropriate sentence, as laid down in R v Gallagher, has similarities to the position where regulator and contravenor jointly submit that a particular penalty should be imposed in a civil penalty case. Just as the criminal court will take into account the prosecution´s views on the appropriate sentence, so the court in the civil penalty case, as NW Frozen Foods explained, will take account of the regulator´s position. But in neither case is the court relieved from the responsibility of exercising its own judgment as to the appropriate sentence (in criminal cases), or whether the proposed penalty is within the appropriate range for the contravention (in civil penalty cases). In each case, the Court should be satisfied that it is being given accurate, reliable and complete information on critical questions.'
18 With the foregoing in mind I turn now to the particular orders proposed in the agreements made between the parties.