The Deputy Commissioner's application for costs
16 At the hearing for handing down Senvion No 2 the present dispute about costs was raised by counsel. Counsel for the Deputy Commissioner in particular made submissions in support of its costs being awarded. I said as follows:
HIS HONOUR: Well, let me tell you, I don't propose to hear any argument as to costs today. If you want to press costs, you can put some submissions in writing, but let me say this. In relation to the application that was contested, Senvion was successful in connection with its application for recognition, but unsuccessful in its opposition to the application for leave to proceed. The Pacific Hydro Entities, on the other hand, were successful in their application for leave to proceed; unsuccessful in their application to alter the scope of the stay, rather than being given leave to proceed under section 440D. So I would call that, in a sense, a draw. Now, if you want to try and persuade me to the contrary, I will read what you put in writing, and if you are going to do so, you should consider also that this is not normal inter parties litigation where you have a clearly successful or unsuccessful plaintiff or defendant as the case may be. Senvion needed to seek recognition of the proceeding, as was its right, but needed to move the court.
The Pacific Hydro entities, if they were to continue with their proceeding, needed to either obtain a carve-out of the stay provision or obtain leave to proceed. So this was a case on both sides where there was a legal reason to move the court in the interests of the party moving the court. Now, it seems to me in those circumstances and where each party has been partially successful and partially unsuccessful, my inclination, unless you give me compelling reasons to the contrary, would be to make no order as to costs.
17 In relation to the Deputy Commissioner's potential application for costs, I said:
HIS HONOUR: Mr Bender, it is an odd circumstance, it seems to me, that an intervening party, who was given leave to intervene, was put on an interlocutory process, but then for whatever reason I haven't been informed of, and I'm not expecting to be told why, but took no part in the substantive application, it is of some surprise to me that we're now going to have an argument about costs. I would have thought that's something that would and should been resolved as part of whatever discussions occurred that led to the abandonment of any substantive argument so far as the Commissioner's position was concerned.
18 I directed that all parties wishing to disturb the presumptive position that costs lie where they fall, file and serve written submissions and other material and that the application would be determined on the papers. The Deputy Commissioner did so, and Senvion filed material in response.
19 The Court has a broad discretion under s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) to award costs. The Deputy Commissioner accepted that costs typically follow the event, however noted that the Court's broad discretion extends to making no order for costs in favour of a successful litigant: see Coombes v Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations (No 2) [2008] FCA 1078 at [29]; Donald Campbell & Co v Pollack [1927] AC 732 at 810-812.
20 The Deputy Commissioner submitted that the general principle that costs follow the event may be modified or displaced where there is conduct on the part of the successful party in relation to the conduct of the litigation that would justify a different outcome: Northern Territory v Sangare [2019] HCA 25; 265 CLR 164; 93 ALJR 959; 372 ALR 117 at [25]. This was said to be exemplified in the following cases:
Where the litigant has not succeeded on the merits of his case but for other reasons, for example, on a technicality: see Williamson v Bors (1900) 21 LR (NSW) Eq 302;
Where there is conduct which induced the other party to the litigation to believe that they had a good cause of action: Coombes v Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations (No 2) [2008] FCA 1078 at [29]; Northern Territory v Sangare [2019] HCA 25 at [25] and the cases cited therein; and
Where a party has facilitated the loss of the opportunity to expeditiously dispose of the case, for example, where a party could have made an amendment to their case earlier and if the other party has invested costs in the action prior to the amendment, or the other party may well have taken a different view of their stance in the proceeding if the amendment had been made earlier: Barry Edward and Thelma June Harrington v Greenwood Grove Estate Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2011] NSWSC 1598 at [8]-[14]; Bonic v Pacific General Securities Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1221 at [14]; Capolingua v Phylum Pty Ltd (1991) WAR 137; Smith v Gould (No 2) [2012] VSC 541 at [11].
21 The Deputy Commissioner's submissions amount, in effect, to an assertion that Senvion did not 'succeed' in respect of its application against the Deputy Commissioner, and that in any event Senvion should be ordered to pay costs otherwise. This submission was founded upon the following propositions as follows:
Senvion's Originating Process was made on the basis of, inter alia, Arts 20-22;
The Deputy Commissioner's application took as its "key jurisdictional foundation" relief under Art 22, which requires an order being made under Art 21;
On this basis, the Deputy Commissioner filed material in support of its application and correspondingly incurred costs;
Senvion notified the Deputy Commissioner and the Court that it would not be pressing for relief under Art 21 in September after receipt of the Deputy Commissioner's submissions;
Senvion has not formally withdrawn its prayer for relief sought under Art 21, and nor has it formally sought leave to amend its Originating Process (and such amendment the Deputy Commissioner would have opposed);
There has been no hearing on the merits of the Deputy Commissioner's application;
Taking the above in combination, the Deputy Commissioner's application was withdrawn "based on a technicality" and costs should not follow the event in the usual way.
22 Before considering the substance, I note that Senvion did seek to formally amend its Originating Process orally in the course of the hearing of the application on 7 October 2019. I granted it leave to do so, the Deputy Commissioner having by this point withdrawn his application and not appearing at the hearing.
23 The Deputy Commissioner's submissions were premised on his characterisation of the application as one taking Arts 21 and 22 as its "key jurisdictional foundation". Though it is true that the majority of the relief sought did fall under this Article, relief was also sought under Arts 6 and 20 of the Model Law. Senvion's decision not to press relief sought under Art 21 did not preclude the Deputy Commissioner continuing with its application for relief under Arts 6 and 20.
24 The Deputy Commissioner's submissions characterised the relief under Art 20 as being sought "merely as a matter of clarification out of an abundance of caution", and that the Art 21 relief was the "core" of his application. However, the Deputy Commissioner nonetheless elected not to continue his application for that relief. In relation to the Deputy Commissioner's contention that he would have opposed any application to amend the Originating Process, it was open to the Deputy Commissioner to continue to press his application pending an application by Senvion to amend its Originating Process, but he did not do so.
25 A further factor which influences the exercise of my discretion is the difficulty conceiving what Senvion could have done differently in the circumstances. Senvion needed to apply for recognition. It was not seeking this relief against the Deputy Commissioner, but rather recognition of the foreign insolvency. Senvion had no choice but to seek recognition. The Deputy Commissioner on the other hand intervened to best secure his interests. The Deputy Commissioner's original interlocutory application sought relief from the consequences of Article 21.
26 In my view, both Senvion and the Deputy Commissioner acted reasonably to protect their respective interests. Having regard also to the nature of Senvion's application, the fairest outcome on the question of costs is that they should lie where they fall. Accordingly, I reject the Deputy Commissioner's application for costs. Although the Deputy Commissioner has been unsuccessful in his application for costs, it was not unreasonable for him to make the application, and consistent with the exercise of my discretion in relation to the principal application, I propose to make no order for costs in connection with this application.