Factors relevant to the exercise of discretion under section 440D
47 The discretion conferred under s 440D is broad but must be exercised with the object of Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act in mind. In Larkden Pty Ltd v Lloyd Energy Systems Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1305; 285 ALR 207 Hammerschlag J at [37]-[39] said:
The policy underlying Pt 5.3A, as evinced by s 435A, is to maximise the chances of the beleaguered company staying alive.
The stay of proceedings imposed by s 440D may facilitate the achievement of this object, amongst others, by
(a) affording the administrator time to assess and report on the company without the distraction of the proceedings;
(b) putting a brake on legal and associated costs;
(c) allowing time for the development of proposals which might preserve the value of the company as a going concern;
(d) giving the creditors time to consider their position for the purposes of the creditors' meeting; and
(e) in appropriate circumstances, preventing a creditor from obtaining some advantage over other creditors or potential creditors.
Whilst the discretion under s 440D must be exercised with the objects of the Part in mind, it remains one at large. A stay is the starting point. There must be circumstances which warrant its displacement.
(emphasis added)
48 In Hopkins v AECOM Australia Pty Ltd & Ors [2012] FCA 1204; 91 ACSR 391 Nicholas J adopted some factors, or indicia, that might commonly be considered in the exercise of the discretion under s 440D, which had been helpfully distilled from earlier authorities by Tobias JA (with whom Beazley and Giles JJA agreed) in Attard v James Legal Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 311; 80 ACSR 585. Justice Nicholas stated at [20]:
In Attard v James Legal Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 311 the New South Wales Court of Appeal identified a number of factors relevant to the question of whether leave to proceed should be granted under s 440D. In that case Tobias JA (with whom Beazley and Giles JJA agreed) said (at para [146]-[147]):
[146] More recently, Rein AJ (as his Honour then was) summarised in J F Keir Pty Ltd v Priority Management Systems Pty Ltd (admin apptd) [2007] NSWSC 748 at [8] the factors to be taken into account in respect of an application for leave under s 444E(3):
• whether the claim has a solid foundation and gives rise to a serious dispute: Vagrand Pty Ltd (in liq) v Fielding (1993) 41 FCR 550;
• whether the administrator would be unreasonably distracted from his or her statutory duties and be obliged unnecessarily to incur substantial legal costs: Foxcroft v Ink Group Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACLC 1063; J & B Records v Brashs Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACLC 534; Pioneer Water Tanks (Aust 94) Pty Ltd v Delat Pty Ltd (1998) 16 ACLC 36; Slater v Global Finance Group Pty Ltd (1999) 150 FLR 264;
• whether the company is insured against the liability that is the subject of the proceedings: Foxcroft v The Ink Group Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACLC 1063;
• who appointed the administrator: Wallabah Pty Ltd v Navillo Pty Ltd (1997) 15 ACLC 396;
• whether the applicant will suffer any disadvantage if leave is not granted: J & B Records v Brashs Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACLC 534; Wallabah Pty Ltd v Navillo Pty Ltd (1997) 15 ACLC 396;
• whether there are good reasons for allowing a creditor to depart from the general intention of Pt 5.3A, which is that a creditor ought not be able to take action against the company in such circumstances: Foxcroft v The Ink Group Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACLC 1063; Re Grenadier Constructions No 2 Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACLC 460.
[147] To these factors may be added the following:
• who is applying for leave: Wallabah Pty Ltd v Navillo Pty Ltd (1997) 15 ACLC 396; BBC Hardware Ltd v GT Homes Pty Ltd [1997] 2 Qd R 123;
• what funds the company has available to defend against litigation: Wallabah Pty Ltd v Navillo Pty Ltd (1997) 15 ACLC 396.
49 In Wallabah Pty Ltd v Navillo Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 142; 15 ACLC 396; 23 ACSR 444 Olney J at 446 said:
Each of ss 440D and 440J gives the Court a discretion which it is required to exercise judicially and upon the merits of each individual case. In so doing the Court must have regard to the general legislative policy of the statute and to the specific provisions of the sections under consideration. Each case will of course have to be determined upon its own facts.
(emphasis added)
50 While the identification from earlier authorities of factors that are relevant to the discretion is of assistance when considering the exercise of the discretion in a particular case, I respectfully agree with what was said by Olney J referred to above, namely that each case will have to be determined on its own facts. I should add that I do not regard what was said by Tobias JA in Attard as suggesting the contrary. Judges and lawyers alike benefit from the industry of judges, like Tobias JA, who make the effort to distil from the normal distribution of myriad facts and circumstances some common or recurring themes and factors relevant to the exercise of a discretionary power. But it would be wrong to seize upon a particular verbal formulation used by the judge as if it were intended, much less had the effect, of constraining the proper judicial exercise of the discretion in a later case. Senvion submitted that the consideration of disadvantage to the applicant must be shown by the applicant (whatever disadvantage it might be) to be disadvantage it will suffer. I disagree. Although Tobias JA expressed this factor literally in terms that the applicant "will" suffer a disadvantage, his Honour's discussion of commonly accepted criteria should not in my opinion be construed as suggesting that the applicant must establish such disadvantage to any particular degree of likelihood. Indeed, such a construction would be contrary to the first factor identified in Attard, namely that the proceeding has a "solid foundation".
51 The extent to which the litigation in question will disrupt, cause inconvenience, cost or delay to the work of the administrator or liquidator, or in this case the process of reconstruction pursuant to the debtor-in-possession regime applicable under German Insolvency Code, will necessarily be an important factor having regard to the object of Part 5.3A referred to above. In many cases, several of the established factors identified in Attard will assist in informing the exercise of the discretion. But depending upon the facts of the particular case, some will be demonstrably more significant than others and some may not apply at all.
52 In the present case there are two factors of particular weight to the exercise of the discretion under s 440D. The first is the nature of the claim by the Pacific Hydro Entities in the Supreme Court Proceeding. The second is the peculiar vulnerability of the Pacific Hydro Entities to Senvion in the day to day operations of their wind farms.
53 Turning to the first of the above factors, in paragraph 28 of their written submissions as to final relief, the Pacific Hydro Entities submitted that:
The Pacific Hydro Entities seek to enforce a contractual right that is of a proprietary, or at least an "essentially proprietary", nature. The Access Devices are a part of - and are necessary for the Pacific Hydro Entities' use and enjoyment of - their property constituting the wind farms. …
(emphasis in original)
54 The Supreme Court Proceeding was instituted by Originating motion. Senvion submitted that the bases for the claim to a proprietary interest in the Access Devices has not been clearly formulated. There is force in that submission. However, in my view there is sufficient foundation for the claim to a proprietary interest to give rise to a serious dispute as to this question. If the Pacific Hydro Entities were successful in their claim to having a proprietary interest in the Access Devices, the likely result is that property in the Access Devices would fall outside of the Senvion's property and the Pacific Hydro Entities' claim for recovery of them would not offend the object of Part 5.3A. In Beconwood Securities Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2009] FCA 131 at [7] Finkelstein J said:
…where the plaintiff is claiming his own property from a company in liquidation, leave to proceed is granted as a matter of course.
55 In my view, notwithstanding the presently imprecise formulation of their claim to a proprietary interest, the Pacific Hydro Entities should be allowed to advance their proprietary claims.
56 I turn now to the second principal factor, namely the likely hardship that may be suffered by the Pacific Hydro Entities if they were prevented from continuing the Supreme Court Proceeding. As I have said above, the Pacific Hydro Entities are peculiarly vulnerable in the day to day operations of their businesses to Senvion. This vulnerability arises fundamentally from the fact that Senvion alone is in possession of the Access Devices necessary to remotely monitor and, if need be, restart the wind turbines. The practical consequences for the Pacific Hydro Entities arising from its dependence upon Senvion are explained in an affidavit of Mr Cesar Eduardo Salvatierra Seguel affirmed on 19 August 2019. Mr Seguel is the Executive Manager, Operations of Pacific Hydro Pty Ltd. He deposes that there are 127 wind turbines spread across the wind farms, comprising of 39 turbines at the Crowlands Wind Farm, 74 turbines associated with the Portland Wind Energy Project situated at Cape Bridgewater, Cape Nelson South, Cape Sir William Grant and Cape Nelson, and 14 wind turbines associated with the Yaloak South Wind Farm.
57 Mr Seguel deposes that a number of requests have been made for the Access Devices but those requests have not been responded to.
58 In paragraph 27 of his affidavit, Mr Seguel says:
In the most extreme case, if there were to be an external event which caused or required a shutdown of an entire Wind Farm, and the Pacific Hydro Entities did not have access to the passwords, the entire Wind Farm would remain non-operational indefinitely, unless and until the passwords could be obtained.
59 The Pacific Hydro Entities claim that the passwords are within the definition of Access Devices in the Maintenance Agreements. The definition of Access Devices referred to in clause 26(c) extracted in paragraph [32] above refers to such keys, passwords, user names, access codes and similar access devices required or used to provide Maintenance Services. Maintenance Services are defined in clause 1 of the Maintenance Agreements as:
Maintenance Services means:
(a) Scheduled Maintenance of the Assets;
(b) all Remedial Maintenance of the Assets;
(c) remote 24/7 monitoring of the Assets; and
(d) the performance of all Assets operations required in order for the Supplier to perform the Scheduled Maintenance and Remedial Maintenance of the Assets (including, but not limited to, starting, stopping and resetting Wind Turbines both at Site and remotely),
each in accordance with and as further set out in the terms of this Maintenance Agreement.
60 The Pacific Hydro Entities claim that they are entitled to delivery up of the Access Devices as defined reading clause 26(c) together with the definition of Maintenance Services. Even if the claim to a proprietary interest in the Access Devices was to be characterised as a weak claim, about which I express no view, there is plainly a serious question concerning the Pacific Hydro Entities' contractual entitlements under the Maintenance Agreements. The dependence of the Pacific Hydro Entities' upon Senvion, in my view alone warrants the grant of leave to proceed under s 440D.
61 The vulnerability of the Pacific Hydro Entities to Senvion is not practically ameliorated by the Interim Arrangements in respect of the Retained Items, save only for the purpose of preserving the status quo for the interim period. The proposed Interim Service Agreement also does not ameliorate the Pacific Hydro Entities' vulnerability to Senvion. My conclusion in this regard is fortified by the fact that Senvion has elected pursuant to s 103 of the German Insolvency Code not to perform its obligations under and pursuant to the Maintenance Agreements. Presently, notwithstanding Senvion's election not to perform the Maintenance Agreements, it has indicated a willingness to provide what it claims to be like services under the proposed Interim Services Agreements. The Pacific Hydro Entities have not accepted the offer to enter into the Interim Services Agreements and in submissions expressed dissatisfaction with some of their terms. It is unnecessary to compare the proposed Interim Services Agreements' terms with the terms of the Maintenance Agreements, as the latter are concluded and binding agreements, albeit that they are not presently enforceable under German Law according to Dr Wolf's opinion. Senvion's offer to enter into Interim Services Agreements begs the question in issue in the Supreme Court Proceeding, namely, whether the Pacific Hydro Entities' claims for delivery up of the Access Devices should be accepted.
62 Further, negotiations for the sale of Senvion's business in Australia to a third party are currently ongoing. In the absence of the continuation of the Supreme Court Proceeding, being the process by which the Pacific Hydro Entities may either vindicate their claims to a proprietary interest in the Access Devices or enforceable contractual rights to them, it is self-evident that the bargaining position of the Pacific Hydro Entities would be severely weakened in relation to any negotiations with Senvion concerning any Interim Services Agreements, as well as any negotiations with a third party purchaser concerning the terms of any new maintenance agreements. Indeed, if the Supreme Court Proceeding were not permitted to continue, having regard to the critical significance of the Access Devices to the day to day operations of the wind farms, it is conceivable that the Pacific Hydro Entities would be left in a position of having no practical choice but to agree to terms put to them by Senvion, or by a prospective purchaser of the relevant Senvion business, or else suffer the risk that the operation of the wind farms may be interrupted without the ability to restart the turbines.
63 There were other factors in relation to potential disadvantage raised by the Pacific Hydro Entities. They contended that they would potentially be unable to comply with reporting and regulatory requirements if the Maintenance Services currently performed by Senvion were not continued and they were not in a position themselves to perform those activities or contract with others to do so. In view of the conclusions I have reached concerning the clear disadvantage that may be suffered if leave is not given to continue with the Supreme Court Proceeding, it is unnecessary for me to say anything more about that or other aspects of potential disadvantage to the Pacific Hydro Entities if leave were not given to continue the Supreme Court Proceeding.