AOD19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1983

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographic, clerical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04(h) of the Rules.

1. By an application filed with the Court on 15 February 2019, the applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal), which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to not grant them Protection (Class XA) (subclass 866) visas (visa).

1. The background to this matter is derived from the first respondent's written submissions. Unless otherwise indicated, it does not appear to be in dispute.
2. The applicants are citizens of Bangladesh who arrived in Australia on 2 October 2014 as the holders of Visitor (Class FA) (subclass 600) visas (Court Book (CB) 260).
3. On 22 December 2014, the applicants applied for the visa (CB 1 to 36). The first applicant claimed to fear harm from the Awami League (AL) due to his associations with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). He claimed to have held offices in the BNP's student wing, and later its youth wing. He claimed that in 2014, AL activists twice attacked and assaulted him, and that his opponents have brought politically motivated false criminal charges against him. He claimed that the AL will arrest, imprison, mistreat and perhaps kill him on his return to Bangladesh. The second applicant relied on the first applicant's claims for protection.
4. On 18 March 2016, the delegate refused to grant the applicants the visa (CB 259 to 272).
5. On 6 April 2016, the applicants applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision (CB 275 to 276).
6. On 2 July 2018, the Tribunal wrote to the applicants seeking their availability for a hearing and afforded the applicants an opportunity to provide any further evidence (CB 283).
7. On 27 August 2018, the Tribunal invited the applicants to a hearing scheduled for 13 September 2018 (CB 285 to 287).
8. On 6 September 2018, following a request from the applicants, the Tribunal rescheduled the hearing to 21 September 2018 (CB 290 to 292).
9. On 14 September 2018, the Tribunal wrote to the applicants in respect of a non-disclosure certificate issued pursuant to s 438 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). The Tribunal expressed its view as to the validity of the certificate and invited the applicants to comment (CB 294 to 295).
10. On 19 September 2018, the applicants provided further documents to the Tribunal in support of their application, namely country information, articles and a letter from the Bangladesh Nationalist Youth Party (CB 296 to 797).
11. On 21 September 2018, the first applicant appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments (CB 798 to 800).
12. On 18 October 2018, the applicants were invited to a further hearing before the Tribunal to be held on 31 October 2018 (CB 1052 to 1054). On the same day, following a request from the applicants, that hearing was postponed to 30 October 2018 (CB 1055 to 1059).
13. On 30 October 2018, the applicants appeared before the Tribunal, accompanied by their representative and assisted by an interpreter (CB 1060 to 1062).
14. On 18 January 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the applicants the protection visa (CB 1067 to 1089).

1. The Tribunal set out the background to the application and the criteria for the visa (CB 1070 at [1] to [6]) and the applicants' claims (CB 1070 to 1071 at [7] to [16]). The Tribunal summarised the claims as follows (CB 1070 at [7]):

(a) the first applicant was a member of the BNP's student wing, and more recently, its youth wing;

(b) he suffered harassment, detention and mistreatment from police and security forces, as well as violence from AL activists; and

(c) in 2014, the student wing activists twice attacked and assaulted him in his office, and he narrowly avoided arrest by security forces. He also claimed that his opponents brought politically motivated false criminal charges against him and understands that he is on a list for extra-judicial killings; and

(d) AL security forces will arrest or kill him on return to Bangladesh and there is an arrest warrant for him.

1. The Tribunal set out the evidence before it (CB 1071 to 1072 at [17] to [18]) and the non-disclosure certificate (CB 1073 at [19] to [22]). The Tribunal recorded it having written to the applicants about the certificate and its preliminary view that the certificate was not valid and that the information sought to be covered by it was not relevant to the review. The Tribunal decided that the certificate was not valid on the basis that it did not specify a reason that could form the basis for a claim of public interest immunity. The Tribunal otherwise found purportedly subject to it was not relevant (with the exception of information pertaining to the first applicant's travel to the USA) (CB 1072 at [22]).
2. The Tribunal then set out its consideration of the applicants claims and evidence.
3. In respect of the first applicant's political activities in Bangladesh, the Tribunal had significant concerns about the truthfulness of the first applicant's claims, finding his evidence to be vague and lacking context. The Tribunal noted that during the hearing, the first applicant claimed to be involved with the BNP's student wing (JCD), and was elected president of the committee (CB 1075 at [31]). The Tribunal found the first applicant's evidence was fairly general and lacking in specifics, and that he was unable to provide any documentary evidence to support the claim that he held the position in the JCD (CB 1075 at [32], [34] and [36]). The Tribunal found it difficult to ascertain what tasks the applicant had undertaken in a particular role he claimed have had with the JCD. The Tribunal found the first applicant's evidence relating to his involvement in the BNP's youth wing (JBD) to be vague and unsubstantiated and it did did not accept his explanation that relevant documents were destroyed after an alleged raid on his office in 2014 (CB 1076 at [40]).
4. The Tribunal placed minimal weight on letters and documents provided by the applicants in support of their application (CB 1076 to 1078 at [41] to [42]) and was not satisfied that the first applicant had any political interests or engagement that went beyond a general preference for the BNP, or that he had participated actively in any political or social events formally linked with the political party (CB 1077 at [45]).
5. In respect of their experiences in Bangladesh before 2014, the Tribunal considered the applicants' written claims about the first applicant's claimed torture and imprisonment, to be untruthful (CB 1077 to 1078 at [49]). The Tribunal concluded that the first applicant had not suffered any threats or restrictions on his political freedoms, that he had not been the subject of false cases, imprisonment, torture or any associated psychological harm (CB 1078 at [51]). As to their claimed experience of harm in Bangladesh after 2014, the Tribunal did not accept that the first applicant had any direct political involvement in the BNP or that the claimed incidents prior to 2014 occurred. Accordingly, the Tribunal did not accept that the claimed incidents of attacks on the first applicant by student activists and/or Bangladeshi security forces in early 2014 occurred (CB 1080 at [65]).
6. More specifically in respect of false charges which the first applicant claimed had been laid against him, the Tribunal acknowledged a number of documents in support of the claim, including a First Information Report (FIR), an arrest warrant and two order sheets (CB 1082 at [73]). The Tribunal was concerned about the genuineness of the documents and observed that it was not possible to assess the accuracy them without originals (CB 1082 to 1083 at [77]). In light of those concerns and based on the other material before it, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the first applicant had been the subject of false or politically motivated allegations or charges. Further, the Tribunal found there was no evidence of an arrest warrant or any related court proceedings, pending legal action nor ongoing adverse interest from the local police (or other police units), nor from Bangladeshi security forces (CB 1083 at [78]).
7. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicants received threatening phone calls, had moved around for their safety nor had bribed officials to arrange their safe departure from Bangladesh. The Tribunal found instead that the applicants left Bangladesh for reasons unrelated to their protection claims (CB 1084 at [83]).
8. Having not accepted that the first applicant's political opinion extended beyond that of a person who generally prefers the BNP, nor that he has a high profile with the BNP or local authorities, activists or anyone, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicants would have a well-founded fear of persecution if they returned to Bangladesh (CB 1086 to 1087 at [96] to [100]). The Tribunal was therefore not satisfied that the applicants are people in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) of the Act (CB 1087 at [101]);
9. In respect of the complementary protection criterion, the Tribunal was not satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence the applicants being removed from Australia to Bangladesh, there was a real risk that they will suffer significant harm (CB 1088 at [105]).
10. In the circumstances, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicants satisfied the criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), or s 36(2)(b) or (c) of the Act (CB 1088 at [107]).

1. By an application to show cause filed with the Court on 15 February 2019, the applicants seek judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. The proceedings were initially docketed to another judge of this Court (first primary Judge). On 14 March 2019, a Registrar made orders which included a grant of leave to the applicants to amend. The proceedings were next to be listed for callover before the first primary judge on a date to be advised administratively to the parties.
2. The proceedings were later placed in the central migration docket, possibly due to the retirement of the first primary Judge. They were next called-over on 31 January 2025 before a Registrar by telephone, on which occasion the first applicant appeared with the assistance of an interpreter in the Bangla language. The applicants were again given leave to file an amended application 28 days before the final hearing.
3. The proceedings were docketed to me on 27 June 2025, on which date I made orders listing them for hearing before me this morning. The applicants were again granted leave to file any amended application together with written submissions and evidence by 30 September 2025.
4. The applicants have not taken up the opportunity to amend their application at any stage; however, on 29 September 2025, they did file a written submission and a bundle of documents within the time allowed by the Court. The first respondent filed written submissions as ordered, together with an additional Affidavit of Ella Sophia Hilder affirmed on 7 October 2025 (Hilder Affidavit), documents which had previously been the subject of a non-disclosure certificate annexing that Affidavit was received into evidence without objection.
5. Both applicants have appeared before me this morning with the assistance of an interpreter in the Bangla language. The two-volume Court Book was tendered and collectively marked as Exhibit "1R", without objection. The applicants confirmed that they had received the Court Book. They also confirmed that they had received the Minister's written submissions, which they had read.
6. The applicants sought to tender a bundle of additional documents which they had filed. There are four documents which constitute the bundle. Each is dated 2025, which (obviously enough) post-dates the Tribunal decision. The solicitor for the first respondent objected to the bundle being received, saying that the material filed is irrelevant to the Court's task, noting that the Court cannot review the factual merits of the Tribunal's decision: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh, and Gummow JJ. An application for judicial review is ordinarily confined to the material put before the Tribunal. Fresh evidence is not admissible unless it bears on some jurisdictional error: SZJMG v Minister for Immigration [2008] FCA 1145.
7. I took some time to explain to the applicants why the documents could not be relevant, and the tender of the bundle was rejected.
8. I have read the applicants' written submissions and I understand them. Those written submissions go to the merits of the applicants' visa application and the claims that they make, together with matters they raise as to their circumstances in Australia. I also took some time to explain to the applicants that while I understood those submissions, they do not form any relevant basis upon which the decision could be remitted to the Tribunal, and they indicated that they understood that.

1. In the absence of the applicants having availed themselves of the grants of leave to amend, the grounds of review are those contained in the originating application, as follows:

1. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal has failed to apply the correct test pursuant to Section 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

Particulars:

In dealing with the Applicant's claims under Section 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the Administrative Appeals Tribunal explicitly failed to disaggregate the statutory formulae under Section 36(2)(aa) of the Act.

2. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal denied procedural fairness to the applicant.

1. Each of the grounds was interpreted to the applicants in turn, and they were each given the opportunity to address them. The first applicant primarily made submissions on their behalf, however, I also asked the second applicant if she had anything to add to the submissions in respect of each ground.

1. By ground 1, the applicants submit that the Tribunal failed to properly apply the statutory test and, in particular, failed to disaggregate s 36(2)(aa) of the Act from s 36(2A).
2. When this ground was interpreted to the applicants, and they were given the opportunity to address it, the first applicant made submissions to the effect that the certificate produced in respect of the BNP was not checked by the Tribunal, and that an arrest warrant was not accepted by the Tribunal because it was not "the main copy"[1]. The first applicant said that the Tribunal could have received the main copy from the Australian High Commission in Dhaka at any time. The first applicant said that he felt that the Tribunal should have checked all the documents that he submitted, and failed to do so.
3. I pressed the applicants to address ground one as it was raised in the application, but they did not do so further, instead reiterating that the Tribunal ought to have investigated their documents further. When called upon, the second applicant asked whether or not this was the time to explain the situation which she and the first applicant in Bangladesh. The Court again explained, as had occurred at the outset of the hearing, that this was no part of the Court's jurisdiction.
4. The first respondent submitted that the ground, as pleaded, is misconceived and that there was nothing in the Tribunal's reasons to indicate that it did not apply the correct test, nor that it failed to disaggregate, or to distinguish between ss 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Act. I accept that submission. It is clear from the Tribunal's reasons that it identified the correct legal principles and made separate findings on whether the applicants met the refugee and complementary protection criteria (CB 1070 at [6] and 1089).
5. Insofar as ground 1 takes issue with the Tribunal's reliance for its conclusions with respect to s 36(2)(aa) of the Act on its anterior findings of fact in relation to s 36(2)(a) of the Act, this does not disclose error. It is well established that anterior factual findings which are germane to the Tribunal's assessment of the applicant's claims under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act and it was not necessary in the circumstances for the Tribunal to engage in a separate consideration of the same factual matters in respect of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act: see SZSYI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1276 at [46] to [47] per Bromwich J, SZSHF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 237 at [25] to [26] per Siopis J and SZSGA v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCA 774 (SZSGA) at [56] per Robertson J.
6. In the instant case the Tribunal rejected the majority of the first applicant's claims as not credible under s 36(2)(a) of the Act (CB 1085 to 1086 at [91] to [92]). It was open to it to then proceed to reason in the manner it did in respect of complementary protection. The first respondent also says that the Tribunal considered whether the applicants satisfied s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. On the basis of the same adverse credibility findings, the Tribunal was also not satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk that the applicants would suffer significant harm as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Bangladesh (CB 1087 at [102] to [103]).
7. Further, in assessing the application against s 36(2)(aa) of the Act, the Tribunal considered the applicants' general concerns about the political violence and poor governance in Bangladesh, but was not satisfied that the political and security environment the applicants might face in Bangladesh amounted to a real risk of significant harm (CB 1087 to 1088 at [104]).
8. I am satisfied that there was no failure on the part of the Tribunal to properly apply the statutory test nor to disaggregate it, particularly having regard to the principles in cases such as SZSGA (supra), whereupon it is a perfectly acceptable methodology of reasoning for the Tribunal to rely on its anterior factual findings in relation to complementary protection from its assessment under the refugee criterion. In any event, I am not satisfied that there is an error as alleged.
9. Turning then to how ground 1 was raised or addressed at hearing today, essentially the applicants say that rather than finding that certain documents were not reliable and/or potentially not authentic and that little weight could be given to them, there was an obligation on the part of the Tribunal to investigate those documents and their authenticity. However, contrary to what is alleged, it is well-established that there is no general duty to inquire imposed upon the Tribunal.
10. In order to establish such a duty to inquire, the applicants would be required to establish that there was an obvious inquiry about a critical fact the existence of which was easily ascertainable: see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 111 ALD 15; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12 and SZNBX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1403; (2009) 112 ALD 475 at [21] per Bennett J.
11. At hearing today, the solicitor for the first respondent made submissions to the effect that the Tribunal turned its mind to the arrest warrant, as can be seen at (CB 1081 at [71]), the last sentence of which specifically refers to the arrest warrant. The Tribunal then considered the arrest warrant and the documents in support on the following page at (CB 1082 to 1083 at [72] to [78]), and ultimately, in light of all of its findings, concluded that there was no such arrest warrant. The first respondent says the Tribunal went on to conclude that the first applicant was not present at any of the political rallies as alleged, and that he was not subject to false or politically motivated allegations or charges. It then concluded that there was no associated arrest warrant, or any related court proceedings or legal actions. The first respondent submitted that the Tribunal did squarely deal with the evidence before it in respect of the arrest warrant. The Tribunal was mindful of the prevalence of fraudulent documents in Bangladesh. The first respondent says that the first applicant's contention in his oral submissions today is unfounded. In respect of the submissions made as to ground 1, such that the Tribunal did not take any steps to verify the evidence to which the applicants filed, the first respondent submits that there is no duty on the Tribunal to make inquiries. I accept that it was for the applicants to make their case before the Tribunal.
12. In essence, the first respondent submitted that the Tribunal was not obliged to undertake steps to authenticate the documents that the applicants provided to it. The documents that relate to the applicant's membership of the BNP were addressed by the Tribunal, particularly at (CB 1076 to 1077 at [41] to [45]) of its decision. In particular, at [41], the Tribunal considered the weight to attach to the letters, and, in that regard, made observations about the prevalence of document fraud in Bangladesh, but then also went specifically to analyse the letters of support which were provided not only as to their content, but also as to their form, and, in particular, in the context of the author of the document, the Tribunal also turned its mind to whether or not it would be able to confirm the identity or the position of the person who had signed them.
13. In those circumstances, not only am I satisfied that there was not a critical and obvious inquiry about a critical fact the existence of which was, I am also not satisfied that it was easily ascertainable. The Tribunal, in fact, turned its mind to whether it would be easily ascertainable, as can be seen from the finding that it would be unable to confirm the details further.
14. In respect of the arrest warrant, that is something which the Tribunal set out specifically at [17] of its reasons for decision (CB 1072 at point 5 of that page, being the last square bullet point under the heading "Supporting Documents"). The Tribunal went on to consider that document at CB 1081 to 1083 at [71], [73] to [78] of its reasons for decision. The Tribunal considered whether or not the document was the original and at [74], observed that it raised this issue with the applicant, who said that he could try to obtain photocopies of the original documents, and the Tribunal observes that the Tribunal had received no further documentation relating to this. What this demonstrates is that the Tribunal had raised the issue of the fact that the arrest warrant was not an original document. It did so in the context of the hearing, which took place on 30 October 2018, and that can be seen from the hearing information report which appears from CB 1060 to 1062. That is relevant by reference to the date on which the Tribunal's decision was made, namely, some two and a half months later on 18 January 2019. It also can be observed from the hearing information report (CB 1062), that there was no particular time period in which the applicant was given the opportunity to provide such documents. I infer from that and from the absence of any commentary in the Tribunal's quite detailed decision that no such additional time was requested. Notwithstanding the fact it was not requested, the Tribunal did not make its decision for some two and a half months after the date of the hearing, and the applicants could have provided any additional documents that they wished in that period and did not do so.
15. I also note that while the applicants were represented throughout the Tribunal phase by a migration agent, who is also a solicitor. The agent was appointed as their authorised recipient and, in that context, the applicants were given a number of opportunities to provide evidence to the Tribunal, including:

(a) an invitation included in the acknowledgement of application letter (CB 278);

(b) a specific, separate invitation to provide information (CB 283); and

(c) the invitation to hearing, which made plain to the applicants that the Tribunal, at that stage, was unable to make a favourable decision based on the material before (CB 285).

1. What can also be seen from what followed (demonstrated also by the two-volume Court Book) is that, thereafter, the applicants provided more than 700 pages of additional materials to the Tribunal in that time period.
2. The first applicant made submissions to the effect that, from 2019 to 2024, they were unable to get documents from courts or police stations because of the nature of the government. The first applicant said that notwithstanding the fact that colleagues friends and party leaders could not get additional documents or authenticated documents for them is further proof of the obstacles they faced and that they had given the Tribunal all the documents they could.
3. Being explanations which are given to this Court for the first time, those are matters which obviously were not able to be taken into account by the Tribunal. However, it does tend to highlight that, even if the Tribunal had wished to obtain further documentation, on the applicants' own account there would not have been any easily ascertainable documents or information forthcoming based on the first applicant's submissions. In any event, I am not satisfied, in respect of either the BNP documents nor the arrest warrant, that there was any general duty on the Tribunal to make further inquiries about issues of authenticity beyond those which it raised. The applicants were given a proper opportunity, both before the Tribunal hearing and as a result of matters discussed at that hearing, for a full two and a half months thereafter to provide any documents. They were represented throughout, and yet, did not do so. Nor did they seek an extension of the time in which to do so, nor make a specific request that the Tribunal undertake steps to authenticate the documents for itself.
4. Overall, I am not satisfied that there is any error of the kind alleged by ground 1, either as it is raised in the application nor how it was addressed at hearing. I accept the submissions of the first respondent that this is not a case where the Tribunal failed to have regard to the documents that were before it, nor that it was obliged to authenticate them, rather, it was required to assess the documents given to it on the basis of those documents and the other evidence before it. Accordingly, there is no error as alleged by ground 1.

1. By ground 2 the applicants make a bare allegation of a denial of procedural fairness. The first respondent submits that in the absence of particularisation, this ground cannot be meaningfully responded to and should be dismissed for this reason: WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760 at [35] per Gilmour J and SZNXA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 775 at [21] per Reeves J.
2. In Kaur v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 117 (Kaur) in which made it expressly clear that submissions of the kind of the first respondent (made at [50] above) cut across the model litigant obligation and ought not be made, as noted in Kaur at [32] to [34] (footnote omitted):

Overall, absolute submissions which urge dismissal on technical bases do not assist the Court. As I observed recently in Kaur v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 103 (Kaur), the migration jurisdiction has evolved in past the decade. It is incumbent upon this Court to concern itself with the substance of applications rather than taking an overly strict approach to form when applicants are unrepresented, as the applicant is today.

The grounds in the application are not themselves incomprehensible. The applicant is before me in Court. She was able to speak to the grounds and was able (or more specifically given the opportunity) to give particulars in Court. If the first respondent's Counsel had been taken by surprise by any particulars given by the applicant in Court, and required further time to address them, then procedural fairness would have warranted that such an opportunity would be afforded. I see no utility in this Court, at first instance, taking so technical an approach to applications that its review function is not properly undertaken.

For the reasons that in Kaur (supra) at [29] to [34], such an approach serves neither the applicant nor the interests of the administration of justice. The Minister, who has obligations as a model litigant to avoid taking technical points, should also assist the Court and the applicant by taking a substantive and practical approach to judicial review applications. In this matter, the Minister quite properly went on to substantively address the grounds raised. While I note that the proposition was put to formally reserve a position, the grounds will be considered in full.

1. In circumstances where the applicants are presently before me today, they were able to particularise, if they wished, any denial of procedural fairness that was meant by them. As such, I would not simply dismiss the ground in the manner contended for, in particular having set out in Kaur, why it is that WZAVW does not stand for the proposition for which the first respondent contends.
2. In any event, when given the opportunity to make submissions in respect of ground 2, the applicants today said that the Tribunal ought not to have found that the first applicant could not be considered as being an activist, nor could it have logically found that he would not come to harm or that he would not experience suffering given the ruling party had been in power for 15 years. The first applicant said that he felt that the Tribunal did not accept that he would be arrested when he landed in his country. The first applicant said that (at T8.2 to T8.5):

...If the people, journalists had seen me, then I would have been probably in jail for the time and tortured all my life, for a long time and if they did not sight me there, then probably I would just be abducted, and then nobody would know about me because I would have been killed.

1. The first applicant said that these things had been happening in Dhaka, and are still happening now. The first applicant said, that, notwithstanding the fact that there is now a different leader in power, it is still difficult for him, until there is a change of leadership, to return to Bangladesh. The second applicant reiterated the first applicant's submissions.
2. The first respondent submitted that the evidence before the Court does not reveal any breach of the Tribunal's obligations under Part 7 Division 4 of the Act. That is because the applicants were validly invited to attend two hearings pursuant to s 425 of the Act, to which the first applicant attended both, and the second applicant attended the latter (CB 798 and 1060). The applicants were assisted by a registered migration agent and a Bengali interpreter at both hearings. The first respondent says there is no evidence to suggest that the applicants were denied a meaningful opportunity to give evidence and present arguments before the Tribunal.
3. Further, the information that the Tribunal relied on to dispose of the applicants' claims consisted of country information and the applicants' own evidence, which had been given for the purpose of the review. Country information and information pertaining to the "existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence" does not fall within the bounds of s 424A of the Act: see SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 96 ALD 1 at [18] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ and VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 123; (2004) 236 FCR 549 at [24] per Finn and Stone JJ.
4. In respect of the aspects of the applicants' claims for which they advanced submissions today, I explained to them on several occasions during today's hearing that it is not for the Court to take into account those matters. It is not for the Court to assess them for itself, and provided that the conclusions of the Tribunal were open to it, the fact that the applicants disagree with the conclusions to which the Tribunal ultimately came, or still maintain that they, or, specifically, the first applicant, faces harm on return to Bangladesh, is not a basis upon which the decision can be remitted, absent a jurisdictional error. I am satisfied that there is no aspect of the Tribunal's processes which failed to deny the applicants procedural fairness, as that concept is understood, particularly by reference to the then s 422B of the Act, and, in those circumstances, including from the matters that were addressed by the applicants today, I am not satisfied that there is an error established by ground 2.

1. While not raised by the applicants, for completeness the first respondent sought to address the s 438 certificate (CB 274) in the interests of completeness.
2. The documents covered by the certificate are included at Annexure "ESH-01"to the Hilder Affidavit.
3. The first respondent submits that the basis for the issue of the certificate was that "disclosure of this information would be contrary to the public interest because the aforementioned folios contain information relating to an internal working document and business affairs".
4. The Tribunal found that the certificate was invalid as the specified reason for the non-disclosure were not capable of grounding a claim of public interest immunity: see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 42, at [19] to [20] per Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ and BEG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 93 ALJR 252 at [10], [39] to [40] per Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ. The first respondent accepts that as being correct and contends that no error arises from the manner in which the Tribunal dealt with the certificate.
5. I agree that the Tribunal was correct to find the certificate was invalid and that it complied with any procedural fairness obligations it had in respect of that certificate by:

(a) informing the applicants of the existence of the certificate;

(b) advising them that it believed the certificate to be invalid and the documents were irrelevant (in part); and

(c) allowing the applicants an opportunity to comment those matters.

1. I am of the view that there is no error arising from the manner in which the Tribunal dealt with the certificate.

1. Consequent upon my dismissal of the application, the first respondent makes an application for costs fixed in the sum of $5,400. When asked what they wished to say about whether costs should follow the event, and, if so, in what amount, the first applicant said "whatever the honourable judge decides to do", and the second applicant, when given an opportunity to make her own submissions in respect of costs, said that she had nothing to say.
2. Rule 25.14 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules), provides that in circumstances where the Court determines that a party is entitled to costs, they are entitled to the amount up to and including that in schedule 2, Part 3 of the Court's rules, which, at the present date, is $9,097.93. I am satisfied in this matter that costs should follow the event. Accordingly, r 25.14 of the Rules is engaged. The amount sought by the first respondent is significantly less than the $9,097.93 which the Court could order and I am satisfied by reference to the proceedings that it is a reasonable amount. I will so order.

1. This paragraph is in addition to the reasons for judgment given ex tempore at the conclusion of the hearing on 14 October 2025. The Court explained to the applicants several times during at the conclusion of the hearing, including again at the pronouncement of orders, the practical effect of order 3 made on that date. On 10 November 2025, the applicants filed a Notice of Appeal with the Federal Court of Australia. The Court was on leave from 12 to 23 November 2025 inclusive and these reasons for judgment have been published as soon as possible upon return, also having regard to r 21.12 of the Rules.

I certify that the preceding seventy-two (72) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Given.