AOI20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1811

1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent's costs fixed in the amount of $5,000.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographic, clerical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04(h) of the Rules.

1. In this matter the applicant is challenging a migration decision under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). The applicant seeks constitutional writ relief against the respondents in respect of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 6 January 2020 which affirmed an earlier decision of a delegate of the first respondent (delegate) not to grant the first applicant a Protection (Class XA) (subclass 866) visa (protection visa) under s 65 of the Act.

1. On 29 April 2009, the applicant, a citizen of India, first arrived in Australia as a dependent on his wife's student visa.
2. On 10 July 2014, the applicant lodged an application for a protection visa.
3. On 27 November 2015, a delegate of the first respondent refused to grant the visa on the basis that it was not satisfied that the applicant met s 36(2) of the Act which required the applicant to be a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations.
4. On 19 December 2015, the applicant lodged an application for review of the delegate's decision with the Tribunal.
5. On 15 December 2016, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review not to grant the applicant a protection visa (first Tribunal decision).
6. On 11 January 2017, the applicant applied to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (as it then was) for judicial review of the first Tribunal decision.
7. On 31 January 2018, the Court made orders by consent quashing the first Tribunal decision and remitting the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration according to law.
8. On 20 August 2019, the Tribunal invited the applicant to appear at a hearing on 3 October 2019, to give evidence and present arguments, which was postponed to 7 November 2019.
9. On 7 November 2019, the applicant appeared before the Tribunal with the assistance of his representative and a Punjabi interpreter.
10. On 6 January 2020, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review not to grant the applicant's protection visa.

1. The Tribunal identified the issue for review was the credibility of the applicant and whether, on the accepted claims, the criteria for protection under the Act had been satisfied.
2. The Tribunal considered the evidence before it, including country information, the applicant's written claims contained in a submission to the delegate, the applicant's claims during his interview with the delegate, and the applicant's oral evidence at the hearing.
3. The Tribunal addressed the applicant's credibility by reference to the applicant's claims during his interview with the delegate, his written submission and the oral evidence that he gave during the Tribunal hearing on 7 November 2019.
4. The Tribunal at paragraph [68] noted that it raised the inconsistencies in applicant's evidence regarding the veracity of his claims. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant addressed the concerns adequately and found the applicant to not be a witness of truth.
5. The Tribunal noted the applicant claimed to be a follower of the Deri Sacha Sauda (the DSS) since 2007 and after returning from a DSS temple in early 2008, he was attacked by armed extremists from the opposing Sikh group. The Tribunal considered the applicant's evidence and determined that the applicant's claims in relation to the 2008 attack by Sikh extremists were inconsistent. In putting these inconsistencies to the applicant during the hearing, the Tribunal found the applicant's submissions in response to be vague, evasive and unconvincing.
6. The Tribunal considered the applicant's claim that his family adopted DSS and that owing to their involvement in the group, the Sikh extremists damaged property and threatened his family in 2014. The Tribunal had regard to affidavits previously submitted by the applicant which contained evidence inconsistent with the applicant's oral evidence at the hearing in relation to his family's involvement with the DSS. The Tribunal did not accept that these inconsistencies could be explained by the applicant as being nervous or anxious during the hearing.
7. The Tribunal moved to consider the First Information Report (FIR) submitted by the applicant and apparent court documents. The Tribunal found that the information in the FIR failed to resolve the inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence.
8. The Tribunal had regard to the applicant's delay of approximately five years in lodging an application for a protection visa after arriving in Australia in 2009. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant sought to stay in Australia for his safety on the basis of his study nor did it accept that the applicant thought he could safely return to India in that time whilst his family continued to communicate the danger in India. Accordingly, the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant had manufactured his protection claim and that the applicant was not a person who has a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons set out in the Act.
9. In considering the credibility of the applicant's evidence, the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant was not a witness of truth and that his protection claims were false. The Tribunal considered the applicant's affidavits, a letter from a DSS centre, the FIR and a court document and did not accept that the applicant or his family were followers of DSS and had faced harm previously for this reason. The Tribunal found that there was no credible evidence that the applicant would face serious harm if returned to India nor did he have a well-founded fear of persecution.
10. Considering all of the applicant's claims and evidence, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real chance of serious harm on return to India for any of the reasons claimed.
11. The Tribunal found that the applicant did not satisfy ss 36(2)(a) or (2)(aa) of the Act and accordingly affirmed the delegate's decision refusing to grant the protection visa.

1. On 10 February 2020, the applicant filed an application in this Court seeking judicial review of the Tribunal's decision dated 6 January 2020. The application contains ten (10) grounds of review. They are (as written):
   1. That the Tribunal has committed a jurisdictional error by deciding the review application filed by the applicant yet again without considering the affidavits of Gurmukh Singh and Surinder Singh. The respondent I had earlier conceded this matter by submitting to the Federal Circuit Court " The first respondent concedes that the second respondent fell into jurisdictional error on the basis that the second respondent failed to consider the applicant's claims in relation to the attacks on the applicant's family by Sikhs in 201 I, 2012 and 2014, as set out in the affidavits of Gurmukh Singh dated 30 May 2014, Gurnam Singh dated 30 May 2014 and Surinder Singh dated 30 May 2014". Shockingly, there is not even a mention about the affidavits filed by Gurmukh Singh and Surinder Singh, let alone considering them, in the order passed by the tribunal which is impugned herein. The tribunal has yet again repeated the same mistake and resultantly denied justice to the applicant.
   2. That the Tribunal has committed a jurisdictional error by deciding the review application filed by the applicant on the basis that he was not entitled to Complementary Protection Visa especially when the applicant had specifically pleaded that his life was in danger should he be forced to go back to India as he is a follower of a sect, whose members are the prime target of Sikh militants. Although the Tribunal has agreed that members of Dera Sacha Sanda have been killed by the militants, yet has refused to grant the protection to the applicant

3. The Tribunal failed to comply with s359A of the Migration Act 1958

Particulars:

The Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by failing to comply with s359A of the Migration Act 1958.

The Tribunal had to give clear particulars of the information to the applicant and invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, under section 359AA. If this was not done then it was incumbent on the Tribunal to give an opportunity to the applicant and provide clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considered would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and

(b) ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understood why it was relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and

(c) invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it. AND

(2) The information and invitation must be given to the applicant:

(a) except where paragraph (b) applies--by one of the methods specified in section 379A;

(b) if the applicant is in immigration detention--by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to such a person

The Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by not providing any particulars of the provisions, evidence, regulations, and facts which were taken into consideration while affirming the decision of the delegate. It was incumbent on the tribunal to do that especially because of the fact that that the application was lodged and argued by the applicant without any legal help from a lawyer or a migration agent.

1. That the Tribunal has committed a jurisdictional error by not putting the clear particulars of the information to the applicant that it will be considering and in fact, basing its decision after heavily relying on the evidence earlier given by the applicant to the AAT at the first hearing before the matter was remitted back by the Federal Circuit Court. The applicant was caught by surprise when the tribunal tried to question him on the evidence allegedly given by the applicant during his earlier hearing before the AAT. The tribunal expected the applicant to remember all the evidence he had given to the AAT around four years back. The tribunal also never invited the applicant to comment on or respond to, either orally or in writing to the said evidence earlier relied upon by the AAT during the previous hearing. Resultantly, the applicant lost their right to comment on the information under Section 359A by way of methods prescribed under Section 379A.

The tribunal relied on the country information from different sources and based its decision primarily on the basis of the said information in reaching the conclusion that there was no danger for the members of the sect from the Sikh militants anymore and thus denying protection to the applicant whereas the evidence on the record overwhelmingly proved beyond any doubt that hundreds of Dera Sacha Sauda members were killed by the Sikh militants in India.

1. That the Tribunal has committed jurisdictional error in not giving the Applicant the information. The applicant had specifically made a request under the Freedom of Information Act to supply him the hard copies of the documents and the record pertaining to the AAT and the department's file as he did not have access to the computer. However, he was never supplied with copies of the record which was eventually used against him at the hearing. Thus the information was not clear and in a material particular. The Tribunal did not comply with Section 359AA as it did not explain what an opportunity to respond entailed; that is, it did not explain that a response could be in writing, such that it could have offered an adjournment to go and make their own decision and explore their options to that adverse information and provide a meaningful response. In the present case, the Tribunal even failed to give basic information to the applicant.
2. That the Tribunal has committed a jurisdictional error as the tribunal was totally confused about the facts of the matter especially the place where the applicant was attacked by the militants in 2008. The tribunal mixed up the names of towns and cities and although observed that" To the delegate, the applicant said that the location of the attack was near the city of Chandigarh, 'next to Haryana'. He said that the location of this attack was 'quite far' from his home. The applicant then said that as soon as he came out of the 'dera', which he said was in Haryana, the incident occurred. The delegate asked the applicant to confirm where he was attacked and, also, why he was at this location near Chandigarh. In his responses, the applicant said that he was attacked at a location that was approximately 15 kilometers from the 'dera' and near Chandigarh where he got off a bus. He then said that he went to the 'dera' in Sirsa and as he came out of the 'dera' his attackers might have been keeping an eye on him." All the statements made by the applicant as noticed by the tribunal are absolutely correct. The tribunal got confused with the demographics of the towns and cities. The categoric evidence given by the applicant was that he was attacked in the dera's center at Panchkula, which is admittedly in the State of Haryana, admittedly about 15 km from Chandigarh and admittedly far away from applicant's home in the State of Punjab. There was no contradiction of the evidence whatsoever as the tribunal also noticed in paragraph 24 of its order "The Tribunal again asked the applicant to name the location where the attack took place. In response, the applicant said the attack took place at Panchkula". The applicant had repeatedly given the evidence during the hearing that all centers of Dera Sacha Sauda including the one in Panchkula are also called dera's branches. The tribunal has failed to rely on the truthful evidence given by the applicant.
3. That the Tribunal has committed jurisdictional error by not relying on the evidence given by the applicant even after noticing that in the cross-examination, in paragraph 28 of the impugned order " The Tribunal then reminded the applicant that he had said that there was a DSS center in Panchkula and he said that was correct. The Tribunal asked the applicant whether he went to that center and, in response, he said that he did when he was attacked. When asked if he was referring to the occasion on which he was attacked in early 2008, the applicant said that was correct. The Tribunal then asked the applicant whether, on that particular day, he had been to the DSS temple in Sirsa and the center in Panchkula. In response, the applicant said, that was correct because when he and the others came out of the center in Panchkula, they got attacked." If all this was correct, as noticed by the tribunal then there was no contradiction whatsoever with the evidence of the applicant.
4. That the Tribunal has committed a jurisdictional error as the tribunal has not given any reason whatsoever for not believing the letter and certificate issued by the dera to the effect that parents of the applicant were also supporters of the dera and they started visiting the dera after the applicant had left for Australia. Shockingly, the tribunal noticed in paragraph 41 of its order "With the submissions of 26 November representative submitted a letter that he claimed was from the DSS center that the applicant's family attend. In this respect, the representative provided a document dated 20 November 2019 purportedly from a DSS center in Hoshiarpur and stating that the applicant's parents and brothers had been followers at that center since 2010.According to this letter, they all had 'full faith' in the DSS and had visited the DSS in Sirsa a few times. While those claims are broadly consistent with the applicant's claims about his family following the DSS, they do not explain or excuse the applicant's evidence to the delegate that his family was not followers of the DSS.". The tribunal lost sight of the fact that the applicant had told the delegate that his parents were not the followers of the Dera till the time he was in India and before he left for Australia.
5. That the Tribunal has committed jurisdictional error by not reading the document which was an important court document in the right context. A perusal of the bail order which is a part of the record clearly shows that both the brothers were illegally detained in the custody from the 29th of May 2018 till the time they were released on bail by the Court on the 15th of June 2018. The tribunal has noticed "In support of these claims, the representative enclosed a First Information Report dated 29 May 2018 and what appeared to be extracted from a court document related to that report and which appears to have been prepared or issued in July 2008. According to these documents, the applicant's brothers were held in custody from 29 May 2018 and a request was sought for bail. These documents indicated bail was granted by the court. The Tribunal has carefully considered the contents of these documents, but, they do not indicate that the applicant's brothers were held for one week as the representative purported to claim nor for four or five days as the applicant claimed. Overall, the contents of these documents do not resolve the inconsistency in the evidence before the Tribunal about the period of detention of the applicant's brothers." The tribunal miserably failed to read this document correctly and wrongly noted the date in July which was, in fact, the date when a copy of the bail order of the Court was supplied to the applicant's father. The bail order of the Court clearly shows that both brothers of the applicant were illegally detained by the police for more than a week.
6. That the Tribunal has committed jurisdictional error by not considering the case of the applicant under the alternative criterion in s.36(2)(aa) of the Act. There is no discussion whatsoever by the tribunal as to why the applicant was not entitled to the Complementary Protection Visa under Section 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The tribunal has only considered the applicant's case under the refugee convention under section 36(2)(a).

1. On 12 June 2025, a Registrar of this Court made an Order for both the applicant and first respondent to file an amended application (if applicable), written submissions and any further evidence in respect to the hearing. The applicant did not file any documents in accordance with this Order. The first respondent filed their written submissions as required by the Order.
2. On 30 July 2025, the proceedings were docketed to me and set down before me for final hearing on 3 October 2025.

1. At the hearing of this matter on 3 October 2025, the applicant was unrepresented, assisted by a Punjabi interpreter. Ms Wilford of Sparke Helmore Lawyers appeared for the first respondent.
2. This Court has duties to take appropriate steps to ensure that unrepresented applicants have sufficient information about practice and procedure of the court they are appearing in, so far as is reasonably practicable, for the purpose of ensuring a fair trial: see generally SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146; (2013) 216 FCR 445 (SZRUR) at [37] (Robertson J, with Allsop CJ and Mortimer J agreeing) and BSQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 943 Hill J.
3. I consider, in cases such as the present where the applicant is unrepresented, the appropriate procedure is to give the applicant an opportunity to explain orally at the hearing before me what was meant by the grounds of review as they appear in the application to this Court and why the applicant considers the Tribunal was wrong.
4. Accordingly, I asked the applicant if he wanted to make any submissions about any of the 10 grounds contained in his application. The applicant told the Court he relied upon what was said in the application and did not want to make any oral submissions about any of the 10 grounds.
5. Ms Wilford in reply made brief oral submissions summarising the first respondent's written submissions on the grounds.

1. The issue before this Court is whether the Tribunal's decision contained a jurisdictional error; that is, a serious legal error that results in an administrative decision lacking any legal force: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476; LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 98 ALJR 610 at [2] (LPDT). To constitute jurisdictional error, the error must be material, in the sense that it could have realistically deprived the applicant of the opportunity of a successful outcome: LPDT at [32] and Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421.
2. As I explained to the parties during the hearing, the issue before the Court is not whether the Tribunal decision was correct on the merits: Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 (Djokovic).
3. Below the Court sets out its consideration of the 10 grounds of judicial review in this matter. For the reasons given below, neither of the grounds identify the Tribunal committed any jurisdictional error. In coming to this conclusion, I have read the grounds relied upon as broadly as possible and, when doing so, remained alert to the possibility of legal error in the decision.

1. Ground 1 asserts the Tribunal committed a jurisdictional error by deciding the review application without considering the affidavits of Gurmukh Singh and Surinder Singh.
2. This ground is unmeritorious as it does not raise an arguable ground of jurisdictional error. At paragraph [34] of its decision, the Tribunal identified both affidavits which had been submitted after the delegate's interview. At paragraphs [35]-[38] the Tribunal considered these affidavits and found them to be inconsistent with the applicant's evidence given to the Tribunal. It was based on these inconsistency concerns that the Tribunal sent a s 424A request to the applicant by letter dated 13 November 2019. The argument that the Tribunal did not consider the two affidavits has no basis.
3. Ground 1 has no merit.

1. As to ground 2, the applicant claims the Tribunal committed a jurisdictional error by deciding the review on the basis that he was not entitled to a 'Complementary Protection Visa', in circumstances where the applicant had claimed that his life would be in danger should he be forced to go back to India owing to his allegiance to the DSS, whose members, it was claimed, were the prime target of Sikh militants and had been killed in the past by militants.
2. This ground also has no merit. At paragraph [68] of its decision the Tribunal found the applicant was not a witness of truth. The Tribunal disbelieved the applicant's evidence that he attended and followed the DSS in India and that Sikh extremists took an adverse interest in him and threatened and attacked him. The Tribunal also disbelieved the applicant's evidence that his parents and brothers were followers of the DSS and his claims that they suffered harm at the hands of Sikh extremists and Indian police.
3. The Tribunal found for these reasons that the applicant did not hold a well-founded fear of persecution based on any convention ground, and found, for these same reasons, the Tribunal found that there was not a real risk that the applicant would suffer significant harm in India (see paragraph [72]). In other words, the Tribunal used the anterior findings in s 36(2)(a) to find that there was no real risk the applicant would suffer significant harm in India under the complementary protection provision under s 36(2)(aa).
4. Justice Marshall in MZYXS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 614 at [31] held that:

The Tribunal was entitled to rely on its finding that there was no real chance of the relevant harm alleged for Convention purposes in assessing whether there was a real chance of significant harm for complementary protection purposes, when the same essential claims and facts were being relied on in each aspect of the appellants case before the Tribunal

1. No separate claims were made by the applicant (apart from his claims for protection under s 36(2)(a)) in support of any claim under the complementary protection criteria in s 36(2)(aa) in the Tribunal.
2. This reasoning process adopted by the Tribunal in the present case was perfectly permissible under the Act. Therefore, the Tribunal did not commit any jurisdictional error when it determined that the complementary protection provisions were not satisfied.

1. Grounds 3 and 4 claim the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by its failure to comply with s 359A of the Act.
2. These grounds also fails.
3. Section 359A was not relevant to the review in the Tribunal. Section 359A relates to Part 5, reviewable decisions. As the delegate's decision was a Part 7 reviewable decision under s 411(1)(c), the relevant provision is s 424A, which is the cognate provision to s 359A in Part 5. However, as the applicant is unrepresented, I will read s 359A to mean s 424A in these grounds.
4. On 13 November 2019, the Tribunal invited the applicant to comment on or respond to information under s 424A(1), which the applicant did on 27 November 2019. This invitation under 424A(1) was made on the basis of conflicting accounts about his family's adoption of the DSS and suffering harm on that basis; and inconsistent evidence about where the applicant about being attacked in early 2008 in the vicinity of a DSS temple. The Tribunal in its decision did not accept the applicant's explanation about the inconsistent evidence.
5. The applicant's arguments as to s 359A (read: s 424A) are misconceived. The s 424A(1) invitation was unobjectionable. The applicant submitted the Tribunal was obliged to put other matters to him for comment, but failed to do so. These included provisions and regulations considered by the Tribunal, evidence given by the applicant himself and preliminary assessments about credit findings.
6. First, any "provisions and regulations" which were considered by the Tribunal in its decision were not "information" under s 424A(1). Second, as to the evidence given by the applicant to the first Tribunal, that fell within the exception to the obligation in s 424A(1) in s 424A(3)(b) of the Act, because it was information that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application for review. Third, the Tribunal is not under any obligation in s 424A to give the applicant for comment its thought processes going to the assessment of the applicant's evidence to the Tribunal. The High Court in SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [1981] HCA 26; (2007) 147 CLR 297 (SZBYR) at [18] held that "information" does not include the Tribunal's subjective appraisals, thought processes and determinations, defects, gaps or lack of detail in an applicant's evidence. The Tribunal is not required to provide the applicant with a running commentary on any of its preliminary subjective assessments of the applicant's evidence.
7. In Ground 4, the applicant also submitted that the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error when it relied on country information from different sources and based its decision primarily on the basis of that information in reaching its conclusion that there was no danger for the members of the DSS from Sikh militants. This argument misunderstands the Tribunal decision. The Tribunal made its decision based on its comprehensive adverse credibility findings made about the applicant, namely the finding that, because the applicant was found not be a witness of truth the, none of his claims were believed.
8. Grounds 3 and 4 are rejected.

1. In Ground 5, the applicant argues the Tribunal never supplied him with documents that were the subject of a freedom information request made by the applicant, and that there was a breach of s 359A in relation to the request.
2. This claim has no merit. The evidence in the Court Book (page 129) demonstrates that the Tribunal gave the applicant all of the documents that were sought by his Freedom of Information request dated 9 August 2016 (FOI request). On 11 August 2016, the Tribunal provided the applicant with a hard copy of all the documents he had requested under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). To date, there has been no complaint made by the applicant that particular documents were not provided by the Tribunal on 11 August 2016. As the first respondent correctly submitted, the applicant has not identified any basis for contending that a failure to comply with an FOI request would manifest as jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
3. As to the allegation about a breach of s 359A (read: s 424A), the applicant has not articulated to the Court what he meant by this argument. If by this argument the applicant is alleging that the Tribunal had an obligation to put the delegate's decision to the applicant for comment, then this is rejected on the basis that it was the applicant himself who put the delegate's decision before the Tribunal (attached to the application for review). Accordingly, that information fell within the exception in s 424A(3)(b), and no obligation under s 424A(1) was enlivened.
4. For these reasons, ground 5 is rejected.

1. Ground 6 and 7 sets out the applicant's disagreement with the Tribunal's findings in relation to contradictions and inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence about the location of the alleged attack in 2008. The applicant claims no such inconsistencies exist. The first respondent in his written submissions (at paragraph [31]) addressed both grounds as follows:

...The applicant claims that there was no contradiction in his evidence in respect of the location of the attack. This cannot be maintained on the evidence before the Court. As the Tribunal found, the applicant gave the following accounts of where the attack took place: he told the delegate that it occurred near the city of Chandigarh, next to Haryana, when he came out of the dera in Sirsa (CB 313 [17]); he told the first Tribunal that he attended the DSS temple in Sirsa often and that he was attacked approximately 15 kilometres from Sirsa when he was going towards Chandigarh (CB 313 [20]); in submissions he claimed that he was "coming from the '[DSS] Sirsa' centre in Panchkula Haryana", being 15 kilometres from Chandigarh (CB 313 [21]); he told this Tribunal that he attended a DSS temple in the city Sirsa and district Haryana, near Chandigarh (CB 313 [22]-[23]); he then told the Tribunal that the attack occurred in Panchkula, 15 kilometres from Sirsa (CB 314 [24]). The Tribunal was correct to find that the applicant had not previously claimed there was an attack in Panchkula, and it was therefore open to conclude this evidence was inconsistent with his previous evidence (CB 315 [31]). Further, the applicant had advanced differing purposes for being at the location. As to the explanation that all temples were addressed with the word 'Sirsa', the Tribunal did not consider this resolved the inconsistencies it identified.

1. I agree with this submission. These were all findings of fact, which cannot be challenged in this Court in an application under s 476 of the Act. This Court cannot re-decide the merits of the applicant's case before the Tribunal: see Djokovic. Based on the findings of fact made by the Tribunal (outlined above) it was open to the Tribunal to conclude at [32] that the applicant's evidence on this is "replete with inconsistency". Further, to the extent that these grounds are a complaint that the Tribunal had an obligation to put concerns about the applicant's evidence, in respect of the location of the alleged attack, to the applicant for comment before making its decision, but failed to do so, such an argument is also rejected. As I outlined above, the High Court held in SZBYR at [18], that the Tribunal is not required to provide the applicant with a running commentary on any of its preliminary subjective assessments of the applicant's evidence.
2. Grounds 6 and 7 have no merit.

1. As to ground 8, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal had committed a jurisdictional error by not giving any reason whatsoever for not accepting the letter from the DSS and certificate issued by the DSS.
2. This ground of review does not disclose an arguable jurisdictional error. The challenges made in this ground are to findings of fact made by the Tribunal. As outlined above, this Court cannot re-decide the merits of the applicant's case before the Tribunal: see Djokovic.
3. In any event, this argument fails at the factual level. The argument the Tribunal failed to provide reasons for not accepting the letter is incorrect. The Tribunal dealt with the letter from the DSS at [41] of its reasons as follows:

With the submissions of 26 November 2019, the representative submitted a letter that he claimed was from the DSS centre that the applicant's family attend. In this respect, the representative provided a document dated 20 November 2019 purportedly from a DSS centre in Hoshiapur and stating that the applicant's parents and brothers had been followers at that centre since 2010.8 According to this letter, they all had 'full faith' in the DSS and had visited the DSS in Sirsa a few times. While those claims are broadly consistent with the applicant's claims about his family following the DSS, they do not explain or excuse the applicant's evidence to the delegate that his family were not followers of the DSS.

1. The Tribunal referred to these findings at [69] and concluded that the contents of the document were false. These findings were reasonably open to the Tribunal on the material before it.
2. Ground 8 is rejected.

1. Ground 9 is another challenge to the factual findings of the Tribunal. It argues that the Tribunal had committed jurisdictional error by not reading the First Information Report, which was an important court document, in the right context. It argues that a perusal of the bail order which is a part of the record clearly shows that both of the applicant's brothers were illegally detained in custody from 29 May 2018 until the time they were released on bail by the Court on 15 June 2018.
2. This ground appears to argue the Tribunal misapprehended or misunderstood this evidence, because the Tribunal found it did not show the applicant's brothers were held for one week in custody as alleged by the applicant.
3. This ground is completely unmeritorious. The Tribunal's reasoning about this document was set out in paragraph [52] of its decision as follows:

In support of these claims, the representative enclosed a First Information Report dated 29 May 2018 and what appeared to be extracts from a court document related to that report and which appears to have been prepared or issued in July 2008. According to these documents, the applicant's brothers were held in custody from 29 May 2018 and a request was sought for bail. These documents indicated bail was granted by the court. The Tribunal has carefully considered the contents of these documents, but, they do not indicate that the applicant's brothers were held for one week as the representative purported to claim nor for four or five days as the applicant claimed. Overall, the contents of these documents do not resolve the inconsistency in the evidence before the Tribunal about the period of detention of the applicant's brothers.

1. It was open to the Tribunal as part of its fact-finding function to find that the First Information Report did not demonstrate the length of time the applicant's brothers were held in custody and did not resolve the inconsistency in the evidence.
2. Ground 9 is unmeritorious.

1. In this ground the applicant claims there was no discussion by the Tribunal as to why the applicant was not entitled to a protection visa under s 36(2)(aa) and that the Tribunal had only considered the applicant's case under s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
2. This ground is misconceived and is unmeritorious. The applicant's claims to fear harm were rejected on the basis of adverse credibility findings made by the Tribunal. For that reason, the Tribunal found that s 36(2)(a) was not satisfied. The Tribunal then decided that, for the same reasons, the applicant did not meet the requirements under s 36(2)(aa). There was nothing erroneous about the complementary protection finding made under s 36(2)(aa). In SZSGA v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCA 774 at [55]- [57] and SZSHK v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCAFC 125 at [32]- [33] the Federal Court held that the Tribunal is entitled to rely upon its findings under s 36(2)(a) when making its findings under s 36(2)(aa) that there was no real risk that the applicant would suffer any form of significant harm if the applicant were to return to their home country.
3. Ground 10 has no merit.

1. The applicant has not established that the Tribunal's decision is affected by jurisdictional error.
2. As the applicant is unrepresented, I am required to consider whether any arguable substantive jurisdictional error in the decision sought to be reviewed arises from the material before me: see MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392 at [112] and [113]; and BSQ17 at [27]. I am satisfied that no arguable substantive jurisdictional error arises from my review of the Tribunal decision in this matter.
3. The application is dismissed.

1. The first respondent seeks costs fixed in the sum of $5,000. I consider the amount sought by the is reasonable for this type of matter. I will make an order for the amount sought by the first respondent against the applicant.

I certify that the preceding seventy-four (74) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Cleary.