Acts Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas), ss 6(2), 8A

Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Rules 1998 (Tas)

Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas)

Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas)

Tasmanian Civil and Administration Tribunal Act 2020 (Tas), ss 2, 7A, 59, 115, 136, 137, 148

Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Amendment Act 2021 (Tas)

Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Consequential Amendments) Act 2021 (Tas), ss 368

Tasmanian Civil and Administration Tribunal Rules 2021 (Tas), r 11

Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas), ss 2A, 3, 59, 64

Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Regulations 2021 (Tas), regs 15, 16, 17

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Comber [1986] FCA 92, 10 FCR 88

Jenks v Dickinson (Inspector of Taxes) [1997] STC 853

State of Tasmania v Tripptree [2023] TASSC 16

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34, 262 CLR 362

Judgment Number: [2026] TASSC 6

PETER WALKER v MONDELEZ AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 78 004 551 473)

1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal ('TASCAT'). The TASCAT came into being upon the commencement of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020 (Tas) ('TASCAT Act') on 4 November 2021, the date it received the Royal Assent (s 2, TASCAT Act). The TASCAT opened its doors on 5 November 2021. The operation of nine former boards and tribunals were folded into the jurisdiction of the TASCAT, including the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal ('WRC Tribunal'). The intention was that the jurisdiction of each of those nine boards or tribunals would then come within the "umbrella" of a single independent quasi-judicial tribunal. The TASCAT may be compared to similar civil and administrative tribunals in other States and Territories.
2. Stage 1 of the establishment of the TASCAT involved the co-location of the nine Tribunals and Boards at new premises in Hobart following passage of the TASCAT Act. The legislation to implement Stage 2 consisted of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Amendment Act 2021 ('Amendment Act') and the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Consequential Amendments) Act 2021 ('Consequential Act'). By s 368 of the Consequential Act the definition of "Tribunal" at section 3 in the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas) ('WRC Act') was amended to refer to the TASCAT and to delete reference to the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal. Similar consequential amendments were made throughout the WRC Act.
3. In making provision for the operation of the TASCAT in place of the WRC Tribunal, consideration was given to how previously established practice, procedures and rules might vary when the operation of existing boards or tribunals were transferred into the new tribunal. Those changes are reflected in the current legislative scheme, aspects of which arise for consideration in this appeal. Changes to the TASCAT's operation and jurisdiction have continued since its inception.
4. Prior to the creation of the TASCAT, the rights and entitlements of workers and employers under the WRC Act were dealt with in the WRC Tribunal. Mr Cox KC in his opening remarks for the appellant provided a useful "potted history" of the administration of workers compensation in Tasmania since 1927.
5. Since the introduction of the TASCAT, disputes relating to workers compensation under the WRC Act are determined in the "General Division - Personal Compensation Stream (Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation)" of the TASCAT.
6. The old tribunals and boards were abolished on commencement of the TASCAT Act (s 148). The appeal filed in this Court has, as part of the title, "On Appeal from the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal". That language is inappropriate, the WRC Tribunal having been abolished when the TASCAT Act commenced on 4 November 2021.
7. Section 59 of the TASCAT Act provides, inter alia, for the establishment of the General Division and various streams. I understand there may still be informal references to the WRC Tribunal as a shorthand way of identifying that aspect of the TASCAT's jurisdiction, but it is to be identified by reference to the "General Division - Personal Compensation Stream (Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation)". Whilst that description of the TASCAT's jurisdiction is unwieldy, clinging to references to the WRC Tribunal may lead to error.
8. This appeal is brought under s 136 of the TASCAT Act from a decision of the TASCAT in its General Division. Section 136(1) confers the right to appeal on a question of law. An appeal under s 136 is to be instituted, heard and determined in accordance with the rules in force under the Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas): refer to s 137(1) of the TASCAT Act.

1. In proceedings below, Senior Member Thomson considered whether the TASCAT has the power to extend the time limited within which to object to a bill of costs under reg 16 of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Regulations 2021 (Tas) ('WRC Regulations'). Whilst that question may, at least at first glance, appear mundane and somewhat prosaic, it raises wide reaching and important questions of statutory construction, and the operation of the TASCAT in this aspect of its jurisdiction.
2. The appellant worker served his bill of costs on the respondent employer after the TASCAT ordered that the employer pay the worker's costs of a referral under the WRC Act. The employer, having been served with a bill of costs, failed to deliver a notice of objection within the requisite 14 days provided for at reg 16 of the WRC Regulations and thereafter sought an extension of time within which to do so.
3. The employer filed and served its notice of objection on 13 February 2025, two days beyond the time limited by reg 16. The employer then filed an application in the General Division of the TASCAT seeking an extension of the time limited under reg 16 pursuant to r 11 of the Tasmanian Civil and Administration Tribunal Rules 2021 (Tas) ('TASCAT Rules'). Ultimately the TASCAT found that it had the power under r 11 to extend time under reg 16 and this appeal by the appellant worker engages that decision.

Costs Under the WRC Act

1. Costs under the WRC Act are dealt with at s 59 as amended. That provision makes it clear that the costs regime to be applied after the transfer of jurisdiction to the TASCAT remains legislated for under the WRC Act. Section 59(4) states that the provisions relating to costs introduced upon the commencement of the TASCAT Act do not apply, ie "Division 10 of Part 8 of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020 does not apply in relation to proceedings in relation to this Act."
2. Section 59(1), (2) and (3) appear in the WRC Act at Part V ('Dispute Resolution'), Division 5 ('Miscellaneous'), and describe the TASCAT's power to make costs orders in proceedings under the WRC Act. The recovery of costs ordered by the TASCAT under s 59 of the WRC Act work with the WRC Regulations dealing with costs. It should be noted that the enactment of the WRC Regulations was coincident with the process of transferring the workers compensation jurisdiction from the WRC Tribunal to the TASCAT, and after the enactment of the TASCAT Act. Parliament must have considered how the TASCAT was to engage with workers compensation matters when enacting the WRC Regulations in 2021.
3. The WRC Regulations at Part 2 ('Practice and Procedure') deal with "Practice and procedure of the tribunal" (Division 1) and "Costs" (Division 2). In the latter Division, reg 15 deals with the process if costs are not agreed between the parties, and provides that the successful party may serve a bill of costs on the unsuccessful party. The quantum of costs is dealt with at reg 15(2) by reference to Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas) ('SC Rules'). Regulation 16(1) then deals with the process by which an unsuccessful party can object to a bill of costs (italics added):

"(1) An unsuccessful party is taken to admit each item on the bill of costs unless that party delivers to the Registrar, and to the unsuccessful party, a notice of objection within 14 days after the date of service of the bill of costs."

1. The learned Senior Member began by identifying the issues raised by the parties (Tribunal Decision ('TD'), at [8]-[9]). The employer contended that reg 16, which provides for notices to objections to a bill of costs, is subject to r 11 thus conferring the power to extend time under reg 16 on the TASCAT.
2. Rule 11 of the TASCAT Rules provides (italics added):

"The Tribunal may extend or abridge time in which an action, in relation to any proceedings, may be taken, or must be taken, under these rules, an Act or a relevant Act."

1. Essentially, it was argued below, by the respondent employer, that Parliament intended to empower the Tribunal with the ability to extend time limits for any matters over which the TASCAT has jurisdiction. In contrast, the appellant worker contended that the general power to extend time under r 11 is excluded by the terms of reg 16, and that the effect of that regulation is to deem a bill of costs accepted unless a notice of objection is filed and served within time, and no power to extend time under reg 16 arises.
2. In the TASCAT and on appeal, the appellant relied upon this Court's decision in State of Tasmania v Tripptree [2023] TASSC 16 as establishing the mandatory nature and ambit of the operation of reg 16. Further, the appellant contended that there are, in any event, additional safeguards available to an employer in circumstances where the employer has failed to meet the time limit under reg 16. These included the enforcement provisions at s 61(6) of the WRC Act and the limited power to set aside a judgment in the Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Rules 1998 when seeking to enforce a judgment debt such as one in respect of costs.
3. The Senior Member embarked on the statutory construction of reg 16. He did so on the basis (TD [22]) that (italics added):

"Rule 11 on its face, read with s 115 of the TASCAT Act, appears to allow the Tribunal to extend time. There is no direct inconsistency between r 11 and reg 16. I do not understand the worker to be arguing to the contrary."

1. The decision below, that r 11 operated to allow the TASCAT to extend the time limited in reg 16, relied on the following propositions (TD [24]-[31]):
   1. Section 115(2)(a) of the TASCAT Act read with r 11, suggests that time may be extended even after it has expired, and that even a deeming provision does not necessarily exclude the power to extend time;
   2. The discretionary power to extend time is fettered by well-established common law factors relevant to the exercise of that discretion. That discretion means that the extension of time is not "at large";
   3. Rule 11 is made under s 115 of the TASCAT Act. When r 11 and s 115 are read together the language of s 115 indicates that r 11 is intended to confer a broad power to extend time over a range of matters. The WRC Act expressly excludes particular provisions of the TASCAT Act, including the cost regime at Part 8, Division 10, but there is no express exclusion of the operation of r 11;
   4. To the extent that r 11 may be seen as a general provision and reg 16 as a special provision, the operation of r 11 is not excluded by virtue of the principle that a general provision does not repeal a specific provision. That is because the operation of r 11 and reg 16 can be reconciled and are not inconsistent; and
   5. The Senior Member was not persuaded by the worker's argument as to the additional safeguards said to be available to the employer.

1. The Senior Member considered the decision of this Court in Tripptree, which dealt with the operation of reg 16, and found that it may be distinguished, albeit it is persuasive but not binding (TD p 4). In Tripptree, the Court considered circumstances in which the worker had served a bill of costs on the employer and the employer had delivered a notice of objection to the worker. Unlike this case, the notice of objection was delivered by the employer to the worker within the time limit provided by reg 16, but the employer failed to serve the notice on the Registrar. Failure to serve the Registrar was a breach of the requirements of reg 16(1) (see [14] above) but on a different basis to the matters arising in this appeal. The parties in Tripptree requested the TASCAT to determine:

"... whether the time limit in respect of delivery of the notice of objection in r 16 was an obligatory requirement or merely a directory requirement not subject to such compliance in order for a notice of objection to be treated as valid and engaging a dispute as to the contents of the bill of costs which dispute would be determined by the Tribunal." (Tripptree, Marshall AJ at [10])

1. In Tripptree at [11], Marshall AJ accepted that reg 16 is a deeming provision, and cited a passage from Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Comber [1986] FCA 92; 10 FCR 88 at 96 as to the construction of such provisions: "Deeming provisions are required by their nature to be construed strictly and only for the purpose they are resorted to". The TASCAT at first instance in Tripptree determined that it had no power to go behind a deeming provision and that it did not have jurisdiction to order an assessment or conduct any review of the bill of costs. Marshall AJ, on appeal, discusses the operation of reg 16 (Tripptree [24]) before concluding at [25] that: "The consequence of a failure to comply with r 16 ... means that the Tribunal was not seized of jurisdiction to deal with a contest to the respondent's bill of costs by the appellant". That finding does not dispose of the question whether there is power to extend the time limited under reg 16.
2. The Senior Member in this case distinguished Tripptree on the basis that the appeal in that matter went to a different question, ie whether reg 16 is directory or mandatory, and that Marshall AJ found that reg 16 is mandatory, and compliance a condition precedent to dispute a bill of costs. No issue was raised in Tripptree as to the power to extend time under reg 16 which is the issue that arises in this appeal. Of course, his Honour's decision in Tripptree remains persuasive.

1. The appellant worker contends that the Senior Member erred in law in concluding that, pursuant to s 115 of the TASCAT Act and r 11 of the TASCAT Rules, the TASCAT does have the power to extend time to file a notice of objection under reg 16.
2. There is only one ground of appeal, and that ground asserts an absence of jurisdiction in the TASCAT to extend time for filing such a notice.
3. Resolution of the issues raised in this appeal begins with the power of the TASCAT to make rules, which appears at s 115 of the TASCAT Act. The nature and extent of that power is significant and provides some compass as to how r 11 is to be construed. I set it out in its entirety (italics added):

(1) The Tribunal rules may provide for the Tribunal to extend or abridge a time limit for doing anything in connection with any proceedings, or the commencement of any proceedings, even though the limit is imposed under this Act or a relevant Act.

(a) may be authorised even though the time for complying has passed; and

(b) may be given on conditions specified by the Tribunal."

1. There are some important elements to notice in s 115. First, that the TASCAT's power to make rules with regard to time limits can be exercised in two regards, either to make rules (i) for doing anything in connection with any proceedings, or (ii) the commencement of any proceedings. The Parliament granted rule-making power to extend or abridge time in respect of either, or both, these matters.
2. Further, the power granted applies to time limits under either the TASCAT Act or a "relevant Act". Rules may authorise the extension of time "even though the time for complying has passed" (s 115(2)(a)).
3. The relevant time limit is the 14 days provided for in reg 16 of the WRC Regulations. Those regulations are made under the WRC Act which in turn is a "relevant Act" for the purposes of the TASCAT Act. The definition of "relevant Act" is found at s 3 of the TASCAT Act, which refers to Acts which appear in Schedule 1, and the WRC Act is nominated at item 98 of Schedule 1. Time limits imposed by the WRC Regulations are time limits imposed under the WRC Act as the WRC Regulations are made under that Act (s 64 of the WRC Act confers a regulation-making power in respect of Part V of that Act).
4. Rule 11 of the TASCAT Rules is set out at [14] above. The language employed in r 11 does not seek to extend time in relation to "the commencement of proceedings", it does not rely on the rule-making power at s 115 to make rules in that regard (see [27(ii)] above). Rather, it relies on the rule making power (at [27(i)] above) to make rules "to extend or abridge time for doing anything in connection with any proceedings" (italics added). The language in r 11 refers to, "an action, in relation to any proceedings". Because of the bifurcation of the power to make rules in s 115(1) of the TASCAT Act (refer [27] above) the absence of any express reference in r 11 to the "commencement of proceedings", indicates that it is not intended (by r 11) to confer power on the TASCAT to extend or abridge time in that regard, ie r 11 confers powers to extend time where a "proceeding" has been commenced. I say that because of the language employed in r 11, and because the Parliament clearly draws a clear distinction in respect of the heads of rule-making power conferred at s 115(1) of the TASCAT Act. Thus, an invocation of s 115 in respect of the "commencement of proceedings" would require words to that effect in the relevant rule.
5. Of course, subject to the operation of the TASCAT Act, any relevant Act and the rules of statutory construction, there is nothing to prevent the TASCAT making additional or amended rules that seek to confer power in respect of the extension or abridgement of time for "the commencement of proceedings". One important matter to have regard to were such a rule contemplated, would be to assess how such a rule would work with the objects of the WRC Act. Whilst that issue is not directly relevant to this appeal it arises in the context of an argument put by the respondent as to the effect that r 11 might have were the construction below affirmed. I return to that issue below from [35].
6. When I refer to "subject to the operation of the TASCAT Act and any relevant Act" at [31] above, I note the operation of s 7A of the TASCAT Act:

If there is an inconsistency between a provision of a relevant Act and a provision of this Act, the regulations or the Tribunal rules, the provision of the relevant Act prevails to the extent of the inconsistency."

1. In making a rule under s 115, the TASCAT is empowered to make rules that extend or abridge time where the time for complying has passed (s 115(2)(a) TASCAT Act, see [26] above), and where such a time limit is imposed under a "relevant Act", such as the WRC Act. As noted at [29], the WRC Regulations are made under that "relevant Act".
2. The argument advanced by the appellant on appeal has two primary elements.
3. First, that reg 16 of the WRC Regulations is a deeming provision and its operation, contra the decision below, is inconsistent with the power conferred by r 11 of the TASCAT Rules, and reg 16 prevails to the extent of any inconsistency (s 7A of the TASCAT Act).
4. Second, in regard to the proper constructions of reg 16, that were r 11 to confer a power on the TASCAT to allow extension of time limits under the WRC Act and WRC Regulations, then the system of workers compensation in Tasmania would be overwhelmed because otherwise crisp executory steps preserved by mandatory time limits would become loose and ephemeral making the system unworkable. Further, that such an effect would be inconsistent with the objects legislated for at s 2A of the WRC Act.
5. In aid of the second point, the appellant, in his written submissions (at [27]), nominated the following time limits found in the WRC Act as examples, and observed that were each of the relevant time limits to be susceptible to the power of extension, the workers compensation system in this State would cease to function (due to ensuing delay) which would be an absurd result, and that outcome is relevant to the proper construction of reg 16, ie:

• S 67B - Commencement of weekly payments to dependents - within 14 days the employer must commence payments. Non-compliance is an offence.
• S 39 - Employer to give claimant notice of status of claim within 28 days. Non-compliance is an offence.
• S 15 - The provision of annual reports by no later than 31 October and the causing of a copy of that report to be laid on the table of each House of Parliament within 15 sitting days.
• S 28 - Review of diseases in relation to firefighters. Report to be laid before each House of Parliament within 10 sitting days.
• S 33A - Employer given notice of injury must inform worker of right to claim within 14 days. Non-compliance is an offence
• S 36 - Employer to forward accident report to insurer within 3 days and forward a completed claim and a copy of the claim to the insurer within 5 days and the insurer must, within 5 days of receiving a claim forward a copy of it to the Board.
• S 55 - Failure to attend before a medical panel without giving 7 days prior notice. The worker's rights to compensation under the Act may be suspended.
• S 57(2) - 7 day period after notice of determination - application for review.
• S 67F - 28 days to dispute liability in respect of death of worker.
• S 69(13) - Amount of compensation - 14 day requirement after the expired medical certificates, otherwise s.81A applies.
• S 77AA(1) - 28 days for notice to dispute medical expenses.
• S 77AB - Liability for expenses less than $5,000. 28 day notice period.
• S 77G - Appeals from medical accreditation - 14 day period.
• S 81 - Commencement of weekly payments - 14 days after receipt of claim - offence for non-compliance.
• S 81A - 84 days for application.
• S 86(4) - Dispute as to termination or reduction of weekly payments. Noting the reversal of onus of proof for non-compliance.
• S 90A - 30 day period for referral to dispute independent medical review.
• S 90A(7) - 14 day period for disputing medical report.
• S 90B - 7 day requirement to serve medical reports on worker's primary treating medical practitioner.
• S 97 - Obligation of employers to ensure and notice of provisions to licensed insurers under sub-s.(6), (6A), (7).
• S 97AA - 28 day notice of expiry of policy.
• S 112 - Appeals to the Supreme Court within 14 days."

1. Turning to the first argument. There was no challenge to Tripptree by the respondent employer, and argument on appeal proceeded on the basis that reg 16 is a deeming provision. It was put that Tripptree dealt with reg 16 on an associated but different point, ie Tripptree engaged the question whether reg 16 was mandatory or directory, whereas this appeal deals with the power to extend time and that was not the subject of full argument in Tripptree.
2. Indeed, in Tripptree there does not appear to have been extensive argument regarding the construction of deeming provisions beyond the passage cited from Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Comber referred to above at [22]. Some reliance by the respondent, both before the TASCAT and in this Court, was placed on observations by Neuberger J (as his Lordship then was) in Jenks v Dickinson (Inspector of Taxes) [1997] STC 853 at 878 as to the construction of deeming provisions:

"That is not to say that normal principles of statutory construction somehow cease to apply when one is concerned with interpreting a deeming provision; there is no basis in principle or authority for such a proposition. It is more that, by its very nature a deeming provision involves artificial assumptions."

1. To resolve the issues between the parties there is a need to construe both reg 16 and r 11, and to consider the operation of r 11 in respect of reg 16. No issue was taken with the learned Senior Member's approach to statutory construction (TD [10]) where he relied upon a passage from SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34, 262 CLR 362 per Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ at [14]:

"The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose [13]. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense[14]. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected."

1. The process of statutory construction with regard to reg 16 requires attention to the objects at s 2A of the WRC Act under which the WRC Regulations are made. The Acts Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas) at s 8A(1) provides that "an interpretation that promotes the purpose or object of the Act is to be preferred to an interpretation that does not promote the purpose or object".
2. Section 2A of the WRC Act identifies the objects of the legislative scheme for workers compensation in Tasmania. The objects engage, inter alia, the making and management of compensation claims and the resolution of disputes between workers and employers. Regulation 16 is primarily concerned with the latter, not the former. For that purpose, the objects at s 2A(d) and (f) are of particular relevance:

(a) provides for the prompt and effective management of workplace injuries in a manner that promotes and assists the return to work of injured workers as soon as possible; and

(b) provides fair and appropriate compensation to workers and their dependants for workplace injuries; and

(c) assists in securing the health, safety and welfare of workers and in reducing the incidence of workplace injuries; and

(d) provides an effective and economical mechanism for resolving disputes relating to the treatment and management of, and compensation in relation to, workplace injuries; and

(e) is efficiently and effectively administered; and

1. Were a construction of reg 16 to have the effect of prospectively generating applications to extend time right across time sensitive steps legislated for in the WRC Act, thus bringing the workers compensation system to a halt (as argued by the appellant), that may, on its face, be inconsistent with the objects of the WRC Act. Were that in fact the effect of a proposed construction, then that would clearly be relevant to the task of identifying the proper construction. Such an effect would - pursuant to s 8A of the Acts Interpretation Act - militate against accepting the construction preferred below which applies r 11 to the time period limited in reg 16.
2. The Acts Interpretation Act at s 6(2) provides that "The headings of the parts, divisions, and subdivisions, into which any Act is divided shall be deemed to be part of the Act", and thus part of the process of construction. Regulation 16 appears in the second division of Part 2 of the WRC Regulations. Division 2 is titled "Costs". Also regulated in Part 2 in Division 1 is "Practice and procedure of Tribunal".
3. In 2021 when these regulations came into force (13 July 2021), the TASCAT Act had been passed, and the establishment of the TASCAT (4 November 2021) was imminent and anticipated. Reference to the "Tribunal" in the title of Part 2, Division 1 of the WRC Regulations must have initially been to the WRC Tribunal but with the understanding that ultimately the WRC Regulations would apply in the new TASCAT.
4. It is interesting that the title of Part 2 of the WRC Regulations is "Practice and Procedure", in that it suggests that despite the title of Division 1, Division 2 and the costs regime it legislates for were considered matters of practice and procedure.
5. The language of reg 16 is mandatory, as found in Tripptree. It is a deeming provision because it operates on the "fiction" that a failure to serve an objection to a bill of costs within 14 days means that an "unsuccessful party is taken to admit each item on the bill of costs" (italics added). In the absence of a legislative intention to mitigate the effect of that provision, it has an executory operation. The learned Senior Member found that r 11 read with s 115 of the TASCAT Act provides the legislative intention to make the period legislated for in reg 16 susceptible to extension by the TASCAT.
6. The construction of deeming provisions is a task in with which some care must be taken. As the learned author notes in Pearce, D, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 10th edition, Lexis Nexis, 2024 at [4.81]:

"As with all legislative expressions, the scope of the deeming will be determined by what it is intended to achieve. It will not require that it be given a narrow meaning as a matter of course. Context will determine the breadth of meaning to be given to the deemed activity, cf the discussion of what was described as a deeming provision in Plaintiff B9/2014 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 178; (2014) 227 FCR 494 at [49] ff."

1. Context in this matter is important because the introduction of the TASCAT Rules was part of a cognate legislative scheme to fold the resolution of disputes under the WRC Act into the TASCAT. The nature of that scheme requires attention to the introduction of the TASCAT - by the TASCAT Act and TASCAT Rules. Do those elements of the scheme have something to say as to the legislative intention regarding the operation of reg 16? For the reasons that follow, the clear legislative intention evidenced in s 115 of the TASCAT Act is to create a rule-making power with the effect of r 11, and to apply it to time limits created under a "relevant Act", including those legislated for under the WRC Regulations.

1. The breadth of the power conferred at s 115 indicates the legislative intention to give the TASCAT broad powers to make rules to extend or abridge a time limit even though the limit is imposed by the TASCAT Act or a relevant Act. The validity of r 11 was not in issue in this appeal. It was the operation of r 11, and its effect, that lay at the centre of the parties' contentions. After the introduction of the TASCAT disputes between workers and employers were transferred to the TASCAT. The TASCAT Act defines "proceedings" at s 3; "proceedings" can be clearly contrasted with the making of claims for compensation:

"Proceedings means proceedings of the Tribunal and includes a hearing of the Tribunal and proceedings of the Tribunal that do not consist of a hearing."

1. In that regard it is important to note that r 11 relates only to "an action, in relation to any proceedings", ie thus engaging the rule making power in s 115(1) "for doing anything in connection with any proceedings" not "the commencement of proceedings". This is not to "read down" r 11. It merely identifies the rule-making power upon which r 11 rests. Were r 11 to seek to engage time limits in respect of the commencement of proceedings then one would expect express language to that end in order to reflect the alternative heads of rule-making power created under s 115(1).
2. The power conferred by r 11 is not "at large"; it is necessarily circumscribed by well-established common law principles upon which the discretion to extend time may be exercised.
3. The reference in s 115(2)(a) to the extension or abridgement of time in respect of actions where the time limited by statute has already passed, evinces a legislative intention to permit the TASCAT to make rules that allow for the extension of time even where the relevant time limit has passed, as in this case. That necessarily anticipates the availability of relief from any executory consequence of such a provision, albeit such relief is only available according to established common law principles.
4. Rule 11 deals with the extension of time in respect of "actions that may be taken, or must be taken" (italics added), relying on the rule-making power conferred at s 115(1).
5. The conferral of power by s 115 to extend or abridge a time limit is very broad. Power is conferred, inter alia, in respect of time limits for doing anything in connection with any proceedings.
6. That language is permissive rather than restrictive. The use of the words "anything" and "any" emphasise the breadth of the power conferred. That language is broad enough to support the conferral of power at r 11 in respect of the power to "extend or abridge time in which an action, in relation to any proceedings, may be taken, or must be taken".

Operation of rule 11 on regulation 16

1. Regulation 16 falls into the latter category. It is a time limit within an action must be taken, it has a mandatory effect (Tripptree), ie, it requires that an unsuccessful party having been served with a bill of costs by the successful party, be taken to admit each item of the bill of costs unless that party delivers a notice of objection to both the Registrar and to the successful party within 14 days after service of the bill of costs.
2. Regulation 16 is not inconsistent with r 11. Rule 11 is to be read as not engaging the commencement of proceedings by virtue of the different elements of the rule making power at s 115(1) of the TASCAT Act. It focusses on the time limits "in which an action, in relation to any proceedings, may be taken, or must be taken" which sits comfortably within the rubric of the rule- making power at s 115(1) "for doing anything in connection with any proceeding_"._ The fact that the relevant time limit is mandatory and that time has passed, does not mean that extending time under reg 16 is beyond the operation of r 11.
3. The power to extend time conferred by r 11 is discretionary and is exercisable against the common law principles referred to above, and as such it will only be engaged and operate to extend time where the application of those principles supports such an extension. That is consistent with principles of fairness and equity, reflecting the objects of the WRC Act at 2A(f).
4. Whilst this appeal deals with the position of an employer seeking an extension it will apply equally to workers and employers alike. It is easy to envisage circumstances in which a mandatory deadline could operate inequitably were a worker or an employer denied the right to seek an extension of time. The mandatory period of 14 days is a brief period which will work efficiently when the principles upon which time might be extended are not engaged (see s 2A(d)). Equally the process of resolving any application to extend or abridge time under reg 16 should be short and disposed of efficiently.
5. However, the second argument relied upon by the appellant worker, that construing reg 16 in this fashion would bring the wheels of the workers compensation system in this State to a halt because it would act to clog that system, is a matter of considerable importance. The alarm evident in that submission subsides when a close examination is made of the provisions relied upon by the appellant as examples of the problem he contends emerge.
6. First, we can pare away those sections that the appellant relies upon that relate to time limits in the making of claims for compensation, or steps taken in that process that are clearly not actions "taken in relation to any proceedings" and therefore not caught by r 11.
7. Second, we can take away provisions going to the commencement of proceedings because that also is not within the ambit of r 11 when read with s 115(1) of the TASCAT Act. When that was put to counsel for the appellant, the only remaining examples in the list set out above that were relied upon as examples were those at ss 55, 57(2) and 112. As s 112 deals with appeals to this Court that is a matter that too can be put to one side.
8. Turning to ss 55 and 57(2) of the WRC Act. For the reasons I have set out above, the power to extend or abridge time in respect of a very limited number of time limits provided for in the WRC Act could not provide a basis for discounting the construction adopted below.
9. Failure to attend a medical panel without giving 7 days prior notice (s 55) may work an injustice if not subject to a power to extend.
10. Section 57(2) deals with the situation where a matter has been resolved in the absence of a party to a proceeding, and provides that the party has 7 days after receiving notice of the order made by the Tribunal to apply to the Tribunal for a rehearing (s 57(2)(b)). Like the time limit relied upon in respect of s 55, the circumstances pertaining to the operation of s 57(2) may work an injustice in the absence of an entitlement to seek an extension of the time limited for an application to rehear the matter decided in a party's absence. Addressing those matters in a new cognate scheme for the resolution of proceedings dealing with workers compensation is consistent with the objects of the WRC Act.
11. The reasoning process set out above is not to "read down" the language of r 11 it merely identifies its proper operation. In order to sustain the construction found below it is not required to "read" r 11 "down hard" as contended by the appellant. The rule-making power at s 115 of the TASCAT Act is very broad. The validity of r 11 rests on the specific heads of power identified within that provision. Indeed, to suggest that r 11 engages the making and administration of compensation claims under the WRC Act would be a misapprehension as to the nature of "proceedings", as defined by the TASCAT Act.
12. For these reasons I would dismiss the appeal.