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[2026] NSWSC 935
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-08-07
Williams J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Anderson v Beldev M1 Pty Ltd [2026] NSWSC 935
Hearing dates: 24-25 March 2026
Date of orders: 7 August 2026
Decision date: 07 August 2026
Jurisdiction: Equity
Before: Williams J
Decision: See orders at [109].
Catchwords: CONTEMPT — Criminal contempt — Alleged improper pressure applied to a defendant to inhibit him or attempt to inhibit him from defending these proceedings — Whether conduct proved beyond reasonable doubt — Whether real and definite tendency to interfere with the course of justice in these proceedings
Legislation Cited: Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 191
Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) Pt 55
Cases Cited: Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521; [1984] HCA 7
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 375; [2015] HCA 21
Live Group Pty Ltd v Ulman [2017] NSWSC 1759
Novelly v Tamqia Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 167
R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308; [2016] HCA 35
Ulman v Live Group Pty Ltd (2018) 367 ALR 95; [2018] NSWCA 338
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Shane Anderson (First Plaintiff/Respondent)
Beldev SA Pty Ltd (ACN 656 074 047) (Second Plaintiff)
Beldev MI Pty Ltd (ACN 656 074 314) (First Defendant/First Applicant)
Mena Ibrahim (Second Defendant/Second Applicant)
Beldev PM Pty Ltd (ACN 656 074 323) (Third Defendant/Third Applicant)
Peter Micalos (Fourth Defendant/Fourth Applicant)
Beldev Nominees Pty Ltd (ACN 656 073 620) (Fifth Defendant)
Canberra Property Development Holdings Pty Ltd (ACN 650 319 770) (Sixth Defendant)
Intellectual Property Group Pty Ltd (ACN 601 263 638) (Seventh Defendant/Fifth Applicant)
Representation: Counsel:
Mr B Le Plastrier and Mr R Sud (Applicants)
Mr I McLachlan and Mr D de Mestre (Respondent)
Solicitors:
Maddison Marcus Law Firm (Applicants)
Levitt Robinson Solicitors (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2024/155999
Publication restriction: N/A
The background matters described at [3]-[12] below are admitted on the pleadings or were common ground between the parties to the contempt motion.
The proceedings arise out of a joint venture for the development of Block 20 Section 32, Belconnen, Australian Capital Territory (the Site and the Development) pursuant to an agreement entered into on 31 January 2022 between (the Joint Venture Agreement):
the first plaintiff (Mr Shane Anderson) and the second plaintiff (Beldev S****A Pty Ltd) of which Mr Anderson was (and remains) the sole director and shareholder;
the second defendant (Mr Mena Ibrahim) and the first defendant (Beldev MI Pty Ltd) of which Mr Ibrahim was (and remains) the sole director and shareholder;
the fourth defendant (Mr Peter Micalos) and the third defendant (Beldev PM Pty Ltd) of which Mr Micalos was (and remains) the sole director and shareholder; and
the fifth defendant (Beldev Nominees Pty Ltd), which is the joint venture nominee company pursuant to the Joint Venture Agreement.
The Site is owned by the sixth defendant (Canberra Property Development Holdings Pty Ltd), the shares in which are held by interests associated with Mr Anderson and Mr Ibrahim in equal proportions. Mr Anderson and Mr Ibrahim are (and have been at all material times) directors of Holdings.
On the same date as Beldev Nominees and the other parties referred to above entered into the Joint Venture Agreement:
Beldev Nominees (as developer) and Holdings (as landowner) entered into a development agreement in respect of the Development of the Site (the Development Agreement); and
Beldev Nominees (as developer) and the seventh defendant (Intellectual Property Group Pty Ltd) (as development manager) entered into a development management agreement for the provision of certain services by Intellectual Property Group in respect of the Development and the sale of the land as developed. Mr Micalos is a director and shareholder of Intellectual Property Group.
Holdings acquired the Site for $14,000,000.
The Development entailed the construction of a ten-storey mixed use development containing residential units, retail accommodation, and basement car parking.
The applicants adduced evidence that Beldev Nominees retained Icon Co to build the Development. This was not disputed by Mr Anderson.
At the time of the commencement of these proceedings on 27 April 2024, the construction of the Development was financed by a loan in excess of $200,000,000.
There is no dispute that, at all material times until 22 March 2024:
Mr Ibrahim held 46.25% of the shares in Beldev Nominees and was a director of Beldev Nominees;
Mr Micalos held 7.5% of the shares in Beldev Nominees and was a director of Beldev Nominees; and
Mr Anderson held the remaining 46.25% of the shares in Beldev Nominees and was a director of Beldev Nominees.
An Appendix to the Joint Venture Agreement set out a worked example estimating the joint venture profit share of Mr Anderson and Beldev SA, or entities associated with them, as $27,971,240. I assume that the estimated profit share of Mr Ibrahim and Beldev MI as at the date of the Joint Venture Agreement on 31 January 2022 was in the same vicinity as Mr Ibrahim owned the same proportion of the shares in Beldev Nominees as Mr Anderson at that time.
The proceedings involve a dispute about whether or not Mr Anderson remained a shareholder and director of Beldev Nominees after 22 March 2024. The issues raised by the statement of claim filed by Mr Anderson and Beldev SA on 27 April 2024 and the defence filed by Mr Ibrahim, Beldev MI, Mr Micalos, Beldev PM, and Intellectual Property Group on 10 December 2024 include the following:
whether a resolution passed or purportedly passed at a meeting of the Project Control Group (as defined in the Joint Venture Agreement) of Beldev Nominees on 24 November 2023 requiring Beldev SA to pay an equity contribution of $2,901,599.88 by 27 November 2023 is void, voidable or not binding on the grounds that, inter alia, the demand for the additional equity contribution was made for an improper purpose, and the resolution was purportedly passed in breach of specified provisions of the Joint Venture Agreement;
whether a breach notice issued or purportedly issued to Beldev SA by the Project Control Group on behalf of Beldev Nominees on 27 November 2023 in respect of the non-payment of the equity contribution referred to above was invalid by reason of the invalidity of the 24 November 2023 resolution on which it was based, antecedent alleged breaches by Beldev MI and Beldev PM of the Joint Venture Agreement and an alleged “Equity Rebalance Agreement” which precluded Beldev MI and Beldev PM from causing the Project Control Group to issue the 27 November 2023 notice, or by reason of the manner of service of the 27 November 2023 notice;
whether Beldev MI’s exercise or purported exercise on 17 February 2024 of an option pursuant to clause 18 of the Joint Venture Agreement to acquire Beldev SA’s interest in the Joint Venture and Mr Anderson’s shares in Beldev Nominees on account of Beldev SA’s non-compliance with the 27 November 2023 notice was void, voidable or not binding on the grounds that inter alia it was exercised for an alleged improper purpose; and
whether a share transfer form in respect of Mr Anderson’s shares in Beldev Nominees and a resignation of Mr Anderson as a director and secretary of Beldev Nominees executed or caused to be executed by Beldev MI, Mr Ibrahim, Beldev PM and Mr Micalos purportedly under a power of attorney and relying on the alleged failure of Beldev SA to make the equity contribution demanded on 24 November 2023 and the purported exercise of the option on 17 February 2024 were void, voidable or not binding for the same reasons as the purported exercise of the option was void, voidable or not binding.
The statement of claim was filed and certified by Lucy Nguyen of Law Australia on 27 April 2024, who was then the solicitor on the record for Mr Anderson and Beldev SA. On 28 March 2025 a notice of change of solicitor was filed appointing Stewart Levitt of Levitt Robinson Solicitors as the plaintiffs’ solicitor.
The defence was filed and certified by Bechara Shamieh of Madison Marcus Law Firm on 10 December 2024, who was (and remains) the solicitor on the record for Mr Ibrahim, Beldev MI, Mr Micalos, Beldev PM, and Intellectual Property Group.
Holdings and Beldev Nominees have not played any active role in the proceedings to date. The parties refer to Mr Ibrahim, Beldev MI, Mr Micalos, Beldev PM and Intellectual Property Group as the active defendants. In these reasons, I will refer to those active defendants as the applicants on the contempt motion.
By Notice of Motion filed on 30 May 2025, as amended on 25 March 2026, the applicants seek declarations that Mr Anderson is guilty of criminal contempt of court by engaging in the conduct described in charges 1 to 5 of the Amended Statement of Charges dated 13 March 2026 and annexed to the Amended Notice of Motion and an order pursuant to Part 55 rule 13 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) that Mr Anderson be punished for contempt.
The charges set out in the Amended Statement of Charges are:
“Charge 1
1.In or about December 2024, the First Plaintiff solicited the services of a person identified as “Jay” (Jay) with the intention that improper pressure be applied to the Second Defendant to inhibit or attempt to inhibit him from defending these proceedings.
Particulars
a. In or about December 2024, the First Plaintiff attended a meeting with a person who identified himself as “Jay” (Jay).
b. [not used]
c. [not used]
d. At that meeting, or around the time of that meeting, the First Plaintiff:
i. informed Jay that he wished to be reinstated as a shareholder of the fifth defendant, Beldev Nominees Pty Ltd (Beldev Nominees);
ii. informed Jay of his dispute with the Second Defendant;
iii. solicited Jay’s services to assist him be so reinstated;
iv. informed Jay of the location of the construction site at Block 20, Section 32, Belconnen ACT 2617 (the Site); and
v. informed Jay that there were construction works being undertaken at the Site.
e. [not used]
f. The First Plaintiff knew that Jay would, or was likely to, by himself, or by other persons, apply improper pressure on the Second Defendant.
g. The First Plaintiff solicited Jay’s services for the purposes of inhibiting or attempting to inhibit the Second Defendant from defending these proceedings.
Charge 2
2. In or about 30 January 2025, the First Plaintiff caused persons to attend the Site and to intimidate or attempt to intimidate one or more persons engaged to work on the Site on 30 January 2025, and the First Plaintiff did so with the intention that improper pressure be applied to the Second Defendant to inhibit him or attempt to inhibit him from defending these proceedings.
Particulars
a. On 30 January 2025, at approximately 5.30am, about five or six unknown men in face coverings and wearing the colours of the ‘Finks’ motorcycle gang had congregated at the entry of the Site.
b. [not used]
c. One of those men advised the workers and contractors present at the Site that:
i. they had been sent to the Site by or on behalf of the First Plaintiff; and
ii. the First Plaintiff has been wronged.
d. One of those men threatened that, unless the First Plaintiff was reinstated as a shareholder, they would shut down the Site.
e. The Defendant repeats the particulars of Charge 1.
f. The First Plaintiff, by soliciting the services of “Jay”, caused the men to attend the Site and intimidate or attempt to intimidate one or more persons engaged to work on the Site that day.
Charge 3
3. In or about 31 January 2025, the First Plaintiff caused persons to attend the Site and to intimidate or attempt to intimidate one or more persons engaged to work on the Site on 31 January 2025, and the First Plaintiff did so with the intention that improper pressure be applied to the Second Defendant to inhibit him or attempt to inhibit him from defending these proceedings.
Particulars
a. On 31 January 2025 at approximately 5.30am, about twenty-five (25) unknown men wearing face coverings surrounded the entry of the Site and prevented or attempted to prevent access to the entry of the Site.
b. One of those men advised that:
i. the Site will be closed until the First Plaintiff is reinstated as a shareholder; and
ii. someone would need to call Jay and sort it out.
c. The Defendant repeats the particulars of Charge 1.
d. The First Plaintiff, by his soliciting the services of “Jay”, caused the men to attend the Site and intimidate or attempt to intimidate one or more persons engaged to work on the Site that day.
Charge 4
4. On or about 31 January 2025, the First Plaintiff caused a person to intimidate or attempt to intimidate a worker present at the Site at approximately 5.30am on 31 January 2025, and the First Plaintiff did so with the intention that that improper pressure would be applied to the Second Defendant to inhibit him or attempt to inhibit him from defending these proceedings.
Particulars
a. On 31 January 2026 at around 5.30am, one of the men with face coverings referred to in Charge 3 provided a worker engaged to work on the Site that day, [Mr A – a pseudonym], a telephone number to call.
b. [Mr A] called that number (the Phone Number).
c. The person who answered the phone identified himself as “Jay”.
d. Jay advised [Mr A] that:
i. Mr Anderson needs to be reinstated as a shareholder; and
ii. the Site would be closed until then.
e. The Defendant repeats the particulars of Charge 1.
f. The First Plaintiff, by his soliciting the services of “Jay”, caused Jay to intimidate or attempt to intimidate [Mr A].
Charge 5
5. On or about 31 January 2025, the First Plaintiff caused a person to intimidate or attempt to intimidate a director of the contractor engaged to work at the Site at approximately 7.30am on 31 January 2025, and the First Plaintiff did so with the intention that that improper pressure would be applied to the Second Defendant to inhibit him from defending these proceedings.
Particulars
a. On 31 January 2025 at or around 7.30am, [Mr B – a pseudonym], a director of the contractor engaged to work at the Site, called the Phone Number.
b. The person who answered the phone identified himself as “Jay”.
c. Jay threatened [Mr B] to the effect that the Site was not to be opened until the First Plaintiff was reinstated as a shareholder, and there would be problems if the First Plaintiff was not so reinstated.
d. The Defendant repeats the particulars of Charge 1.
e. The First Plaintiff, by his soliciting the services of “Jay”, caused Jay to intimidate or attempt to intimidate [Mr B].”
The applicants relied on:
a statement of agreed facts; [1]
affidavits sworn on 27 May 2025 and 4 March 2026 by a witness known in these proceedings by the pseudonym “Mr A”, who is a senior construction manager of Icon Co;
affidavits sworn on 20 February 2025 and 25 February 2026 by a witness known in these proceedings by the pseudonym “Mr B”, who is a director of Icon Co;
an affidavit sworn on 4 March 2026 by Mr Cristian Fuenzalida, an employed solicitor at Madison Marcus Law Firm which acts for the applicants;
an affidavit of Mr Peter Micalos affirmed on 5 March 2026;
expert evidence of Mr John Reeman, a digital forensics and cybersecurity expert, analysing call detail records (CDR) data produced by telecommunications service providers on subpoena in these proceedings in respect of the following mobile telephone numbers:
(a) a mobile telephone number which the evidence establishes was specified as Mr Anderson’s number in his signature block in an email sent to Mr Ibrahim and Mr Micalos on 21 May 2024, which Mr Reeman was instructed to assume (and Mr Anderson did not dispute) was Mr Anderson’s mobile telephone number in December 2024 and January 2025 (Mr Anderson**’s number); (b) the mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010; (c) the mobile telephone number that Mr A has given evidence was his mobile telephone number in January 2025 (Mr A’s number); and (d) the mobile telephone number that Mr B has given evidence was his mobile telephone number in January 2025 (Mr B’**s number);
CCTV footage taken from premises adjacent to the Site on the morning of 30 January 2025 and on the morning of 31 January 2025 which was produced on subpoena by ACT Police as part of their investigation file; and
other documentary evidence.
None of the applicants’ witnesses were required for cross-examination.
Mr Anderson did not adduce any evidence.
What follows is a summary of the salient aspects of the evidence adduced by the applicants.
It will be recalled that Mr Ibrahim, Beldev MI, Mr Micalos, Beldev PM, and Intellectual Property Group filed their defence in these proceedings on 10 December 2024.
Mr Anderson and Beldev SA, and the applicants, have each been represented by solicitors at all material times during these proceedings.
It is an agreed fact that Mr Anderson gave the following instructions to his solicitor in the course of these proceedings. In December 2024, Mr Anderson approached Mr Konstantin Panov (a real estate agent based on the Gold Coast who is a colleague of Mr Anderson and with whom Mr Anderson is friendly) about his legal dispute with Mr Mena Ibrahim and his desire to find a way to resolve it amicably. Mr Panov informed Mr Anderson of a person named “Jay”, who Mr Panov said was “a mediator who had successfully mediated disputes involving large mining corporations”. Mr Panov informed Mr Anderson that he knew of at least one of those matters that had been successfully resolved. In December 2024 or January 2025, Mr Panov organised a meeting between Jay and Mr Anderson. At the meeting, Mr Anderson informed Jay of the background of the dispute and that he wished for Jay to assist by reaching out to Mr Ibrahim with a view to arranging a settlement. Jay said that he could assist. Mr Anderson provided Jay with Mr Ibrahim’s phone number. Mr Anderson engaged Jay as he believed that Jay had strong industry or union ties, and considered that Jay may be able to effectively negotiate a settlement with Mr Ibrahim.
Mr Reeman’s expert evidence identifies that, at 9:45:16am on 24 January 2025, a text message was sent from Mr Anderson’s number and delivered at 9:45:18am to the mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010. A reply text message was sent from XXXX XXX 010 to Mr Anderson’s number at 9:45:18am and delivered on 25 January 2025. Mr Reeman opines that, as the timestamp of the text from XXXX XXX 010 to Mr Anderson’s number closely corresponds to the delivery of the text from Mr Anderson’s number to XXXX XXX 010, this was either a reply text or an automated response.
Mr A: “Who are you and what are you doing here?”
Matthew: “You guys are not working today.”
Mr A: “What is your name?”
Matthew: “Don’t worry about my name. You can call me Matthew. I know who you are [Mr A]. I’ve worked on one of your sites before. Get your people to call my people.”
Mr A: “Who are your people?”
Matthew: “We’ve been sent here by Shane Anderson. He needs to be reinstated as a partner of this development. You can send this message to the other partners. If Shane is not reinstated, this job will be shut down. We don’t want any trouble, so I trust you’re not going to call the Police.”
Mr A: “I am a nobody. We are just the builder. We have nothing to do with any dispute between the partners. I’m not in charge. Let me call who is in charge. Can you come back in an hour?”
Mr A gave evidence that the men then left in cars that had been parked near the Site.
Mr A’s evidence of his interaction with five or six men at the Site on the morning of 30 January 2025 is consistent with the visual images recorded on the CCTV footage for that date that was produced on subpoena by ACT Police and tendered by the applicants. Mr A gave evidence identifying himself in the CCTV footage and identifying the interaction described in his evidence referred to at [26] above. The word “Finks” is visible on the clothing worn by the men in the CCTV footage. The CCTV footage does not include sound recordings.
Mr A gave evidence that, during his conversation with the man who identified himself as “Matthew”, another one of the men identified himself as “Azza”. Mr A had the impression that these were not their real names.
Mr A gave evidence that between 5:30am and 6:45am subcontractors arrived at the Site and commenced work. There were about 60 subcontractors working on the Site by about 6:45am.
Mr A gave evidence that he called Mr B at about 6:40am and told him about his interaction with the men who had been at the gate to the Site when he had arrived earlier that morning. According to Mr A’s evidence, Mr B said to him words to the effect that: “any matter regarding Shane Anderson does not concern us. We are not stopping work today, tell everyone to go back to work”. Mr B told Mr A that he would drive over to the Site straight away, and to tell the men that “this had nothing to do with us”. Mr A told Mr B that he would convey that to the men, and then ended the call.
Mr B gave evidence that he received a call from Mr A at about 6:45am. Mr A told him that he was at the Site with some of the subcontractors and that five men who he did not recognise had turned up at the Site. The men had identified themselves as members of the Finks ACT Chapter. Two of the men, who identified themselves as “Matthew” and “Azza” had spoken to Mr A. Either “Matthew” or “Azza” had said to Mr A:
“We are from the Finks ACT Chapter and we’ve been sent here by Shane Anderson. He’s been wronged and has been cut out of a deal. He needs to be reinstated as a shareholder otherwise we are going to shut down this job and further things will happen. Tell the developers we’re coming for them. We don’t want any trouble, so I trust that you’re not going to reporting [sic] the matter to the police.”
Mr Reeman’s expert evidence identifies a phone call made from Mr A’s number to a Mr B’s number at 6:45am on 30 January 2025 which lasted for approximately five and a half minutes. That call was preceded by several shorter calls from Mr A’s number to Mr B’s number, and vice versa, lasting a few seconds each, between 6:41am and 6:45am.
Mr B gave evidence that he was concerned about what Mr A told him. Mr B was familiar with the Finks and knew that Mr Anderson was in dispute with Mr Ibrahim and Mr Micalos. Mr B told Mr A to tell the men that it was not a matter that concerned them (i.e. the builder) and to ask the men to leave. Mr B then left his home and began driving to the Site. While he was on his way to the Site, Mr B received another telephone call from Mr A, who told him that the men had left and that the subcontractors had resumed working.
Mr A gave evidence that the men, including “Matthew”, returned to the Site shortly after he had spoken to Mr B. Mr A said to “Matthew”: “**[a]t the end of the day mate, I can’t stop people from working, but if you tell me who your people are, I will get my people to call them. This has nothing to do with us. Please leave. My supervisor is on his way.” “Matthew” said to Mr A: “[d]on’*t *worry about who my people are. We are leaving, but you have been warned and we will be back.” The men then got into cars and drove away.
The CCTV footage produced on subpoena by ACT Police, which was obtained from the occupant of the premises adjacent to the Site, does not capture the return of “Matthew” and the other men to the Site on the morning of 30 January 2025.
Mr A gave evidence that he telephoned Mr B again at about 7:00am and told him that the men had left. Mr B told Mr A that he would inform Mr Ibrahim and Mr Micalos about what had happened.
Mr A gave evidence that work continued on the Site for the remainder of the day.
Mr A gave evidence that one of his colleagues and some of the subcontractors were already at the Site when he arrived at about 5:30am on 31 January 2025. As Mr A walked towards the Site, he observed that there were between 20 and 25 men surrounding the Site. About 3 or 4 of the men were in front of the gate to the Site and the others were around the right side of the Site. Mr A observed that they had formed a line, and it reminded Mr A of union-style picketing. Mr A recognised some of the men as has having attended the Site the previous morning.
As Mr A walked towards to the main entrance to the Site, one of the men, who did not identify himself, said to Mr A words to the effect of: “This development site is closed until Shane Anderson is reinstated as a shareholder. He has been wronged.”
Mr A then had a conversation with the man to the following effect:
Mr A: “Good morning, mate.”
Man: “You’re not going to work today.”
Mr A: “Oh really? I need to go in and do some bits and pieces.”
Man: “We do this the easy way or the hard way.”
Mr A: “Fair enough.”
Man: “You will need to ring Jay and sort it out.”
Mr A: “Who is Jay and what is his number?”
Mr A gave evidence that the man then told him that Jay was the person in charge, and provided him with a mobile telephone number at which Jay could be contacted.
Mr A gave evidence that he then dialled the number the man had given him. The person answered the call and identified himself as Jay. Mr A and Jay then had a conversation to the following effect:
Mr A: “My name is [Mr A]. Your men are blocking the entrance to a development site in Belconnen. Please direct them to leave. This has nothing to do with us.”
Jay: “Shane Anderson has been wronged and needs to be reinstated as a shareholder. This is affecting Shane’s business. The site will be closed until then.”
Mr A: “This has nothing to do with us. I’m just the builder.”
Jay: “This needs to be sorted out. Are you in charge? If not, please ask the person in charge to call me.”
Mr A: “I will point this in the right direction.”
Mr A gave evidence that, after reviewing a call log for his own mobile telephone number produced by Telstra on subpoena in these proceedings, he identified the telephone call referred to above as a call to mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010. Upon being informed by the applicants’ solicitor that the mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010 is registered with Vodafone under the names Samir El Asmar and Daniel Cormio, Mr A gave evidence that he does not know and has never spoken to a person who has identified themselves by either of those names.
Mr A gave evidence that, after his conversation with Jay referred to above, he instructed all the workers to wait across the road from the Site. Mr A was worried about the safety of the workers as he perceived the things that the men and Jay had said to him were threats.
Mr A gave evidence that he then called the ACT Police and reported that there were men surrounding the entrance of the Site who were refusing to leave. Mr A was told that patrol vehicles would be sent to the Site shortly.
Mr A gave evidence that, after calling the ACT Police, he called Mr B. By this time, it was about 6:15am. Mr A told Mr B what had happened and Mr B said that he would drive to the Site straight away.
Mr B gave evidence that he received a call from Mr A at about 6:15am. Mr A told Mr B that, when he had arrived at the Site, he had found about 25 men wearing balaclavas or face covers surrounding the entrance to the Site and that they had organised themselves into a line in front of the Site that was similar to union-style picketing. Mr A told Mr B that one of the men, who did not identify himself, said words to the effect: “This development site is closed until Shane Anderson is reinstated as a shareholder. He has been wronged.” Mr A told Mr B that he then had a conversation with the man to the following effect:
Mr A: “This has nothing to do with the construction work.”
Man: “Well, someone has to ring Jay and sort it out.”
Mr B gave evidence that Mr A told him during their conversation at about 6:15am on 31 January 2025 that the man had then provided Mr A with a telephone number to call, which Mr A did. Mr A told Mr B that he had then called the police, and the police had told him that they would send patrol vehicles to the Site.
Mr B gave evidence that he was very concerned about what Mr A told him, and that it occurred to him that what had happened the previous day was “not a one-off”. Mr B was therefore concerned about the welfare of his employees and subcontractors. Mr B got into his car to drive to the Site.
Mr A’s evidence of the presence of between 20 and 25 men at the Site on the morning of 31 January 2025 is consistent with the visual images recorded on the CCTV footage for that date that was produced on subpoena by ACT Police and tendered by the applicants. The CCTV footage does not include sound recording, but Mr A gave evidence identifying himself in the CCTV footage and identifying the interactions described in his evidence summarised at [39]-[42] above.
Mr A gave evidence that, shortly after his call to Mr B, two ACT Police cars arrived at the Site and the 20 to 25 men dispersed. Mr A observed that some of the men got into a Mercedes car with the number plate “FINKS”.
Mr B gave evidence that, when he arrived at the Site at about 7:30am, there were police officers present. Mr A told him that the men had left as soon as police patrol vehicles had arrived at the Site. Mr A gave Mr B the telephone number that Mr A had called earlier that morning. Mr B then called that number and had a conversation to the following effect with a man who answered the phone and introduced himself as “Jay”:
Mr B: “My name is [Mr B]. I am a director at Icon Co. One of my staff provided me with your number.”
Jay: “My name is Jay. I assume you are calling about the Belconnen site.”
Mr B: “Yes.”
Jay: “The site is not to be opened or accessed until Shane Anderson is reinstated as a shareholder. This matter needs to be resolved. He has been wronged.”
Mr B: “This has nothing to do with us. It is between the developer. Shutting the site is not going to do anything. All I am concerned about is the welfare of my staff and my subcontractors, and you and your men are threatening that.”
Jay: “There won’t be a problem as long as Shane Anderson is reinstated as a shareholder”.
Mr B gave evidence that, after reviewing a call log for his own mobile telephone number produced by Telstra on subpoena in these proceedings, he identified the telephone call referred to above as a call to mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010. Upon being informed by the applicants’ solicitor that the mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010 is registered with Vodafone under the names Samir El Asmar and Daniel Cormio, Mr B gave evidence that he does not know and has never spoken to a person by either of those names.
Mr B gave evidence that, at about 8:10am, he saw on his mobile phone that he had missed a call from the number that he had called earlier and spoken to Jay. Mr B called the number again and recognised the voice of the person he was speaking to as that of the person who had identified himself as Jay on the earlier call. They had a further conversation to the following effect:
Mr B: “Jay, this has nothing to do with the builder. It is a dispute between the developer.”
Jay: “It is now personal too. Shane Anderson owes me money, so it is my problem too.”
Mr B: “That’s your problem, not ours. My only issue is protecting my staff and my contractors.”
Mr B gave evidence that he understood the things said to him by Jay as threats. He did not consider that the matter had been resolved by the last conversation referred to at [55] above, and he remained concerned for the welfare of his staff and subcontractors. A few of the subcontractors had told him that they did not feel safe at the Site and were not comfortable working there. Mr B therefore decided to close the Site for that day and over the weekend, and to monitor the situation before re-opening the Site. Mr B instructed all Icon Co employees and subcontractors to go home and arranged for additional security guards at the Site.
Mr A gave evidence that, shortly after the 20 to 25 men left the Site, Mr B told him that he had decided to close the Site until further notice because he was concerned that the men would continue to attend the Site and he was concerned for the welfare and safety of the staff and subcontractors. Mr B told Mr A that a number of subcontractors had told him that they did not feel safe continuing to work. Mr A therefore left the Site at some time between 8:00am and 9:00am and the Site remained closed for the remainder of the day.
Mr Reeman’s expert evidence identifies a call from Mr A’s number to the mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010 at 5:58am on 31 January 2025, which went unanswered, followed by several calls from Mr A’s number to Mr B’s number between 5:59am and 6:14am, each of which lasted between three and six seconds. This was followed by seven calls from Mr A’s number to XXXX XXX 010 between 6:16am and 6:20am, each of which was forwarded to voicemail. At 6:24am, Mr B’s number called Mr A’s number, and the two numbers were connected for between about 30 seconds and one and a half minutes. At 6:43am, there was a call from Mr A’s number to mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010 and that call was connected for approximately two minutes and 20 seconds. This was followed by a call from Mr B’s number to mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010 at 7:21am which was connected for about two minutes and 43 seconds. On the basis of Mr Reeman’s evidence, it is highly probable that Mr A’s call with Jay referred to at [43]-[44] above occurred after his call with Mr B referred to at [47]-[49] above.59
On the afternoon of 30 January 2025, Mr Anderson had sent an email to Mr Micalos attaching an invoice addressed to Intellectual Property Group for the sum of $400,000 which was described as “Return Loan” and was stated to be due and payable on 30 January 2025. Mr Micalos gave evidence that he understood this invoice to be a demand for payment of principal and interest in respect of a loan that was the subject of proceedings in the District Court between Mr Micalos and Mr Anderson and companies associated with them. Mr Micalos was defending those proceedings on the basis that the loan had already been repaid and discharged. Mr Micalos replied to Mr Anderson’s email stating that legal correspondence would follow. Mr Anderson sent a copy of Mr Micalos’s reply email to the mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010 via WhatsApp at 2:22pm on 30 January 2025, stating: “Hi Jay, Just got this response..”. At 7:34am on 31 January 2025, Mr Anderson received a WhatsApp message from mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010 with a photograph of the entrance to the Site showing about 15 workers wearing high visibility vests standing idle on the footpath outside the Site in broad daylight. That WhatsApp exchange was produced to the Court by Mr Anderson in response to a notice to produce issued by the applicants requiring production of copies of all correspondence and documents recording any messages or communications between Mr Anderson and the user of mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010 and the person identified as “Jay” in the affidavits of Mr A and Mr B. The document produced bears the description: “WhatsApp – Jay Malkoun”. Mr Anderson did not produce in response to the notice any record of any WhatsApp message or other communication sent by him to the user of mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010 in response to Jay’s message attaching the photograph. Mr Reeman’s review of the CDR data for Mr Anderson’s number and the mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010 identified that there were no voice calls or SMS messages between those two numbers on 31 January 2025. According to the documents produced by Mr Anderson, his next communication with Jay was on 19 February 2025. The messages exchanged on and after that date make no reference to Jay’s message attaching the photograph of the Site or to the Development or the Site generally.
Mr Fuenzalida gave evidence that he called the mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010 twice in close succession on the afternoon of 20 February 2026. No one answered the calls. His second call was directed to voicemail. The voicemail message was to the following effect: “Jay” (in a male voice which appeared to Mr Fuenzalida to be pre-recorded) “is unavailable. Please leave a message after the tone” (in a female voice which appeared to be pre-recorded).
On the afternoon of 23 February 2026, Mr Fuenzalida made a further call to mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010. On this occasion, a man answered and identified himself as “Jay”. Mr Fuenzalida made a file note at the time of his conversation with Jay, which lasted for just over five minutes. The file note reads as follows:
“Jay: Hello.
CF: Hello is this Jay?
Jay: Yes.
CF: I’m Cristian, I’m a lawyer from Madison Marcus calling in relation to an ongoing legal dispute between Shane Anderson and our clients involving a development in Canberra.
I understand that Shane approached you in February 2025 to meet at a café in Pyrmont and I just have a few questions about that meeting. Is now a good time to talk?
Jay: Yes. Who do you represent?
CF: I represent Mena and Peter and their companies.
Jay: Ok, yes, I remember this. I didn’t believe Shane. Turns out what he said to me was a lie.
CF: What do you mean?
Jay: Shane had asked me to assist and had provided some documents but turns out he lied.
CF: Ok. Can you please confirm your last name?
Jay: Why would I tell you my last name? What is your last name?
CF: Fuenzalida.
Jay: What is your address?
CF: You want our office address? I can give you my office address.
Jay: No, what is your home address.
CF: Why would I give you my home address?
Jay: Exactly, why would I give you my last name? Don’t ask too many questions. Give me your home address and I’ll come see you in person and we can have a chat. [in a threatening manner]
CF: All I want to know is whether you are prepared to give an affidavit in the proceedings?
Jay: No, I am not prepared to give evidence. This is not my problem. It’s between them.
CF: We have a hearing on 24 and 25 March 2026. Would you be willing to attend the hearing or give a statement?
Jay: No definitely not.
CF: Ok, well we may have to subpoena you.
Jay: If you subpoena me then we will have a big problem. I am telling you now you will have a problem.
CF: OK. Well I don’t think I can anyway because I don’t know your last name.
Jay: I am happy to answer some questions now off the record but I won’t be coming to court or assist.
CF: I understand that Shane asked you do assist, do you remember the context?
Jay: Shane asked me to help with the dispute with Mena. He also provided me with a copy of some court judgment against the other guy, Peter, for 400,000 or something. Then I found out the judgment got reversed or something that. I then realised that Shane was a liar and I walked away.
CF: Yeah we got that judgment set aside. Was it Konstanin Panov who first contact you about helping Shane?
Jay: I don’t think so. It was someone else. I think there were like 4 or 5 people at the meeting.
Jay: No. I don’t think so it was someone else. But I didn’t believe Shane in the end, turns out he was a liar. I hope Mena beats Shane in Court.
CF: Okay, thank you for that bye.
Jay: Bye.”
- “The law of contempt of court is grounded in the judicially recognised right of unimpeded access to the courts. Absent some express disqualification, generally all citizens have a common law right of access to the courts. As Lord Diplock stated in Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273 at 307-309:
The due administration of justice requires first that all citizens should have unhindered access to the constitutionally established courts of criminal or civil jurisdiction for the determination of disputes as to their legal rights and liabilities; secondly, that they should be able to rely upon obtaining in the courts the arbitrament of a tribunal which is free from bias against any party and whose decision will be based upon those facts only that have been proved in evidence adduced before it in accordance with the procedure adopted in courts of law; and thirdly that, once the dispute has been submitted to a court of law, they should be able to rely upon there being no usurpation by any other person of the function of that court to decide it according to law. Conduct which is calculated to prejudice any of these three requirements or to undermine the public confidence that they will be observed is contempt of court.
- Further, Jordan CJ noted in an oft cited passage in Ex parte Bread Manufacturers Ltd; Re Truth and Sportsman Ltd (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 242 at 249-250:
It is of extreme public interest that no conduct should be permitted which is likely to prevent a litigant in a Court of justice from having his case tried free from all manner of prejudice.
- Contempt of court operates to protect this “extreme public interest”. The principles of contempt of court by improper pressure on a party were helpfully distilled by Mason P in Harkianakis v Skalkos (1997) 42 NSWLR 22 (Harkianakis) at 27-30. An expansion of the principles set out by the learned President in Harkianakis relevant to these proceedings follows.
- To succeed in a claim for contempt, the claimant must demonstrate to the criminal standard, the conduct had as a matter of practical reality, a real and definite tendency to interfere with the course of justice; John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v McRae (1955) 93 CLR 351 at 372. This has been formulated using various terms, as summarised by Mason P in Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v X (2000) NSWLR 653 at [170]:
[170] The prosecutor was required to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the publication had “as a matter of practical reality, a tendency to interfere with the course of justice in a particular case” (John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v McRae (1955) 93 CLR 351 at 370). In Hinch Mason CJ (at 27-28) thought that a test of “substantial risk of serious interference” would best reconcile the conflicting demands for a free press and for a fair trial, whilst conceding that it was synonymous or virtually synonymous with other authoritative formulations. Wilson J (at 34) spoke of a need to demonstrate a “real and definite tendency to prejudice or embarrass pending proceedings”. Deane J (at 47) suggested “clear tendency” as a suitable paraphrase. See also per Toohey J at 70.
- The distinction between civil and criminal contempt was set out by the High Court (Brennan, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) in Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 (Witham) at 530:
In general terms, the distinction between civil and criminal contempt is that a civil contempt involves disobedience to a court order or breach of an undertaking in civil proceedings, whereas a criminal contempt is committed either when there is a contempt in the face of the court or there is an interference with the course of justice.
- A further distinction relevant to the law of contempt is between proper and improper pressure. As Mason P said in Harkianakis at 30:
In punishing certain types of interference with litigants, the law is concerned to distinguish between proper and improper pressure…This is because the litigant’s freedom to conduct litigation as he or she chooses is not an absolute one. The distinction between proper and improper pressure is also encountered in restitution and contract law with their categories of economic duress…The fixing of an early hearing date by a judicial officer puts pressure on a litigant, but no one would categorise such pressure as improper. Likewise with the disinterested persuasion to settle by a member of the litigant’s family. But not all pressure is as disinterested, or can claim such obvious justification in the public interest. Pressure may be actual or threatened, conditional or unconditional. What is done (or threatened) may be lawful or unlawful conduct. The mere fact that something that is lawful is threatened does not mean that the pressure is necessarily proper. Were it otherwise, a threat to report a legal practitioner to a professional disciplinary body (cf In re Martin, The Times, 23 April 1986) or to commence a prosecution (cf Smith v Lakeman) could not constitute a contempt. Yet it clearly may.
- Spigelman CJ expanded upon this in Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd [2002] NSWCA 160 (Bhagat) at [35]-[39], observing at [38-[39]:
[38] Whether or not the pressure sought to be applied in a particular case can be described as “improper”, depends on all of the circumstances of the case. The various statements in the letters in these proceedings must be read in the whole context.
[39]…A firm assertion that the other party must lose and a reasonable statement of the consequences of loss is not a contempt, even if it does exert pressure on a party to withdraw proceedings. The position is otherwise if a demand of that character is accompanied by improper threats or assertions.
…
- The New South Wales Court of Appeal most recently cited Bhagat in McGuirk v University of New South Wales [2010] NSWCA 104 at [169].
…
- In terms of procedure, part 55 of the Supreme Court Rules must be adhered to in filing a Statement of Charge for criminal contempt, pursuant to the principle a person accused of contempt is entitled to know the gist or substance of the charges against him or her; Coward v Stapleton (1953) 90 CLR 573 at 579-80.
- There are several cases of contempt which fall into a similar category as the alleged claim in this case, namely alleged improper pressure on a litigant. Beginning with the most relevant, but unfortunately also the most inaccessible, in Hillfinch Properties Ltd v Newark Investments Ltd [1981] The Times 1 July (Hillfinch), it was reported Slade J:
…was content to assume that it was a contempt of court for a rabbinical court to threaten practising, orthodox Jews with excommunication merely for the alleged sin of prosecuting litigation, but refused to express final conclusion on the question.
- As alluded to, despite extensive investigative efforts, I have been unable to locate a full judgment of Hillfinch. A similar issue was flagged by Young CJ in Eq in Yeshiva Properties No 1 Pty Ltd v Lubavitch Mazal Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 714 at [17], being the only other authority that appears to have made reference to Hillfinch. A further summary is available by Robert Ombres in The Christian Law Review, Vol. 72/73, pp. 60-68, and the decision is cited in various texts; C J Miller, Contempt of Court (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2000) at 11.09; N Lowe and B Sufrin, Borrie & Lowe: The Law of Contempt (4th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010) at 10.13 (and pp 428 and 444 in 3rd ed, p 299 in 2nd ed). Hillfinch is also cited in Evelyn Ellis and C.J. Miller, ‘The victimisation of anti-discrimination complainants - is it contempt of court?’, P.L. 1993, Spr, 80-92 at 91, and A. Riseley, ‘Improper Pressure on Parties to Court Proceedings’ (1986) Sydney, The Commission, 4.
- From full judgments that are available it is plain a threat to a party pending proceedings has long been considered possible conduct giving rise to contempt; see Smith v Lakeman, 26 L. J. Ch. 305; In re Mulock (1864) 3 Sw & Tr 599; 164 ER 1407 (Mulock). In Mulock, a case about threatening a petitioner in a divorce suit with the publication of a statement of facts unless he withdrew the petition, the Judge Ordinary, Sir James Wilde, stated at 601:
From the pressure of this threat Mrs Chetwynd seeks protection, and she claims a right to approach this court free from all restraint or intimidation. It is a right that belongs to all suitors. … No one can doubt that the very offering of such a threat to a suitor in this Court, for such a purpose, is in itself, and quite independently of its subsequent fulfilment, a contempt of Court.”
The applicants bear the onus of proving the contempt charges beyond reasonable doubt. [4] The contempt motion is nevertheless a proceeding within the civil jurisdiction of the Court. [5]
As the applicants’ submissions acknowledged, the contempt charges raise a circumstantial case against Mr Anderson. It was common ground between the applicants and Mr Anderson that the principles applicable to proof of a circumstantial case beyond reasonable doubt were described by the High Court in R v Baden-Clay: [6]
“46 The prosecution case against the respondent was circumstantial. The principles concerning cases that turn upon circumstantial evidence are well settled. In Barca v The Queen, Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ said:
When the case against an accused person rests substantially upon circumstantial evidence the jury cannot return a verdict of guilty unless the circumstances are ‘such as to be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused’: Peacock v The King. To enable a jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused it is necessary not only that his guilt should be a rational inference but that it should be ‘the only rational inference that the circumstances would enable them to draw’: Plomp v The Queen; see also Thomas v The Queen.
47 For an inference to be reasonable, it “must rest upon something more than mere conjecture. The bare possibility of innocence should not prevent a jury from finding the prisoner guilty, if the inference of guilt is the only inference open to reasonable men upon a consideration of all the facts in evidence” (emphasis added). Further, “in considering a circumstantial case, all of the circumstances established by the evidence are to be considered and weighed in deciding whether there is an inference consistent with innocence reasonably open on the evidence” (emphasis added). The evidence is not to be looked at in a piecemeal fashion, at trial or on appeal.
48 Further, a criminal trial is accusatorial but also adversarial. Subject to well-defined exceptions, “parties are bound by the conduct of their counsel, who exercise a wide discretion in deciding what issues to contest, what witnesses to call, what evidence to lead or to seek to have excluded, and what lines of argument to pursue.” (citations omitted)
“We have no doubt that the position is correctly stated in the following passage in Reg. v. Beble, that “It is not the law that a jury should examine separately each item of evidence adduced by the prosecution, apply the onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to that evidence and reject if they are not so satisfied”. At the end of the trial the jury must consider all the evidence, and in doing so they may find that one piece of evidence resolves their doubts as to another. For example, the jury, considering the evidence of one witness by itself, may doubt whether it is truthful, but other evidence may provide corroboration, and when the jury considers the evidence as a whole they may decide that the witness should be believed. Again, the quality of evidence of identification may be poor, but other evidence may support its correctness; in such a case the jury should not be told to look at the evidence of each witness “separately in, so to speak, a hermetically sealed compartment”; they should consider the accumulation of the evidence: cf. Weeder v. The Queen.
Similarly, in a case depending on circumstantial evidence, the jury should not reject one circumstance because, considered alone, no inference of guilt can be drawn from it. It is well established that the jury must consider “the weight which is to be given to the united force of all the circumstances put together”: per Lord Cairns, in Belhaven and Stenton Peerage, cited in Reg. v. Van Beelen; and see Thomas v. The Queen and cases there cited. In Plomp v. The Queen it was argued that the motives of the accused could not be considered until it was shown by evidence that in some physical way his actions were responsible for his wife’s death. The Court rejected this argument. Dixon C.J. said:
All the circumstances of the case must be weighed in judging whether there is evidence upon which a jury may reasonably be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the crime charged. There may be many cases where it is extremely dangerous to rely heavily on the existence of a motive, where an unexplained death or disappearance of a person is not otherwise proved to be attributable to the accused; but all such considerations must be dealt with on the facts of the particular case. I cannot think, however, that in a case where the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence any part of the circumstances can be put on one side as relating to motive only and therefore not to be weighed as part of the proofs of what was done.
It follows from what we have said that the jury should decide whether they accept the evidence of a particular fact, not by considering the evidence directly relating to that fact in isolation, but in the light of the whole evidence, and that they can draw an inference of guilt from a combination of facts, none of which viewed alone would support that inference. Nevertheless the jury cannot view a fact as a basis for an inference of guilt unless at the end of the day they are satisfied of the existence of that fact beyond reasonable doubt. When the evidence is circumstantial, the jury, whether in a civil or in a criminal case, are required to draw an inference from the circumstances of the case; in a civil case the circumstances must raise a more probable inference in favour of what is alleged, and in a criminal case the circumstances must exclude any reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence (see Luxton v. Vines; and Barca v. The Queen). The statement by Lord Wright in Caswell v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries*, Ld.*, that “There can be no inference unless there are objective facts from which to infer the other facts which it is sought to establish” is obviously as true of criminal as of civil cases. The process of reasoning in a case of circumstantial evidence gives rise to two chances of error: “first from the chances of error in each fact or consideration forming the steps and second from the chance of error in reasoning to the conclusion”: Morrison v. Jenkins. It seems to us an inescapable consequence that in a criminal case the circumstances from which the inference should be drawn must be established beyond reasonable doubt. We agree with the statement in Reg. v. Van Beelen, that it is “an obvious proposition in logic, that you cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the truth of an inference drawn from facts about the existence of which you are in doubt.” (citations omitted)
The evidence, considered as a whole, establishes each of the following matters beyond reasonable doubt.
First, in December 2024 or January 2025, Mr Anderson met with a person named “Jay” and engaged him to reach out to Mr Ibrahim with a view to arranging a settlement of these proceedings (the engagement meeting).
Second, Jay told Mr Anderson at the engagement meeting that he could assist in arranging a settlement with Mr Ibrahim.
Third, Mr Anderson engaged Jay on account of his belief that Jay had strong industry or union ties and that he may be able to effectively negotiate a settlement with Mr Ibrahim.
Fourth, at the time Mr Anderson engaged Jay, both Mr Anderson and Mr Ibrahim and their related companies had legal representation in these proceedings.
It is an agreed fact that Mr Anderson gave instructions to his solicitor in these proceedings to the effect of each of the first to third matters above. The evidence does not provide any basis for an inference that those instructions were untrue, and the submissions made on behalf of Mr Anderson proceeded on the basis that those instructions were true.
Fifth, Mr Anderson engaged Jay to attempt to arrange a settlement with Mr Ibrahim with the intention that Jay would use the strong industry or union ties that Mr Anderson understood Jay had to cause the disruption or threatened disruption of the construction work at the Site so as to apply pressure to Mr Ibrahim to abandon his defence of these proceedings and yield to Mr Anderson’s claim to be reinstated as a shareholder and director of Beldev Nominees. Mr Anderson knew that Jay would or was likely to cause such disruption himself, or through other persons, and engaged Jay for the purpose of applying such pressure to Mr Ibrahim.
Those are the only rational inferences that can be drawn from the first to fourth matters above and the twentieth matter below, considered as a whole.
Counsel for Mr Anderson emphasised that it is an agreed fact that Mr Anderson instructed his solicitor that he had told Mr Panov that he wished to resolve his legal dispute with Mr Ibrahim amicably and that Mr Panov had recommended Jay to Mr Anderson as a mediator. I do not consider that those matters are capable of supporting an alternative inference. A party who resolves a dispute on terms satisfactory to them often perceives the end result to be an amicable resolution even if the process by which that result was achieved was less than amicable. The instructions given by Mr Anderson to his solicitor establish that Jay was engaged by Mr Anderson unilaterally to reach out to Mr Ibrahim with a view to arranging a settlement of the legal dispute that is the subject of these proceedings. If Jay had a track record as a mediator – an independent third party engaged by parties jointly to facilitate their negotiations to explore a potential resolution of their dispute – he was not engaged in that capacity by Mr Anderson in this instance.
The instructions given by Mr Anderson to his solicitor identify Jay’s strong industry or union ties as the skill set that Mr Anderson wished to deploy by engaging Jay to attempt to arrange a settlement with Mr Ibrahim. There is no rational reason why such industry or union ties would qualify Jay to negotiate a consensual agreement settling these proceedings which raise the legal issues outlined at [12] above which have nothing to do with industrial or union issues or the activities of the construction workforce on the Site.
Counsel for Mr Anderson accepted that one available inference is that the relevance of Jay’s industry or union ties, as perceived by Mr Anderson, was that Jay may be able to cause interference with the performance of the construction work on the Site. It was submitted on behalf of Mr Anderson that this was not the only available inference, and that “the fact that he has union ties could mean that he knows a lot of people who could either speak directly or indirectly to certain parties in an issue. It may well be that they in turn know someone who can bring that party to the table and discuss things. It may well be there’s personal contacts, all those sort of things that go on in business every day … but it doesn’t mean in and of itself something nefarious … business is done like that every day and familiarity with people has a lot to do with how deals are done and how things are resolved.” Mr Anderson’s instructions to his solicitor did not disclose any belief on Mr Anderson’s part that Jay’s industry or union ties meant or were likely to mean that Jay knew people through whom he could speak to Mr Ibrahim to facilitate the negotiation of a consensual agreement settling the proceedings. Mr Anderson and his lawyers were well placed to instigate themselves any such negotiation with Mr Ibrahim and his lawyers themselves, including by seeking a court-ordered mediation. The submission that Mr Anderson might have engaged Jay simply because he knew a lot of people through whom he might negotiate on behalf of Mr Anderson a consensual agreement with Mr Ibrahim resolving the proceedings is both inherently improbable and speculative. I reject that submission.
In finding that Mr Anderson engaged Jay with the intention that he would disrupt the progress of the construction work at the Site, and with the knowledge that Jay would or was likely to do so either himself or through other persons, so as to apply pressure to Mr Ibrahim to abandon his defence of these proceedings and yield to Mr Anderson’s claim to be reinstated as a shareholder and director of Beldev Nominees, I have taken into account that interests associated with Mr Anderson own 50% of Holdings, which owns the Site and which entered into the Development Agreement with Beldev Nominees. The terms of the Development Agreement were not in evidence. I have assumed in favour of Mr Anderson that any disruption of the construction work on the Site and any resulting delay in the completion of the Development would be likely to delay Holdings receiving any benefits to which it may be entitled under the Development Agreement, and that this would adversely affect the interests of each of Mr Anderson and Mr Ibrahim as the equal indirect shareholders of Holdings. However, as the applicants submitted, any such downside risk for Mr Anderson was accompanied by the potential upside, if the intended pressure on Mr Ibrahim succeeded, of achieving Mr Anderson’s reinstatement as a shareholder and director of Beldev Nominees with the prospect of achieving profits that had been estimated in the worked example in the Joint Venture Agreement as $27,971,240. For that reason, I do not consider that Mr Anderson’s part-ownership of Holdings diminishes the very high degree of probability that he engaged Jay with the intention that he would exert pressure of the kind and in the manner that I have found at [73] above and in the knowledge that he would or was likely to do so. For the reasons explained at [74]-[77] above, that high degree of probability satisfies the standard of beyond reasonable doubt.
It was submitted on behalf of Mr Anderson that it would not have been in his interests for the Development to be disrupted in circumstances where he was asserting a claim to be a 46.25% shareholder in Beldev Nominees, and that it would have been “self-sabotage” for Mr Anderson to engage Jay with the intention and knowledge that Jay would disrupt the construction work. I reject that submission. For the reasons I have explained above, the evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Anderson engaged Jay for the purpose of applying pressure to Mr Ibrahim to force him to yield to Mr Anderson’s claim and thereby achieve his reinstatement as a shareholder and director of Beldev Nominees without having to prove his case in these proceedings. As the applicants submitted, that objective was in Mr Anderson’s interests and was not “self-sabotage”.
Sixth, at the engagement meeting, Mr Anderson told Jay that his dispute with Mr Ibrahim concerned his purported removal as a shareholder and director of the company that was carrying out the Development at the Site. As referred to at [74] above, it is an agreed fact that Mr Anderson instructed his solicitor that he informed Jay about the background to the dispute at the engagement meeting. The evidence does not provide any basis for an inference that those instructions were untrue, and, as I have already mentioned, the submissions on behalf of Mr Anderson proceeded on the basis that those instructions were true. The nature and location of the Development and Mr Anderson’s claim that he had not validly been removed as a shareholder and director were core elements of the dispute and it is highly probable that Mr Anderson’s background briefing to Jay disclosed those details, particularly having regard to the nature of the pressure that I have found Mr Anderson intended Jay to apply to Mr Ibrahim and the evidence referred to in respect of the seventh to twentieth matters below.
Seventh, Jay communicated with Mr Anderson using the mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010. That is established by the evidence referred to at [25] and [59] above.
Eighth, five or six men wearing clothing bearing the word “Finks” attended the Site at about 5.30am on 30 January 2025. That is established by the unchallenged evidence of Mr A referred to at [26] above, which is corroborated by the CCTV footage referred to at [28] above and by Mr B’s unchallenged evidence referred to at [32] above about his telephone conversation with Mr A at about 6:45am that morning. Mr Reeman’s evidence referred to at [33] corroborates the evidence of Mr A and Mr B referred to at [31]-[32] concerning the occurrence and timing of that telephone conversation.
Ninth, one of those men, who called himself “Matthew”, said to Mr A on that occasion that they had been sent to the Site by Mr Anderson, that Mr Anderson needed to be reinstated as a partner of the development, and that Mr A should tell the other partners that the Site would be shut down if Mr Anderson was not reinstated as a partner of the development. That is established by the evidence of Mr A referred to at [26] above, which was not challenged and which was corroborated by Mr B’s evidence referred to at [32] above about his telephone conversation with Mr A at about 6:45am that morning. The evidence of each of Mr A and Mr B carries significant weight because neither of them has any interest in the outcome of these proceedings or the contempt motion, yet they were each willing to testify about the attendance of the men at the Site. The events about which they have given evidence are unusual events, and their evidence that those events caused them to feel threatened and to be concerned for the welfare of the staff and subcontractors of Icon Co working on the Site, was not challenged. Those events occurred only four months before Mr A made his principal affidavit and about 13 months before Mr B made his principal affidavit. Each of them had reason to remember those events, unlike the events of any ordinary working day on the Site. The differences between Mr A’s account of what “Matthew” said to him, and Mr B’s evidence of what Mr A told him about that encounter, are not differences of substance and are indicative of Mr A and Mr B having given their evidence independently and without consulting with one another. I reject the submission made on behalf of Mr Anderson that little or no weight should be given to these aspects of the evidence of Mr A and Mr B, and to their evidence of their subsequent conversations with Jay referred to at [89] and [91] below, because the statements that they deposed were made by “Matthew” and Jay were ambiguous. As the applicants submitted, those statements conveyed a consistent and unambiguous message that the men would physically prevent work from continuing on the Site unless and until Mr Anderson was reinstated as a shareholder or partner in the development being carried out on the Site. The evidence of Mr A and Mr B satisfies me beyond reasonable doubt that “Matthew” told Mr A that they had been sent to the Site by Mr Anderson, and that Mr A should tell the other partners that the Site would be shut down if Mr Anderson was not reinstated as a partner of the Development.
Tenth, the five or six men, including “Matthew”, returned to the Site at about 7:30am on 30 January 2025 and “Matthew” warned Mr A that they would be back. That is established by the unchallenged evidence of Mr A referred to at [35] above, which carries significant weight given that it is inherently probable that he would remember the unusual events in question and in circumstances where he has nothing to gain from giving evidence in relation to the contempt motion, and by the evidence of what happened the following day as referred to immediately below.
Eleventh, between 20 and 25 men surrounded the Site at about 5:30am on 31 January 2025 and prevented Mr A and all other workers from entering the Site. One of the men told Mr A that the Site was closed until Mr Anderson was reinstated as a shareholder, and impliedly threatened Mr A with violence (“We do this the easy way or the hard way”) when Mr A indicated his intention to enter the Site. That is established by the unchallenged evidence of Mr A referred to at [39]-[41] above, which is corroborated by the CCTV footage referred to at [51] above and by Mr B’s unchallenged evidence referred to at [48] above about his telephone conversation with Mr A at about 6:15am that morning. Mr Reeman’s evidence referred to at [58] above corroborates the evidence of Mr A and Mr B that they had a telephone call that morning, although it appears that the call occurred at about 6:24am rather than 6:15am and after several earlier very short calls or messages. The evidence of Mr A and Mr B carries significant weight for the reasons explained at [83] above.
Twelfth, the man who threatened Mr A on the morning of 31 January 2025 told Mr A that he needed to “ring Jay and sort it out”, told Mr A that Jay was the person in charge, and provided Mr A with a mobile telephone number at which Jay could be contacted. That is established by the unchallenged evidence of Mr A referred to at [41]-[42] above, which is corroborated by Mr B’s unchallenged evidence referred to at [48]-[49] above about his telephone conversation with Mr A at about 6:15am that morning. As explained above, Mr Reeman’s evidence referred to at [58] above corroborates the evidence of Mr A and Mr B that they had a telephone call that morning, although it appears that the call occurred at about 6:24am rather than 6:15am after several earlier very short calls or messages. The evidence of Mr A and Mr B carries significant weight for the reasons explained at [83] above.
Thirteenth, the mobile telephone number that the man referred to above gave to Mr A for the purpose of contacting Jay was the same number (XXXX XXX 010) that Mr Anderson used to communicate with the person named Jay who he had engaged as referred to at [68]-[80] above. That is established by the evidence referred to at [25] and [59] above together with Mr A’s unchallenged evidence referred to at [42]-[44] above.
Fourteenth, Mr A called that mobile telephone number on the morning of 31 January 2025 and had a conversation with a person who identified himself as Jay when he answered the call. The occurrence of Mr A’s call to that mobile telephone number is established by Mr A’s unchallenged evidence referred to at [42]-[44] above, and by Mr Reeman’s evidence referred to at [58] above which establishes a connected call from Mr A’s number to the mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010 at about 6:43am on 31 January 2025 after several earlier calls made from Mr A’s number to that number from about 5:58am which had gone unanswered or been forwarded to voicemail. The fact that the person who answered the call identified himself as “Jay” is established by Mr A’s unchallenged evidence referred to at [43] above considered together with the seventh and thirteenth matters referred to above.
Fifteenth, during that call, Jay told Mr A that Mr Anderson had been wronged and needed to be reinstated as a shareholder, and that the Site would remain closed until then. That is established by Mr A’s evidence referred to at [43] above. The evidence of Mr A carries significant weight and I reject Mr Anderson’s submission that it should be given little or no weight for the reasons explained at [83] above. Moreover, this aspect of Mr A’s evidence is consistent with the conduct of the men who had gathered at the Site and prevented and intimidated workers from entering the Site that morning and on the previous morning as described at [82]-[85] above, one of whom had told Mr A that Jay was the person in charge of their activities as referred to at [86] above.
Sixteenth, Mr B called the mobile telephone number XXXX XXX 010 after he arrived at the Site at about 7:30am on 31 January 2025. That is established by Mr B’s unchallenged evidence referred to at [53]-[54] above which is corroborated by the evidence of Mr B’s role as a director of Icon, by Mr A’s evidence referred to at [43] above that Jay had told him in their call earlier that morning to “ask the person in charge to call me”, and by Mr Reeman’s evidence referred to at [58] above which identifies a call from Mr B’s number to XXXX XXX 010 at 7:21am on 31 January 2025 lasting approximately two minutes and 43 seconds.
Seventeenth, Jay told Mr B during their call on the morning of 31 January 2025 that the Site was not to be opened or accessed until Mr Anderson had been reinstated as a shareholder. In response to Mr B’s expression of concern for the welfare of Icon Co’s staff and subcontractors, Jay replied that “There won’t be a problem as long as Shane Anderson is reinstated as a shareholder”, implying that there was a risk to the welfare of any staff and subcontractors who attempted to enter the Site if Mr Anderson was not reinstated as a shareholder. This is established by Mr B’s unchallenged evidence referred to at [53] above, which is consistent with the conduct of the men who had gathered at the Site and prevented and intimidated workers from entering the Site that morning and on the previous morning as described at [82]-[85] above, one of whom had told Mr A that Jay was the person in charge of their activities as referred to at [85] above. I reject the submission that Mr B’s evidence about his conversation with Jay should be given little to no weight for the reasons explained at [83] above.
Eighteenth, Jay caused the men to attend the Site and to unlawfully prevent and intimidate workers from entering the Site on the mornings of 30 and 31 January 2025, caused those men to convey the message on both of those occasions that the Site would be closed unless and until Mr Anderson was reinstated as a shareholder or partner in the Development, and conveyed that message himself in his conversations with Mr A and Mr B on 31 January 2025. Jay had no lawful right to cause the employees and subcontractors of Icon Co to be prevented from entering the Site and working on the Site. Jay engaged in this conduct in an attempt to exert pressure on Mr Ibrahim to capitulate to Mr Anderson’s claims in these proceedings, in performance of his retainer with Mr Anderson. By engaging Jay as referred to at [68]-[80] above, Mr Anderson caused the men to attend the Site and to unlawfully prevent and intimidate workers from entering the Site on the mornings of 30 and 31 January 2025, caused those men to convey the message on both of those occasions that the Site would be closed unless and until Mr Anderson was reinstated as a shareholder or partner in the Development, and caused Jay to convey that message to Mr A and Mr B on 31 January 2025.
Those are the only rational inferences that can be drawn from the first to seventeenth matters above.
A theoretical possibility that the attendance of the men at the Site on 30 and 31 January 2025 was orchestrated by a different person on each occasion is mere speculation and highly improbable given that the men asserted the same demand on each occasion, which was consistent with the demand conveyed by Jay to each of Mr A and Mr B on 31 January 2025.
Contrary to the submissions made on behalf of Mr Anderson, I do not consider that any delay between the engagement meeting and the events of 30 and 31 January 2025 supports an inference that the conduct orchestrated by Jay on 30 and 31 January 2025 was for some purpose unconnected with his retainer by Mr Anderson. The possibility that Jay orchestrated and participated in that conduct in which demands were made for Mr Anderson to be reinstated as a shareholder or partner in the Development for some reason unconnected with that retainer is mere speculation. It is highly probable that the time that passed between the engagement meeting and the events of 30 and 31 January 2025 is attributable to the typical shutdown of construction activities over the December/January summer holiday period.
Nineteenth, at 7:34am on 31 January 2025, Jay sent Mr Anderson a photograph of a group of about 15 workers standing idle on the footpath adjacent to the entrance to the Site in broad daylight. That is established by the evidence of the WhatsApp messages referred to at [59] above. Counsel for Mr Anderson acknowledged that the photograph in Jay’s WhatsApp message to Mr Anderson had been taken at the Site. It displays a scene consistent with those depicted in the CCTV footage referred to at [51] above, albeit that the photograph has been taken from a different angle to the angle from which the CCTV footage was filmed. The photograph does not show the Site itself, other than part of the driveway which is the entrance to the Site. The photograph does not depict any person other than the workers standing on the footpath, with the exception of part of the abdomen and right hand of a person standing to the immediate left of the photographer whose face is excluded from the photograph. I reject as mere speculation the submission made on behalf of Mr Anderson that, by sending the photograph, Jay might have intended to convey to Mr Anderson that he had gone to the Site to negotiate with Mr Ibrahim. The only message that the photograph is rationally capable of conveying is that workers had been prevented from entering the Site. I infer that Mr Anderson understood the photograph in this way, and understood the communication from Jay attaching the photograph as conveying that Jay had caused that outcome.
Twentieth, Mr Anderson did not respond to Jay’s message received at 7:34am on 31 January 2025 questioning why Jay was sending him the photograph or why workers were gathered on the footpath outside the Site rather than working on the Site. That is established by Mr Anderson’s failure to produce any record of any such response in answer to the notice to produce and by Mr Reeman’s evidence referred to at [59] above. The absence of any such response from Mr Anderson, considered together with the evidence referred to at [73]-[79] above concerning Mr Anderson’s state of mind when he engaged Jay in December 2024 or January 2025, gives rise to an inference that Mr Anderson was unsurprised that workers appeared from the photograph to have been prevented from working on the Site on the morning of 31 January 2025 because that was the very kind of action that Mr Anderson had intended Jay to take or arrange, and had known that Jay would or was likely to take or arrange, in order to apply pressure to Mr Ibrahim to resolve these proceedings by capitulating to Mr Anderson’s claims. That inference arises beyond reasonable doubt. As counsel for Mr Anderson submitted, Jay’s message attaching the photograph was received by Mr Anderson at 7:34am on 31 January 2025, several minutes after the conduct that is the subject of the five charges had concluded. The absence of any response from Mr Anderson, together with the evidence referred to at [73]-[79] above, nevertheless supports the inference that I have drawn concerning Mr Anderson’s state of mind at the earlier point in time when he engaged Jay.
Considered as a whole, the twenty matters referred to above are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than that Mr Anderson is guilty of engaging the services of Jay with the intention and knowledge that Jay would apply improper pressure to Mr Ibrahim to inhibit or attempt to inhibit him from defending these proceedings, and that Mr Anderson thereby caused the attendance of the men controlled by Jay who prevented and intimidated workers from entering the Site on 30 and 31 January 2025 and caused Jay to intimidate Mr A and Mr B on 31 January 2025. As a matter of practical reality, Jay’s unlawful actions, which Mr Anderson caused, put at risk and threatened to put at continuing risk the progress of the Development which was carrying significant liabilities, and thereby put at risk the potential profits that Mr Ibrahim and interests associated with him stood to make from the Development. The threat conveyed was plain: reinstate Mr Anderson so that he will share in the profits, or the Site will remain closed. That threat had a real and definite tendency to interfere with the course of justice in these proceedings by exerting pressure on Mr Ibrahim to yield to the threat by abandoning the defence of Mr Anderson’s claims and abandoning his reliance on the Court to resolve the legal dispute between Mr Anderson and Beldev SA and the active defendants. That is to say, the pressure was intended to inhibit Mr Ibrahim from defending these proceedings.
I reject the submission made on behalf of Mr Anderson that the evidence does not exclude a reasonable hypothesis that Mr Anderson did not intend the events of 30 and 31 January 2025 to occur, and did not intend for any improper pressure to be applied to Mr Ibrahim, and that Jay took it upon himself to apply that pressure. No such hypothesis is reasonably capable of being inferred from the evidence considered as a whole. As I have explained at [73]-[77] above, Mr Anderson had all means of legitimate pressure at his disposal, without engaging Jay, and chose to engage Jay on account of his strong industry and union ties which had no relevance to the substance of the issues in dispute in these proceedings but which could be used by Jay to disrupt the progress of construction Work at the Site which would apply improper pressure to Mr Ibrahim of the kind described immediately above. The propounded hypothesis involves accepting that Jay would choose to deploy that power to further Mr Anderson’s interests without a clear understanding that Mr Anderson had engaged him to do so, and would reward him for doing so. That is highly improbable. Finally, the propounded hypothesis is wholly inconsistent with the absence of any response from Mr Anderson questioning the message that he received from Jay at 7:34am on 31 January 2025 for the reasons explained at [96]-[97] above.
I also reject the submission made on behalf of Mr Anderson that the evidence does not exclude a reasonable hypothesis that Mr Anderson intended for Jay to conduct or facilitate a lawful negotiation with Mr Ibrahim, but that that intention was miscommunicated to Jay. That hypothesis is mere conjecture which fails to grapple with the evidence referred to at [73]-[77] and [96]-[97] above.
For completeness, I note that, in final closing submissions, counsel for Mr Anderson abandoned a third alleged hypothesis that had featured in earlier submissions, namely that there were two people named “Jay” and that the Jay engaged by Mr Anderson was different from the Jay who was in charge of the men who attended the Site on 30 and 31 January 2025 and who spoke to each of Mr A and Mr B on 31 January 2025. That concession was properly made in light of the seventh, thirteenth and nineteenth matters referred to at [81], [87] and [96] above, which establish beyond reasonable doubt that there was one person named Jay who used the same mobile telephone number when communicating with Mr Anderson in January 2025 and when communicating with Mr A and Mr B on 31 January 2025.
For all the reasons at [67]-[101] above, and applying the principles referred to at [63] above, Mr Anderson’s conduct in engaging Jay with the intention and knowledge that Jay would exert improper pressure on Mr Ibrahim to abandon the defence of Mr Anderson’s claims and Beldev SA’s claims in these proceedings, and to thereby abandon his reliance on the Court to resolve the legal dispute between Mr Anderson and Beldev SA and the active defendants, constitutes criminal contempt of court.
The applicants have proved each of the five charges beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of Charge 1 are established by the findings in respect of the first to sixth, nineteenth and twentieth matters referred to at [68]-[80] and [96]-[97] above, and for the reasons explained at [98]-[100] above.
The elements of Charge 2 are established by the findings in respect of the first to tenth and eighteenth to twentieth matters referred to at [68]-[84] and [92]-[97] above, and for the reasons explained at [98]-[100] above.
The elements of Charge 3 are established by the findings in respect of the first to sixth, eleventh and eighteenth to twentieth matters referred to at [68]-[80], [85] and [92]-[97] above, and for the reasons explained at [98]-[100] above.
The elements of Charge 4 are established by the findings in respect of the first to sixth, twelfth to fifteenth, and eighteenth to twentieth matters referred to at [68]-[80], [86]-[89] and [92]-[97] above, and for the reasons explained at [98]-[100] above.
The elements of Charge 5 are established by the findings in respect of the first to sixth, thirteenth and sixteenth to twentieth matters referred to at [68]-[80], [87] and [90]-[97] above, and for the reasons explained at [98]-[100] above.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court makes the following declarations:
DECLARE that the First Plaintiff is guilty of criminal contempt of court by engaging in the conduct described in Charge 1 in the Amended Statement of Charges dated 13 March 2026, namely:
In or about December 2024, the First Plaintiff solicited the services of a person identified as “Jay” with the intention that improper pressure be applied to the Second Defendant to inhibit or attempt to inhibit him from defending these proceedings.
On or about 30 January 2025, the First Plaintiff caused persons to attend the construction site at Block 20, Section 32, Belconnen ACT 2617 (the Site) and to intimidate or attempt to intimidate one or more persons engaged to work on the Site on 30 January 2025, and the First Plaintiff did so with the intention that improper pressure be applied to the Second Defendant to inhibit him or attempt to inhibit him from defending these proceedings.
On or about 31 January 2025, the First Plaintiff caused persons to attend the construction site at Block 20, Section 32, Belconnen ACT 2617 (the Site) and to intimidate or attempt to intimidate one or more persons engaged to work on the Site on 31 January 2025, and the First Plaintiff did so with the intention that improper pressure be applied to the Second Defendant to inhibit him or attempt to inhibit him from defending these proceedings.
On or about 31 January 2025, the First Plaintiff caused a person to intimidate or attempt to intimidate a worker present at the construction site at Block 20, Section 32, Belconnen ACT 2617 at approximately 5.30am on 31 January 2025, and the First Plaintiff did so with the intention that that improper pressure would be applied to the Second Defendant to inhibit him or attempt to inhibit him from defending these proceedings.
On or about 31 January 2025, the First Plaintiff caused a person to intimidate or attempt to intimidate a director of the contractor engaged to work at the construction site at Block 20, Section 32, Belconnen ACT 2617 at approximately 7.30am on 31 January 2025, and the First Plaintiff did so with the intention that that improper pressure would be applied to the Second Defendant to inhibit him from defending these proceedings.
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Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 191.
[2017] NSWSC 1759 at [88]-[103].
Ulman v Live Group Pty Ltd (2018) 367 ALR 95; [2018] NSWCA 338 at [70]-[85] (Bathurst CJ and Beazley P).
Novelly v Tamqia Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 167 at [10] (Gleeson JA, Meagher and Kirk JJA agreeing) and the authorities there referred to.
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 375; [2015] HCA 21 at [40]-[47] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ).
(2016) 258 CLR 308; [2016] HCA 35 at [46]-[48] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ) (citations omitted).
(1984) 153 CLR 521 at 535-536; [1984] HCA 7 (citations omitted).
Anderson
Beldev M1 Pty Ltd
(1984) 153 CLR 521
(2015) 256 CLR 375
(2016) 258 CLR 308
(2018) 367 ALR 95
(1997) 42 NSWLR 22
(1955) 93 CLR 351
(1995) 183 CLR 525
(1953) 90 CLR 573