AUL25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 370

1. The applicant is a citizen of Malaysia who applied for a protection visa in Australia. A delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant a protection visa and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirmed the delegate's decision. The applicant seeks an extension of time under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act)[1] for judicial review of the Tribunal decision.
2. For the reasons explained below, I have decided not to grant the applicant an extension of time to seek judicial review of the Tribunal decision. The application to this Court is therefore dismissed.

APPLICATION FOR A PROTECTION VISA AND RELATED DECISIONS

1. The applicant applied for a protection visa on 20 August 2018. In his protection visa application, he claimed that he witnessed illegal money lenders hurting and harassing his friend who had obtained an illegal loan. The applicant claimed that he himself was threatened by the illegal money lenders that they would hurt him and his family if he made any reports to the authorities.
2. On 6 February 2019 a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant a protection visa.
3. On 8 February 2019 the applicant made an application to the Tribunal for merits review of the delegate's decision.
4. The applicant provided a completed pre-hearing information form to the Tribunal on 28 March 2024. In this form, the applicant provided further information about his claims for protection. In relation to his claim to fear harm from money lenders, the applicant said:

(a) a few years earlier, he had a good friend in Malaysia who owed $30,000 to a money lender in an unlicensed loan and the applicant acted as guarantor for his friend; and

(b) the money lenders came to collect the debt but his friend has moved to a location unknown to the applicant. The applicant later found out his friend had died and left the debt unpaid. As the applicant had acted as guarantor, the money lenders wanted him to pay the debt and threatened to kill him if he could not do so.

1. The applicant attended hearings before the Tribunal on 9 April 2024 and 2 May 2024 to give evidence and present arguments about his claims for protection.
2. On 12 September 2024 the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

1. The Tribunal set out the evidence the applicant gave to the Department and to the Tribunal in writing as well as the oral evidence that the applicant gave to the Tribunal in two hearings.
2. The Tribunal noted that country information before it indicated that the use of informal loans through unlicensed money lenders is common in Malaysia. The Tribunal considered that the country information provided broad support for the applicant's claims. However, the Tribunal had a number of concerns with the applicant's claims and the evidence that he provided over time.

(a) The Tribunal had serious concerns about the clear discrepancies between the applicant's written and oral evidence, and considered that there was little correlation between the claims in the applicant's protection visa application and his later evidence. The Tribunal considered the applicant's attribution of these discrepancies to friends who he claimed assisted him with his protection visa application. However, the Tribunal found the applicant's evidence about the involvement of his friends, and the later claim that one of the friends was a middle person in the preparation of his application, to be unpersuasive. The Tribunal considered the discrepancies between the applicant's claim in his visa application and his later evidence, and his shifting evidence about the preparation of his visa application, raised concerns about the credibility and reliability of the applicant's claims.

(b) The Tribunal found the applicant's evidence about his friend who allegedly borrowed money and the money lending group to be limited in credible detail. The Tribunal considered that, given the applicant's claimed interactions and concerns with the money lending group over a nine month period, it was difficult to accept that the applicant would not know more details about the money lenders, including the name of the group, the names of certain members and the people who targeted him, its location and details about connections to other gangs.

(c) The Tribunal had concerns with the plausibility of the applicant's claim to have acted as a guarantor for his friend's loan. The applicant gave evidence that he knew about Ah-long and the dangers of borrowing from unlicensed money lenders. The Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant also knew about the risks to his friend as borrower and to him as guarantor. The Tribunal accepted it was not implausible for a person to want to help a friend. However, the Tribunal found it difficult to accept that the applicant would act as guarantor in circumstances where the applicant was a business owner who knew the terms of the agreement and would have had some understanding of the implications of the agreement and his friend's ability to service the loan, and where the total value of the loan was several times the value of the applicant's own assets.

(d) The Tribunal had concerns with the applicant's evidence about the threats he claimed to have faced from the money lenders, when considered against his other evidence. The Tribunal formed the impression that the applicant varied and added to his evidence to respond to the Tribunal's issues and concerns, rather than providing a credible account of what actually occurred.

1. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant's claims were not credible and made the following findings of fact at [80] of its reasons:

It follows that I am not satisfied and do not accept his protection claims related to the moneylender group (Ah-long). I do not accept his friend (Z) borrowed money from an Ah-long. I do not accept the applicant acted as guarantor for that loan. I do not accept his friend failed to make his repayments and was killed or otherwise died in Kuala Lumpur. I do not accept that any moneylender sought payment from the applicant, or that he was ever threatened or harmed by the moneylender group. I do not accept he sought to avoid them by running away, staying at his friends' homes or altering his business/work practices to avoid interactions with the group. I do not accept that he was forced to sell his assets and flee to Australia, at least for these reasons. I also do not accept his written claims that he witnessed his friend being beaten, that he was chased and threatened by the moneylender group, or that he moved his family to his hometown before fleeing to Australia. I do not accept his later claims that he heard from his friend in Malaysia that people were looking for him. For clarity, I do not accept any aspect of these claims.

1. The Tribunal found that the applicant was not and had never been at risk of harm from unlicensed money lenders or any other person or group. It was not satisfied that there was a real chance of the applicant facing harm for any of these reasons if he returned to Malaysia now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. It also found that there was not a real risk of the applicant facing significant harm from an unlicensed money lending group or any other person or group, or on any related basis, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Malaysia. The Tribunal therefore found that the applicant did not meet the criteria for the grant of a protection visa in s 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Migration Act.

1. The time limit for the applicant to make an application to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal decision was 35 days from the date of the decision: s 477(1) of the Migration Act. With the Tribunal decision made on 12 September 2024, this meant that the last day for the applicant to make an application to this Court within time was 17 October 2024. The applicant instead made his application on 16 January 2025 and made an application in writing for an extension of time.
2. The applicant provided the following grounds in support of its extension of time application:
   1. I was not aware of the limit for the judicial review in Court and I required extension of time to seek justice where I believe there was a lack of procedural fairness.
   2. The Applicant met the key elements of the Subclass 866 visa but the Tribunal member did not consider and therefore committed factual and legal error.
3. Despite having an opportunity, pursuant to an Order made by a Registrar of this Court on 23 May 2025, to file any amended application, additional evidence and written submissions at least 28 days before the hearing, the applicant did not file any documents ahead of the hearing.
4. At the start of the hearing, Counsel for the Minister advised the Court that the applicant had sent an email to the Minister's lawyer a few days before the hearing attaching a written submission. The applicant did not provide that submission to the Court. I stood the matter down to give the applicant an opportunity to review the submission, which he said was prepared by his wife, and asked the Minister's lawyer to provide a copy to the Court. When the hearing resumed, the applicant confirmed he wished to rely on the written submission and I have had regard to it in considering his extension of time application. I thank Counsel for the Minister for bringing the applicant's submission to the Court's attention.
5. The evidence before the Court comprises:

(a) an affidavit of the applicant, filed with his application on 17 January 2025;

(b) the court book filed on behalf of the Minister on 25 February 2025;

(c) an affidavit of Isabel Margarita Cruz Aroca filed on behalf of the Minister on 6 February 2026; and

(d) oral evidence given by the applicant at the hearing.

CONSIDERATION OF THE EXTENSION OF TIME APPLICATION

1. Pursuant to s 477(2) of the Migration Act, the Court may extend the time for the applicant to make an application to this Court if:

(a) an application has been made in writing to the Court specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to make the order; and

(b) the Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order.

1. There are no prescribed criteria to which the Court must have regard in determining whether an extension of time is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice, and the discretion of the Court under s 477(2) is largely unconfined. The Court will, however, often have regard to matters such as the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, any prejudice to the respondents and the merits of the proposed judicial review application: Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 579; [2022] HCA 28 at [12]; SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 (SZTRY) at [6]. I consider that it is appropriate to have regard to those matters in the present case.

The length of the delay and the explanation for the delay

1. Both parties proceeded on the basis that the applicant made his application to this Court 90 days after the end of the 35 day time frame prescribed by s 477(1) of the Migration Act. By my calculations, the applicant made his application to this Court 91 days late. Whether the delay is 90 or 91 days, I accept the Minister's characterisation of the delay as 'significant', and my consideration of the application for an extension of time is the same whether the delay is 90 or 91 days.
2. Based on the grounds for his extension of time application, which were repeated in the applicant's affidavit filed with his application, the applicant's main explanation for the delay is that he was unaware of the time limit.
3. The applicant provided a similar explanation in his written submission, namely:

4. I do not have a lawyer and I have been representing myself.

1. I received the Tribunal decision, but I did not fully understand that I only had 35 days to apply to the Court.

6. I was very stressed and upset after the Tribunal refused my case.

1. I do not have legal knowledge and I did not understand the difference between Tribunal review and Court review.

8. I also do not have much money to get legal advice quickly.

1. After I understood that I could apply to this Court, I prepared and filed my application.
2. I did not delay on purpose. I was confused and did not understand the strict deadline.

1. At the hearing before the Court, I gave the applicant an opportunity to give oral evidence to better explain the reasons for the delay and why he considers it to be necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant the extension of time.
2. In his oral evidence, the applicant said:

(a) he does not have a lawyer and he had to prepare the application himself;

(b) he did not understand the section for the Minister and the Tribunal and he can understand a little bit;

(c) he has learned and researched on his own and that it why it is slow;

(d) at the moment he is financially tight as his wife cannot work and he is the only one working; and

(e) he has to take care of his four year old daughter.

1. The applicant's evidence (and his submission) does not adequately explain a delay of 90 or 91 days in making his application.
2. I accept the applicant did not have the assistance of a lawyer within the period from the Tribunal decision to the application to this Court, and may not have been able to afford to pay a lawyer. However, lack of legal advice is not, of itself, an adequate explanation for the delay: AZX21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 1379 at [11].
3. I am also prepared to accept that the applicant did not, in fact, know of the 35 day time limit to make his judicial review application to this Court. However, that does not adequately explain a delay of 90 or 91 days. It was the applicant's responsibility to ensure that he was aware of any relevant time frames: SZOCH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FMCA 300 at [43]; SZLIH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 108 at [33]. As I discuss below, the applicant was informed by the Tribunal of the time period within which he could make an application for judicial review. However, even if the Tribunal had not given the applicant information about the time frames to seek judicial review, his explanation would still be insufficient. The applicant has not given any specific evidence about the steps he took to find out if there was any applicable time frame (such as contacting the Court or the Tribunal, looking at websites, or asking questions of a migration agent or lawyer). His general explanation that he did not have a lawyer, did not understand and it took time for him to learn lacks specificity and does not show that the applicant took steps to try to find out the information he needed in a timely manner. Ignorance of the relevant time frame does not, of itself, amount to an adequate explanation for a significant delay in making the application: MZZYV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 957 at [25].
4. The affidavit of Ms Cruz Aroca filed on 6 February 2026 annexes a fact sheet which was described as being 'inadvertently excluded from the Court Book'. The fact sheet is published by the Tribunal and titled 'Information About Decisions'. The fact sheet includes a sub-heading 'Review of decisions' and the following information appears under that sub-heading (emphasis added):

Applicants can apply to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (the Court) for judicial review of our decisions. The Court will consider whether we made a jurisdictional error. If you wish to apply for review, you must do so within 35 days of the date of our decision. If you require an extension of time, you must ask for it in the application and explain why. The Court will decide whether or not to grant an extension of time.

1. The Minister provided this fact sheet to show that the applicant was advised of his right to seek judicial review, and the time frame for doing so, at the time he was provided with a copy of the Tribunal decision. However, the affidavit does not expressly or impliedly state that the fact sheet was provided to the applicant or that the deponent has a basis for believing that to be the case. The applicant has not disputed that he received a copy of the fact sheet and, considering the evidence as a whole, I am prepared to accept that it was provided to the applicant. However, the evidence is not presented in a way that would be easy for a self-represented applicant to understand and so it is necessary to take some time to explain the steps that I have followed to infer that the fact sheet was provided to the applicant.
2. The Tribunal sent an email to the applicant's authorised representative on 13 September 2024 and this email is in the court book. The email shows that it contains two attachments, which are both identified by file names consisting of numbers rather than words. The first document in the court book following the email is a covering letter to the applicant's authorised representative which indicates that it encloses a 'letter to applicant with attachments'. The second document in the court book is a letter to the applicant which identifies that it contains two attachments referred to as a 'written record of the outcome of the review' and 'MR25 Information about decisions'. The fact sheet annexed to Ms Cruz Aroca's affidavit has a reference to 'MR25' in the footer. An inference can be drawn from this that the fact sheet annexed to Ms Cruz Aroca's affidavit was included in the letter to the applicant which also enclosed the Tribunal decision, and which is deemed to have been given to him at the end of the day the email was transmitted to his authorised recipient, pursuant to the operation of ss 441C(5) and 441G(1) of the Migration Act.
3. The applicant also referred in his submission to feeling stressed and upset after he received the Tribunal decision. There is no medical or other evidence before the Court to suggest that any stress or upset the applicant felt prevented him from making his application to the Court within time. The applicant also referred in his oral evidence to the need to care for his child. This also does not explain the delay.
4. The lack of an adequate explanation for a significant delay weighs against the grant of an extension of time.

1. The Minister appropriately accepted that he would not face any prejudice if the extension of time were granted beyond the public interest in the finality of administrative decision making. However, the absence of prejudice alone is not sufficient to justify the grant of an extension of time: SZTRY at [6].

The merits of the proposed judicial review application

1. The applicant set out the following grounds in his proposed judicial review application:
   1. The Tribunal misconstrued the risk and fear of significant harm as set out in section 36(2A) of the Migration Act 1958.
   2. The Tribunal construed erroneously (and narrowly) the existence of risk to life and fear of significant harm to the applicant upon his return to Malaysia from moneylender group (Ah-long).
   3. The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the said decision because its "reasonable satisfaction" was not arrived in accordance with the provisions of the Migration Act
   4. The Tribunal has failed to investigate applicant's claim, especially the grounds of persecution in Malaysia.
   5. The second respondent failed to comply with the mandatory requirement under section 424A(read with section 424AA) of the Migration Act to give the applicant clear particulars of information it considered would be part of the reason for affirming the decision under review, to ensure the applicant understood why that information was relevant to the review and the consequence of its being relied upon, and to invite the applicant to comment upon or respond to that information.
2. The applicant in his written submissions referred to other reasons he believes the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error. The applicant relevantly said:
   1. The Tribunal rejected my credibility. I believe some of its conclusions were based on guessing and assumptions rather than clear evidence.
   2. The Tribunal doubted certain people existed and doubted my explanations. I believe these conclusions may not have been logical.
   3. I also believe I may not have been given a full and fair opportunity to respond to the Tribunal's concerns about inconsistencies before they rejected my case.
3. The applicant was afforded an opportunity at the hearing to give more information about and to better explain these proposed grounds. He declined to address the grounds or otherwise explain why he believes the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error.
4. The applicant also referred in the grounds of his extension of time application (extracted at [14] above) to his belief that he was denied procedural fairness. The applicant did not explain the basis of this belief in his oral submissions to the Court and, in the absence of any explanation, the Court infers that the applicant's procedural fairness complaint relates to the matters identified in grounds 3, 4 and 5 of the proposed judicial review application and [18] of his written submission, which relate to procedural fairness.
5. Where the applicant has not sufficiently explained the grounds or provided meaningful detail, I have endeavoured to understand the applicant's grounds (including those in his submission) the best I can and I have interpreted them broadly. Having done this, I do not consider that any of the grounds raised by the applicant have any meaningful prospects of establishing jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision.

The applicant's written submission at [16] and [17]: complaints about the Tribunal's credibility findings

1. The applicant's first complaint about the Tribunal's credibility findings is that some of the findings were based on guessing and assumptions rather than clear evidence. The Tribunal was not required to uncritically accept all the applicant's claims and it was not required to have rebutting evidence before it rejected the applicant's claims: Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1253; (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451. The Tribunal gave carefully considered reasons for rejecting the applicant's evidence, based on inconsistencies and implausibility that it identified in the applicant's evidence. The Tribunal's findings were made based on a careful analysis of the evidence before it and not on guesses or unwarranted assumptions.
2. The applicant's second complaint about the Tribunal's credibility findings is that they were illogical or irrational. The Tribunal's reasons were carefully considered and the findings made by the Tribunal were open to a reasonable and rational decision-maker on the evidence before the Tribunal: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16 at [135]. It was open to the Tribunal to reject the applicant's claims for the reasons it gave, and to doubt the existence of the people whom the applicant claimed assisted him with his protection visa application, given the lack of detail that the applicant provided and the inconsistencies in his evidence.
3. The applicant does not have any reasonable prospect of establishing jurisdictional error in relation to the adverse credibility findings made by the Tribunal.

Grounds 1 and 2: The applicant's allegation that the Tribunal misconstrued the risk of 'significant harm'

1. Proposed grounds 1 and 2 allege that the Tribunal misconstrued the risk of significant harm the applicant would face if he was returned to Malaysia and construed the risk too narrowly.
2. On one level, by these grounds, the applicant appears to be simply expressing disagreement with the Tribunal decision. The applicant's disagreement with the Tribunal decision is not, of itself, sufficient to establish jurisdictional error: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21 at [40].
3. The Tribunal correctly identified in its reasons the relevant law that applied, including but not limited to the test for the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act to which the concept of significant harm is relevant. The Tribunal correctly identified that the meaning of 'significant harm' is set out in s 36(2A) of the Migration Act. The Tribunal annexed the relevant provisions of the Migration Act to its statement of reasons.
4. The Tribunal considered the claim made by the applicant that he would face harm from illegal money lenders in Malaysia and the evidence that he provided in relation to the claim. As can be seen from the summary of the Tribunal decision above, after considering the evidence given by the applicant, the Tribunal made adverse credibility findings and rejected the factual basis of the applicant's claim. Having rejected the whole of the factual basis relevant to the applicant's claim to face harm from money lenders, the Tribunal was not satisfied that there was a real risk the applicant would suffer significant harm as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being returned to Malaysia. Based on the same findings of fact the Tribunal was not satisfied that there was a real chance the applicant would face serious harm if he returned to Malaysia.
5. The Tribunal's conclusion was not based on any construction of the term 'significant harm' or any narrow construction of the circumstances that might amount to a real risk of significant harm. Rather, the Tribunal decision was a consequence of its rejection of the factual basis of the applicant's claim, and I have found above that these findings were open to the Tribunal. There is nothing in the Tribunal reasons or otherwise before the Court to suggest that the applicant would have any reasonable prospect of establishing grounds 1 and 2 if the extension of time were granted.

Grounds 3, 4 and 5 and submission at [18]: The applicant's allegations relating to procedural fairness issues

1. By proposed ground 3, the applicant asserts that the Tribunal's reasonable satisfaction was not arrived at in accordance with the provisions of the Migration Act.
2. The Minister submitted that this ground is a template ground that is meaningless without particulars. As noted above, the applicant chose not to give any further information about his grounds in his oral submissions.
3. In conducting the review, the Tribunal was required to follow the procedures in the Migration Act and it was able to exercise the powers and discretions conferred by the Migration Act on the original decision-maker: s 415(1) of the Migration Act. Pursuant to s 65 of the Migration Act, if a decision-maker is satisfied that an applicant for a visa, amongst other things, satisfies all relevant criteria for the grant of the visa, the decision-maker is to grant the applicant a visa. If the decision-maker is not so satisfied, the decision-maker is required to refuse to grant the applicant a visa. I infer that the 'satisfaction' the application refers to in proposed ground 3 is the satisfaction as to whether he meets the criteria for the grant of a protection visa. I infer that the assertion that the Tribunal's satisfaction was not reached in accordance with the provisions of the Migration Act is an assertion that the Tribunal failed to follow the procedures set out in the Migration Act in reaching its decision. I therefore treat this ground as a procedural fairness ground.
4. The procedural fairness obligations of the Tribunal were, at the time of the review, set out in Division 4 of Part 7 of the Migration Act. The applicant has no reasonable prospects of establishing that the Tribunal failed to comply with these obligations. In particular, I observe that the Tribunal invited the applicant to attend a hearing, as required by s 425 of the Migration Act, and the notice of the invitation to attend the hearing complied with the requirements of s 425A. The applicant attended the hearing and was assisted by an interpreter at the hearing. There is nothing before the Court to suggest that the applicant was not afforded a real and meaningful invitation to attend the hearing.
5. One of the provisions in Division 4 of Part 7 of the Migration Act is s 424A which is the subject of proposed ground 5 of the judicial review application. The applicant asserts that the Minister failed to comply with s 424A of the Migration Act. Section 424A(1) required the Tribunal to give to the applicant clear particulars of information that would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review, to explain to the applicant why the information is relevant and to give the applicant an opportunity to comment on or respond to the information.
6. I accept the Minister's submission that there was no information the Tribunal was required to invite the applicant to comment on pursuant to this provision. That is because the information that the Tribunal relied on in making its decision was the information in the visa application which the applicant provided to the Department, the evidence that the applicant gave to the Tribunal and country information. All of these types of information fall within the exemptions to the requirement to comply with section 424A(1) that are set out in s 424A(3)(a), (b) and (ba) of the Migration Act. I note that [18] of the applicant's written submission alleges that the Tribunal did not give the applicant a sufficient opportunity to comment on inconsistencies in his evidence and I address this assertion further below. However, to the extent that this may be seen as part of the applicant's assertion that the Tribunal failed to comply with s 424A of the Migration Act, it has no reasonable prospects of establishing jurisdictional error. The existence of doubts, inconsistencies and the absence of evidence do not amount to 'information' for the purposes of s 424A of the Migration Act: SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609; [2007] HCA 26 at [18].
7. The applicant has not otherwise made any allegation that the Tribunal failed to comply with any specific provision of the Migration Act and there is no information before the Court to suggest that it is reasonably arguable that the Tribunal failed to comply with any of the provisions in Division 4 of Part 7 of the Migration Act.
8. By proposed ground 4, the applicant asserts that the Tribunal failed to investigate his claims. I treat this ground as one that overlaps with the applicant's assertions that he was denied procedural fairness. The Tribunal does not have any general duty to inquire: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594; [2011] HCA 1 at [20]. In some cases, it may be that a failure to make an obvious inquiry about the existence of a critical fact, the existence of which is easily ascertained, may give rise to jurisdictional error: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429; [2009] HCA 39 at [25]. There is nothing in the material before the Court to suggest that this may be such a case. The applicant, as a person claiming to engage Australia's protection obligations, was responsible for specifying all particulars of his claim to be owed protection and for providing sufficient evidence to establish that claim: s 5AAA of the Migration Act.
9. The Tribunal afforded the applicant a number of opportunities to provide his claims to the Tribunal, both orally and in writing, and it is apparent from the summary of the evidence given by the applicant at the Tribunal hearing, as set out in the Tribunal's reasons, that the Tribunal asked the applicant questions about his claims for protection. There are no reasonable prospects of the applicant being able to establish proposed ground 4 of his application.
10. The applicant otherwise asserted in [18] of his submission that the Tribunal did not give him sufficient opportunity to address any inconsistencies in his evidence. The applicant has not provided any transcript of the Tribunal hearing that would support his assertion that he was not given sufficient opportunity to address the inconsistencies. It appears from the Tribunal's summary of the applicant's oral evidence given at the hearing that it asked him many questions and put to him many of the concerns and doubts it had about his evidence, including doubts based on inconsistencies. The applicant does not have reasonable prospects of establishing jurisdictional error based on his assertion at [18] of his written submission.
11. I have not otherwise identified any basis upon which the applicant would have reasonably arguable prospects of success if the extension of time were granted.
12. The absence of any reasonably arguable merit in the proposed substantive application weighs heavily against the grant of an extension of time.

1. The applicant raised other matters in his submissions, such as the need to care for his child, and that he is the sole income earner in his family. The applicant questioned how he is to work and care for his child if he does not have a visa. He submitted that he is very stressed because he, as the sole income earner, has to pay for his house and car and everything.
2. While the Court understands the concerns expressed by the applicant, they are not matters that weigh in his favour in relation to the consideration of the extension of time application. The Court has no power to grant the applicant any type of visa, and where the applicant has applied for a protection visa, the delegate and the Tribunal on review could only make a favourable decision if he satisfied the criteria for the grant of a protection visa. There is no discretion to grant a protection visa to an applicant who does not satisfy the relevant criteria. The applicant's family responsibilities and his desire to receive a visa so that he can work are not matters that make it necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to grant him an extension of time.

1. The lack of an adequate explanation for the significant delay in applying for judicial review of the Tribunal decision and the absence of any reasonably arguable prospects of success in relation to the proposed judicial review application weigh strongly against the grant of an extension of time. The lack of prejudice to the Minister is not enough, in these circumstances, to warrant the grant of an extension of time. I am not satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to grant the applicant an extension of time. His application is therefore dismissed.

I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Ladhams.

[1]Significant amendments have been made to the Migration Act following the commencement of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth). Unless otherwise stated, all references to the Migration Act in this judgment are references to the provisions of the Migration Act in effect at the relevant time of the events described in this judgment. All references to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal are to the Tribunal as it existed at the time the applicant's matter was before it for review.