Acts Interpretation Act 1931, s 8A;

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 3;

Anti-Discrimination Act 1998;

Judicial Review Act 2000;

Supreme Court Rules 2000, Pt 26, Div 3;

Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020, ss 74A, 89;

Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2021, r 11;

Teachers Registration Act 2000, ss 3, 6A, 7A, 12, 13, 17A, 17BA, 17K, 18A, 20, 22B, 24, 24B 28, 29, 78;

Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Regulations 2021, reg 16.

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321;

Forest Practices Authority v Anti-Discrimination Commissioner [2025] TASSC 19;

Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99; [2005] HCA 7;

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362; [2017] HCA 34;

Walker v Mondelez Australia Pty Ltd [2026] TASSC 6.

1. The appellant, Ms Arkley, is a teacher. She applied to the Teachers Registration Board (the Board) for registration under the Teachers Registration Act 2000 (TRA). In considering whether Ms Arkley is fit to be a teacher, the Board required her to undergo an independent medical examination (IME) by a psychiatrist at her own expense. Ms Arkley appeals against the Board's decision to require the assessment.
2. Ms Arkley filed her appeal outside of the prescribed period. She has applied for an extension of time, which the Board opposes. The Board has also applied for the appeal to be dismissed on the basis that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal against a decision to require an IME.
3. I have concluded that the Tribunal does not have the power to extend time, nor to hear an appeal from a decision to require an IME. Ms Arkley's application to extend time fails and the Board's application for dismissal for want of jurisdiction succeeds. The appeal must be dismissed.

1. The Board is a body corporate comprising seven members. It is continued by and performs functions under the TRA. Section 6A prescribes those functions, which include registering teachers and conducting investigations for the purposes of that Act.
2. The starting point, at least for Ms Arkley, is an application for registration as a teacher under s 12. There are three categories of registration: full, provisional, and specialist vocation education and training. Each category has different criteria. The Board must register an applicant if satisfied that the applicant meets the criteria, but may impose reasonable conditions: s 13(1) and (4). The Board must refuse registration if not satisfied that the criteria are met: s 13(1)(c).
3. While each category has different criteria, common to each is the criterion that "the applicant is fit to be a teacher": s 13(2)(c), (3)(c), and (3A)(c). In determining whether an applicant is fit to be a teacher, the Board "may take into account... any medical, psychiatric, or psychological condition of the applicant": s 17K(1)(a). To that end, the Board may require an applicant to undergo a psychiatric examination and authorise the psychiatrist to provide a copy of his or her report to the Board: s 17K(2). Somewhat circularly, s 3 defines 'fit to be a teacher' as "fit to be a teacher as determined under section 17K".
4. Finally, s 7A states:

In performing its functions and exercising its powers, the Board must consider the welfare and best interests of students to be of paramount importance.

1. It appears that Ms Arkley's previous registration as a teacher was suspended by the Board based on concerns raised by its Victorian equivalent, the Victorian Institute of Teaching (VIT). Ms Arkley's Victorian registration was subsequently cancelled. This is relevant only by way of background.
2. On 8 February 2025, Ms Arkley applied to the Board for registration as a teacher under the TRA, s 12. It appears that the background to which I have referred caused some delay. On 24 November 2025, the Board wrote to Ms Arkley about her application. By that letter, the Board directed Ms Arkley to (i) undergo an independent psychiatric examination by a particular psychiatrist, and (ii) authorise that psychiatrist to provide a copy of his report to the Board.
3. Ms Arkley says, without demurrer by the Board, that she received the letter the following day on 25 November 2025.
4. On 2 February 2026, Ms Arkley applied to review the Board's decision. For clarity, I will refer to the two decisions in the Board's letter as the single decision to require an IME.

1. The Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020 (TASCAT Act) imposes a time limit within which an appeal must be filed. For appeals under the TRA, the period is 28 days from the date on which Ms Arkley was notified of the Board's decision: TASCAT Act, s 74A(1)(c)(ii). That period expired on 23 December 2025. Ms Arkley filed her appeal on 2 February 2026, which was some 41 days out of time.
2. Although Ms Arkley does not contend to the contrary, I conclude that there is no power to extend time. While r 11 of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2021 confers a power to extend time, the power applies only to extending time in a proceeding, not commencing a new proceeding: Walker v Mondelez Australia Pty Ltd [2026] TASCAT 6 at [30] (Shanahan CJ). Ms Arkley seeks to extend time to commence her appeal, not take a step in it.
3. Although Shanahan CJ's remarks are obiter, being observations about the interaction between r 11 and the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Regulations 2021, reg 16, they are highly persuasive. I should follow his Honour's observations unless satisfied that they are clearly wrong. I am not so satisfied.
4. I conclude that time cannot be extended. The appeal is incompetent because it was not filed within time. It must be dismissed.

1. The Board goes on to contend that, if there is a power to extend time, an extension should be refused having regard to the circumstances of Ms Arkley's case. Ms Arkley made submissions in support of an extension but (understandably, given that she is self-represented) not in respect of the interpretation of s 74A and r 11, above. Given my conclusions that time cannot be extended and that Board's decision is not amenable to review, it is unnecessary to consider whether time should be extended.

1. Given my conclusion that time cannot be extended, it is not strictly necessary to consider the Board's application for dismissal. I have nonetheless done so in case I am wrong about the extension of time, and to assist these and future parties.

1. The Board contends that it did not make a reviewable decision and that the appeal should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. This is a more complex issue which involves the interpretation of the TRA. It does not involve the merits of Ms Arkley's case.
2. The Tribunal has no inherent jurisdiction. The only appeals that it can hear are those where legislation creates a right of appeal. Section 29(1) of the TRA confers a right of appeal against decisions made under that Act. It states:

A person may appeal to the [Tribunal] for a review of a decision that the person is given notice of under section 28.

3. Section 28 provides:

28. Notification of decision > > The Board is to give a person notice in writing of - > > (a) any decision it makes that affects that person or a person employed by that person; and > > (b) the reasons for that decision.

1. The Board contends that its decision under s 17K is not a decision for the purposes of ss 28 and 29. It relies on several cases which have considered what is a reviewable decision under, variously, the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) and the Judicial Review Act 2000. It also relies on the prescriptive list of decisions that the Board may make under s 24 following an inquiry, which does not include requiring an independent medical examination under s 17K.
2. The meaning of the phrase 'decision under an enactment' for the purpose of judicial review legislation is a different question to whether a decision under s 17K is amenable to review under s 29. The latter question is answered by considering the effect of a decision under s 17K; is it sufficiently final?
3. Although the question is answered by interpreting the TRA, the Board's correspondence is, with respect, somewhat confusing. The Board's letter of 24 November said:

You can choose not to undertake the requested psychiatric examination in which case the Board will determine your application with the information already provided.

4. A series of emails were then sent between Ms Arkley and an officer of the Board. In response to Ms Arkley's question "[w]hat are my options?", the officer responded that:

If you choose, or are unable to, proceed with the IME then your application for registration will become dormant. > > I cannot offer any options as this is now a requirement for procession of your application.

5. The response contradicts the Board's letter. In any event, the Board submits that the position conveyed in its letter is correct:

Should [Ms Arkley] refuse to undergo the IME or decline to provide further information as requested, the Board will proceed to assess the application for registration based solely on the material already provided.

1. On its face, s 28 is very broad. It refers to 'any decision... that affects that person'. The appeal right in s 29 appears to pick up decisions attracted by s 28. But like all legislation, ss 28 and 29 must not be interpreted in a vacuum. Instead, I must consider the TRA's text while, at the same time, having regard to its context and purpose: SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362; [2017] HCA 34 at [14] (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ). An interpretation which promotes the TRA's purpose is to be preferred over one which does not: Acts Interpretation Act 1931, s 8A(1).
2. In Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321, the High Court held that a decision under s 3(1) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) must be one required or authorised by statute rather than merely a step taken in the course of reasoning on the way to the making of the ultimate decision. Mason CJ, with whom Brennan and Deane JJ agreed, gave the example of a decision by the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal refusing to adjourn a hearing. His Honour considered that to be a procedural decision which did not affect the rights and liabilities of an applicant and therefore not be amenable to judicial review. Relevant also is the High Court's decision in Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99. The Board also pointed me to Porter AJ's useful discussion in Forest Practices Authority v Anti-Discrimination Commissioner [2025] TASSC 19, where his Honour considered whether accepting a complaint under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 was sufficiently final to be amenable to judicial review. His Honour's discussion and the cases referred to are illustrative but not determinative because they answer a different question.
3. The following principles may be distilled from these cases. Reviewable decisions under judicial review legislation usually:
   • are final, operative, or determinative of the factual issue that the decision maker must consider; and
   • confer, alter, or affect legal rights and obligations under the particular legislation; but
   • do not include preliminary or anterior conclusions which are a step along the way in the course of reasoning leading to an ultimate decision.
4. This is not an application for judicial review, but the principles are nonetheless of some assistance in interpreting ss 28 and 29. While a decision to adjourn an inquiry under s 22B of the TRA may, in a literal sense, affect a person, I do not think that it is amenable to review under s 29. But a hypothetical example does not advance the issue terribly far.

1. I have already explained at [4]-[7] some aspects of the TRA which inform the legislative context and purpose.
2. I do not overlook that s 17K confers a specific power to require the production of information, unlike a decision to adjourn. Nor do I overlook that, unlike a hypothetical adjournment, producing information or submitting to an IME may be required at any time rather than as part of an inquiry or other prescribed process. However, the power in s 17K must be exercised consistent with the TRA and for a proper purpose. The Board's functions, in broad terms, include ensuring that only persons fit for registration are registered. So much is consistent with the paramountcy of the welfare and best interests of students (s 7A) and the various registration and disciplinary powers, some of which I have set out below as examples of what appear to be final decisions.
3. Examples of final decisions appear to include:
   • granting, refusing, or renewing registration (ss 13, 14 and 17A);
   • imposing, amending, or removing conditions on registration (s 17)
   • taking disciplinary action if a teacher is found guilty of a prescribed offence (s 18A);
   • cancelling or suspending registration without an inquiry (s 17BA(2));
   • immediate suspension prior to inquiry (s 24B); and
   • those made following an inquiry (s 24);
4. These are standalone, final decisions. They confer or alter a registrant's rights and are determinative of the factual issue that the Board must decide. In contrast, s 17K is a procedural power exercised for the purpose of the Board making a final decision. Here, the Board made a preliminary conclusion as a step along the way of determining Ms Arkley's application for registration.

A 'decision' is not limited to the inquiry powers in s 24

1. The Board submits that 'decision' in s 28 is limited to decisions made under s 24. I reject that submission.
2. Section 24 prescribes the powers available to the Board following an inquiry. An inquiry is an investigation held or appointed by the Board into a complaint or concern. The TRA's structure reflects that an inquiry is quite separate from applications for registration.
3. Part 3 of the TRA is titled 'Registration of Teacher and Limited Authorities to Teach'. I have already referred to the making (s 12) and determining (s 13) of applications, which are within Div 2 ('Registration of teachers'). Division 4 ('Determining good character and fitness to be a teacher') addresses the registration requirements of good character and fitness. Section 17K is within Div 4.
4. Part 4 is titled 'Discipline and inquiries'. It addresses the professional discipline of registrants and prescribes the process the Board must follow in holding or appointing an inquiry into a registrant, a complaint, or a matter referred by the registrant's employer. See s 20(1). I have already noted that s 24 prescribes the decisions that the Board may make as a result of an inquiry.
5. Sections 28 and 29 are within Pt 5, which is titled 'Miscellaneous'.
6. I reject the Board's submission that the word 'decision' in s 28 is limited to decisions made in s 24. It is inconsistent with the structure of the Act as I have set out. Sections 28 and 29 are in a self-contained Part. The Board's interpretation would result in an absurd situation by which decisions made following an inquiry (under Pt 4) would be amenable to review but a decision to refuse registration of a teacher (under Pt 3) would not. A decision to refuse registration is equally final and of equal significance to an applicant's rights under the TRA.

Does 'a decision' extend to a requirement under s 17K?

1. However, I do not think that the appeal right in s 29 extends to a decision under s 17K. The latter does not determine any person's rights in a final sense. Section 17K was introduced by the Teachers Registration Amendment Act 2009. The Minister's second reading speech does not assist much.[1] But, as the clause notes say, s 17K:

Establishes the evidence the Board will use to determine whether a person is fit to be a teacher for the purposes of teacher registration.

2. In addition to s 17K, the Board may require an applicant to "provide any further information it considers necessary to consider the application" or "authorise the Board ... to obtain information relating to the applicant from ... any other person": s 12(3). Section 17K may therefore be somewhat unnecessary (save for the clarity to which the Minister adverted; see footnote 1).
3. The Board is required to determine an application for registration that is valid. The only requirements of an application are that it be in the approved form and accompanied by the prescribed fee: s 12(2). While the Board may request additional information under ss 12(3) or 17K, the better view is that if the information is not forthcoming, the Board is required to determine the application without it. So much is consistent with the definition in s 3 of 'fit to be a teacher'. Here, the consequence of Ms Arkley not participating in an IME is that the Board will determine her application for registration without the psychiatrist's report. Without a report, the Board may be less likely to find Ms Arkley to be fit to be a teacher and therefore be required to refuse her application under s 13(1)(c). But that is a question of fact and a matter for the Board, not for this Tribunal. I repeat that s 29 provides an appeal right against refusal of registration.
4. I do not overlook that, as Ms Arkley points out, submitting to the IME would cost her time and money. There are real consequences for her. But the Board's decision does not determine her rights or liabilities. It does not determine her application for registration. It is not final.
5. I also do not overlook that the Board may exercise the s 17K power at any time; it is not limited to where the Board is determining an application under s 12 or an investigation under s 29. Nor do I overlook that s 17K uses the word 'require', which, read literally, has a mandatory aspect to it. Whether the Board could, in different circumstances, compel a person to undergo an IME, for example through relief similar to mandamus,[2] was not the subject of submissions and need not be answered.
6. The Board may only grant registration if satisfied that the applicant is fit to be a teacher. 'Fitness' is an evaluative criterion answered on the application of facts consistent with s 17K. It is the Board's function to decide whether an applicant satisfies the criterion. The TRA's context and purpose, including the paramount consideration in s 7A, the definition in s 3, and the examples of final decisions which I have identified, suggest that s 17K, is directed to ensuring that the Board has the information that it needs to make the final decisions (which are reviewable).
7. It would be a perverse outcome, inconsistent with the Act's context and purpose, were the Board's decisions to obtain information to inform its decision making subject to merits review. The Tribunal would be impairing the Board's ability to make an informed, merits-based decision. Clear language would be required in the Act to express such an intention. The TRA contains no such clear language.
8. I conclude that the Board's decision under s 17K is not amenable to review. Accordingly, the appeal is incompetent and must be dismissed on that basis.

1. Although not the subject of submissions, it seems to me that, if I am wrong about that conclusion, the appeal must nonetheless be dismissed on the basis that it is misconceived.
2. As the Board concedes, it is obliged to determine Ms Arkley's application even if she does not participate in an IME. To that end, the outcome of this appeal does not affect the Board's decision whether to grant registration. Even if the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear an appeal against a decision under s 17K, the Tribunal's powers do not assist the applicant. The Tribunal could affirm, vary, set aside and substitute, or set aside and remit the Board's decision: s 78(1). Even if the Tribunal set aside the Board's requirement under s 17K, Ms Arkley would be in the same position that she is presently in: the Board can proceed to determine her application for registration without the IME report.
3. The TASCAT Act, s 89 allows the Tribunal to dismiss a proceeding that is "frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance". The appeal is misconceived because it cannot provide Ms Arkley the relief that she seeks. Accordingly, it should be dismissed on that alternative basis.

[1] Save as to note that the Bill contains "a range of more minor amendments within the new legislation that add clarity to existing Board functions and powers, resolve wording anomalies and provide more detail to existing provisions."

[2] See the Supreme Court Rules 2000, Pt 26, Div 3 - Relief similar to mandamus.