(c) The Privacy Proceedings;
69Mr Altaranesi brought a large number of privacy proceedings, some 25 altogether. In these proceedings he claimed in various ways that the Area Health Service and its employees breached his privacy. Each one of these proceedings has been dismissed. Mr Altaranesi's conduct in this group of proceedings is the pre-eminent reason for the Court making a vexatious proceedings order under s 8 of the Act. The privacy proceedings started with Mr Altaranesi filing an application on 15 December 2008 in the matter KT v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2010] NSWADT 102. They concluded with his filing applications for special leave to appeal in the High Court on 28 February 2012 and 2 April 2012: Tareq Altaranesi v Administrative Decisions Tribunal & Anor [2012] HCASL 126 and [2012] HCASL 129. The High Court dealt with and dismissed both applications for special leave to appeal on the papers on 15 August 2012. It is necessary to consider the detail of these various applications commencing in December 2008.
70Mr Altaranesi's claims of breach of privacy were made under the Privacy and Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 ("the Privacy Act") and the Health Records and Privacy Information Act 2002 ("the Health Records Act"). Mr Altaranesi commenced the first ADT action under these two Acts on 15 December 2008, which was decided by Judicial Member Molony on 12 February 2010: KT v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2010] NSWADT 102 [Tab 6]. Mr Altaranesi's ADT application was for a review, under the Privacy Act and the Health Records Act, of the conduct of a doctor and another employee employed by the Area Health Service, who were each alleged to have disclosed Mr Altaranesi's health or personal information to third parties without his consent.
71The ADT rejected Mr Altaranesi's case on the facts. The ADT found that the doctor had disclosed Mr Altaranesi's health information with his consent and rejected Mr Altaranesi's contrary account as "untruthful", and further found that Mr Altaranesi's allegations against that doctor were "unsupported and false": (at [9]).
72The ADT also rejected Mr Altaranesi's application on an issue of law. The Tribunal found that the information disclosed was neither health information nor personal information and being the kind of information described in the Court of Appeal's decision in Vice-Chancellor Macquarie University v FM [2005] NSWCA 192, did not attract the operation of the Privacy Act or the Health Records Act: (at [10]). In the result therefore Mr Altaranesi was "entirely unsuccessful": (at [11]).
73The ADT then made adverse cost orders against Mr Altaranesi after hearing submissions in relation to costs. The ADT did so in the context of Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997, s 88 ("the ADT Act") which provides the general rule that parties are to bear their own costs, unless in the ADT's discretion identified factors warrant the ADT making an order for costs in the circumstances. Those factors include "vexatiously conducting the proceedings", "prolonging unreasonably the time taken to complete the proceedings".
74The ADT exercised its ADT Act, s 88 discretion and awarded costs. Its findings well demonstrate that these proceedings were "vexatious proceedings" within s 6 of the Act. The ADT made the following findings relevant to the exercise of its costs discretion. Mr Altaranesi filed and relied upon "extensive materials" which the ADT found "not relevant": (at [18]). When prosecuting his claim Mr Altaranesi filed "a large volume of irrelevant material and made submissions going to issues beyond the scope of the internal review", issues which at the hearing "he repeatedly persisted in trying to press": (at [44]). This had the result of increasing the "complexity and difficulty" of the proceedings: (at [44]). Various of Mr Altaranesi's claims and submissions were described as "always untenable and bound to fail" (at [35]), as being "untenable", which was "clear from the start" (at [40] and [41]), as "pressing some claims which....were vexatious" (at [47]). I accept the Attorney's submissions that this was "vexatious proceedings" within s 6 of the Act. I infer from Mr Altaranesi's persistence in unsubstantiated contentions in this matter and from the volume of material filed and from the lack of tenable argument that the proceedings were an abuse of process, were without reasonable ground and were instituted with the intention and the effect of harassing, annoying and causing delay and detriment to the Area Health Service and its individual employees.
75Although the next ADT privacy proceeding was decided on 15 April 2010, after KT v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2010] NSWADT 102 [Tab 6], it was initiated before that other matter. In this next matter (KT v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2010] NSWADT 94 [Tab 7]) Mr Altaranesi alleged that he had been denied or delayed access to his own health information contrary to the Privacy Act and the Health Records Act after one ADT member recused herself the matter came before Judicial Member Molony who found that Mr Altaranesi had not demonstrated any contravention of the principles promulgated under the Privacy Act or the Health Records Act and decided to take no action on the review (at [55] and [56]). The ADT found there to be some arguable substance to this complaint, and the Attorney does not allege it was vexatious. The Attorney's position in my view is correct. This was not "vexatious proceedings".
76But the same is not true of Mr Altaranesi's appeal from the two earlier privacy provision proceedings, KT v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2010] NSWADT 102 [Tab 6] and KT v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2010] NSWADT 94 [Tab 7], which the ADT Appeal Panel decided on 2 September 2010: KT v Sydney South West Area Health Service (GD) [2010] NSWADTAP 60 [Tab 8]. The Appeal Panel dealt with both aspects of Judicial Member Molony's Tab 6 decisions, the dismissal of the review and the cost application, together with an appeal from the Tab 7 decision. It is not necessary to enter into detail in relation to the Appeal Panel's findings that all three appeals be dismissed other than to identify a number of findings that reaffirm the continuation in this appeal of Mr Altaranesi's patterns of litigious conduct. The Appeal Panel could find "no error in the approach adopted by the Tribunal": at [32]. "There is nothing about [the ADT's] decision (though KT would no doubt disagree) that suggests its judgment involved any manifest injustice": at [47]. And "in our view there was nothing exceptional about the way the Tribunal dealt with this case": at [60].
77Mr Altaranesi initiated his next privacy proceeding with the ADT on 25 September 2010: Kt v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2010] NSWADT 227 [Tab 9]. In this matter he alleged contraventions of the information protection principles under the Privacy Act and the health privacy principles under the Health Records Act. Mr Altaranesi's application alleged disclosure of his personal information for unlawful purposes to lawyers, doctors, other employees, police and insurers. The Area Health Service challenged the ADT's restriction to deal with the proceedings and the ADT dismissed Mr Altaranesi's claims on the basis of lack of jurisdiction, on the basis of lack of merit in the complaint and on the basis of non acceptance of Mr Altaranesi's evidence: KT v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2010] NSWADT 227 [Tab 9]: at [13], [14], [76], [77], [79] and [141]. On the basis of the ADT's findings I conclude that this was a "vexatious proceeding" within s 6(c) of the Act in that it was "without reasonable ground".
78Mr Altaranesi appealed to the Court of Appeal against the result in KT v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2010] NSWADTAP 60 [Tab 8]. He filed his Notice of Motion in the Court of Appeal on 30 November 2010 against the decision of the Appeal Panel on 2 September 2010, dismissing the allegations in the three matters. Campbell JA, sitting as a Court of Appeal, determined Mr Altaranesi's motion on 13 December 2010: Altaranesi v Administrative Decisions Tribunal [2010] NSWCA 378. Mr Altaranesi's motion sought two classes of order: (1) dealing with the costs he had been ordered to pay in the ADT pending the outcome of his appeal; (2) reviewing the merits of the case; and (3) contending that the decision of the ADT had been obtained by fraud. Two of these three matters were entirely without merit. The other could probably have been dealt with without the need for a motion.
79The Area Health Service gave undertakings that disposed of the costs issue. But the other two issues were dismissed. Campbell JA found that it might be possible for Mr Altaranesi to argue a case of jurisdictional error or denial of procedural fairness as an appeal on a question of law within the ADT Act, s 119: at [6] - [8]. But Campbell JA found that the contention that the decision below was obtained by fraud "depended upon a factual base which has not yet been established" and "is not the sort of allegation that can be made in an appeal brought under ADT Act, s 119". In any event, his Honour found that the appropriate place for such an attack would be in the original jurisdiction of the Court in its Equity Division, not in the Court of Appeal: at [10].
80Apart from the costs issue, Mr Altaranesi put nothing of substance before Campbell JA in this proceeding. The remainder of his Honour's reasoning dealt with ways that his Honour thought that the proceedings might be advanced. This was somewhat of an explanation to Mr Altaranesi, in his Honour's reasons, about the available legal avenues for him. But none of what Campbell JA said in my view is a basis to infer that Mr Altaranesi was actually advancing a reasoned case based valid upon points of law articulated in accordance with orthodox principle. The proceedings were dismissed because they lacked legal merit. In my view these were also, for that reason, "vexatious proceedings" within the meaning of paragraph 6(a) and (c) of the Act.
81Mr Altaranesi's next privacy proceedings was the result of a 12 February 2010 application to the ADT and was based on a deemed refusal of his prior FOI request to the Area Health Service. On 3 March 2011 the ADT (Judicial Member Molony) affirmed the deemed decision to refuse Mr Altaranesi access to the documents the subject of the FOI request: Altaranesi v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2011] NSWADT 43 [Tab 11]. This is a matter in which the Attorney did not allege was vexatious and was one on which, therefore, Mr Altaranesi relied to show that on balance he was well able to initiate competent and meritorious proceedings. Although I do not find this was a "vexatious proceedings" within s 6 of the Act, nevertheless it gives little comfort to the Court that Mr Altaranesi was focused upon the meritorious and reasonable exercise of his rights.
82Mr Altaranesi is both ready and determined to burden his opponents and public authorities with complexity and prolixity. Between December 2009 and the filing of proceedings in February 2010 this Tab 11 matter shows that Mr Altaranesi had been corresponding with the Area Health Service seeking the entire health information about him in the files maintained by various doctors and departments. The Area Health Service took the position that, relying upon FOI Act, s 25(1)(a) that the work involved in dealing with his application for access would "substantially and unreasonably divert the agency's resources away from...the exercise of its functions". Rather than modify, reduce or focus his requests to make them more manageable, Mr Altaranesi continued to insist upon them in full and made other requests. When the matter came before the ADT it concluded that by December 2010 Mr Altaranesi had "amended and amplified his request": at [54]. But the amendment was not just to preserve the volume of his existing requests. Rather it was a tactic to try and avoid the effect of FOI Act, s 25(1)(a), whilst not sacrificing any of his requests, as the ADT found: at [56]. The ADT accepted that the work involved in processing Mr Altaranesi's amended request would substantially and unreasonably divert the Area Health Service's resources; and, it affirmed the deemed refusal of access to the documents: at [78].
83Although Mr Altaranesi had an arguable right to access the documents, this case [Tab 11] shows his tendency, also evident elsewhere, deliberately to add to the burden of requests to his opponents. Such conduct is particularly relevant in the other cases where the Court finds "vexatious proceedings" within s 6(b) and (d) of the Act.
84Mr Altaranesi took the Appeal Panel proceedings, KT v Sydney South West Area Health Service (GD) [2010] NSWADTAP 60 [Tab 8], decided on 2 September 2010, further with a costs argument, decided on the papers on 4 March 2011. The Appeal Panel's decision in dismissing the appeals included directions for submissions on costs, which both sides filed, asking for costs. The Appeal Panel was required to apply ADT Act, s 88 which presumes parties will bear their own costs of ADT proceedings unless one or other party is guilty of vexatious or other similar conduct. In the result the Appeal Panel ordered Mr Altaranesi to pay the Area Health Service's costs: KT v Sydney Local Health Network (formerly South West Area Health Service) (No. 2) (GD) [2011] NSWADTAP 8 [Tab 12] at [34]. In doing so the Appeal Panel criticised Mr Altaranesi's conduct in ways that found an inference that these were "vexatious proceedings" within s 6 of the Act.
85With respect to the three concurrent appeals, the Appeal Panel's key findings were: (1) Mr Altaranesi's pursuit of the appeal was "a continuation of the same unacceptable conduct as he had shown at first instance before the ADT" (at [27]); (2) Mr Altaranesi "has continued to pursue a claim found by the Tribunal to be untenable" (at [27]); and having dealt with two of the appeals, (3) the Appeal Panel's view of the third appeal was "this appeal was not as unmeritorious as the other appeal...and did not take up a lot of time at hearing" (at [31]). The Appeal Panel's conclusions were the majority of these appeal proceedings were occupied with unmeritorious time wasting points that I infer were, brought without reasonable ground, and had the effect of causing harassment, annoyance, delay and detriment such that it was an abuse of process and "vexatious proceedings" within s 6(a) - (d) of the Act.
86On 5 October 2010 Mr Altaranesi appealed to the Appeal Panel against two other ADT decisions, KT v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2010] NSWADT 131 [Tab 23] of 20 April 2010 and KT v Sydney South West Area Health Service [2010] NSWADT 227 [Tab 9] of 24 September 2010. ADT Act, ss 112 and 113 require appeals to be on questions of law, or brought with leave, as to the merits. Mr Altaranesi's appeals against both decisions failed, for reasons from which I infer this appeal was "vexatious proceedings" under s 6 of the Act. Leave to appeal against the first [Tab 23] decision, was not granted. The Appeal Panel found that Mr Altaranesi had "no arguable case in relation to the Tribunal's exercise of its discretion" on the three discretionary judgments being challenged: at [24]. In relation to the second judgment appealed against, at [Tab 9], the position was even stronger against Mr Altaranesi. The Appeal Panel found that the ADT had undertaken a thorough investigation of the matters under review and in respect of the various complaints said that the ADT had "dealt thoroughly with the issues raised by [Mr Altaranesi] and its findings are unassailable": at [48]. In respect of another complaint that the Area Health Service's supplying documents under subpoena constituted a "fraud" on Mr Altaranesi, the Appeal Panel found "there is no basis for this allegation. The Agency had a legal duty to respond to the subpoena": at [54]. On another complaint where the Tribunal was being invited to re-open the merits of the case the Tribunal said "this case received close and careful consideration by the Tribunal below. It made detailed findings on the evidence placed before it, and has had regard to the applicable law. There are no errors of law in its analysis. There needs to be an end brought to this dispute": at [70]. The Appeal Panel left open issues of costs which became the forum for another contest.
87The Appeal Panel's decision of 18 March 2011 [Tab 13] left open the issue of costs of the appeal. The Appeal Panel, through its President, determined the issue of costs on 28 September 2011: KT v Sydney Local Health District (formerly Sydney South West Area Health Service) (No. 2) (Costs) [2011] NSWADTAP 42 [Tab 15]. In this decision the Appeal Panel, declined to grant Mr Altaranesi costs against the Area Health Service and awarded costs against him for the subject appeal. By the time this case was decided the President had already experienced a number of Mr Altaranesi's applications to the Appeal Panel. And he made comments in dismissing the cost application, about the course of the litigation to that point. The learned President's comments assist this Court in inferring that these, and indeed the earlier proceedings, were vexatious.
88The President's comments were sharply critical of Mr Altaranesi's conduct. A few examples will suffice. The President was not prepared to grant costs concessions "to an unsuccessful litigant in person who has been involved in numerous findings in the Tribunal...who should have acquired some understanding of the need to exercise the right of appeal with care and for the need of economy and focus in the presentation of arguments and material" at [12]. The President commented on Mr Altaranesi's grounds of appeal: that he had "adopted a scattergun approach", and that "they read like chapter headings from a textbook", and moreover, "many of the grounds had no explanation and lacked in my view any reasonable basis": at [94]. The President thought that the costs orders were justified because "the appellant brought a weak case to the Appeal Panel", and he "raised numerous points, most of them having no merit", and he conducted the case "to put in issue all aspects of it" with the result that "the proceedings had been unreasonably prolonged, giving rise to unnecessary costs": at [22]. In summary, Mr Altaranesi's cost application was "without merit": at [21].
89This particular piece of litigation KT v Sydney Local Health District (formerly Sydney South West Area Health Service) (No. 2) (Costs) [2011] NSWADTAP 42 [Tab 15] is a very clear example of Mr Altaranesi's litigious conduct which qualifies under every paragraph of the Act's s 6 definition of "vexatious proceedings".
90On 16 July 2010 Mr Altaranesi wrote to the privacy officer of the Area Health Service complaining about seeking review of the use by Ms Jackie Mills, an employee of the Area Health Service, of Mr Altaranesi's personal information. An internal review took place, which was not to Mr Altaranesi's satisfaction. And on 15 September 2010 Mr Altaranesi filed an application for review, which was determined on 15 July 2011: KT v Sydney Local Health Network [2011] NSWADT 171 [Tab 14]. Here Mr Altaranesi sought review under the Privacy Act in respect of the Area Health Service's use and disclosure of his personal information. The reasons of Judicial Member Molony reflect a struggle by that judicial officer to contain Mr Altaranesi's conception of the issues within reasonable boundaries. The conflict between the Judicial Member's sense of relevance and Mr Altaranesi's desire to litigate every issue is palpable in many parts of the reasons: "it is a matter that would ordinarily have been completed in half a day. The proceedings was protracted by KT's persistent attempts to introduce, rely upon ad cross-examine about matters which fell outside the scope of the review". The Judicial Member was sure that Mr Altaranesi's conduct was deliberate, saying that the limits on the scope of the Tribunal's review under the Act "are matters about which KT was well aware, having been advised of the number of cases, as well as this case": at [15] - [16]. This is a further demonstration of Mr Altaranesi's persistence against reasonable advice, in pressing irrelevant issues forward. In this case it resulted in attempting to lead "a substantial body of evidence going to issues outside the scope of the review", much of which was struck out.
91Here too there was a recusal application on the ground of the Judicial Member's alleged apprehended bias. The Judicial Member found the application was simply a result of "the matter not proceeding as [Mr Altaranesi] had hoped, and his dissatisfaction with what had occurred": at [27].
92The evidence in this case repeated letter writing and requests for internal review, which in the Judicial Member's opinion constituted a "an abuse of the processes established by the Act": at [65].
93In my view this proceeding qualifies as "vexatious proceedings" within every paragraph of s 6 of the Act. It was pursued without reasonable ground. It involved deliberate protraction of the proceedings. It was an abuse of process. And it undoubtedly caused harassment, annoyance, delay and detriment.
94Judicial Member Molony then had to deal with the question of costs arising out of his earlier decision KT v Sydney Local Health Network [2011] NSWADT 171 [Tab 14]. Mr Altaranesi opposed the making of cost orders against him, despite the determination adverse to him in the substantive proceedings. He argued that the ADT had no power to award costs in the review of conduct under the Privacy Act. Mr Altaranesi was unsuccessful in this contention in a decision that Judicial Member Molony gave on 6 October 2011: KT v Sydney Local Area Network [2011] NSWADT 233 [Tab 16].
95Judicial Member Molony's reasons for awarding costs against Mr Altaranesi throw further light on the conduct of the proceedings and the cost application itself. Judicial Member Molony's findings support the inference, which I draw, that both the Tab 14 proceedings and the costs argument itself, resulting in the Tab 16 decision, were "vexatious proceedings" within s 6 of the Act. His findings, coming as they did after experience with Mr Altaranesi in various applications, provide close insight into Mr Altaranesi's conduct. Samples of the findings follow. The Tribunal found that Mr Altaranesi "by his conduct in the proceedings did protract them significantly": at [16]. The ADT was of the view that Mr Altaranesi "persisted with matters which had been ruled irrelevant": at [17]. Moreover in light of existing authority his "attempts to extend the ambit of external review were always untenable and bound to fail": at [18]. And as to two of Mr Altaranesi's points the ADT was of the view they were "an exercise in utility from the start. This did not require specialist knowledge to understand. It was a matter which was obvious". As to Mr Altaranesi's other points in the proceedings the ADT held "the balance of KT's claim was dubious at best": at [21].
96But the Tribunal's findings reaffirmed Mr Altaranesi's tendency to prolixity "KT also advanced a series of other arguments which I found unnecessary to consider....He filed and relied on large volume of irrelevant material and made submissions going to issues beyond the scope of the internal review, all of which had to be considered by the agency and consume time in the hearing": at [22]. The ADT then had to assess whether Mr Altaranesi was "vexatiously conducting proceedings" within the meaning of ADT Act, s 88(1A)(a)(vi). Applying authority relating to the now repealed Supreme Court Act, s 84, Attorney General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, Roden J) the ADT concluded: "I am satisfied that KT did conduct the proceedings vexatiously" (at [26]), in part because the proceedings were either "bound to fail" or "held only a minimal prospect of success" and Mr Altaranesi "persistently sought to use the proceedings to ventilate issues beyond the scope of the Tribunal's review" (at [26]). Finally, the ADT made a character assessment of Mr Altaranesi in profile, which in a few brush strokes accurately depicts the Mr Altaranesi who appears through these many proceedings: in all his conduct Mr Altaranesi "displayed a dogged persistence which it was not possible to fully restrain": at [28]. In my view this assessment is perfectly correct. The only way of restraining Mr Altaranesi in my view is by making an order under s 8 of the Act.
97Mr Altaranesi took one step further his argument about costs, which had been determined in KT v Sydney Local Health District (formerly Sydney South West Area Health Service) (No. 2) (Costs) [2011] NSWADTAP 42 [Tab 15]. The quantum of costs in that earlier proceeding was not able to be resolved without further argument and then a further decision, which the ADT (the President) made on 31 October 2011: KT v Sydney Local Health District (formerly Sydney Local Health Network) (No. 3) (Amount of Respondent's Costs) [2011] NSWADTAP 49 [Tab 17]. In this further costs matter Mr Altaranesi criticised the Area Health Service's claim for costs of $5,080, objecting to the some of the dates and the items of work changed.
98The Tribunal's decision was clear: "the items of professional work listed...are for modest amounts of time...[and] are calculated at a usual professional hourly rate": at [6]. In the result in exercising his discretion the ADT President fixed the amount of costs to be paid by Mr Altaranesi of $4,500: at [8]. Like all the other costs orders recorded in this narrative of proceedings Mr Altaranesi is involved, he has not paid these costs to the Area Health Service.
99Mr Altaranesi filed the next privacy proceedings to be considered on 20 April 2010 which was heard in February and June 2011 and became the subject of a decision on 9 December 2011: KT v Sydney Local Health Network [2011] NSWADT 292 [Tab 18]. These proceedings raised a wholly new privacy issue. Mr Altaranesi alleged that after he had been assaulted, in the circumstances previously described, photographs were taken of him whilst he was in the emergency department of Royal Prince Alfred Hospital. An employee of the Area Health Service is said to have taken these photographs, which Mr Altaranesi claimed were his personal information.
100All but one of Mr Altaranesi's complaints in this proceeding were dismissed, including his application that the Tribunal member, Judicial Member Molony, recuse himself.
101The Attorney submits that this was "vexatious proceedings" within s 6 of the Act. I accept that submission. Before analysing the Tribunal's findings I would observe that in order to deal with Mr Altaranesi's application in this matter Judicial Member Molony was required to write a judgment in some 129 paragraphs and spend four days of hearing, on an application which was without merit except in one respect (which did not result in a remedy). By 2011 the diversion of judicial resources into Mr Altaranesi's unsuccessful proceedings was growing, as such figures show. Hearing time of some four days spent over six months and the writing of judgments of up to 30 pages for proceedings which mostly consist of arguments about the tendering of irrelevant evidence, and the consideration of hopeless submissions, is not a sustainable use of court and tribunal resources. Thus, the hearing time and judgment writing time in such unsuccessful proceedings are a basis for me to infer (together with the lack of merit in the argument) that the proceedings were s 6(d) "vexatious proceedings" conducted, so as to have the effect of annoying, causing delay and detriment to the orderly administration of courts and tribunals such as the ADT.
102The lack of merit in Mr Altaranesi's arguments in relation to this particular application can be seen with some examples. The ADT comprehensively rejected Mr Altaranesi's evidence and version of events. It rejected his complaint that he had not consented to the Area Health Service using his health information: at [71] - [72]. It rejected his general account of events: see [67] and [115]. Moreover, the ADT did not accept that Mr Altaranesi's complaints raised "for consideration any allegation of conduct in breach of s 11 of the Privacy Act": at [94]. His complaints did raise issues concerning the use and disclosure of Mr Altaranesi's ID photographs. But the Tribunal accepted that this was for legitimate management purposes and was not a breach of the Privacy Act: at [94] - [98].
103Mr Altaranesi succeeded on one complaint. But on that complaint the Tribunal took no further action. Mr Altaranesi complained that the Area Health Service had refused to record the withdrawal of his consent to the use of his personal health information. The Area Health Service should have placed his request to withdraw his consent on his medical files. The ADT was prepared to infer that the Area Health Service was not going to act on his request: at [117]. Although this meant that the Area Health Service had not ensured that Mr Altaranesi's health information was accurate and up to date (at [121]), the ADT remarked that Mr Altaranesi's complaint was best addressed by simply adding to his medical records that the consent had been withdrawn. But the Tribunal found that it was not appropriate "to make an order for compensation" as "there is no evidence of loss or mental trauma resulting from this conduct": at [125]. These findings illustrate yet another feature of many of Mr Altaranesi's complaints. Even the ones that are upheld can often be of such a technical nature that: no further serious action is required; no substantial criticism of the public authority is offered; and, no compensation is appropriate, because no lasting injury is done to Mr Altaranesi. Occupying court and tribunal time with matters of this character has the effect of causing delay and detriment within s 6(d) of the Act.
104But I am prepared to infer from this case that Mr Altaranesi deliberately caused detriment and delay and deliberately harassed or annoyed to the Area Health Service, and the ADT. I draw this conclusion from the ADT's description of Mr Altaranesi's conduct of the hearing (at [8]):-
"These boundaries were the cause of considerable dispute and agitation on KT's part during the hearing. There are many matters, which he wished to traverse in the course of the hearing that I considered irrelevant to the Tribunal's review of conduct...I repeatedly stopped KT for leading evidence concerning, or asking questions about...matters which he sought to raise going to the agency's processes, rather than the conduct under review."
105There was also much evidence in these proceedings of Mr Altaranesi's refusal to accept the ADT's rulings. He responded to ordinary rulings on procedure and evidence by asking Judicial Member Molony to disqualify himself. That application was declined: at [14] - [18]. And Judicial Member Molony's reasons for refusal of this application show it was unfounded.
106Mr Altaranesi went once more to the Court of Appeal. This time he sought appellate review of the ADT Appeal Panel's decisions in KT v Sydney South West Area Health Service (GD) [2010] NSWADTAP 60 [Tab 8]. The decision of the Appeal Panel now appealed from was itself a consideration of three other first instance decisions of the ADT, as these reasons have previously explained. The Court of Appeal heard this appeal under ADT Act, s 119 on 21 September 2011 and gave its decision on 8 February 2012: Altaranesi v Administrative Decisions Tribunal [2012] NSWCA 19 [Tab 19]. The ADT Act, s 119 limits appeals from the Appeal Panel from the ADT to questions of law, which either must constitute the decision appealed from, or be material to that decision: see Health Care Complaints Commission v Karalasingham [2007] NSWCA 267 at [14] - [16]. Here the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Altaranesi's appeal with costs: at [102]. Despite multiple grounds of appeal the leading judgment of Meagher JA, agreed in by Campbell JA and Handley JA, dismissed the appeal on the basis that Mr Altaranesi had not identified any error by the Appeal Panel on a question of law material to the Tribunal's decisions. The findings to this effect of the Court of Appeal in respect of the several grounds of appeal are at [31], [36], [41], [43], [44], [47], [50], [53], [54], [56], [58], [59], [66], [70], [71], [72], [87], [88], [91], [92], [100] and [101]. Meagher JA found, for example, "there was no substance" in Mr Altaranesi's submissions in relation to denial of procedural fairness (at [37] - [38])); that certain factual discrepancies to which Mr Altaranesi referred in the course of his submissions "do not however assist the appellant's argument": at [58]. Other arguments put such as one involving for example the question of excessive delay were not supported "by reference to any matter which involves a question of law": at [89]. Finally, Mr Altaranesi listed matters which he said the Appeal Panel failed to take into account, but the Court of Appeal found that most of the matters listed were not relevant to any consideration of whether there was excessive delay on the part of the [Area Health Service]": at [91]. This matter has the same character as the other proceedings Mr Altaranesi initiated that the Court has already found to be "vexatious proceedings".
107Between mid 2011 and mid 2012 Mr Altaranesi initiated further privacy proceedings. When he was unsuccessful in these proceedings at a lower level he simply escalated his dispute for the next level. So the Area Health Service was litigating with him during this more recent period in the ADT, in ADT Appeal Panel, in the Court of Appeal and in the High Court of Australia. Each of these matters does not need to be dealt with in the same detail as the privacy proceedings already analysed above. But an important preliminary observation about the recent proceedings is that until the Attorney commenced this action by Summons on 20 April 2012, Mr Altaranesi was continuing to initiate proceedings with the same frequency and to conduct them with the same energy as he had before. A weighty consideration in my view in favour of the making of a s 8 order is that he was continuing to generate proceedings with undiminished frequency, proceedings which often required consideration in unmeritorious arguments in lengthy appellate judgments.
108Mr Alataranesi is prepared to contest the smallest costs issues. And in so he shows a lack of proportion and restraint in the conduct of litigation. The Appeal Panel reserves for further consideration in KT v Sydney Local Health Service (formerly Sydney South West Area Health Service) (No. 2) (Costs) [2011] NSWADT 42 the question of Mr Altaranesi's costs in respect of an ADT procedural planning meeting which took place on 20 October 2009 but at which the Area Health Service did not attend. Mr Altaranesi's application for these costs was justified because the Area Health Service did not appear (at [16]). But Mr Altaranesi's claim for costs for the day did not succeed due to lack of proper substantiation (at [14] and [17]). The costs claim was only $164 in total, including transport and parking of $29, out of pocket expenses of $10, postage of $4.70 and other expenses for paying a carer for his daughter for $120. Mr Altaranesi succeeded in establishing postage expenses of $3.70, which was so small that the ADT refused to make a costs order for that sum in his favour. Contesting such a proceeding without proper evidence, the Attorney does not claim was vexatious. And I do not find that it was vexatious. But the conduct that occurred as characteristic of his general propensity to litigate over small issues.
109On 29 June 2011 Mr Altaranesi made another request from the Area Health Service for access to his personal information. He followed up on the request and the Area Health Service undertook an internal review of the request in September 2011. Dissatisfied with the outcome of that review on 30 September 2011 Mr Altaranesi commenced proceedings in the ADT for a review under the Privacy Act and the Health Records Act. This application was heard on 25 May 2012 and Judicial Member Eisenberg made her decision on 21 September 2012: AFU v Sydney Local Health District [2012] NSWADT 197 (DH1) [Tab 2]. Judicial Member Eisenberg determined not to take any action in the matter as after considering the facts she found: there was no excessive delay in providing Mr Altaranesi with the documents he had sought; all relevant documents had been provided, but not produced documents were excluded from the definition of "personal information" in the Privacy Act and were properly not produced; and so, it was not necessary to consider whether a remedy should be granted. Judicial Member Eisenberg's reasons for decision contained many examples of Mr Altaranesi seeking to re-ventilate earlier claims and proceedings (at [64]). I accept the Attorney's submissions that this proceeding was "vexatious proceedings" on the basis that it was "without reasonable ground" within s 6(c) of the Act.
110Mr Altaranesi appealed against two earlier Privacy Act proceedings and gained another determination from the Appeal Panel on 3 July 2012: KT v Sydney Local Health District [2012] NSWADTAP 23 (DH1) [Tab 3]. But Mr Altaranesi was again unsuccessful. His appeal was dismissed and he was ordered to pay the Area Health Service's costs in the sum of $3,000: at [56]. This appeal was from two privacy proceedings decided in the ADT, which have already been analysed in these reasons: KT v Sydney Local Health Network [2011] NSWADT 171 [Tab 14] and KT v Sydney Local Health Network [2011] NSWADT 233 [Tab 16]. This matter represented another failure by Mr Altaranesi to accept the finality of decisions made against him. Although he has only limited rights of appeal under ADT Act, ss 112 and 113 on questions of law and by leave on the merits, objectively speaking the Appeal Panel's reasons show in this (DH1) [Tab 3] matter that he had no genuine point of law or other proper basis to seek leave to appeal on the merits. In my view he simply did not accept the finality of the two earlier decisions.
111The reasons for decision for the Appeal Panel in (DH1) [Tab 3] repeat now familiar themes in Mr Altaranesi's litigation. The Appeal Panel confirmed that Judicial Member Molony "properly did not disqualify himself": at [13]. There were "no grounds" for disturbing the ADT's judgment on the issue of sending documents to Self Insurance Corporation: at [26]. Mr Altaranesi's points did not raise "any arguable error" in the Tribunal's approach as to the law or as to the merits of the dispute: at [32]. The Appeal Panel interpreted some of Mr Altaranesi's submissions as pointing up his "key aim" was in "pressing his privacy principles non compliance case" in effect no matter what the decisions against him, because of the "the need to vindicate his reputation": at [30].
112Over Mr Altaranesi's opposition the Appeal Panel ordered him to pay the Area Health Service's costs (at 47]). The Appeal Panel did so because of strong grounds that "litigation is of a vexatious kind": at [53]. Moreover, the Appeal Panel found that the appeal before them, except for one of many subsidiary points, "had...little or no reasonable prospects of success": at [54]. The Appeal Panel even assessed costs itself at $3,000 to avoid further litigation about the issue of costs, which it reasonably anticipated from Mr Altaranesi: at [56]. I accept the Attorney's argument that this was "vexatious proceedings", within s 6 of the Act.
113Then Mr Altaranesi went once more to the Court of Appeal. In a proceeding heard and determined on 2 April 2012 Basten JA and Sackville AJA: (1) dismissed Mr Altaranesi's application for an extension of time and to appeal against the Appeal Panel; (2) refused leave to appeal from a costs decision of the Appeal Panel; and (3) ordered Mr Altaranesi to pay the costs of the Area Health Service: Altaranesi v Sydney Local Health District [2012] NSWCA 69 (DH1) [Tab 4]. These were applications against two matters already considered in these reasons, KT v Sydney Local Health Network (formerly Sydney South West Area Health Service) [2011] NSWADTAP 10 [Tab 13] and the cost decision in KT v Sydney Local Health District (formerly Sydney South West Area Health Service) (No. 2) (Costs) [2011] NSWADTAP 42 [Tab 15]. Mr Altaranesi's applications were wholly unsuccessful. Basten JA found that time should not be extended because "no arguable case of legal erroneous decisions have been made good": at [22]. Nor did Mr Altaranesi demonstrate an error in respect of costs of the Appeal Panel's decision: at [26] and [31]. In my view this was "vexatious proceedings" within s 6(c) of the Act, brought "without reasonable ground".
114In May 2012 Mr Altaranesi argued another appeal to the Appeal Panel. This appeal was from the ADT's decision in KT v Sydney Local Health Network [2011] NSWADT 292 [Tab 18], a decision which has already been considered extensively above. The ADT Appeal Panel dismissed the appeal on 31 October 2012: KT v Sydney Local Area Health District (GD) [2012] NSWADTAP 43 (DH1) [Tab 5]. The Appeal Panel rejected the challenge to the ADT's findings of fact and could not otherwise find appealable error in the ADT's reasons: at [37], [38], [39], [47], [48] and [49].
115The Appeal Panel's concluding remarks on this appeal are instructive for the current exercise of discretion. After finding that the appeal "had no strength" and referring to the Tribunal's "comprehensive decision after four days of hearing" the Appeal Panel stated (at [59]), "appeals of the present kind, which essentially seek to re-open all aspects of the first instance proceedings...should not be encouraged". In my view this too was as the Attorney submits "vexatious proceedings" under s 6(a) and (c) of the Act.
116Finally, Mr Altaranesi went to the High Court seeking leave to appeal against the two Court of Appeal decisions considered above, Altaranesi v Administrative Decisions Tribunal [2012] NSWCA 19 [Tab 19] and Altaranesi v Sydney Local Health District [2012] NSWCA 69 (DH1) [Tab 4]. The High Court (Gummow and Kiefel JJ) dismissed these applications for special leave on the papers: Tareq Altaranesi v Administrative Decisions Tribunal & Anor [2012] HCASL 126 and [2012) HCASL 129, commenting that "none of the matters raised by the appellant in his material filed in this court cast doubt on the correctness of the Court of Appeal's decision". No question of law warranting a grant of special leave to appeal is articulated. The High Court's reasons further reveal that Mr Altaranesi was prepared to pursue further procedural steps because they were available, but without any regard to the merits and prospects of success of taking those further steps. I accept the Attorney's submission that this was "vexatious proceedings" within s 6(c) of the Act.