15 Contrary to Mr Billings' submissions[18], the prosecutor, by offering to withdraw the charge under s 49(1)(b) or to have it struck out or dismissed, was not engaging in an abuse of process. It may be that the prosecution can obtain a forensic advantage by bringing charges under both s 49(1)(b) and s 49(1)(f), as Mr Billings submitted. In some cases, at least, the bringing of both charges may, as a matter of forensic reality, compel the accused to adduce evidence, such as evidence of the amount of his or her drinking and expert evidence as to the effect on persons generally of such drinking.[19] That may be thought necessary because of the reverse onus of proof under s 49(4) in respect of charges under s 49(1)(f). On the other hand, evidence of that kind might be thought necessary in any event because of the special evidentiary provisions of the Act concerning breath analysing instruments and certificates of analysis.[20] As it happens, in the present case Mr Johnstone gave evidence that he drank 8 pots of beer - perhaps one more or one less - in the period of 5 hours or so before he was intercepted. Further, he had available evidence from an expert, Mr Graham Young, tending to show that at the time of driving his breath (and blood) alcohol concentration would have been approximately 0.067% and that at the time of the test it would have been approximately 0.091%.[21] Of course, this evidence was designed to help him with respect to the charge under s 49(1)(b), not the charge under s 49(1)(f). However, it is possible, I suppose, that in some other case evidence of this general kind adduced by a defendant in order to demonstrate that the breath analysing instrument was not "in proper working order" or was not "properly operated" (within the meaning of s 49(4), for the purposes of s 49(1)(f)) might be latched onto by the prosecution to assist it to prove the charge under s 49(1)(b), whereas otherwise the onus of proof would be on the prosecution to prove its case under s 49(1)(b) beyond reasonable doubt (albeit still with the help of the special evidentiary provisions). However that may be, Neill confirms that the Victorian practice of alleging both offences and trying them together, in itself, does not amount to an abuse of process. It seems to me that, in a case like the present, the accused's only resort is to the doctrine of double punishment. If in the circumstances that doctrine does not assist the accused to keep his or her licence, he or she cannot be heard to complain. The accused is not entitled to some other quid pro quo for the forensic advantage which the statute may effectively give to the prosecution. In any event, the accused is not entitled to any quid pro quo that would be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act.