Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Collier - [2022] NSWSC 903 - NSWSC 2022 case summary — Zoe

NSWNSWSC

Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Collier

[2022] NSWSC 903

Supreme Court of NSW|2022-04-05|Before: Cavanagh J, Davies J, Muir J

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of NSW

Decision date

2022-04-05

Before

Cavanagh J, Davies J, Muir J

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Judgment (21 paragraphs)

[1]

rt (NSW), Davies J, 16 March 2012, unrep) Collier v Hedges [2012] QDC 86 Collier v Queensland [2010] QSC 254 Collier v Queensland (Supreme Court (QLD), Muir J, 22 December 2005, unrep) Collier v Sengos [1993] NSWCA 67 Collier v Sengos [1993] NSWCA 68 Collier v Sengos [1994] NSWCA 55 Collier v State of New South Wales [2014] NSWCA 442 Collier v State of New South Wales [2014] NSWSC 1073 Collier v State of New South Wales [2014] NSWSC 776 Collier v State of New South Wales [2015] HCASL 132 Collier v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 78 Collier v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 461 Collier v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 1359 Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2017] FCCA 615 Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2018] FCA 1569 Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd (No 3) [2019] FCCA 2995 Collier v Tesoreiro [2017] FCA 1497 NRMA Insurance Ltd v Collier [1996] NSWCA 403 Potier v Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales (2015) 89 NSWLR 284; [2015] NSWCA 129 Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No. 8) [2014] NSWCA 125 Viavattene v Attorney-General (NSW) [2015] NSWCA 44 Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited [2018] NSWCA 317 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Attorney General for the State of New South Wales (Plaintiff) Marion Louise Collier (Defendant) Representation: Counsel: D Birch (Plaintiff)

[2]

Solicitors: Crown Solicitor's Office (Plaintiff) Self-Represented (Defendant) File Number(s): 2019/183521 Publication restriction: Nil

[3]

Judgment

Pursuant to a summons filed on 13 June 2019, the plaintiff, the Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales, seeks orders against the defendant, Marion Louise Collier (Mrs Collier), under s 8(7) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) (the Act).
The proceedings were listed for hearing commencing 5 April 2022. Mr Birch appeared for the plaintiff. Mrs Collier was not legally represented and appeared by audio-visual link (AVL) in accordance with her request to do so.
The plaintiff proposes an order in the following terms: "That Mrs Marion Louise Collier be prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales, without leave of this Court."
Mrs Collier opposes any such order or any orders at all being made.
On the final day of the hearing, I dealt with two motions, being: 1. A motion filed by Mrs Collier on 31 March 2022 seeking an order that the hearing date be vacated and other unrelated orders; and 2. A motion filed by the plaintiff on 18 February 2022 seeking leave to rely on a recently served affidavit of a solicitor for the plaintiff dated 18 February 2022.
For the reasons set out in my judgment, [1] I dismissed Mrs Collier's motion and granted leave to the plaintiff to rely on the further affidavit (which merely brought the matter up to date in terms of identification of any proceedings which had been or were being pursued by Mrs Collier at that time).
During the course of my earlier ex tempore judgment, Mrs Collier interrupted saying she would be appealing my decision and terminated her connection to the AVL deliberately. Following unsuccessful attempts to have Mrs Collier reappear on the AVL, I continued with the delivery of the ex tempore judgment and the hearing of the matter.
At the end of the plaintiff's submissions, I stood the matter over for conclusion of the hearing to the next day so as to provide Mrs Collier with a further opportunity to appear. Again, despite being afforded that opportunity and being aware of the continuation of the proceedings, she did not appear.
Prior to leaving the virtual courtroom, Mrs Collier had provided me with written submissions, as had the plaintiff.

[4]

Principles to be applied

The effect of the orders sought by the plaintiff is that Mrs Collier be precluded from commencing any further proceedings in New South Wales without the leave of this Court.
The relevant sections of the Act are in the following terms: "8 Making of vexatious proceedings order (1) When orders may be made An authorised court may make an order under this section (a vexatious proceedings order) in relation to a person if the court is satisfied that: (a) the person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia, or … (7) Orders that may be made by Supreme Court The Supreme Court may make any one or more of the following vexatious proceedings orders in relation to a person: (a) an order staying all or part of any proceedings in New South Wales already instituted by the person, (b) an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings in New South Wales, (c) any other order that the Court considers appropriate in relation to the person.
The four steps necessary for the Court to make orders under the Act are set out in Zepinic v Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited [2] as follows: (a) The first step is to identify the "proceedings" the subject of the application, which are said to be "vexatious"; (b) The second step is to determine which, if any, of those proceedings is vexatious within the meaning of s 6 of the Act; (c) The third step is to determine whether the person has "frequently" instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia; (d) The power conferred by s 8(7) being discretionary, the court must, as a final step, determine the manner in which the discretion is to be exercised, bearing in mind the wide scope of the power.
"Proceedings" is defined in s 4 of the Act. The definition is broad enough to include all civil proceedings, criminal proceedings, interlocutory proceedings, procedural applications and appeals.
"Vexatious proceedings" is also a defined term. The term is defined as follows: "6 Meaning of 'vexatious proceedings' In this Act, vexatious proceedings includes: (a) proceedings that are an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal, and (b) proceedings instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose, and (c) proceedings instituted or pursued without reasonable ground, and (d) proceedings that are conducted to achieve a wrongful purpose, or in a way that harasses, or causes unreasonable annoyance, delay or detriment, regardless of the subjective intention or motive of the person who instituted the proceedings."
The Court must consider each proceeding individually so as to determine whether that proceeding falls within the definition. [3]
Whilst the definition of vexatious proceedings is not exclusive, it may be difficult to envisage other circumstances which would fall within the meaning of vexatious proceedings but not fall within paras (a) to (d). It is also important to emphasise that whether proceedings are instituted or pursued without reasonable grounds must be assessed objectively. [4] It is not necessary to make a finding that the person against whom the order is sought knew or believed that the proceedings were instituted or pursued without reasonable grounds.
If it were to the contrary, the outcome of an application such as this might be dependent upon an enquiry into the beliefs, views and perceptions of Mrs Collier about each of the proceedings which had been commenced.
Further, proceedings may harass or cause unreasonable annoyance, delay or detriment as referred to in s 6(d) of the Act, even if the person does not intend to harass or cause annoyance, delay or detriment. This is clear from the final phrase in s 6(d) which was added pursuant to the Vexatious Proceedings Amendment (Statutory Review) Act 2018 (NSW).
The first step is to determine whether the person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia. The actual number of proceedings is not determinative. The individual number of proceedings can be small or large, depending on the context of the litigation being considered.
In Potier v Attorney General in and for the State of New South Wales, [5] Leeming JA observed that: "I can readily envisage circumstances where a litigant commences only a handful of large proceedings, making serious allegations without any proper basis, but which occupy a significant amount of time and resources of parties and the courts, which could satisfy the statutory test of 'frequently'. This illustrates the fact that '[t]he issue posed by the statutory term 'frequently' is not to be assessed merely by an arithmetic calculation': Viavattene at [49]."
As his Honour said, "frequently" is not to be assessed merely by an arithmetic calculation. It must be looked at in the context of the litigation being considered. [6]
As set out in s 8(7) of the Act, the Court has a broad discretion as to the orders that may be made which include: 1. an order staying all or part of any proceedings already instituted; 2. an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings; and 3. any other order that the Court considers appropriate in relation to the person.
In considering any order that should be made, it is relevant to have regard to the purpose of a vexatious proceedings order which was explained by the Court in Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No. 8) [7] as follows: "… The purpose of the statutory power is not to punish the litigant for past misdeeds. The purpose is to shield other litigants from harassment and to protect the Court itself from the expense, burden and inconvenience of baseless and repetitious suits …"
In the end, it is necessary to examine each of the proceedings in which Mrs Collier was involved in order to determine whether any, some or all are vexatious proceedings as that term is defined in the Act.
In examining them, I may have regard to the nature of the proceedings, the allegations raised, the way in which the proceedings were conducted and the way in which Mrs Collier has conducted herself before the Court.

[6]

Opportunity to be heard

Having regard to s 8(3) of the Act, it is appropriate that I specify in some detail what happened during the hearing. As set out in s 8(3), a court must not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard.
These proceedings were listed for hearing for two days commencing 5 April 2022.
Prior to commencing the substantive hearing, I heard and gave judgment on the two motions to which I have already referred.
I delivered an ex tempore judgment on 5 April 2022. Whilst I was delivering my ex tempore judgment, Mrs Collier said: "MRS COLLIER: Your Honour, I will be appealing you because you've got everything wrong. HIS HONOUR: That is okay, Mrs Collier. MRS COLLIER: Because I did provide evidence. Their submission didn't come until 25 February. HIS HONOUR: Mrs Collier, please. You can appeal. I will give my judgment. MRS COLLIER: Please give your judgment; I will appreciate it, your Honour."
Immediately thereafter, Mrs Collier terminated her AVL connection. I directed that emails be sent by the solicitor for the plaintiff and my associate to Mrs Collier indicating that I would be continuing my judgment in five minutes and I would be waiting on the bench for her to reconnect her AVL. As she did not do so, I finished delivering my ex tempore judgment.
I then left the Court for a period, again directing that Mrs Collier be informed that I would be recommencing the proceedings at 11.40am. When I returned, Mrs Collier had not reconnected her link but she did send me an email which I placed on the record as follows: "Dear Your Honour, I do not appreciate being deliberately lied about in the manner in which you have and I am not going to put up with deliberate lies further. I have reported such to Police, as I do not know about you, but I for one, do not appreciate everything and anything to do with me, being passed around like lollies at a store. It is quite obvious, you were put up for a purpose and the judgement you gave proved it, you are the most ACTUALLY BIAS person I have ever had the misfortunate to come across, you crossed the line and should excuse yourself, either that your [sic: or] you misheard me and have therefore misquoted me. There would not be a fair and just hearing, as you as a Judge is [sic: are] supposed to do, we will have to leave it up to the Court of Appeal, to hear the transcript tape (without it being made correct). Regards Marion Collier."
I then directed that a further email be sent to Mrs Collier indicating that the proceedings would recommence at 12pm. There being no appearance by Mrs Collier at that time, I proceeded with the application. At the end of the plaintiff's submissions, I adjourned until the next day, again, directing that Mrs Collier be informed that the matter would be recommencing the next day.
On the next morning, Mrs Collier did not appear. I was informed that the solicitor for the plaintiff had missed a call from Mrs Collier that morning. He called her back and she answered the phone. He enquired whether she intended to attend the hearing and she terminated the call. There being no appearance by Mrs Collier and the plaintiff having concluded its case, I reserved my decision and adjourned.
In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that Mrs Collier was given an opportunity of being heard within the meaning of s 8(3) of the Act. Mrs Collier's deliberate termination of the AVL link when she realised that the case would be proceeding was akin to a litigant simply walking out of a courtroom in the middle of the case and declining to participate further in the proceedings.
The requirements of s 8(3) of the Act have been satisfied.

[8]

Mrs Collier's submissions

Mrs Collier filed written submissions on 28 March 2022. She criticises the plaintiff and suggests that members of the Court of Appeal deliberately and intentionally ignored the fact that final orders for preparation of this matter have not yet been made (so it is said).
Mrs Collier disputes all of the contentions of the plaintiff. She suggests that the plaintiff has continuously exercised its power towards her in a manner so as to constitute stalking, bullying, gaslighting, intimidation, harassment, medical negligence, criminal behaviour and a failure of a duty of care.
Mrs Collier says that she has never commenced any proceedings other than with the intention of having justice done. She denies ever commencing any proceedings with the intention of being vexatious. She specifically states that: 1. She has not reagitated any proceedings previously determined in any court; 2. She has never made any allegations against any party of unsubstantiated bias; 3. She has never made any allegations against a party of unsubstantiated perjury, criminal conduct and fraud; 4. She has never commenced any baseless appeals and interlocutory applications; 5. She has never failed to comply with the court rules and timetables without making an application to extend or alter such orders; 6. She has never exercised disruptive behaviour in court on any occasion; and 7. She has never engaged in unnecessary correspondence with the Court not limited to ex parte communications.
On the other hand, she asserts that the plaintiff, through his legal representatives, has engaged in such conduct. She says that there is no basis for any court to declare her vexatious other than for the use of the plaintiff to cover up disgusting and unlawful behaviour of the plaintiff, his legal representatives and numerous other people.
Finally, she says that to make the Orders sought by the plaintiff would be to forever destroy the good and honest name of the Court. She calls to her aid a statement, "he saw a wrong and tried to right it".
Other than in those general terms, Mrs Collier did not make specific submissions about each of the proceedings referred to in the plaintiff's table.

[10]

Collier v Sengos - proceedings in 1993 to 1994

During the period 1993 to 1994, there were seven proceedings in which Mrs Collier was involved arising out of or relating to a property owned by her and her husband and the attempts by the mortgagee to obtain possession of that property.
Mrs Collier and her husband owned a property at Camden (the Camden property). The property was subject to a mortgage to Mr Sengos. Following alleged default on the mortgage, Mr Sengos attempted to take possession of the property but was unable to do so. He filed a summons seeking possession of the property and an order for possession was made on 23 July 1993.
Mrs Collier appealed, also seeking a stay of execution of the order for possession.
As is apparent from the judgment, [8] Mrs Collier interrupted during delivery of the judgment, leading to the following statement from Mahoney JA (as his Honour then was): "Mrs Collier I will have to ask the officer to remove you from the Court unless you behave yourself."
When announcing that there would not be a stay, Mrs Collier said: "So you are ignoring the facts? Can I have these orders made available because I intend to make an application to the High Court this afternoon."
After further comment from the Court, she said: "I understand that and all I can say is that it would help if you read the file adequately because the dogs were nowhere near the house on 3 May."
Eight days later, Mrs Collier made a further application for a stay. Cripps JA held that there was no merit in the application. [9]
Mrs Collier and her husband then filed a summons naming Mr Sengos, a solicitor and a barrister, as defendants to the summons and charging them with contempt of court.
The barrister moved the Court by way of a motion to strike out the summons against him. Mrs Collier had contended that the barrister took part in deception of the Court for breach of his clients' undertaking and interference with the proper administration of justice by reading an affidavit which was false, but she did not adduce evidence on the hearing to establish that the affidavit was false.
Indeed, she asserted that the affidavit was true.
The Court found that the charge of contempt against the barrister was entirely ill-founded and misconceived, [10] stating: "Accordingly, it seems clear that whatever case Mr and Mrs Collier may have against [Mr] Sengos and Mosca, they have no case whatever against Mr Burns. So far as appears from the material before the Court, he was doing no more than his duty as a barrister, presenting the affidavit evidence given to him on the client's behalf by his solicitor. It has not been shown that he has acted in any way other than a proper fashion."
In July 1994, the Court heard a further motion for dismissal of the summons, on this occasion brought by both Mr Sengos and the solicitor against whom she had filed proceedings. The Court made the orders sought in the motion thereby striking out the whole of Mrs Collier's summons, describing the application brought by Mrs Collier and her husband as ill-founded and totally misconceived. [11]
I consider that both the application for a stay in the Court of Appeal and the appeal were vexatious in that they were pursued without reasonable grounds and conducted in a way that caused annoyance, detriment and delay.
I consider that the summons for contempt instituted by Mrs Collier was vexatious in that it was commenced without reasonable grounds and was commenced to harass or annoy and for a wrongful purpose. The allegations against the three defendants were without any foundation at all and must have been pursued for an improper purpose.

[13]

Proceedings arising out of convictions for traffic offences in 2010

In April 2010, Mrs Collier was convicted of six traffic offences following an earlier plea of guilty in the Local Court at Gulgong.
Mrs Collier appealed to the District Court alleging that, although she was present and represented by a solicitor at the time (who told the Court that he was instructed to plead guilty to all matters), she gave no such instructions and further that she never pleaded guilty and never intended to plead guilty. She claimed that her ex-husband had sent the email instructions. She said she had not given permission to plead guilty. Her ex-husband gave evidence stating that he had sent the email in her name and he often did that sort of thing on her behalf.
Mrs Collier further maintained that insofar as the transcript showed her as having made statements amounting to admissions of guilt, the transcript was wrong.
Walmsley SC DCJ found that Mrs Collier did plead guilty to the six offences but he accepted her ex-husband's evidence as to sending the email. Whilst his Honour had concerns about the integrity of the pleas as originally entered, having regard to the substance of the matter and the fact that she was present on several occasions after the plea, he was not convinced that any miscarriage of justice occurred and declined to permit the withdrawal of the pleas.
During the delivery of judgment, Mrs Collier interrupted saying she had been advised by a solicitor to lodge an appeal, asserting that his Honour had "got it all wrong". She said she would be appealing the decision because of its incompetence. She asserted that his Honour had ignored certain matters suggesting that she was not guilty and intended to take it to a court where she could get a just hearing.
Mrs Collier then filed a summons in the Court of Appeal seeking judicial review of that decision. Her summons was dismissed. [14]
The matter then came back before Magistrate Stevenson for resentencing on 26 March 2012 for the offences of driving a vehicle without a licence. Mrs Collier did not attend. Magistrate Stevenson revoked the two bonds and issued fines instead. She was fined $200 in each matter with 28 days to pay.
Immediately thereafter, Mrs Collier wrote to the Deputy Crown Solicitor alleging that the Police prosecutor had misrepresented her on the hearing.
On 1 March 2012, Mrs Collier filed a summons naming the DPP (NSW) as first defendant, Magistrate Stevenson as second defendant and "Magistrates of the Local Court at Penrith" as third defendant. She sought a total of 30 orders being writs of certiorari and mandamus directed at the proceedings in the Local Court.
The matter came before Davies J on 16 March 2012. As is apparent from his Honour's judgment of 16 March 2012, [15] Mrs Collier was proceeding on the basis that she did not accept the correctness of the Court of Appeal's decision and wanted Davies J to review the Court of Appeal's judgment. As his Honour observed, the proceedings were not properly constituted in that she had incorrectly named the defendants. Further, Mrs Collier left the courtroom before his Honour commenced to deliver the reasons because she told him that he was making it very difficult for her and she was obliged to seek the review of the Court of Appeal's decision by approaching the Registrar.
The next day, 17 March 2012, Mrs Collier swore an affidavit in support of a notice of appeal and a new notice of motion. Mrs Collier made unsubstantiated criticisms of the Court as well as the Magistrate. The notice of motion was dismissed on 22 March 2012. [16]
On 27 June 2012, Mrs Collier filed a summons seeking leave to appeal naming the NSW Police Service, the Local Court of NSW and Magistrate Stevenson, arising out of Magistrate Stevenson's orders.
In my view, the summons seeking judicial review, the summons naming the DPP (NSW) and magistrates as defendants and the summons seeking leave to appeal were vexatious proceedings. Mrs Collier had no reasonable prospects of success. She made allegations which could not be substantiated and in the second of those proceedings continued to pursue persons as defendants when there was no legal basis for doing so. She had no reasonable grounds for pursuing the proceedings.

[14]

The proceedings against the State of New South Wales

Mrs Collier commenced proceedings against the State of New South Wales on 28 March 2014. On 28 May 2014, the State filed a motion seeking dismissal of the proceedings pursuant to Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) r 13.4(1).
As set out in the judgment of Harrison J, [17] the State was successful in striking out the proceedings but Mrs Collier was given leave to replead.
She responded to that decision by making an application that Harrison J recuse himself on the grounds of actual or apprehended bias, albeit at the time that the application was made by her, his Honour was not hearing any matter involving her. As his Honour observed, [18] he was not part-heard in any proceedings. His Honour was not scheduled to hear any contest in the future. There was thus no present or anticipated relevance to the application pursued by Mrs Collier.
After dismissal of that application, the State again filed a motion seeking dismissal of the proceedings. The matter first came before Campbell J on 27 August 2014 at which time his Honour extended the time for Mrs Collier to replead and stood over her motion about a subpoena she had issued to the Commissioner of Police for further hearing.
As it turned out, the matter again came before Campbell J on 1 October 2014. At that time, his Honour dismissed the proceedings. [19]
In his judgment, his Honour referred to the various allegations made by Mrs Collier including: 1. Allegations made against New South Wales Police Officers in respect of their conduct between 1986 and February 2004; 2. Allegations made against Officers of the DPP, court officials and a Magistrate during the time period 1990 to May 2014; 3. Allegations made against the Department of Health during the period 2011 to 2014; and 4. Allegations made against various members of Parliament.
His Honour dismissed the proceedings on the basis that the statement of claim did not disclose a serious question to be tried.
During the course of the proceedings, Mrs Collier continued her approach of appearing by telephone, making submissions about matters which were not relevant and terminating the phone call when she apparently did not like what was being said. As the proceedings were dismissed, his Honour did not deal with Mrs Collier's motion in respect of the subpoena.
Mrs Collier sought leave to appeal from the decision of Campbell J. She also filed a motion with an affidavit in support seeking leave to issue various subpoenas. Her motion was determined by Leeming JA. [20]
His Honour observed that the proposed matters of appeal contained no fewer than 47 grounds, many of which would fall outside any question which could possibly arise on appeal. The grounds included that the primary judge had concealed criminal actions of employees of the New South Wales Police Service and Members of the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council.
During the hearing, Mrs Collier accused Leeming JA of being involved in a cover-up and, when requested to withdraw the statement, declined to do so.
The Court of Appeal then heard Mrs Collier's application for leave to appeal from the decision of Campbell J on 30 March 2015. That application was dismissed as were Mrs Collier's motions filed on 25 February 2015 and 11 March 2015. [21]
In the lead-up to the hearing, Mrs Collier again applied to the Court of Appeal Registrar to recuse himself on the grounds of bias. She refused to accept the Registrar's decision and made unfounded allegations against the State's legal representatives. As is apparent from the transcript of the hearing in the Court of Appeal, Mrs Collier continued to make irrelevant submissions in the Court of Appeal, made grandiose statements about being a victim of harassment against her and again made unfounded allegations against the legal representatives of the State.
She then applied for special leave to the High Court. Her application was refused. [22] In her application for special leave, she suggested that members of the Supreme Court Registry and legal representatives of the State had interfered with the administration of justice and further that evidence was suppressed and ignored by the Court of Appeal.
On my review of all of the proceedings which Mrs Collier pursued against the State in respect of her allegations against Police officers, court officers and judicial officers, she: 1. Never particularised or set out any proper cause of action against any of the defendants; 2. Continued to make very serious allegations against a number of people in support of which she never produced any evidence; 3. Continued to make allegations of judicial bias without substance; 4. Made allegations of criminal conduct on the part of the judiciary without any basis for doing so; 5. Conducted herself in a hostile and disrespectful way; 6. Pursued appeals that had no merit or even an arguable case; and 7. Made serious allegations against opposing solicitors without any foundation.
I am satisfied that all of the proceedings instituted and conducted against the State arising out of the statement of claim which she filed on 28 March 2014 were vexatious.

[15]

The Queensland proceedings

In 2003, two persons (who I will not identify) were placed under the care of the Department of Family Services in Queensland.
Mrs Collier appealed from the decision of the Children's Court of Queensland to the District Court of Queensland. Her appeal included an allegation of apprehended bias. Her appeal was unsuccessful. She sought leave to appeal to the Queensland Court of Appeal. Her appeal was dismissed as incompetent. [23] Along the way, Mrs Collier had not complied with various orders relating to the appeal process. She sought leave to appeal to the High Court. Her application was dismissed. [24]
I am satisfied that her appeals to the Queensland Court of Appeal and the High Court were vexatious. They had no reasonable prospects of success. Her appeal to the Court of Appeal was pursued without regard to the Court's processes and requirements.
In 2005, Mrs Collier commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of Queensland making very serious allegations against Police officers, child safety officers and members of Parliament. She was refused leave to file a version she wished to file. Muir J described her pleading as vexatious. [25] The proceedings remained in abeyance until 2009 when costs issues arose. Mrs Collier sought to have the proceedings reinstated. They were ultimately dismissed. [26] As is evident from the judgment, the proceedings had no reasonable prospects of success and included scandalous allegations made about a number of people which were made without any foundation.
I am satisfied that all of these proceedings, including her originating processes, were vexatious. The proceedings were intended to harass and included scandalous allegations made without regard to their accuracy. They had no reasonable prospects of success.
In 2011, Mrs Collier was convicted of breaching a domestic violence order made on 12 February 2008. Mrs Collier appealed to the Queensland District Court. As part of her appeal, she alleged that the arresting Police officer had lied in his evidence (in relation to a Police notebook). She did not adduce any evidence to support that contention and Jones DCJ noted that he was not taken to any material in support of her assertions.
Further, his Honour found that there was no merit in the appeal. [27]
Mrs Collier then appealed to the Queensland Court of Appeal. The Court noted that the appeal replicated the arguments she had advanced in the Queensland District Court. [28]
As part of her appeal, she alleged that there was a private communication between the Judge and the prosecution clerk. Again, there was no foundation to that submission.
Further, she alleged that a certified copy of the original domestic violence order had been given illegally to an employee in the Office of the DPP (QLD), although she made no attempt to substantiate that allegation.
Subsequently, Mrs Collier filed an application for a directions hearing in which she alleged that Counsel for the respondent and the employee of the DPP should be brought before the Court for contempt. In effect, this was a similar application to the type of application she pursued in 1994 against those legal representatives who opposed her in the Collier v Sengos proceedings.
Mrs Collier then commenced proceedings in the Queensland District Court attempting to reagitate the issues that had been determined in the District Court appeal and the original Magistrates Court's decision. Those proceedings were dismissed. [29]
Mrs Collier then sought leave to appeal again to the Queensland Court of Appeal seeking to adduce new evidence. Her application for leave to appeal was dismissed. [30]
She also applied for leave to appeal against the decision to dismiss the proceedings for contempt. That application was dismissed, the Queensland Court of Appeal noting that there was an issue as to whether the application could have ever been fought properly in the Queensland District Court. [31]
Whilst I am not satisfied that the original appeal to the Queensland District Court was vexatious, I am satisfied that the proceedings instituted and conducted by Mrs Collier in the Queensland Court of Appeal were vexatious. Allegations were made as to the conduct of the primary judge which were without foundation. An allegation was made about an employee of the Office of the DPP (QLD) which was not supported by any evidence. Her application to bring persons to court for contempt of court was without foundation and could only have been intended to harass and be brought for a wrongful purpose.
Her application for leave to adduce new evidence was also without foundation as the evidence was irrelevant and available to her in any event.

[16]

Proceedings against the Country Women's Association of New South Wales

On 21 April 2016, Mrs Collier filed a statement of claim in this Court against the Country Women's Association of New South Wales (the CWA) seeking damages from the CWA arising out of alleged defamation of her by the CWA.
The proceedings were listed before the defamation list judge (McCallum J, as her Honour then was) on 3 June and 12 August 2016. Case management orders were made, including that the parties attend a mediation. Attempts to arrange a mediation were unsuccessful, seemingly due to Mrs Collier's inability to make herself available. On 19 August 2016, Mrs Collier wrote to the Court objecting to the matter being listed for hearing, stating that she would be requesting a trial by jury.
On 15 September 2016, Mrs Collier indicated that she would be seeking that McCallum J remove herself from further participation in the proceedings on the basis of perceived judicial bias.
However, Mrs Collier did not pursue that application when the matter again came before her Honour on 16 September 2016. At that time, her Honour rejected Mrs Collier's application to further amend her statement of claim (orders having previously been made about the amendment of the statement of claim). [32]
Mrs Collier then filed a summons seeking leave to appeal in respect of those orders. That application first came before the Court of Appeal Registrar on 14 November 2016. Mrs Collier appeared by phone but terminated the link during the course of argument. The Registrar's attempts to re-engage her were unsuccessful.
On 9 December 2016, Mrs Collier filed a further motion seeking to set aside the orders made by the Registrar on 14 November 2016. In her affidavit in support of this motion she made various assertions including that she was not provided with all relevant information and specifically suggested that: 1. The Registrar had deliberately deleted or withheld information from her; 2. McCallum J had refused to address what she wanted; and 3. The CWA had illegally supplied an incomplete white folder and only supplied material to support their illegal and criminal claim.
On 17 February 2017, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mrs Collier's summons seeking leave to appeal from the decision of McCallum J dated 16 September 2016 and ordered Mrs Collier to pay the costs. [33]
Then, on 8 March 2017, Mrs Collier commenced proceedings in the Equity Division seeking similar orders to those which had been raised during case management of the defamation proceedings. That is, she did not take the opportunity to amend the statement of claim in the defamation proceedings to add the additional cause of action. Rather, she commenced fresh proceedings in the Equity Division.
Mrs Collier's appeals against case management orders in the defamation proceedings having been unsuccessful, the defamation proceedings were again relisted for further case management before McCallum J on 7 April 2017. Her Honour made orders in respect of interrogatories and discovery. [34]
Then, on 21 April 2017, the equity proceedings were listed for case management before the Equity Registrar. Indeed, during the period April 2017 to October 2017, both matters were listed for case management on a number of occasions. [35] Mrs Collier took points such as: 1. Opposing the CWA's answers to interrogatories on the grounds that they were served a day late; 2. Seeking payment of her expenses in travelling to Court; 3. Failing to answer particulars; and 4. Opposing an order that the defamation proceedings and the equity proceedings be heard together.
On 17 October 2017, McCallum J made orders that the proceedings be heard together as well as other case management orders. [36]
Then, on 20 October 2017, Mrs Collier filed a motion in the defamation proceedings seeking orders for issue of subpoenas.
On 24 October 2017, she filed a motion in the leave application proceedings (which were dismissed on 17 February 2017) seeking an order that the orders of the Court of Appeal of 17 February 2017 be stayed. She sought to rely on fresh evidence and also alleged that the leave application proceedings were unconstitutional and conducted in breach of s 109 of the Constitution. She also alleged that the case management orders of 16 December 2016 made by McCallum J were unconstitutional.
Both the defamation and equity proceedings were heard before Adamson J during the period 6 to 10 November 2017. On 17 November 2017, her Honour made an order for judgment for the CWA in the defamation proceedings and dismissed the summons in the equity proceedings. [37]
Thereafter, Mrs Collier's motion in the leave application proceedings came before Gleeson JA for case management.
On 28 November 2017, his Honour dismissed the application for leave. [38]
On 28 November 2017, Mrs Collier filed a notice of appeal in respect of the decision of Adamson J of 17 November 2017.
On 5 December 2017, the CWA filed a motion for security for costs and sought orders that the notice of appeal be struck out on the basis that there was no right of appeal except by leave pursuant to s 101(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW).
On 12 December 2017, Adamson J made costs orders including an order for indemnity costs against Mrs Collier in respect of the defamation and equity proceedings. [39]
The appeal proceedings were then listed before the Court of Appeal Registrar on 6 December 2017 and the Registrar made orders. Nine days later, on 15 December 2017, Mrs Collier filed a motion seeking that the orders of the Registrar be overturned as well as other orders. The orders included that the persons responsible for divulging private and confidential information to the CWA be brought before the Court for punishment, that the person responsible for not filing Mrs Collier's notice of appeal and affidavit on 19 November 2017 be brought before the Court for gross neglect of duty and failure to comply with the code of conduct of the Court, that the solicitor for the CWA be brought before the Court for knowingly swearing a false affidavit and that the Court of Appeal Registrar was negligent and showed "perceived bias" on three separate occasions.
The notice of motion filed 15 December 2017 then came before the Court of Appeal Registrar on 29 January 2018 at which time case management orders were made.
In support of her motion, Mrs Collier prepared a document which was titled "Applicant's Procedural Chronology". In that document she made various unfounded statements about the orders made by Adamson J and the Court of Appeal Registrar and other court staff, as well as assertions about the provision of incorrect information by the respondent.
On 20 January 2018, she forwarded an email to Mr Chris D'Aeth, the Principal Registrar, as well as the Court of Appeal Registrar, the Chambers of the Prothonotary and the Chambers of the Chief Justice, making unfounded allegations about the Principal Registrar, the associates and McCallum J as well as the Registrar of the Common Law Division, suggesting that her appeal would be upheld and that the proceedings would be going to the High Court.
In an email of 20 January 2018 at 8.53am, she accused the Principal Registrar of perpetrating lies and deliberately having criminal intentions. She suggested she would take action against him personally unless he started doing his job and referred to a cover-up.
The motion came before Gleeson JA on 5 February 2018. The transcript reveals that during the hearing, Mrs Collier made further allegations about the conduct of the Registrar of the Court of Appeal and suggested that the Court had deliberately sat on it. She suggested that she was not given a fair hearing, referring it to being "a prejudice Court". [40]
She then filed submissions in respect of her 18 December 2017 motion, again making allegations about deliberate interference by the Court of Appeal Registrar and staff. She made further unfounded allegations about the conduct of Gleeson JA.
On 17 February 2018, she forwarded an email to the Court, again making allegations about the conduct of Gleeson JA in terms of predetermining his decision and being one-sided.
She forwarded a further email on 21 February 2018 at 10.10pm, again making allegations about the Court of Appeal Registrar as well as suggesting that the solicitor for the CWA had engaged in deliberate and intentional deceit, as well as unsubstantiated allegations about Counsel for the CWA.
Mrs Collier then filed a further motion of 22 February 2018 seeking orders that both Gleeson JA and the Court of Appeal Registrar be disqualified for actual bias and that the Deputy Registrar be referred to the Court of Appeal because of criminal conduct. The matter came on for further case management before Gleeson JA on 6 March 2018. Thereafter, she filed a further motion on 16 March 2018 seeking a stay of proceedings and again seeking orders based on an allegation of actual bias on the part of Gleeson JA.
She filed an affidavit of 15 March 2018 in support of her argument. Without any proper foundation, she accused the opposing legal representatives of illegal and unethical conduct.
On 19 March 2018, she filed her summary of argument in her appeal proceedings from Adamson J. Amongst the points she raised with her were allegations that her Honour had declined to abide by "statute law", showed actual bias and deliberately ignored evidence.
On 10 July 2018, the Court of Appeal heard Mrs Collier's appeal and four motions which she was pursuing. The appeal was found to be incompetent in part as Mrs Collier had declined to comply with orders by the Registrar. Her appeal and the motions were dismissed. As the judgment demonstrates, [41] this is another example of Mrs Collier refusing to comply with orders which were intended to facilitate the proper and expeditious determination of appeals.
In my view, all of the CWA proceedings conducted or instituted by Mrs Collier after the filing of the originating process were vexatious. Mrs Collier had pursued a total of ten proceedings against the CWA.
Even the original proceedings filed by Mrs Collier did not disclose a proper cause of action and did not contain essential facts which grounded any cause of action, although I make no finding that in filing the originating process she was instituting vexatious proceedings.
However, from that time, all of the CWA proceedings conducted by Mrs Collier were vexatious.
Mrs Collier: 1. Failed to comply with initial case management orders; 2. Thereafter made allegations of bias against the judge and improper conduct on the part of the opposing legal representatives; 3. Continued to fail to comply with court orders and sought to circumvent the Court's orders by commencing new proceedings in the Equity Division; 4. Conducted hearings and dealt with court staff in a rude, disrespectful and scandalous way, continuing to make allegations of judicial misconduct and misconduct on the part of the opposing legal representatives without any basis; 5. Pursued appeals and motions in the Court of Appeal which had no reasonable prospects of success and without any regard to the ordinary requirements of the appeal process; and 6. Demonstrated her habit or practice of insulting the court and then removing herself (terminating her AVL connection) when she did not get her way.
I am satisfied that each of the proceedings instituted and conducted by Mrs Collier involving the CWA, after the filing of the originating process, were vexatious.

[17]

The Telstra proceedings

On 11 October 2016, Mrs Collier filed an originating application in the Federal Court seeking orders against Telstra and the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman Limited (TIO). The proceedings arose out of her apparent dissatisfaction with the telecommunications service provided by Telstra to her and her dissatisfaction with the TIO's dealing with her complaint. She sought exemplary damages and a pecuniary penalty from Telstra on the basis of its wilful acts which were malicious, oppressive, fraudulent, wanton and grossly reckless. She sought an order that the TIO review her complaint.
When the matter first came before Flick J on 8 November 2016, his Honour stood the matter over in the hope that the parties might resolve their dispute. Telstra made an offer to waive the outstanding balance in her account and offer her a credit. Mrs Collier did not accept the offer. His Honour transferred the matter to the Federal Circuit Court. On 18 November 2016, Mrs Collier refiled the originating application in the Federal Circuit Court.
On 2 February 2017, the TIO filed an application seeking that the originating application be dismissed as an abuse of process.
On 17 March 2017, Mrs Collier filed an application in her case seeking orders including that: 1. Judge Dowdy recuse himself; 2. The matter be remitted back to the Federal Court; and 3. Orders against the solicitor and counsel acting for the TIO.
Her application was dismissed on 28 March 2017. [42] She then appealed to the Federal Court. The appeal was dismissed. [43]
On 1 November 2018, Telstra filed an application in her case seeking an order that the application be summarily dismissed on the basis that the claims were frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process.
Both applications were heard on 12 February 2019. Mrs Collier appeared in person.
On the evidence before the Court, there is reference to Telstra having offered to pay the sum of $2,000 to Mrs Collier. As noted in the judgment, Mrs Collier made a submission to the Court in respect of that offer that Telstra needed to be punished and that she should not be disciplined because she was entitled to proper retribution. [44]
In his judgment, [45] Dowdy J made the following comments: "The hearing on 12 February 2019 extended over a period of two and a half hours and it became clear to me that the Applicant is an intelligent and articulate woman. This accords with the view of Farrell J as expressed in [2018] FCA 1569 at [94]. I was of the view that the Applicant was deriving considerable personal enjoyment from appearing in Court, making submissions and engaging and interacting with the Counsel for Telstra and the TIO and myself as the Judge. It appeared to me as though she viewed the hearing as a sort of game in which she was a privileged participant and from which role she gained a feeling of satisfaction and importance. I gained the clear impression that the Applicant was predominantly interested in using the Court hearing and the proceeding as a whole as a stage on which she might continue to vent her spleen against the Respondents, an anger for which there appears to be no reasonable basis, rather than as a proper means to recover a monetary amount or other recognised form of relief in satisfaction of any claimed legal wrong. Her references at the hearing to seeking 'punishment' and 'proper retribution' against Telstra, recorded at [20] above, informed and confirmed my views in this regard. The simple fact of the matter is that the Applicant has failed to articulate or formulate in writing, or orally at the hearing, any coherent or legally meaningful claim in money terms or otherwise against Telstra, either by reference to material facts or at all. Further confirmation that the Applicant is not seeking to vindicate any asserted breach of her legal rights in good faith is her refusal, for present purposes putting aside the first settlement offer, to accept the second settlement offer or the third settlement offer and the $2,000 paid into Court by Telstra. In my view both the second settlement offer and third settlement offer would have given to the Applicant more than she could ever achieve against Telstra in the present proceeding, which as it stands is nothing. However, she has refused those offers because of her wish to continue to derive personal enjoyment and satisfaction in the continuance of the proceeding and the continuance of her vexation and harassment of Telstra for no good or sufficient reason. In the circumstances, the continuance of the proceeding against Telstra at the behest of the Applicant serves no proper utility and it should be terminated."
At the same time as Mrs Collier was pursuing the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court, she commenced new proceedings in the Federal Court, presumably as an attempt to have the issues agitated in that Court rather than the Federal Circuit Court. The Registrar of the Federal Court refused to accept the documents. She applied for judicial review. Bromwich J set aside the Registrar's decision on the basis that not all of the orders she sought were identical to the existing proceedings being pursued in the Federal Circuit Court. [46]
Mrs Collier sought leave to appeal from the judgment of 28 March 2017. [47] That application was dismissed. [48] In her grounds of appeal, Mrs Collier made scandalous allegations without any foundation including that the primary judge had acted in breach of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), fabricated court proceedings and deliberately accepted statements that he knew not to be true.
In the judgment, Farrell J made a number of observations about Mrs Collier's conduct including that: 1. The tenor of many of her communications with the primary judge's chambers and Registry staff was unacceptably uncivil and based on perceptions which were not available even on a rational basis. [49] 2. Her own unwillingness to comply with the Judge's directions against ex parte communications with the Judge's chambers led to many of the misunderstandings and an unnecessarily protracted decision-making about which she complains. 3. Mrs Collier takes offence and draws conclusions from other people's conduct that a reasonable person would not in the same circumstances. Her resulting immoderate characterisations of the conduct of others as asserting that she was lying, as harassing and intimidating her and as untruthful, dishonest or biased were unjustified on the material set out.
Her Honour observed that nothing that he had seen justified the scandalous claims that she made against the primary judge, members of the Registry and members of the legal profession. [50]
Other than her application for review determined by Bromwich J, each of the proceedings instituted and conducted by Mrs Collier as part of the Telstra proceedings, were vexatious. Whatever the substance of her dissatisfaction with Telstra's service, she made claims in her originating process as to the intentions of Telstra which were without substance and had no prospects of success.
Thereafter, she conducted the litigation in a manner intended to delay and annoy. She declined to comply with orders of the Court. She duplicated proceedings and made allegations particularly against judicial officers and court staff which were scandalous and without substance. She instituted and continued proceedings that had no prospects of success.

[18]

The current proceedings

These proceedings were commenced by the filing of the summons by the plaintiff on 13 June 2019.
The filing of the summons has led to the following further proceedings instituted by Mrs Collier being: 1. A notice of motion filed by Mrs Collier on 8 September 2021 which was dismissed by Beech-Jones CJ at CL on 17 November 2021; [51] 2. A summons filed on 14 December 2021 in the Court of Appeal seeking leave to appeal from the dismissal of that motion which was dismissed on 15 March 2022; [52] 3. An application by Mrs Collier seeking leave to issue a subpoena which was refused by Hamill J on 24 March 2022; [53] 4. A notice of motion filed by the plaintiff seeking access to certain court files in relation to nine identified proceedings which Mrs Collier opposed, suggesting that the plaintiff was on a fishing expedition and had not obtained her permission for the production of the documents and that the proceedings were frivolous and vexatious. Ierace J made the orders sought by the plaintiff; [54] 5. A summons seeking leave to appeal was filed by Mrs Collier on 25 November 2020 in respect of the decision of Ierace J. Mrs Collier alleged actual bias on the part of his Honour and breach of statute on the part of the solicitors for the plaintiff. That is, an allegation of perjury which was without foundation; [55] 6. A notice of motion filed by Mrs Collier in the Court of Appeal on seeking an order for a stay of these proceedings. The motion was dismissed with costs; [56] 7. On 31 March 2022, Mrs Collier filed a motion seeking that the hearing be vacated and a stay of execution on two State Revenue fine enforcement notices. This is the motion which I dismissed on 5 April 2022; [57] and 8. On 31 March 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to rely on the further affidavit of Tom Alexander Allchurch which merely annexed further proceedings which the plaintiff had become aware of subsequent to Mr Allchurch's earlier affidavit. Mrs Collier opposed the plaintiff being given leave to rely on that further affidavit without any proper basis for doing so. [58]
In the institution and conduct of the proceedings to which I have referred, Mrs Collier continued her habit of: 1. Lodging appeals in the Court of Appeal which had no substance and did not have reasonable prospects of success; 2. Making unsubstantiated allegations of bias against judicial officers and allegations of perjury or professional misconduct on the part of solicitors representing the opposing party; 3. Terminating her AVL connection (that is, walking out of Court) when she did not like what was being said; 4. Corresponding directly with the Court including making false and unfounded allegations of improper conduct on the part of the judicial officer; and 5. Maintaining points which had no prospects of success without identifying any reason or substance for doing so.
Even in her approach to resisting the orders sought by the plaintiff, Mrs Collier has demonstrated her penchant for conducting proceedings without regard to the prospects of success, without regard to court orders and procedures and in a rude and offensive manner.

[19]

Conclusion

The plaintiff has identified 56 proceedings which it submits would fall within the meaning of "vexatious" in the Act.
I have conducted a review of the proceedings instituted or conducted by Mrs Collier over the past 28 or so years, although I have not necessarily referred to every proceeding in which she has been involved.
I am not required to make a determination that every proceeding that Mrs Collier has instituted or conducted is vexatious. The question is whether she has frequently instituted and conducted vexatious proceedings, not whether some specific number or percentage of the proceedings are vexatious. Having said that, as I have already identified, Mrs Collier has instituted and conducted a large number of proceedings which I consider to be vexatious within the meaning of the Act. Indeed, she has instituted and conducted proceedings which would fall within the meaning of vexatious since 1994.
I am satisfied that she has frequently instituted and conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia.
I still have a discretion whether to make a vexatious proceedings order and a discretion as to the form of order that might be made.
As will be apparent from the review I have just undertaken, Mrs Collier has been conducting proceedings particularly in New South Wales for a period of at least 28 years. Whilst there are some proceedings which I am satisfied are not vexatious, such as the NRMA proceedings and the initial proceedings she pursued against the DPP, a substantial number of the proceedings which she has instituted or conducted are vexatious as that term is understood in the Act.
Mrs Collier has filed an originating process on a number of occasions without any proper grounds for doing so.
She then has a habit of responding to decisions, orders or statements that she does not like by: 1. Appealing against even case management orders that do not suit her; 2. Lodging stay applications and appeals generally that have no reasonable prospects of success; 3. Duplicating proceedings such as commencing proceedings in the Equity Division rather than the Common Law Division to circumvent orders which might have been made; 4. Declining to comply with even basic requirements for properly identifying the case which she seeks to pursue and pursuing proceedings without any reasonable grounds for doing so; 5. Deliberately disrupting proceedings by interrupting with baseless allegations and complaints about the judicial officer and assertions of error; 6. Accusing judicial officers of actual or apprehended bias; 7. Making offensive and scandalous comments about registrars and judges and other persons without any basis for doing so; and 8. Making allegations against opposing legal representatives as to misconduct and indeed perjury without foundation.
Her conduct of even these proceedings tends to confirm this practice or habit culminating in her deliberate termination of her AVL connection, declining to further participate and as a final step, forwarding an email to my Chambers making various allegations about the way I was conducting the hearing and my motives.
I mention this only because, even on the application to determine whether a vexatious proceedings order should be made, Mrs Collier showed herself as incapable of conducting the proceedings in any orderly or proper way. On my review, her propensity to make unsubstantiated allegations about the Judge, court staff and opposing legal representatives has only escalated in recent years. This has been most apparent in her conduct of the proceedings against the CWA, the proceedings against the State of NSW, the proceedings against Telstra and these proceedings. Having said that, as long ago as 1994, she instituted proceedings for contempt against three persons without any proper basis for doing so.
In the circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make the order proposed by the plaintiff. I am not satisfied that Mrs Collier will adopt any different approach to the conduct of any litigation she may wish to pursue in the future and thus I do not consider that I should exercise any discretion not to make the order.
I make an order that Mrs Marion Louise Collier be prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales, without leave of this Court.

[21]

Endnotes

Attorney-General for State of New South Wales v Collier (No 1) [2022] NSWSC 457.
[2018] NSWCA 317 at [13]-[15] (per Simpson AJA, McColl and Macfarlan JJA agreeing) (Zepinic).
Viavattene v Attorney-General (NSW) [2015] NSWCA 44 at [43]-[44] (per Leeming JA, Beazley P and Basten JA agreeing) (Viavattene); Zepinic at [17].
Attorney-General v Altaranesi [2013] NSWSC 63 at [19] (Slattery J).
(2015) 89 NSWLR 284; [2015] NSWCA 129 at [117].
Attorney General of NSW v Wilson [2010] NSWSC 1008 at [12] (Davies J); Attorney General of NSW v Croker [2010] NSWSC 942 at [22] (Fullerton J); Attorney General in and for the State of NSW v Gargan [2010] NSWSC 1192 at [7] (Davies J)
[2014] NSWCA 125 at [56].
Collier v Sengos [1993] NSWCA 67.
Collier v Sengos [1993] NSWCA 68.
Collier v Burn [1994] NSWCA 53.
Collier v Sengos [1994] NSWCA 55.
NRMA Insurance Ltd v Collier [1996] NSWCA 403.
Collier v Director of Public Prosecutions [1994] NSWCA 54.
Collier v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2011] NSWCA 202.
Collier v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Supreme Court (NSW), Davies J, 16 March 2012, unrep).
Collier v Cook [2012] NSWCA 50.
Collier v State of New South Wales [2014] NSWSC 776.
Collier v State of New South Wales [2014] NSWSC 1073.
Collier v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 1359.
Collier v State of New South Wales [2014] NSWCA 442; Collier v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 461.
Collier v State of New South Wales [2015] NSWCA 78.
Collier v State of New South Wales [2015] HCASL 132.
CAO v Department of Child Safety [2009] QCA 169.
CAO v Department of Child Safety [2009] HCASL 259.
Collier v Queensland (Supreme Court (QLD), Muir J, 22 December 2005, unrep).
Collier v Queensland [2010] QSC 254.
Collier v Hedges [2012] QDC 86.
CAO v Hedges [2013] QCA 1.
CAO v HAT [2013] QDC 42.
CAO v HAT [2014] QCA 61.
CAO v HAT [2014] QCA 61.
Collier v Country Women's Association of New South Wales [2016] NSWSC 1361.
Collier v Country Women's Association of New South Wales [2017] NSWCA 22.
Collier v Country Women's Association of New South Wales (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 422.
See eg, Collier v Country Women's Association of New South Wales (No 3) [2017] NSWSC 604.
Collier v Country Women's Association of New South Wales (No 4) [2017] NSWSC 1411.
Collier v Country Women's Association of NSW [2017] NSWSC 1573.
Collier v Country Women's Association of New South Wales [2017] NSWCA 303.
Collier v Country Women's Association of NSW (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 1729.
Collier v Country Women's Association of New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 36.
Collier v Country Women's Association of New South Wales (No 3) [2018] NSWCA 184.
Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2017] FCCA 615.
Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2018] FCA 1569.
Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd (No 3) [2019] FCCA 2995.
Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2017] FCCA 615 at [35]-[37].
Collier v Tesoreiro [2017] FCA 1497.
Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2017] FCCA 615.
Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2018] FCA 1569.
Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2018] FCA 1569 at [95].
Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2018] FCA 1569 at [97].
Attorney General for New South Wales v Collier [2021] NSWSC 1483.
Collier v Attorney General for New South Wales (No 2) [2022] NSWCA 40.
Attorney General v Collier [2022] NSWSC 323.
Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Collier [2020] NSWSC 1572.
Collier v Attorney General for New South Wales [2021] NSWCA 16.
Collier v Attorney General for New South Wales [2022] NSWCA 26.
Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Collier (No 1) [2022] NSWSC 457.
Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Collier (No 1) [2022] NSWSC 457. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 06 July 2022

Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Collier

At a glance

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Judgment (21 paragraphs)

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Legislation Cited (5)

Cases Cited (50)

Cited By (2)