//
© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2010] FCA 1417
plaintiff. Ms Macmillan's application to set aside the s 596B summons was dismissed except that the summons' document schedule was to be amended; Ms Macmillan ordered to pay one half of the plaintiffs' costs...
The receivers of SESI sought documents and examination under s 596B from an employee of the Legal Practice Liability Committee about professional indemnity insurance held by BRB, a law firm sued by the receivers. The employee argued statutory secrecy barred disclosure. Finkelstein J held that a compulsory s 596B examination is a 'proceeding' for the purposes of the Legal Profession Act's secrecy exemption, and that insurer-related information relevant to assessing the value or recoverability of SESI's potential legal claims is part of the company's examinable affairs. The summons was upheld, but the court required narrowing of an overbroad documents schedule and left detailed relevance rulings to the Registrar; Ms Macmillan was ordered to pay half the receivers' costs of the interlocutory application.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
6 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
1,918 words · generated 28/08/2026
The receivers of South Eastern Secured Investments Ltd (SESI) obtained leave under s 596B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to issue an examination summons to Ms Macmillan, an employee of the Legal Practice Liability Committee (the Liability Committee). The summons required her to attend a court examination and to produce documents relating to professional indemnity insurance policies issued by the Liability Committee to the law firm Birch Ross & Barlow (BRB) and to claims or notifications of claims made by BRB (Reasons [1], [9]-[11]).
SESI's receivers were pursuing a civil action in the Supreme Court of Victoria against BRB and some former directors of SESI. The receivers alleged BRB negligently failed to advise SESI of a statutory super-priority charge under the Retirement Villages Act 1986 (Vic) attached to property secured for loans, resulting in significant loss to SESI (Reasons [3]-[7]). The receivers sought insurer-related information to assess whether pursuing the claim against BRB would be commercially viable, principally the existence, terms and limits of BRB's professional indemnity policies, claims history, and whether any denial of indemnity had occurred (Reasons [10]-[11]).
Ms Macmillan applied to set aside the summons. Her principal grounds were (1) a statutory secrecy obligation under s 6.6.13(1) of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic), which prohibits a member or employee of the Liability Committee from disclosing information acquired under the Act, and (2) that the material sought was not part of SESI's examinable affairs (Reasons [12]-[14]). Finkelstein J heard the interlocutory application on 9 November 2010 and delivered reasons on 10 December 2010.
The court held that (a) an examination under s 596B is a 'proceeding' for the purposes of the secrecy exemption in s 6.6.13(2)(a); (b) documents and evidence about BRB's insurance policies and claims, insofar as they relate to assessing the value or recoverability of SESI's causes of action against BRB, are within the scope of 'examinable affairs'; and (c) parts of the document schedule were overbroad and required amendment, leaving the Registrar to police relevance at the examination (Reasons [15]-[33]). The interlocutory application was dismissed save for agreed amendments to the schedule, and Ms Macmillan was ordered to pay one half of the receivers' costs (Orders dated 16 December 2010).
Two distinct legal questions drove the decision.
Is a s 596B examination a 'proceeding' for the purposes of s 6.6.13(2)(a) of the Legal Profession Act? Finkelstein J relied principally on Cheney v Spooner (1928) 41 CLR 532. Cheney concerned a compulsory examination under company/winding-up provisions and held that the application, summons and the examination constituted a 'proceeding' within the meaning of the Service and Execution of Process Act; the information obtained by the court-ordered process on oath was properly described as 'evidence' (Reasons [15]-[17]). The judge rejected an argument that the word 'proceeding' should be given a narrower meaning similar to that adopted for the Evidence Act (as discussed in Griffin v Pantzer), on the basis that the policy considerations for narrowing in the Evidence Act context do not apply to the secrecy exemption in the Legal Profession Act (Reasons [18]-[20]). The result: the secrecy exemption in s 6.6.13(2)(a), which permits producing a document or giving evidence to a court or tribunal in the course of proceedings relating to professional indemnity insurance, can apply to a s 596B examination.
Are insurer-related materials part of the company's 'examinable affairs'? The court examined authorities (Grosvenor Hill, Interchase, Meteyard, Allstate, Clutha and Gerah) recognising that examinable affairs include company property and choses in action and that information allowing estimation of the value of a company's chose in action, including details of related insurance policies and decisions about claims, is properly part of examinable affairs (Reasons [21]-[24]). Kiefel J's reasoning in Interchase, that insurer information which allows estimation of the worth of a company's claim is 'about' that property, was applied (Reasons [22]). Finkelstein J concluded the proposed examination's focus on BRB's policies, claims and ability to recover was plainly 'proceedings relating to' those policies and 'about' SESI's examinable affairs (Reasons [30]).
The court was wary of overbreadth. It noted McLelland CJ's caution in GPI Leisure that the liquidator should not be permitted to use court process to investigate the merits of insurer-insured disputes beyond what is necessary, but Finkelstein J considered McLelland CJ's narrower approach inconsistent with Interchase and Meteyard and declined to follow it to the extent of conflict (Reasons [28]-[29]). The practical outcome was to require amendment of the document schedule and to leave detailed relevance determinations to the Registrar at the examination (Reasons [31]-[33]).
Before this judgment, authorities established that insurer-related information could be relevant to a company's examinable affairs. Key authorities include Gerah Imports (South Australian Full Court), Interchase (Full Federal Court), Meteyard (NSW Court of Appeal) and Allstate v QBE (cited at [23]-[24]). There was an existing tension with GPI Leisure (McLelland CJ), which counsel and some courts had cited to resist broad disclosure of insurer-insurer disputes or the merits of denials of indemnity, but later authorities had read GPI Leisure more narrowly.
Finkelstein J endorses the line represented by Interchase and Meteyard: insurer information that allows assessment of a company's potential recovery or the worth of a chose in action properly falls within examinable affairs. He expressly declines to follow GPI Leisure to the extent it conflicts with those authorities (Reasons [28]-[29]). The consequence is a reaffirmation of the broader approach: compulsory examinations may properly probe insurer policy terms, claimed events, denials and related matters insofar as they bear on the company's examinable property and decisions about pursuing litigation.
Additionally, the judgment clarifies that a s 596B examination is a 'proceeding' for the purpose of statutory secrecy exemptions like s 6.6.13(2)(a), aligning the treatment of such examinations with older authorities such as Cheney and Beall (Reasons [15]-[19]).
Reasons [15]-[17] (on Cheney and 'proceeding'/'evidence'):
Reasons [21]-[23] (on examinable affairs and choses in action):
Reasons [28]-[29] (on GPI Leisure caution):
Reasons [31]-[33] (on overbreadth and role of Registrar):
Based on the reasoning in the judgment, the following fact patterns will typically trigger the principles applied here:
Where those facts exist, this judgment supports permitting targeted disclosure and examination about insurer-related matters that bear directly on the valuation or recoverability of the company's causes of action, while requiring limitation to avoid irrelevancies or probing the merits of insurance disputes beyond necessity (Reasons [21]-[33]).
The judgment itself surveys prior authorities but does not record later judicial treatment of Finkelstein J's decision. The present text therefore does not provide material about subsequent appellate treatment or citation history. From the judgment, one can only note that Finkelstein J relied on and aligned with the broader line of authorities (Interchase, Meteyard, Gerah) and expressly disapproved aspects of GPI Leisure to the extent inconsistent (Reasons [22]-[29]). To learn how later courts have treated this decision, one would need to consult subsequent reported decisions and citators.
The judgment resolves key points in this dispute but leaves some questions open or only partially addressed:
The outer boundary of permissible inquiry into insurer-insured disputes. Finkelstein J permits inquiry into matters that relate to valuation and recoverability, but emphasises limiting questions unrelated to a present denial of liability or to valuation (Reasons [31]-[33]). The precise line between permissible insurer-related information and impermissible investigation into the merits of coverage disputes will often depend on case-specific facts and Registrar/judicial rulings at examinations.
Interaction with legal professional privilege and other confidentiality protections. The judgment recognises that some disclosures to insurers may have privileged aspects (Reasons [28]), but does not resolve how privilege disputes arising in this context should be adjudicated in practice at examinations.
Applicability of the secrecy exemption where examinations involve third-party insurers in different jurisdictions or where other statutory secrecy regimes overlap. The decision anchors itself in Cheney and the ordinary meaning of 'proceeding', but cross-jurisdictional or multi-statutory secrecy conflicts may present more complex issues than those before the court.
Whether and to what extent the court's disapproval of GPI Leisure's narrower approach will be followed in future cases. Finkelstein J preferred the broader line of authority; appellate courts may be asked to resolve the tension definitively.
The degree of deference to be given to Registrars in policing relevance and scope. The court left fine-grained decisions to the Registrar (Reasons [31]-[33]). Future litigation may test how strictly Registrars apply relevance limits and whether their approach is subject to frequent appellate review.
These questions indicate areas where further litigation or appellate clarification may occur.
Disclaimer: This is general legal information, not legal advice. I can make mistakes. Before you act on this, rely on it, or use any draft, get a qualified Australian lawyer to check it.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION VID 710 of 2010
IN THE MATTER OF SOUTH EASTERN SECURED INVESTMENTS LIMITED (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) ACN 071 637 477 MARK KORDA AND CRAIG SHEPARD IN THEIR CAPACITY AS RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS OF SOUTH EASTERN SECURED INVESTMENTS LIMITED (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED)
JUDGE: FINKELSTEIN J DATE: 10 DECEMBER 2010 PLACE: MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 The receivers of South Eastern Secured Investments Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (SESI) obtained leave to issue, and then issued, a summons to Ms Macmillan to attend an examination before a Registrar regarding the affairs of SESI and to produce books and documents. The order granting leave was made under s 596B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Ms Macmillan applies to have the summons set aside. Rule 11.5(2) of the Federal Court (Corporations) Rules provides that an application to set aside an examination summons must be made within three days of its service. Her application is out of time, but an extension is not opposed. 2 SESI was part of the Provincial Finance Group (Provic), which carried on lending operations in regional areas of Victoria and southern New South Wales. Prior to its collapse in February 2009, the group raised money from the public on the issue of debentures (in excess of $660 million was raised) and lent money on the security of first mortgages over freehold property. Local firms of solicitors were retained on behalf of group companies in connection with the making of the loans. Often a director of the relevant Provic Group company was a partner in the firm retained. 3 In 2005, SESI lent $18.7 million to Premier Village Developments Pty Ltd (PVD) to enable it to purchase a retirement village at Hoppers Crossing. The loan was intended to be secured by a first mortgage over the retirement village. In the following year, SESI lent a further $1 million to PVD which was also to be secured by the mortgage. This was one of the largest loans SESI advanced. 4 Unbeknown to SESI, s 29 of the Retirement Villages Act 1986 (Vic) created a super-priority charge over the retirement village in respect of all refundable contributions paid by or on behalf of residents. That charge had priority over all other charges and encumbrances. 5 In November 2008, PVD defaulted under the loan. By virtue of the statutory charge in favour of the residents, SESI was not able to recover the full amount of its loan. It may have lost over $12 million. 6 SESI had retained a firm of solicitors, Birch Ross and Barlow (BRB), to act on its behalf in connection with the loan to PVD. BRB also acted for SESI in connection with other loans. There was a close relationship between SESI and BRB; a majority of SESI directors were partners in the firm. 7 The receivers and managers, who were appointed by the debenture holders, have commenced an action against BRB and several of SESI's former directors in the Supreme Court of Victoria. As against BRB, it is alleged that the firm was negligent in performing its retainer. The alleged negligent conduct consists of failing to advise SESI of the existence and effect of the statutory charge. The complaint against the directors is that they breached the duty imposed upon them by s 180 of the Corporations Act: that section requires directors to exercise their powers and discharge their duties with due care and diligence. Damages, interest and costs are sought. 8 Solicitors who carry on practice in Victoria are required to maintain professional indemnity insurance: Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic), s 3.5.2(2). The insurance must be with the Legal Practice Liability Committee established under Part 6.6: s 3.5.2(4). The terms of the policy are approved by the Legal Service Board: s 3.5.6(1). 9 The policies issued by the Liability Committee to BRB are "claims made" policies. The policies issued for the years 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 and 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010 include cover for claims for advice, representation, recommendation, endorsement or opinion favouring investment by way of a loan. The extent of the cover is $2 million for any one loss. 10 The receivers want to know whether it is worthwhile pursuing the claims against BRB. The insurance arrangements are seen by the receivers as critically important to the commercial viability of the claim. Thus the receivers seek to discover what they can about any directors and officers' liability insurance, any professional indemnity insurance and any claims made under those policies in relation to loss suffered by SESI. They also wish to understand the claims history of BRB and the way past claims by SESI have been treated by the Liability Committee. In addition the receivers want to learn more about an exclusion in the policies that was relied upon by the Liability Committee to deny a similar claim in July 2009. Despite attempts to ascertain this information, including examining a director of SESI, the receivers have been unable to obtain enough information to determine the viability of continuing with the Supreme Court proceeding. 11 In pursuit of this information the receivers seek to examine Ms Macmillan. She is an employee of the Liability Committee. The documents she has been asked to produce at her examination relate to the policies issued by the Liability Committee to BRB during the period 1 July 2003 to 11 February 2009 and claims or notifications of claims made by BRB on those policies. 12 Ms Macmillan moves to have the examination summons discharged principally on two grounds: first that she is prohibited by statute from disclosing the information that is sought, and second, that the proposed examination and documents sought to be produced are not part of the examinable affairs of SESI. If the summons is to stand, Ms Macmillan seeks to have altered the documents she has been asked to produce. 13 As regards the first point, s 6.6.13(1) of the Legal Profession Act provides that a member or employee of the Liability Committee must not disclose any information relating to the affairs of any person acquired in the performance of functions or duties under the Act. It is not in dispute that the information and documents sought from Ms Macmillan fall within that description. What the receivers rely upon is an exemption to the secrecy obligation. Section 6.6.13(2) provides that the secrecy obligation does not prevent a person: (a) producing a document or giving evidence to a court or tribunal in the course of criminal proceedings, proceedings under [the Legal Profession] Act or proceedings relating to a contract of professional indemnity insurance; 14 At issue in this application is whether (1) what occurs at a s 596B examination amounts to "producing a document or giving evidence to a court or tribunal" and, if it does, (2) is the production of the documents or the giving of evidence in the course of proceedings "relating to" the insurance contracts issued to BRB. 15 The resolution of the first question is partly solved by Cheney v Spooner (1928) 41 CLR 532. An examination summons was issued under s 123 of the Companies Act 1899 (NSW) to a resident of Victoria to attend or be examined before the Master in Equity in the New South Wales Supreme Court, and to produce books and documents. An order was made under the Service and Execution of Process Act 1901-1924 (Cth) for the service of the summons on the resident in Victoria. Section 16 of the Service and Execution of Process Act provided that "when a … summons has been issued by any Court or Judge … in any State … requiring any person to appear and give evidence, or to produce books or documents, in any civil or criminal trial or proceeding, such … summons may upon proof [of certain methods] by leave … be served on such person in any other State". The resident sought to have the summons set aside. He argued that an examination under the Companies Act did not constitute the giving of "evidence" in a "civil proceeding". That argument was unsuccessful. In the course of giving their reasons, Isaacs and Gavan Duffy JJ considered, first, the meaning of the words "any civil or criminal trial or proceeding". They said (at 536-7): A "proceeding" used broadly as it is used in s 16 of the Federal Service and Execution of Process Act, is merely some method permitted by law for moving a Court or judicial officer to some authorized act, or some act of the Court or judicial officer. 16 Thus they said that an examination summons constituted a proceeding. They went on (at 537) to say: "The required evidence would therefore be given in a civil proceeding within the meaning of s 16 of the Federal Act, constituted by the application, summons and examination". 17 As to the question whether what occurs at an examination is the giving of evidence, Isaacs and Gavan Duffy JJ rejected a submission that the term "evidence" is appropriate only when some issue of fact is raised for judicial or quasi-judicial determination. They said (at 537): That is too narrow a limitation of the term. "Evidence", says Best (12th ed, p 6) practically repeating Bentham, is "any matter of fact, the effect, tendency, or design of which is, to produce in the mind a persuasion, affirmative or disaffirmative, of the existence of some other matter of fact." In this case, the law places on the liquidator, in a voluntary winding-up, the responsibility of working out the affairs of the company. It affords him the means of obtaining information, that is evidentiary facts, enabling him to come to a conclusion as to ultimate facts. The information obtained as prescribed through the instrumentality of the Court and on oath is properly described as "evidence." 18 To my mind, there is no reason to give the word "proceeding" in s 6.6.13(2)(a) a narrow meaning. In its ordinary signification, a proceeding is an application to a court for its intervention or action. It has its ordinary meaning in s 6.6.13(2)(a). 19 It is worthwhile noting in this connection that a compulsory examination has traditionally been regarded as a proceeding. By way of example I refer to Re Beall; Ex parte Beall [1894] 2 QB 135. That concerned a private examination under the Bankruptcy Act. It was held by the Court of Appeal that the examination was a "proceeding of the court" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Rules and hence the transcript of the examination was required to be placed on the court file. Likewise in Re Appleton, French & Scrafton, Ltd [1905] 1 Ch 749 Warrington J held that a Companies Act examination was a "proceeding in the Supreme Court" thus enabling the court to make a costs order. 20 I derive little assistance from Griffin v Pantzer (2004) 137 FCR 209. One of the questions in that case was whether the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) applies to examinations under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The Evidence Act applies to "all proceedings in a federal court or an ACT court": s 4(1). The Full Court accepted that the word "proceeding" can have a wide scope. But the Full Court held (at 258-9) that the proceedings contemplated by the Evidence Act are those in which there are parties and in which there are witnesses. An examination under s 81 of the Bankruptcy Act was not such a proceeding. An examination is not between parties. It does not involve the resolution of a dispute. In my view the reasons that led the Full Court to read down "proceeding" when used in the Evidence Act do not apply to s 6.6.13(2)(a). 21 The second issue (does the proposed examination of Ms Macmillan relate to the examinable affairs of SESI) should also be resolved in favour of the receivers. Section 596B of the Corporations Act permits a summons to be issued to examine a person "about a corporation's examinable affairs". The definition in s 9 of "examinable affairs", as extended by s 53, includes the property of the company, including choses in action: Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd v Barber (1994) 48 FCR 301, 305. 22 In Re Interchase Corp Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 481, Kiefel J said (at 485) that information "about" a company's choses in action included information which: [A]llows some estimation of the value of the chose and, as a result, assists the liquidators to decide whether to prosecute the action. Logically I cannot see why information about whether the judgment resulting has any worth, by reason that it will or will not likely be met by payment, is not also then "about" that property. And whilst it may also be said to be "about" the contract of insurance between insurer and insured, this does not prevent it from having the necessary connection with the company's property and then coming within the scope of an examination under s 596B. 23 In my view, the authority of Re Interchase Corp has not been affected by Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36. In that case, a company in receivership had a potential claim on its insurer in respect of a fire at a coal mine. On the application of the company's receivers, examination summonses were issued to the insurer, an insurance loss assessor, consultants who had provided reports to the insurer about the incident and various other individuals. The NSW Court of Appeal held that the information sought was about the examinable affairs of the company. Basten JA delivered the leading judgment. In the course of it, he said (at [36]): The authorities support the proposition that the examinable affairs of a corporation include: (a) the existence of an insurance policy relating to the assets of the corporation; (b) the terms and conditions of such a policy; (c) where a claim has been made, the decision of the insurer with respect to the claim; and (d) where a claim has not been determined, the potential value of the claim. 24 For these propositions, Basten JA cited Re Allstate Explorations NL; Ryan v QBE Insurance Ltd (2003) 46 ACSR 379 and Re Clutha Ltd (in liq) (2003) 44 ACSR 734. But, of course, the leading case is the decision of the South Australian Full Court in Gerah Imports Pty Ltd v The Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (1993) 61 SASR 557. 25 Later in his reasons, Basten JA made reference to that part of the definition of "examinable affairs" which picked up the affairs of a connected entity of the corporation. In relation to the affairs of the connected entity he said (at [42]): [T]he internal operations or activities of another person or corporation will not fall within the examinable affairs of the corporation simply because they have the potential to affect the value of the assets of the corporation. In other words, although the "property" of the corporation may constitute part of its examinable affairs, the phrase "information about" such property should not be read so broadly as to include "any information which may affect the value of the property". 26 Mr Collins SC, who appeared for Ms Macmillan, pointed to this passage to show that what the receivers wished to discover (ie whether it is worth pursuing a claim against BRB because they have or do not have insurance to cover any claim) does not constitute part of the examinable affairs of SESI. I think that the cited passage deals with another topic. I think also that the argument cannot hold sway, not only because of the decision in Re Interchase but also because Basten JA accepted (at [47]) that the examination summonses were justified for purposes of "deciding whether to institute proceedings against [the insurer] in relation to a denial of liability under the insurance policy. Information relevant to that decision forms part of the examinable affairs of [the company in receivership]. Such information will, consistently with the authorities, include: (a) information necessary to assess the justification or otherwise of the denial [of liability], and (b) in an appropriate case (of which this is not one) information as to the worth of the potential defendant in such proceedings". 27 Mr Collins sought to distinguish this part of the reasons on the basis that it concerned a claim by the company against its own insurer. I agree that what Basten JA said concerns such a claim. Where I disagree with Mr Collins is with his submission that Basten JA's reasoning does not apply to a case where the company does not have any claim or potential claim against its insurer. 28 It is also necessary to refer to Re GPI Leisure Corp Ltd (in liq) (1994) 12 ACLC 815. The liquidator of GPI Leisure alleged that a firm of solicitors was liable to the company for breach of duty. An examination summons was issued to a partner of the firm. He was also required to produce documents which related to the professional indemnity insurance held by the firm. The solicitor applied to have the summons set aside. McLelland CJ in Eq acceded to the application in part. He said (at 817): It is one thing to permit the liquidator to use the process of the Court to compel persons alleged to be liable to [GPI Leisure] to answer questions about the existence of insurance policies which may be available to indemnify such persons in respect of any such liability, and to compel the production of such policies and ancillary documents such as renewal certificates. It is quite another, to permit the liquidator to use such process to compel answers to questions, and to compel the production of documents, in order to conduct an investigation into other matters such as, for example, (a) the merits of any dispute between the insured and the insurer as to whether a policy has been avoided for non-disclosure, or whether conditions of indemnity in the policy have been fulfilled (I should stress that these are hypothetical examples); or (b) confidential disclosures by the insured to the insurer made in order to protect the insured's right to indemnity under a policy (which may not be protected by legal professional privilege). (Citations omitted) 29 Mr Collins said that in Re Southland Coal Pty Ltd (recs & mgrs apptd) (in liq) (2006) 58 ACSR 113 Austin J was in error in holding (as he did at [58]) that the observations of McLelland CJ in Eq in GPI Leisure must be regarded as qualified by Meteyard such that it is permissible, depending on the circumstances, to obtain information in order to investigate the merits of a dispute between insurer and insured, as to whether an insurance policy has been avoided or whether the conditions of indemnity in the policy have been fulfilled on the basis that these are matters which are part of the examinable affairs at least of the insured. In my view, the part of McLelland CJ's decision which I have quoted is in conflict with both Meteyard and Re Interchase and should not be followed. 30 Returning to the exemption to the secrecy obligation (s 6.6.13(2)), it only applies to the giving of evidence or the production of a document in proceedings "relating to a contract of professional indemnity insurance". While the satisfaction of this criterion was in issue, I think there can be no doubt that the proposed examination of Ms Macmillan will deal with the single topic of BRB's insurance policies, claims on those policies and the ability to recover on any claims. This is nothing other than a proceeding which relates to the policies. 31 Next, there is an objection that the documents sought to be produced are wider than may be necessary for a proper determination of the issues which motivated the receivers to bring the summons. There are several respects in which the documents that are sought do travel beyond what is strictly necessary. I have discussed these with counsel and the plaintiffs have agreed to amend the schedule of documents required to be produced. 32 I should add here that the information which the plaintiffs seek to adduce orally from Ms Macmillan travels beyond what they are legitimately entitled to ascertain. For example, BRB's claims history seems to be an irrelevant line of inquiry unless it throws some light on a present denial of liability in respect of a SESI-based claim. I am also concerned about the relevance of the Liability Committee's denial of liability in relation to a claim made on BRB by SESI. But I will leave it to the Registrar before whom the examination will be conducted to consider questions of relevance. 33 Save for the amendments that will be made to the documents schedule (which I will deal with on the papers when the parties provide me with a draft), I will otherwise dismiss Ms Macmillan's application and order her to pay one half of the receivers' costs. I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Finkelstein.
Allstate Explorations NL, Re; Ryan
QBE Insurance Ltd
(1928) 41 CLR 532
(1993) 61 SASR 557
(2004) 137 FCR 209
(1994) 48 FCR 301
(1996) 68 FCR 481
(2005) 65 NSWLR 36
Ms Macmillan's application to set aside the s 596B summons was dismissed except that the summons' document schedule was to be amended; Ms Macmillan ordered to pay one half of the plaintiffs' costs of the interlocutory process (Orders 16 December 2010; Reasons [31]-[33]).