This decision is on an application by Ms Joanne Alexander for orders imposing pecuniary penalties on the second respondent, Mr Jye Owen Sims, on the grounds that he was a person involved in contraventions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ('FW Act') by her former employer, the first respondent Achievement Collective Pty Ltd ('Achievement Collective').
[2]
This what is left of Ms Alexander's claim for underpayment of wages by Achievement Collective, and her application for orders imposing penalties on Achievement Collective, Mr Sims and the third respondent Mr Angkham Phanthapangna for the contraventions of the FW Act related to the alleged underpayment. Mr Sims and Mr Phanthapangna were both at relevant times directors of Achievement Collective.
Achievement Collective was placed into liquidation on 8 July 2025 so no further action against it can be taken in these proceedings.[1] However, the Court did not become aware of this until 8 October 2025 when it was noticed internally during a search of ASIC notices in an unrelated matter. The whole matter had been listed on 8 August 2025 for trial to commence 16 October 2025, along with orders for the filing of affidavits of evidence.
On 8 October 2025 the Court advised the parties that it had become aware of the liquidation of Achievement Collective, but that the trial would proceed as listed on the penalties applications against Mr Sims and Mr Phanthapangna personally.
At the commencement of the trial, counsel for Ms Alexander informed the Court that she had reached a settlement with Mr Phanthapangna, and wished to proceed only against Mr Sims. While the terms of the settlement had been finalised but not yet been completed, counsel for Ms Alexander and counsel for Mr Phanthapangna expressed their confidence that they would be by the end of the day. Counsel for Mr Phanthapangna advised the Court that he did not wish to participate in the proceedings and asked to be excused. She also informed the Court, in response to my inquiry, that Mr Phanthapangna's solicitors had not informed the Court of the liquidation of Achievement Collective, of which he was a director at the time, as they were themselves unaware of it, having not been informed of it by their client.
Ms Alexander's request to proceed rather than adjourn until the next day, which had been set aside, included an issue with her witness being unavailable the next day. As it was by consent of the parties in attendance, I decided to grant that request noting that Mr Phanthapangna had elected not to be heard. Completion of the settlement with Mr Phanthapangna was confirmed the following morning by Ms Alexander filing an application to withdraw in relation Mr Phanthapangna. The further references to him in this decision are for context in the claim against Mr Sims.
Absent from the hearing was Mr Sims. He had been absent from all the pre-trial directions hearings except one held by telephone on 26 June 2025, at which time pre-trial orders were made for the filing and service of affidavits of evidence, and a further directions hearing on 8 August 2025.
Mr Sims did not file any evidence and failed to appear at the 8 August 2025 directions hearing with no communication to the Court or the other parties.
On 8 October 2025 my chambers emailed Mr Sims to confirm that he was aware of the trial listed for 16 October 2025, also confirming that he should contact the Court immediately if there was any reason he could not attend. The email further informed him that if he did not attend then, unless there was a compelling reason otherwise, the Court may determine the matter in his absence.
Mr Sims then replied by email on 13 October 2025 that, in summary, he was suffering ill health that would be aggravated if he were to appear and that he would take responsibility for any wrongdoing found by the Court.
My chambers then responded to him in the following terms:
[3]
Thank you for informing us of your ill health. Her Honour notes that you are not asking for the hearing to be adjourned to await your recovery. However, her Honour is concerned to ensure that you have a fair hearing and that you are aware of the flexibility that the Court may afford to you pursuant to ss 8(b), 8(g) and 32(1) of the South Australian Employment Tribunal Act 2014.
This includes the possibility of you giving your evidence and/or any submissions orally by video-link, only for such time as you require, rather than attending personally for the duration of the hearing. There is also the possibility of you having a support person with you, and of more frequent than usual breaks in the hearing to allow for your rest and recovery.
Do you have any medical evidence of your ill health that you would like the Court to take into account? If so, this would need to be in form of a medical report or records, rather than a simple certificate of sickness.
Please reply to confirm that you have read this email, and also if you would like any of these or other special measures to enable your participation in the hearing of the matter.
[4]
Mr Sims replied by email on 15 October 2025, in summary that he did not think he would ever be well enough to get through the proceedings and that he would respect and accept any decision the Court made. He did not refer to or provide any medical evidence.
While it is a matter for the discretion of the Court, there is relevant authority that for a failure to appear to be excused on medical grounds, medical evidence is required from a qualified medical practitioner confirming that the medical condition is of such a nature or severity that the person is unable to participate in the proceedings.[2]
Accordingly I determined to proceed in Mr Sims' absence, as I considered that the Court had complied with its obligation in s 36(1)(d) of the South Australian Employment Tribunal Act 2014 to take measures that are reasonably practicable to ensure that he had the opportunity in the proceedings to be heard or otherwise have his submissions received.
Ms Alexander's counsel submitted that I could determine her claim summarily, on the grounds that the response filed by Mr Sims was brief and vague, and did not clearly deny the allegations in her application.
I considered that the first paragraph of Mr Sims' Response admitted the allegation at paragraph 6 of Ms Alexander's claim, denied the allegations at paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, but otherwise the document did not respond to the remaining allegations of Ms Alexander's penalty claim. I therefore considered it appropriate to proceed by way of evidence.
At the hearing I admitted into evidence the affidavits of Ms Alexander and her supporting witness Ms Teigan Belik, both dated 3 July 2025 and filed in the Court that same day. In the absence of Mr Sims, there was no challenge to the admission of the affidavits. Ms Alexander gave further brief oral evidence which did not extend beyond what was already in her affidavit.
I accept the evidence given by Ms Alexander and Ms Belik, and otherwise consider the allegations which were not denied as having been admitted by Mr Sims. Rule 23(4) of the South Australian Employment Rules 2024 states "Unless otherwise ordered by the Tribunal, each claim set out in an application and any liability of the respondent to pay any money claimed or give any other form of relief will be taken to be admitted unless specifically denied in a response". In this matter I have discerned no reason why I should order otherwise.
Ms Alexander's penalty claim relates to contraventions of two civil remedy provisions of the FW Act. Firstly, a failure to pay her at the appropriate classification level of the Social, Community, Home Care and Disability Services Industry Award 2010 ('SCHADS Award') for her duties from 6 July 2023 until she stopped work due to a work injury on 11 December 2024, and secondly, an ongoing failure to pay the full amount of employer superannuation throughout the duration of her employment and not at all after March 2023. Both are contraventions of s 45 of the FW Act, with the failure to pay superannuation also a contravention of s 116B of the FW Act from 1 January 2024.
[5]
Achievement Collective was operating as a business which provided support workers to people with disabilities, pursuant to funding that their clients received from the National Disability Insurance Scheme ('NDIS'). A key function of the service was the rostering of support workers who provided care to multiple clients.
Ms Alexander commenced employment with Achievement Collective on 11 May 2022 as a Rostering and Recruitment Officer. At that time the directors of Achievement Collective were Mr Sims and Mr David Hill. Ms Belik was then the Chief Executive Officer. There was at that time no position of General Manager.
Ms Alexander was then promoted to Manager of Service Delivery in May 2023 and her pay increased to pay point 5.1 of the Award, at which time she started reporting directly to Ms Belik.
On 18 May 2023, Mr Hill ceased as a director and left the company. On the same day, Mr Phanthapangna became a director.[3]
In mid 2023, Achievement Collective expanded its operations to Sydney. Ms Alexander flew to Sydney to teach the new NSW state manager the operations of the business systems, and to meet with Mr Sims.
In an airport lounge at Sydney airport awaiting their return flight to Adelaide, Mr Sims offered Ms Alexander promotion to General Manager as the new structure could not have a state manager reporting to the Manager of Service Delivery. Mr Sims told her that "the business could not afford to change [her] pay just yet but that it would in the coming weeks"[4].
After she immediately accepted the offer of promotion, Mr Sims telephoned Mr Phanthapangna in her presence and told him that she had accepted. He also told her that he would get Ms Belik to organise a contract and that they would wait until the contract was signed before her pay increased. Her promotion was announced to staff by the end of that same week.
Ms Alexander spoke with Ms Belik about the new contract, who said she would prepare one as soon as Mr Sims approved it.
Although Ms Alexander commenced her new duties as General Manager immediately, the promised contract did not appear nor did the promised pay increase. On her evidence, which I accept, she raised the issue with Ms Belik over the remainder of 2023, with the response by Ms Belik that she could not prepare it without Mr Sims' approval. Throughout this time Ms Alexander was also reporting to Mr Sims and to Mr Phanthapangna.
In her affidavit Ms Belik confirms that Ms Alexander was working as the General Manager and performing the duties that she claimed. Those duties fall squarely within the criteria for pay point 7.1 of the Award.
Ms Alexander made further specific enquiries of Mr Sims about her pay rate on 9 April 2024, 11 June 2024, and then by email on 30 September 2024 to which Mr Sims replied on the same day "Not a problem, just make the pay increase as of the past pay period." However, there was no supporting instruction from him to the human resources area and the increase was not actioned.
Mr Sims then abruptly left the business and ceased as a director of Achievement Collective on 25 November 2024.
Mr Phanthapangna had ceased as a director on 24 January 2024, and then resumed on 4 October 2024.
Meanwhile, Achievement Collective was not paying employee superannuation as it was obliged to do by cl 23.1 of the Award and, from 1 January 2024, also by s 116B of the FW Act.
Ms Alexander's unchallenged claim is that no employer superannuation was paid on her behalf from March 2023, and that the non-payment of superannuation was across the Achievement Collective workforce.
She and Ms Belik were receiving complaints from staff, some of whom were approaching retirement. This included around 90 support workers, along with a handful of support coordinators and recovery coordinators.
However, Mr Sims refused to put out any statement to staff in relation to the issue until the directors received penalty notices from the Australian Taxation Office. At that point, Ms Belik and Ms Alexander drafted a statement for Mr Sims which he "eventually approved and sent out."
[6]
Accepting the evidence of Ms Alexander and Ms Belik, I find that Ms Alexander was entitled to be paid at pay point 7.1 of the Award from 6 July 2023 and ongoing for the remainder of her employment with Achievement Collective. As it was unchallenged, I accept her calculations in her claim of the amount owed being $22,920.93.
In relation to the non-payment of employer superannuation, Ms Alexander's calculations are that the amount due on what she was actually paid in salary was $15,096.93, with the additional amount due on the underpayment being $2,625.91. I accept that Achievement Collective was obliged to make those payments, did not make those payments and the shortfall is that calculated by Ms Alexander.
Given the liquidation of Achievement Collective, I am unable to make any order for the payment of these amounts by it to Ms Alexander[5]. The relevance in these proceedings is to the liability of Mr Sims for the imposition of pecuniary penalties, which can only arise if I find that he was a person involved in a contravention pursuant to s 550 of the FW Act. Consequently that exercise first involves finding that there was, as alleged, a contravention by the employer, whether that employer is a party to the proceedings or not.
[7]
Is Mr Sims liable as a person involved in the contraventions?
[8]
Ms Alexander has claimed that the contraventions by Achievement Collective should be found to be serious contraventions as defined in s 557A of the FW Act. And further, that Mr Sims should be found to be liable for those serious contraventions as person involved in them.
Section 550 of the Act provides that a person who is involved in contravening the Act is also liable for that contravention, in the following terms:
[9]
550 Involvement in contravention treated in same way as actual contravention
[10]
(1) A person who is involved in a contravention of a civil remedy provision is taken to have contravened that provision.
[11]
Note: If a person (the involved person) is taken under this subsection to have contravened a civil remedy provision, the involved person's contravention may be a serious contravention (see subsection 557A(5A)). Serious contraventions attract higher maximum penalties (see subsection 529(2)).
[12]
(2) A person is involved in a contravention of a civil remedy provision if, and only if, the person:
(a) has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention; or
(b) has induced the contravention, whether by threats or promises or otherwise; or
(c) has been in any way, by act or omission, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in or party to the contravention; or
(d) has conspired with others to effect the contravention.
[13]
Although Achievement Collective had a CEO in Ms Belik, Ms Alexander's evidence is Mr Sims was actively involved in the running of the business such that she reported to him as well as the CEO in her role as general manager, and that it was Mr Sims who made the decisions of which she complains.
Although she also reported to Mr Phanthapangna for part of the relevant period, her evidence was that it was Mr Sims who appointed her to the position of General Manager and personally promised her the pay increase to reflect that role. It was Mr Sims who failed to direct Ms Belik to draft a contract and increase Ms Alexander's pay rate in accordance with that promise and her increased responsibilities.
I accept Ms Alexander's evidence that she repeatedly raised this failure to increase her pay with Mr Sims until his reply to her email on 30 September 2024 that she could increase her pay rate from the next pay period. This response did not acknowledge any entitlement to back pay for the preceding 15 months, and he further failed to approve what he promised in that email before he left the business and the company less than two months later.
Accordingly, I find that his conduct in relation to the breach of Award pay provisions falls within the criteria in s 550(2)(c), that of being directly and knowingly involved by act and omission in that contravention.
In relation to the non-payment of Ms Alexander's superannuation, I accept her evidence that Mr Sims was aware of the non-payment in relation to herself and staff generally, that he resisted any communication to staff about that ongoing non-payment and failed, when it was within his knowledge and power as a director, to rectify that non-payment in relation to Ms Alexander. I have no evidence in relation to any rectification for other staff and no claim from them.
Accordingly, I find that his conduct in relation to the breach of Award superannuation requirements and s 116B of the FW Act the criteria in s 550(2)(c) of being involved in that contravention.
[14]
Section 557A(1) of the FW Act currently provides that a contravention is a serious contravention if the person knowingly contravened the provision or the person was reckless as to whether the contravention would occur. It was amended from its previous form on 26 February 2024.
By reference to the criteria in operation up to 26 February 2024, this involves being satisfied that the principal contravener knowingly contravened the provision and that it was part of a systematic pattern of conduct. After 26 February 2024, I must be satisfied that it either knew or was reckless as to whether the contravention would occur.
A corporation knowingly contravenes a provision if it expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised the contravention.[6] It does not require knowledge that such conduct would be a serious contravention.
This criteria refers to the principal contravener, which in this case is the employer, Achievement Collective. On the evidence I have no difficulty in characterising the contraventions by Achievement Collective as serious contraventions.
However, s 557A(5A) establishes that the criteria for liability for a serious contravention is narrower for a person involved pursuant to s 550. It says:
[15]
(5A) Involvement in a serious contravention. A person (the involved person) who is involved in a contravention of a civil remedy provision by another person (the principal) commits a serious contravention only if:
[16]
(a) The principal's contravention was a serious contravention; and
(b) The involved person knew that the principal's contravention was a serious contravention.
[17]
To find Mr Sims personally liable for a serious contravention, I would need to be satisfied that he knew the contravention was a serious contravention. I could only reach that level of satisfaction by considering evidence as to his state of knowledge.
In this case, I have no evidence from Mr Sims himself and the evidence of Ms Alexander and Ms Belik does not refer to any correspondence, communication or other action or conduct which objectively supports a finding that he had that knowledge. For example, if there had been evidence that someone had raised with him that his failures to pay Ms Alexander her award rate and her superannuation were serious contraventions, that may support a conclusion that he knew. However, I have no evidence upon which to make such an inference.
Therefore, it is only open to me to find that Mr Sims is liable in the ordinary sense for the contraventions in which he was involved.
[18]
The Federal Court, the Federal Circuit Court and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) or an eligible State or Territory court may, on application, order a person to pay a pecuniary penalty that the court considers is appropriate if the court is satisfied that the person has contravened a civil remedy provision.
[19]
By the use of the word 'may', the provision establishes that whether to order penalties, and if so, in which amount, is an exercise of discretion by the Court. This is subject to the maximum limits which s 546(2) directs are those referred to in s 539 of the FW Act, and that the maximum penalty for a corporate body is five times that for a natural person.
Section 539 of the FW Act identifies the maximum penalties that may be ordered in relation to each contravention of each civil remedy provision.
The maximum penalties, in relation to contraventions in this matter of ss 45 and 116B are up to 60 penalty units for each contravention by a natural person which is not a serious contravention. Penalties for serious contraventions are up to 600 penalty units.
For the contraventions in this matter which occurred between 1 July 2023 and 6 November 2024, the applicable amount per penalty unit is $313, while for contraventions committed on or after 7 November 2024 the applicable amount per penalty unit is $330.[7]
This means that for a contravention occurring between 1 July 2023 and 6 November 2024 the maximum is $18,780 for a natural person. For a contravention occurring on or after 7 November 2024 the maximum is $19,800 for a natural person.
[20]
For the purposes of penalties, s 557(1) of the FW Act provides that where multiple contraventions are committed by the same person and arise out of the same course of conduct, they will be taken to constitute a single contravention:
[21]
557 Course of conduct
(1) For the purposes of this Part, 2 or more contravention of a civil remedy provision referred to in subsection (2) are, subject to subsection (3) taken to constitute a single contravention if:
(a) the contraventions are committed by the same person; and
(b) the contraventions arose out of a course of conduct by the person.
[22]
Subsection (2) relevantly includes the contraventions that I have found in this matter.
In relation to the breach of the Award cl 15.7 obligation to pay Ms Alexander at pay point 7.1, the further obligation arising from cl 24.1 of the Award was to pay that rate in each pay cycle being either weekly, fortnightly or monthly. Therefore, there was a breach of that obligation on each payday that it was not paid.
Those multiple failures to pay on each pay day were all the result of a course of conduct by Mr Sims of his ongoing failure to authorise payment by Achievement Collective at the appropriate level. Consequently, they are considered to be a single contravention for the purposes of imposing penalty.
Likewise, the obligation to pay employer superannuation on behalf of Ms Alexander was an obligation arising from the Superannuation Guarantee Administration Act 1992 to pay those contributions to her nominated superannuation fund on a quarterly basis. While each missed quarterly payment was a breach of the Award and, after 1 January 2024 also a breach of s 116B of the FW Act, it was the result of the ongoing failure of Mr Sims to ensure that those payments were made by Achievement Collective as legally required. As such it was a course of conduct by Mr Sims and also considered to be a single contravention for the purposes of imposing penalty.
[23]
The purpose of the civil penalty provisions is deterrence. This includes both specific deterrence, which is directed to the person who has contravened the Act, and general deterrence which is directed generally to persons (both corporate and natural) who employ others. The goal of these provisions is to discourage both the person who has engaged in the contravening conduct and others generally from engaging in similar conduct in the future. This was confirmed by the High Court of Australia in Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Pattinson,[8] ('Pattinson').
The penalties should be sufficiently high to make similar conduct in the future an economically irrational choice. The penalty may be greater or lesser than any amounts owed through the contravention. Proportionality in the imposition of civil penalties is the balance between what is necessary for deterrence and what might be considered oppressive.
Considerations relevant to sentencing for criminal offences, such as punishment and retribution have no role to pay. Considerations such as contrition, restitution and rehabilitation may be relevant to the extent that they inform the need for specific deterrence. That is, if the person has shown contrition and rehabilitation, a court may consider whether the likelihood of them behaving in a similar way in future is lower and warrants a smaller penalty.
About the exercise of the discretion, a helpful summary was provided by Colvin J in Fair Work Ombudsman v Spotless Services Australia Ltd (No 2):
[24]
The Court has a broad discretion when assessing pecuniary civil penalties to be imposed under the Act. Assessment of the appropriate amount requires an instinctive synthesis of the considerations relevant to penalty to arrive at a single result: The required process of assessment is evaluative, not mathematical: Factors that may be relevant have been listed in the decided cases, but such lists should not be approached as a checklist. [9]
(references omitted)
[25]
Some of those other factors include the nature and extent of the conduct; the circumstances of the conduct; the nature and extent of the loss; whether there was similar previous conduct; the size of the enterprise; whether the breaches were deliberate; whether senior management was involved; whether there had been contrition, corrective action and cooperation; the need to enforce compliance with minimum standards; and weighing the indicia[10].
These are factors which were considered prior to the decision of the High Court in Pattinson, and so may be relevant insofar as they inform the Court's consideration of the need for specific and general deterrence.
In this matter, the ongoing failure to pay the appropriate Award rate for the duties of the promotional position that Mr Sims personally appointed Ms Alexander to is a serious matter, and it continued for more than a year. Likewise the failure to pay employer superannuation, ongoing from March 2023. Given the Award pay issue was raised with him by Ms Alexander on several occasions, and the superannuation issue by both Ms Alexander and Ms Belik, I conclude that these failures were deliberate decisions and not a matter of oversight, administrative or otherwise. As one of the directors for much of the relevant period, and sole director for most of 2024, actively involved in the business, he was a senior manager of the organisation responsible for paying her at the appropriate rate, both in terms of wages and superannuation.
There has been no corrective action. While Mr Sims' departure from Achievement Collective meant that he no longer had any decision making power in relation to her employment after 25 November 2024, it was open to him to show contrition by way of an apology, which he did not offer. While Mr Sims has claimed ill health, his lack of communication with the Court or the parties and his absence throughout almost the entire proceedings without providing evidence of such incapacity indicates a lack of cooperation.
Ms Alexander has suffered a loss of the income to which she was entitled through her employment, amounting in total to $40,653.20, along with the interest and earnings that she could have obtained on those amounts. With the liquidation of Achievement Collective, there is no knowing how much she might ever recover of this loss, if anything at all.
Although I take into account the seriousness of the consequences for Ms Alexander of the contraventions, I note that the imposition of penalties is not and is not intended to be compensatory in nature. I note the consequences for her in recognition of the purpose of the provisions of the Act which have been breached, which is for the protection and benefit of employees.
I have no evidence of Mr Sims' current or likely future involvement in employing people. In relation to specific deterrence, I can only take into account his past conduct of which I do have evidence. While past conduct is not always a reliable indicator of future conduct, in this case it is all that I have to go on.
In relation to general deterrence, employers generally must understand the importance of paying their employees appropriately for the work that they do, and on time. Employees may be assumed to rely on their wages for their expenses of daily living and on their superannuation for a retirement income that meets their needs.
This is why the parliament has seen fit to introduce a regime of financial penalties on employers and persons involved who do not comply with those obligations to employees. The FW Act intends that there be personal financial consequences for those making decisions which deprive employees of their entitlements.
[26]
I find that Mr Sims is liable as a person involved the following contraventions of s45 and s116B by Achievement Collective, being civil remedy provisions of the FW Act:
80.1. Contravention of s 45 of the FW Act by failing to a comply with the SCHADS Award:
80.1.1. Between 6 July 2023 and 25 November 2024 failing to pay Ms Alexander at pay point 7.1 in accordance with cl 15.7;
80.1.2. Between 6 July 2023 and 25 November 2024 failing to pay Ms Alexander the full amount of her wages each pay cycle in accordance with cl 24.1;
80.1.3. Between March 2023 and 25 November 2024 failing to pay to Ms Alexander's nominated fund her employer superannuation contributions in accordance with cl 23.2.
80.2. Contravention of s 116B of the FW Act by failing to pay to Ms Alexander's nominated fund her employer superannuation contributions as required by that provision between 1 January 2024 and 25 November 2024.
In relation to the wages contraventions of the Award, as these were considered each to be a single contravention I take the last date of liability as the relevant date for the purposes of the maximum penalty. For the date of 25 November 2024, being the date that Mr Sims ceased to be a director of Achievement Collective, that amount is $19,800.
As the failure to pay at the rate stipulated in cl 15.7 and at the frequency stipulated in cl 24.1 arise from the same conduct of paying a lesser amount than that to which she was entitled in her regular pay, I consider it appropriate to impose one penalty in relation to both breaches of the Award. I consider the seriousness of these contraventions to warrant a penalty of 65% of the maximum for a single contravention, being $12,870.
In relation to the superannuation contraventions, as they are considered a single contravention, I adopt the same last date of liability. I also take this contravention to be a single contravention of both ss 45 and 116B of the FW Act, being the same conduct in breach of two different provisions. However, I consider the failure to pay any contributions to Ms Alexander's superannuation fund to be more serious than the wages contravention. It was a complete failure to pay rather than an underpayment. It has also deprived Ms Alexander of the investment earnings that her fund could have obtained for her and compound earnings into the future.
For these reasons I consider the seriousness of the superannuation contravention to warrant a penalty of 90% of the maximum, being $17,820.
I consider the total of $30,690 does not require adjustment. As a personal penalty for the contraventions found, it is sufficient in my view to meet the requirements of general and specific deterrence without being oppressive.
There is no reason to depart from the usual order that the penalties be paid to the party which has successfully applied for them.[11]
[27]
The Second Respondent, Mr Jye Owen Sims, is to pay the applicant, Ms Joanne Alexander, the pecuniary penalty of $12,870 for contravention of s 45 of the Fair Work Act 2009, being breaches of cls 15.7 and 24.1 of the Social, Community, Home Care and Disability Services Industry Award 2010 between 6 July 2023 and 25 November 2024.
The Second Respondent, Mr Jye Owen Sims, is to pay the applicant, Ms Joanne Alexander, the pecuniary penalty of $17,820 for contravention of s 45 of the Fair Work Act 2009, being breach of cl 23.2 of the Social, Community, Home Care and Disability Services Industry Award 2010 between 31 March 2023 and 25 November 2024 and of s 116B of the Fair Work 2009 from 1 January 2024 to 25 November 2024.
The total of these penalties, being $30,690, is to be paid within 14 days of the date of this order.
[28]
[1]Section 500(2) of Corporations Act 2001 prohibits proceeding with or commencing an action or civil proceeding without leave of the Court. The reference to the Court in this section is defined by s58AA which does not include the South Australian Employment Court.