1. The Applicant gave evidence and answered questions by the Minister. He called three lay witnesses who appeared, in person, by video or telephone.
2. In deciding the application, I have also considered:

(a) a Hearing Bundle labelled HB1-HB621, comprised of 621 pages and filed with the Tribunal on 21 October 2025 ('Exhibit 1'), which includes the Applicant's written submissions, the Minister's Statements of Facts, Issues and Contentions ('SOFIC'), and the Applicant's evidence;[4] and

(b) the parties' oral closing submissions.

1. I will refer to the evidence and submissions, to the extent necessary to expose my reasoning, below.

Applicant's personal circumstances, offending history, and the evidence regarding a risk of recidivism

1. Whilst the Applicant and some of his witnesses gave oral evidence and were questioned by the Minister, none were seriously challenged as to their evidence. Unless otherwise stated, I have accepted their evidence on the basis that I have found no reason to doubt its authenticity.
2. The Applicant is a 32-year-old citizen of India. He is an adherent of Sikhism.
3. He describes a happy childhood and being close to his family.
4. He completed high school and subsequently obtained qualifications in mechanical control and quality control.
5. He entered into an arranged marriage with his (now) ex-wife, who is the primary victim of his relevant offending.
6. He arrived in Australia at the age of 22, leaving behind his parents and a brother.
7. Between 2015 and his subsequent detention in 2019, the Applicant worked consistently, primarily as a truck driver. He built his own business, owning several trucks.
8. In 2018, the Applicant and his ex-wife had a daughter.
9. Over time, his ex-wife's mother, sister, and other adult family members came to share the house occupied by the Applicant and his direct family.
10. Tensions arose between the Applicant, and his wife and her adult family members, in the period leading to the Applicant's offending. He describes it as 'immense pressure and coercion' being placed on him, primarily due to being 'manipulated and threatened' over financial matters.

Criminal offending and other relevant conduct

1. On 5 June 2019, the Applicant committed his offences. His visa was later cancelled, and he was placed in immigration detention from 3 October 2019, and then prison until shortly prior to his sentencing on 19 June 2021. The Applicant was convicted of two offences in a District Court:

(a) 'Endanger life, health or safety of a person' (count 1), for which he was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment, to be served concurrently with; > > (b) 'Unlawfully, and with intent to injure or annoy a person, caused a poison or other noxious thing to be administered to or taken by a person in circumstances of aggravation' (count 2), for which he was also sentenced to 12 months imprisonment, to be served concurrently.

2. On the same day, the Applicant was fined $600 in a Magistrates Court for 'Common Assault in Circumstances of Aggravation or racial Aggravation.'
3. The three charges arose from the same course of conduct, about which factual findings were made by the sentencing Judge in the District Court.
4. In summary, on the evening of 5 June 2019, the Applicant had left the home to work as an Uber driver. His ex-wife was at home with her mother, and a cousin.
5. Her sister had taken the Applicant's daughter to a nearby park.
6. Upon his return home, the Applicant and his ex-wife had an argument about family matters, during which the Applicant engaged in a sustained period of aggressive behaviour towards his ex-wife and members of her family, including:

(a) making threats; > > (b) property damage including throwing his daughter's bottle into a mirror, causing it to break and breaking the glass on a car windscreen with a chair; > > (c) following his ex-wife to the park and telling her if she didn't come back there would be 'consequences that would be no good'; > > (d) after the family returned to the home, the conduct continued, and the Applicant pushed his mother-in-law against a wall; > > (e) then obtaining a can of petrol from outside the house; > > (f) on returning to the house holding the can of petrol over his wife and pouring petrol over the left side of her body; > > (g) then splashing the petrol in a horizontal motion onto the walls and onto the carpet and around the room, during the course of which some of the petrol accidentally came into contact with his (then) one-year-old daughter; > > (h) at some time on that evening, pushing his ex-wife onto a sofa and putting his hands around her neck; and > > (i) using 'intimidating words'.

7. The judge noted the Applicant maintained that the act with the petrol occurred because he wanted to kill himself but rejected the Applicant's claims that his wife had poured the petrol on herself. The Judge also rejected the Applicant's claim that the owner of the car broke their own windscreen.
8. The judge found the Applicant's actions were deliberate and created an environment of danger and intimidation, even though the Applicant had no intent to ignite the petrol.
9. The judge described the actions as causing 'a lot of fear in your ex-wife's mind, that she was going to be gravely injured' and noted her evidence that she 'felt that she was going to die.' The judge also found that this was not a once-off incident, in that the Applicant had previously slapped his ex-wife, such that the offending was not a one-off momentary error of judgment.'
10. The judge referred to a pre-sentence psychological report that noted the Applicant was unable to comment upon the impact of his conduct on his ex-wife and said that it appeared that the Applicant continued to blame others for what had occurred. It was accepted, though, that the Applicant was suffering the ongoing effects of a motor vehicle accident and was diagnosed with depression and at that time was medicated with Lexapro.
11. The judge also accepted that the Applicant had struggled to adapt to life in Australia due to his isolation from his family and limited English language skills. Due to the seriousness of the offences, however, the judge recorded that, ordinarily, the offending would have attracted a sentence of three years for count one and two years and three months imprisonment for count two. The actual sentence was reduced due to the relevance of the offending having caused the Applicant to have been in immigration detention until his sentencing.
12. The Applicant was made subject to a family violence restraining order ('FVRO') that restricts his future engagement or conduct in respect of his ex-wife. The Applicant is not permitted to contact her by any means (other than through a lawyer); enter or approach any premises where she lives, works or is educated; approach her within 100m; commit an act of family violence or be in the possession of a firearm or firearm licence; cause or attempt to cause damage to her property; behave in an intimidating or offensive behaviour towards her; or stalk or cyberstalk her. The restraining order is final, and it is for the duration of the Applicant's life.
13. Since his sentencing, the Applicant has remained in prison or immigration detention. He and his ex-wife divorced, and she has remarried. He has had no contact with his daughter. Both of his parents have died whilst he was in Australia.
14. A Western Australia Corrective Services Parole Assessment dated 26 October 2021 reports that when asked about his offending, the Applicant did not appear to accept full responsibility for his offending behaviour and was unable to reflect on how his victims would have felt because of his actions.
15. Several adverse incidents have been reported against the Applicant during his time in detention, most of which he denies:

(a) On 1 May 2025, the Applicant reportedly engaged in a heated verbal altercation with another detainee. It was reported the Applicant used profanities when arguing with another detainee and maintained an 'aggressive tone'; > > (b) On 18 November 2024, the Applicant reportedly stole a weighted belt from the indoor gym; > > (c) On 26 September 2024, the Applicant reportedly engaged in a verbal confrontation with another detainee; > > (d) On 20 January 2024, the Applicant was reported to be suspected of being under the influence of an intoxicating liquid; > > (e) On 7 January 2024, the Applicant was involved in a major disturbance in the detainee mess area where multiple detainees threw their food across the room and walls of the mess, with the Applicant observed to be making hand gestures encouraging the throwing of food; > > (f) On 23 January 2023, approximately six litres of suspected brew was removed from the Applicant's room; > > (g) On 20 September 2023, the Applicant was reportedly involved in pushing and shoving with another detainee; and > > (h) On 29 December 2022, the Applicant reportedly had a physical altercation with another detainee and was reportedly 'very aggravated and aggressive' although video footage demonstrated that he did not instigate the physical confrontation.

16. I will return to make findings as to those matters as necessary.

Evidence in respect of the Applicant's rehabilitation and risk of further offending.

1. The Applicant has completed several courses aimed at rehabilitation, including:

(a) several parenting courses in 2020; and > > (b) several anger management courses in 2020 and 2023.

2. The Applicant also partially completed a course about domestic violence in 2023. He achieved a score of 91%, acknowledging that a 'pass' was considered to be 100%. I am satisfied from the Applicant's evidence, though, that this relates to non-attendance at part of the course, rather than an objective score. However, that does not explain why the Applicant did not complete the course or undertake a similar course to completion in the intervening period.
3. In a statement in evidence the Applicant says those courses were 'transformative'. He says that he has 'learned to identify triggers for anger, developed healthy coping strategies and gained a deeper understanding of the impact of domestic violence.' He says that he has written letters of remorse to his ex-wife, albeit that he cannot send them, and has 'profound remorse' for his conduct. He acknowledges the fear he put his ex-wife in and the risk of harm to his daughter.
4. He says that the four years he spent in the Australian community before his detention were formative in establishing a connection to Australian society.
5. The Applicant states that the Sikh community in Australia is supportive of him and that they understand his past mistakes but also recognise his genuine efforts at rehabilitation and personal growth.
6. The Applicant has also undertaken vocational courses in detention and volunteers as a barista.
7. He has provided several letters of support from people speaking to his good character, and dedication to his community, work and family. Many speak of their concern as to the loss of his relationship with his daughter that would be occasioned if he does not obtain a visa. Several also say that he is remorseful for his past conduct, but do not describe what they understand that conduct to be.
8. The Applicant also relies on community letters of support with the signature of dozens of people that the Applicant says have the right to remain permanently in Australia. The letters pledge community support for the Applicant on his release into the community in terms of ensuring he has accommodation, employment and emotional support.
9. As stated earlier, three witnesses were called by the Applicant to speak in his favour.
10. The first describes himself as a friend of the Applicant who is willing to support him 'financially, emotionally and mentally' if he is released into the community on a bridging visa. In his written statement he said he was aware of the charges against the Applicant and that the Applicant understands the mistakes he has made and made significant improvements. He describes the Applicant as calm. However, in evidence before me the witness said that his understanding was that the Applicant threw the petrol on himself because 'he wanted to show he had the power' and hoped the Applicant's ex-wife would 'come forward and stop him.' He says he obtained a similar version from the Applicant's ex-wife and does not know why she left the Applicant. I put what actually occurred to the witness and asked whether, if that had been what had occurred, it would change his views. The witness said it would not. I place little weight on this witness's evidence about the Applicant's character and rehabilitation due to his lack of knowledge of the nature of Applicant's actual offending, but I accept his undoubted unconditional support for the Applicant.
11. The second witness describes herself as a cousin sister to the Applicant[5] but they have no blood relationship. She was also supportive of the Applicant and pledged her support and that of the community if he is released. She has never seen the Applicant be angry and said the Applicant's family were happy in 2019 until the Applicant's ex-wife's sister started 'hiding things' about her life from the Applicant. When asked about her knowledge of the incident on 5 June 2019, the witness said the Applicant had not wanted to harm anyone, but instead wanted to 'indicate his upset.' She also believed the Applicant poured the petrol on himself, and that it only got onto the Applicant's ex-wife after some 'pushing and pulling' between them. I give little weight to her evidence as to the Applicant's character or rehabilitation due to her lack of knowledge as to what actually occurred on 5 June 2019, but I accept her support for the Applicant is strong.
12. The third was the Chairman of the local Punjabi Council, who, in a statement in evidence, had raised his concerns as to the breaking of the bond between the Applicant and his daughter and the Applicant's demonstrated capacity for change and commitment to contribute positively to society. In evidence, the witness spoke of the Applicant's sincere efforts at rehabilitation and religious devotion. I accept that the witness was honest and genuine in his evidence and in his belief in the Applicant's good character and desire to make a positive contribution if released from detention.
13. In evidence before me the Applicant said that he was very involved in the Australian Sikh community before his detention and contributed by way of involvement in community fairs and fundraising.
14. He has many friends in the community, some of whom have visited him and others he maintains contact with. He says, for the first time in any specific way, that he was very involved in his friend's children's lives before his detention and incarceration. He gives the example of taking children to school.
15. The Applicant says that he has undertaken courses to improve his English language skills, which had previously been identified as a barrier to him obtaining professional support.
16. The Applicant acknowledges that he maintains a relationship with his brother in India but says that he is busy with his own family.
17. He acknowledges his part in the incident in detention on 2 May 2025 but claims it was misunderstood and that he was not aggressive but 'joking and loud.' He blames the report on his knowledge that the reporting officer was 'bringing drugs into the compound' but gave no evidence about any steps he took in respect of that.
18. He says the incident with the weighted belt was an innocent mistake. He had permission to take it from one guard but the next day another guard, unaware of that permission, reported him. He gave no evidence of his attempts to clear that issue up with the immigration authorities.
19. He denied any personal involvement with home brew, which I accept given his religious beliefs and the lack of specificity as to his personal involvement, as opposed to the involvement of others around him.
20. He accepts his involvement in the 'food fight' incident, but points out that he did not, himself, throw any food.
21. He accepts being involved in an altercation on 30 December 2022 but denies his reported 'comments of vengeance' to another detainee.
22. I find that the incidents acknowledged by the Applicant occurred in the manner reported by the immigration officers, noting that I accept the Applicant was not involved in spitting on 2 May 2025 which appears to have been attributed to other detainees whose names have been redacted. The Applicant's evidence minimising his involvement in those incidents was self-serving and, in some respects, incongruous. I am satisfied that the Applicant would have taken steps to challenge the reports prior to the hearing before me if they were demonstrably wrong.
23. The Applicant was asked by the Minister about what occurred on the evening of 5 June 2019. He said that he was trying to 'end himself' but his wife and daughter came 'in between' that, and 'because they intervened the charge was on me.' He then said that he agreed with the findings in the judge's sentencing remarks and takes responsibility but does not like to reflect on it because he feels that it contributed to his parents' early death. He says that his ex-wife's family put pressure on his parents and asked them for money, in describing 'what they did to my parents'. He says he made a mistake and is 'only human' but he has learnt from it.
24. As to who was responsible for his actions on the evening of 5 June 2019 he said, in respect of his ex-wife's family's involvement, that 'now I blame them, or I take responsibility. It doesn't matter, I have finished my sentence' of imprisonment.
25. He was asked to explain his understanding of the effect his offending had on his ex-wife. His response was telling, in respect of that understanding. He stated that 'he didn't know because he stopped talking to her 'but there must have been no impact on her' because 'if there had been an impact, she wouldn't have remarried.'
26. He says his daughter is suffering because her stepfather cannot replace him and that it has been reported to him that his ex-wife is 'brainwashing' his daughter about him. It has been reported to him that his ex-wife tells his daughter to ' forget about [him].' She 'has got a new dad and forget about old dad.' Whilst he described his daughter's fundamental right to have a relationship with him, he acknowledges having obtained legal advice about his rights to seek to maintain a relationship to his daughter but has taken no steps toward that since June 2019. He says the advice he received was that it would be better to wait until he is released. I could not discern that he had any insight into the effect his delay might have on his daughter, or the likelihood of it impacting any attempt he might make in the future to reintroduce himself into her life.
27. In respect of his depression, the Applicant says he sought medical assistance since his detention but will not take the medications he was prescribed because he felt the doctors were 'drugging' him. He takes self-prescribed treatments instead.
28. The Applicant described his concerns if he is forced to return to India. As he no longer has friends there, and his parents have died, he will have no support, which would affect his mental health. In respect of relying on his brother, he thinks he could but that his brother might resent him because it is his fault that 'his parents left this world'.
29. His qualifications would be recognised, and he could obtain work in India, but it 'would not be on the same pay scale' as Australia.

1. There has been extensive judicial consideration of how the exercise of balancing and weighing the considerations contained in the relevant Ministerial Directions is to be undertaken (albeit in the context of Ministerial Directions preceding Direction no. 110).[6]The Full Court of the Federal Court considered the operation of Direction No. 90 in CRNL v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs.[7] While the Court was considering Direction No 90, I am satisfied that its observations apply equally to Direction no. 110. The Court found that the Tribunal must weigh the various primary and other relevant considerations outlined in the Direction (in this case Direction no. 110) against each other.[8] This involves an evaluative process, requiring the Tribunal to examine factors for and against refusing to grant the visa, and an assessment and evaluation of those factors leading to the formation of a view as to whether the visa should be refused.[9]

1. The Minister, and therefore the Tribunal on review, is required to exercise the discretion in s 501(1), reasonably and on a correct understanding of the law.[10] By the operation of s 499(2A), in doing so the Tribunal must comply with written directions about the performance of its functions or the exercise of those powers which are given by the Minister pursuant to s 499(1).
2. On 7 June 2024, the Minister made Direction no. 110 under s 499, which commenced operation on 21 June 2024. That is the Direction that must be applied.[11]
3. An objective of Direction no. 110 is to guide decision-makers in exercising powers under

ss 501 or 501CA.[12] In exercising the discretion under s 501(1), the Tribunal must have regard to the primary and other considerations set out in Direction no. 110 where relevant to the decision.[13] However, the Direction does not authorise or require the Tribunal to ignore other relevant evidence or factors that may properly bear on the exercise of the discretion. 4. Whilst the primary and other considerations in Direction no. 110 are mandatory considerations they are 'not an exhaustive universe' of considerations'.[14] Put another way, while Ministerial directions may serve a purpose of consistency of decision-making, the Minister cannot, by such a direction, dictate what must be the outcome before the Tribunal undertaking its review on the merits of a particular decision.[15] Similarly, there is no presumption that, because a person fails the character test, it means that they must not be allowed a visa.[16] 5. Paragraph 5.2 of Direction no. 110 contains several principles that must inform my application of the primary and other considerations set out in Part 2 of the Direction, where those considerations are relevant to the decision. Those principles are: 1. Australia has a sovereign right to determine whether non-citizens who are of character concern are allowed to enter and/or remain in Australia. Being able to come to or remain in Australia is a privilege Australia confers on non­citizens in the expectation that they are, and have been, law-abiding, will respect important institutions, such as Australia's law enforcement framework, and will not cause or threaten harm to individuals or the Australian community. 2. The safety of the Australian Community is the highest priority of the Australian Government. 3. Non-citizens who engage or have engaged in criminal or other serious conduct should expect to be denied the privilege of coming to, or to forfeit the privilege of staying in, Australia. 4. The Australian community expects that the Australian Government can and should refuse entry to non-citizens, or cancel their visas, if they engaged in conduct, in Australia or elsewhere, that raises serious character concerns. This expectation of the Australian community applies regardless of whether the non-citizen poses a measureable [sic] risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community. 5. Australia has a low tolerance of any criminal or other serious conduct by visa applicants or those holding a limited stay visa, or by other non-citizens who have been participating in, and contributing to, the Australian community only for a short period of time. 6. With respect to decisions to refuse, cancel, and revoke cancellation of a visa, Australia may afford a higher level of tolerance of criminal or other serious conduct by non-citizens who have lived in the Australian community for most of their life, or from a very young age. 7. Decision-makers must take into account the primary and other considerations relevant to the individual case. In some circumstances, the nature of the non­citizen's conduct, or the harm that would be caused if the conduct were to be repeated, may be so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify not cancelling or refusing the visa, or revoking a mandatory cancellation. 8. The inherent nature of certain conduct such as family violence is so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify not cancelling or refusing the visa, or revoking a mandatory cancellation, even if the information available at the time of consideration suggests that the non-citizen does not pose a measurable risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community. 6. Informed by the principles set out in paragraph 5.2 of Direction no. 110, I must take into account the primary considerations and the other listed considerations, where they are relevant, having regard to the specific circumstances of the case. I must also consider the Applicant's other clearly articulated submissions based on established facts that may properly bear on my decision. 7. The primary considerations are set out in paragraph 8 of the Direction. They are:

(a) protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct;

(b) whether the conduct engaged in constituted family violence;

(c) the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia;

(d) the best interests of minor children in Australia; and

(e) expectations of the Australian community.

1. The 'other considerations' that I must properly consider, insofar as they are relevant to the matter, include (but are not limited to):[17]

1. Further guidance as to how I am to apply the considerations in

Direction no. 110 can be found in paragraph 7, which provides: 1. In applying the considerations (both primary and other), information and evidence from independent and authoritative sources should be given appropriate weight. 2. The primary consideration at 8.1 below (protection of the Australian community) is generally to be given greater weight than other primary considerations. Otherwise, primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than the other considerations. 3. One or more primary considerations may outweigh other primary considerations. 2. However, as regards paragraph 7(2), in FHHM v Minister for Immigration,[18] the Full Federal Court considered its precursor in Direction 79, which also stated that primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than other considerations. O'Callaghan and Colvin JJ, with Derrington J in agreement, referred with approval to remarks made by Colvin J in Suleiman,[19] and stated at [34] that

...particular circumstances may pertain that may justify greater weight being to one or more of the other considerations than one or more of the primary considerations...

3. It is not sufficient for the Tribunal to weigh each of the considerations in Direction no. 110 separately and then aggregate each of the individual assessments by some form of tabulation or calculation. The Tribunal must undertake a process of weighing and balancing, by which it evaluates the different relevant considerations in relation to each other in a balancing exercise in order to reach a decision in respect of the exercise of the discretion in s 501(1).[20]
4. The discretion conferred by s 501(1) is to be exercised subject to the Act and to the self-evident Australian community protective purpose of the discretion. However, by virtue of the section conferring a discretion, it necessarily follows that Parliament has accepted that this purpose is not necessarily served in a given case by a refusal to grant a visa to a person who does not pass the character test.[21] Punishment of the Applicant for the conduct or offences relevant to the decision plays no part in the Tribunal's evaluation. That is a role that is 'exclusively judicial in nature'.[22] However, the process by which the Applicant's visa was refused, is not itself punitive in nature.

1. The first primary consideration, paragraph 8.1(1), directs my attention to the protection of the Australian community. It requires me to keep in mind that the safety of the Australian community is the highest priority of the Australian Government and to that end the Government is committed to protecting the Australian community from harm as a result of criminal activity or other serious conduct by non-citizens.
2. I must have particular regard to the principle that entering or remaining in Australia is a privilege that Australia confers on non-citizens in the expectation that they are, and have been, law abiding, will respect important institutions, and will not cause or threaten harm to individuals or the Australian community.[23]
3. Paragraph 8.1(2) then provides that I must also consider the nature and seriousness of the non-citizen's conduct to date and the risk to the Australian community should the non-citizen commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct.

1. I dealt with the Applicant's offending conduct above. Despite apparently maintaining a different history in his own mind, the Applicant accepts that the conduct occurred as outlined by the sentencing judge and I find that it did.
2. Direction no. 110 requires me to take into account a range of factors, including certain conduct which is specifically categorised in paragraph 8.1.1(1), and thereby deemed to be regarded by Australia's Government and community as 'very serious' or 'serious'. Acts of family violence are deemed to be regarded as very serious.[24]
3. I am satisfied that the Applicant's index offending was very serious 'family violence' as defined in Direction no. 110 because it involved an assault on his ex-wife, a family member, that caused her to be fearful. It was of a particularly serious nature, given the risk of harm by fire that his conduct caused to his wife and his daughter, and the fear of death that knowledge of that risk caused his wife.
4. It was also considered to be very serious and unacceptable by the sentencing judge, who would have imposed a greater sentence of imprisonment were it not for the Applicant's pre-sentence immigration detention related to the offending, even though incarceration is a penalty of last resort.
5. Furthermore, the overall assessment of the seriousness of that conduct is not lessened by the Applicant's conduct in having assaulted his wife on a prior occasion, or of assaulting his mother-in-law. I have considered the impact of the offending on the Applicant's ex-wife as described by the sentencing judge.
6. I accept that the Applicant's offending should not be categorised as frequent, however it did escalate in seriousness from slapping his ex-wife to committing the index offending. Whilst I am satisfied that repeating such offending against the same victim has a cumulative effect, I will not give that specific weight here due to the lack of specific evidence in that regard.
7. There is no suggestion of the Applicant having provided false information to the Minister or reoffending after being warned, or otherwise made aware, about the consequences of further offending on his migration status.

Risk to the Australian community should the non-citizen commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct

1. I must then consider the risk to the Australian community should the Applicant commit further offences. Paragraph 8.1.2 of Direction no. 110 states, in part:
   1. In considering the need to protect the Australian community (including individuals, groups or institutions) from harm, decision-makers should have regard to the Government's view that the Australian community's tolerance for any risk of future harm becomes lower as the seriousness of the potential harm increases. Some conduct and the harm that would be caused, if it were to be repeated, is so serious that any risk that it may be repeated may be unacceptable.
   2. In assessing the risk that may be posed by the non-citizen to the Australian community, decision-makers must have regard to, cumulatively:
   3. the nature of the harm to individuals or the Australian community should the non-citizen engage in further criminal or other serious conduct; and
   4. the likelihood of the non-citizen engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct, taking into account:
   5. information and evidence on the risk of the non­citizen re-offending; and
   6. evidence of rehabilitation achieved by the time of the decision, giving weight to time spent in the community since their most recent offence (noting that decisions should not be delayed in order for rehabilitative courses to be undertaken). ...
2. There is no statutory constraint on the way that I assess that risk other than that there must be a rational and probative basis for my assessment.[25] I should consider the likelihood and consequences of further offending.[26]

1. I am required to have regard to paragraph 8.1.2(1) and have done so.

In respect of the nature of further harm, the Minister relies upon the National Plan to End Violence against Women and Children 2022-2032[27], which states that 'violence against women and children has significant short-term and long-term effects on victim-survivors' physical and mental health and well-being. In addition, the profound effects of violence against women and children ripple out across families, communities and society as a whole.' That evidence is unchallenged and is, of course, now widely understood by the community. Having regard to the very serious nature of the Applicant's index offending, I accept the Minister's submission that any future offending of a similar nature would expose the Australian community to significant physical and psychological harm.

Likelihood of the non-citizen engaging in further criminal or serious conduct

1. The Applicant submits that he poses no risk of reoffending or engaging in other serious conduct. He points to his community support, growth as a person through reflection and engaging in rehabilitation courses, and good behaviour in prison and detention as support for that contention.
2. However, in evidence before me he was unable to articulate, let alone demonstrate, an understanding of the impact his offending had on his ex-wife. Nor did he demonstrate any real remorse in that respect, other than by reference to letters he says he has written to her that are not in evidence. I take into account that he did not complete the course that he undertook in respect of addressing his family violence conduct.
3. He also makes no mention of understanding the effect of his assault on his mother-in-law.
4. That lack of understanding was evident before the sentencing judge in 2019, who found that the Applicant had not fully accepted the nature of his conduct and attempted to minimise the gravity of his offending by making submissions against any argument of family violence toward his ex-wife. It was also the position he adopted before the parole board in 2021.
5. That the Applicant has been involved in reported altercations with other detainees in detention since the completion of his rehabilitation courses indicates to me that he has not fully addressed his anger management through the courses he has completed that were directed to that issue.
6. I found him to continue to lack an understanding or true acknowledgement of the impact his offending has had on anyone other than himself, and his deceased parents.
7. In those circumstances, whilst his participation in rehabilitative courses is commendable, I am not satisfied that it evidences a meaningful shift in his attitude since his offending, and it has not led to more than a superficial understanding of the harm he caused. I am satisfied that the Applicant has outstanding criminogenic needs in respect to his attitude towards women and anger regulation.
8. Whilst the Applicant's ex-wife has the protection of the FVRO, the Applicant may well enter into other intimate relationships, so his ex-wife is not the only one to whom that a risk of future family violence may be manifest.
9. I acknowledge the significant support the Applicant has from the local Punjabi community as a protective factor. However, those apparently closest to him, being the first two of his witnesses, were unaware of the nature of his offending. In those circumstances, I cannot infer that the broader Punjabi community understands the nature of his offending, which reduces the weight I give to this factor as the broader community support may not be maintained if they become aware of the true position. The Applicant also had close ties to the community before his offending, and so I cannot be satisfied that support is likely to have a material bearing in the future.
10. I have taken into account the fact that the bridging visa, if granted, operates for a limited, if indeterminate, duration. This mitigates the risk, but only to a limited extent given the risk is manifest whilst ever the Applicant is in the community.
11. For those reasons, I am satisfied that the better view, taking the into account all of the evidence and weighing the relevant factors cumulatively[28], is that is that the Applicant remains a moderate risk of reoffending or engaging in other serious conduct.
12. Considering all of the relevant issues together, I assess this primary consideration as weighing very significantly in favour of refusal of the bridging visa.

1. Under paragraph 8.2 of Direction no. 110 I must have regard to family violence perpetrated by the Applicant when deciding whether to refuse the bridging visa.
2. Paragraph 8.2(1) of the direction informs me that

[t]he Government has serious concerns about conferring on non-citizens who engage in family violence the privilege of entering or remaining in Australia. The Government's concerns in this regard are proportionate to the seriousness of the family violence engaged in by the non-citizen...

3. As can be seen from this statement, whilst the first primary consideration was addressed to the Applicant's past conduct, present circumstances, and likely future conduct, this primary consideration is focused on the views or policies of the Australian Government. The Applicant's offending was committed principally against his wife and amounts to family violence. On that basis, whilst the conduct of concern that I must consider under this primary consideration is largely the same in the circumstances of this case, it must be reconsidered in response to this part of Direction no. 110 and given due weight.
4. In respect of this primary consideration, specific considerations in paragraph 8.2 of Direction no. 110 relate to conduct that meets the definition of family violence and, in part, otherwise provides similar, although not identical considerations to those set out in the first primary consideration.
5. I accept that the Applicant's conduct in respect of perpetrating family violence should not be categorised as frequent, however it did escalate in seriousness from slapping his ex-wife to committing the index offending. Whilst I am satisfied that any repeated family violence has a cumulative effect, I will not give it any specific weight here due to the lack of specific evidence in that regard.
6. Subparagraph 8.2(3)(c) makes the Applicant's rehabilitation achieved at the time of decision since his last known act of family violence an integer of the assessment of the seriousness of the conduct.
7. As I found earlier, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has rehabilitated. I do not consider him to accept responsibility for his conduct. Nor does he have any meaningful understanding of the impact it had on his ex-wife. In respect of his daughter, the Applicant understands that his conduct has caused their estrangement and had a negative impact on her, but I am not satisfied that he understands that this was his fault.
8. He has, to his credit, made some efforts to address his family violence offending, although his failure to complete the domestic violence education course he enrolled in, or to undertake another one in the intervening period, tempers the extent to which this operates in his favour.
9. There is no evidence that the Applicant has re-offended since being charged, but his capacity to do so has been largely stymied by his detention since 2019.
10. Weighing those factors together, I consider the Applicant's family violence conduct to be very serious. That raises the level of the Government's legitimate concern about conferring on him the privilege of remaining in Australia.
11. I agree with the Minister's contention that this primary consideration weighs significantly in favour of refusal of the bridging visa.

The strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia

1. Relevantly, given the Applicant does not hold a visa that may be cancelled or that has been mandatorily cancelled, Paragraph 8.3 of Direction no. 110 provides that:
   1. Decision-makers must consider any impact of the decision on the non-citizen's immediate family members in Australia, where those family members are Australian citizens, Australian permanent residents, or people who have a right to remain in Australia indefinitely.
2. The Applicant's only immediate family in Australia is his daughter, who the Minister accepts has the right to remain in Australia indefinitely.
3. The Applicant places significant weight on his ability to maintain a relationship with his daughter. He submits that there will be no likelihood of re-establishing it if he is not granted a visa. He also points to concerns as to who will look after his daughter if her mother cannot do so in the future.
4. The Minister submits that the estranged nature of the Applicant's relationship with his ex-wife, together with the existence of the lifetime FVRO order against the Applicant, means that the weight afforded to this factor should be significantly diminished.
5. Given the FVRO does not prevent the Applicant contacting his ex-wife through a lawyer, there remains the possibility of the Applicant seeking to reintegrate himself into his daughter's life.
6. However, the fact remains that the Applicant has sought no contact with his daughter since his detention. He says he does not want to at this time but may in the future. Whilst I accept that he is adopting legal advice in that regard, it remains the case that his daughter has no meaningful relationship with him at this time, which does reduce the impact on her if he is not granted the bridging visa. However, if the Applicant remains in Australia, and is granted the visa, he may be able to more readily reintroduce himself into his daughter's life. I accept his evidence that he loves his daughter and wants to provide support for her. I accept she is more likely to be deprived of that support in the future, in a practical sense, if the visa is not granted.
7. The Minister submits this consideration should be afforded minimal weight in favour of the Applicant. Overall, I find that this primary consideration weighs moderately in favour of granting the bridging visa.

Best interests of minor children in Australia affected by the decision

1. Paragraph 8.4 of Direction no. 110 requires the Tribunal to consider the best interests of minor children in Australia affected by the decision.
2. I have identified the Applicant's daughter as being affected by the decision, in the manner and for the reasons I gave above.
3. The Minister contends that it is inherently unlikely that the Applicant has played any significant role in his daughter's life given she was only 18 months old when he first entered detention, and that any positive weight that may be afforded with respect to the best interests of his daughter should be tempered by the fact that the Applicant does not play a parental role and that his daughter otherwise has a parental figure in her life, namely her mother. In these circumstances, the Minister contends that this consideration should be afforded limited weight.
4. I accept that the Applicant currently has no relationship with his daughter. However, that does not mean that he did not play a positive parental role in her life as a baby, or that he could not do so in the future. At age seven, she is still very young, and a graduated reintroduction to the Applicant cannot be ruled out. However, the Applicant has not even started the process of seeking to obtain such a re-introduction, and nothing in the evidence suggests that his ex-wife would be supportive of it such that it might advance quickly. This limits the extent to which he may have an opportunity to play a positive parental role given the time limited nature of the bridging visa.
5. The fact that the Applicant has had no meaningful contact with her for most of her life also lessens the weight that should be given to the relationship between them.
6. I have also considered the indirect detriment that the Applicant's conduct has caused to his daughter, through his unavailability to her, and the emotional trauma he caused to her primary care giver.
7. Ongoing separation from him may have detrimental effects on the Applicant's daughter, but I have no evidence by which to quantify or give weight to that risk. She has the benefit of her mother fulfilling a parental role.
8. She is now of an age where electronic communication is a possibility if the visa is not granted but that may be insufficient to significantly ameliorate the detriment caused by their physical separation where they are currently estranged. I have no evidence as to her views.
9. The Applicant also exposed his daughter to his family violence conduct, notwithstanding that she may have been too young for it to have a lasting effect. I have no evidence as to whether she suffered physical or emotional trauma arising from the Applicant's conduct.
10. Weighing those issues, I am satisfied that, on balance, granting the visa would be in the Applicant's daughter's best interests, but that the factors that weigh in favour of that assessment are significantly diminished by those counteracting it.
11. In respect of the Applicant's unparticularised claims as to the effect of my decision on the children of his friends, I am not satisfied his removal would have any meaningful impact on their best interests in the absence of probative evidence of him having any continued involvement with them in the long period since he was detained, and where he did not play a parental role in their lives prior to his detention.
12. I weigh this primary consideration moderately in favour of granting the bridging visa.

1. The fifth primary consideration requires me to weigh the expectations of the Australian community. Paragraph 8.5(1) of Direction no. 110 provides that the Australian community expects non-citizens to obey Australian laws while in Australia. The Direction goes on to state that where a non-citizen has engaged in serious conduct in breach of this expectation, or where there is an unacceptable risk that they may do so, the Australian community, as a norm, expects that the Government would not allow them to enter or remain in Australia.
2. Paragraph 8.5(2) directs that visa cancellation or refusal, or non-revocation of the mandatory cancellation of a visa, may be appropriate simply because the nature of the character concerns or offences is such that the Australian community would expect that the person should not be granted or continue to hold a visa.
3. It also notes that the Australian community expects that the Australian Government can and should refuse entry to non-citizens, or cancel their visas, if they raise serious character concerns through conduct, in Australia or elsewhere, of particular kinds. The paragraph directs that, in particular, the Australian community expects that the Australian Government should cancel a non-citizen's visa if they raise serious character concerns through specific conduct listed in sub-paragraphs 8.5(2)(a)-(f), including acts of family violence.
4. Paragraph 8.5(3) of Direction no. 110 further confirms that the stated expectations apply regardless of whether the non-citizen poses a measurable risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community. Paragraph 8.5(4) of the Direction makes it clear that I am to proceed on the basis of the Government's views as articulated, and not attempt to independently assess the community's expectation in this particular case.
5. In weighing this consideration, I am also guided by the principles in paragraph 5.2 of Direction no. 110. Paragraph 5.2(2) states that the safety of the Australian Community is the highest priority of the Australian Government. Paragraph 5.2(3) directs that the Applicant, having engaged in criminal conduct, should expect to forfeit the privilege of staying in Australia. Paragraph 5.2(4) expresses a principle similar to paragraph 8.5(3) with respect to serious character concerns and makes it clear that those concerns are not restricted to circumstances where there is a measurable risk of physical harm to the Australian community.
6. The Minister contends that the Applicant's offending should be regarded as very serious such that the Australian community would expect he should not hold a bridging visa.
7. Having regard to the available evidence, the Minister further contends that the Applicant has not sufficiently demonstrated that his risk of reoffending, and causing further harm, has been mitigated. The Minister contends, and I have found, that there remains a real risk the Applicant may engage in serious conduct in breach of the Australian community's expectations. The Minister therefore contends that this consideration weighs significantly in favour of refusing to grant the bridging visa.
8. Whilst there is a deemed expectation in favour of the bridging visa not being granted, I must, nonetheless, consider what weight to give to that expectation in the Applicant's particular circumstances.[29]
9. I am satisfied, given the nature and seriousness of the relevant conduct and my finding as to a moderate risk of recidivism, that this consideration weighs significantly in favour of refusing the bridging visa.

1. In making a decision under section 501(1), 501(2) or 501CA(4), the considerations below must also be taken into account, where relevant, in accordance with the following provisions. These considerations include (but are not limited to):

(a) legal consequences of the decision; > > (b) extent of impediments if removed; > > (c) impact on Australian business interests.

Legal consequences of decision under section 501

1. As I noted in brief earlier, the Applicant applied for a protection visa on 16 June 2023, claiming to fear harm on the basis of revenge from his ex-wife's family due to his inter-caste marriage.
2. The Applicant also claimed to be bisexual and made further claims of fearing persecution due to his affiliation with the Shiromani Akali Dal, an egalitarian political party (none of which was referred to by the Applicant before me in support of this application).
3. On 3 July 2023, the Applicant's protection visa application was refused. On review, the former Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed that decision. The Applicant has since sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision, which is currently pending.
4. The Minister submits that, if a protection finding were ultimately made in the course of assessing his protection visa application, the Applicant would not be liable for removal unless one of the events in s 197C(3)(c) takes place.
5. The Minister also refers to the Applicant seeking ministerial intervention under s 351. On 16 September 2025, the Applicant was advised that his request for ministerial intervention was under consideration.
6. Pursuant to s 197E(5), the Minister notes that the duty to remove is otherwise presently suspended due to the ministerial intervention consideration.
7. The Minister submits that in these circumstances, the Tribunal should confine its consideration to the direct legal consequences of a decision to affirm the refusal to grant the bridging visa, and not speculate about what decisions may be made with respect to the Applicant's protection visa application in the future, however real the prospects of a positive outcome for him arising from those decisions are.[30]
8. Accordingly, the Minister submits that limited weight in favour of the Applicant should be afforded to this consideration.
9. I accept that I should not speculate about what decisions may be made with respect to the Applicant's protection visa application in the future. I also disagree with the Applicant's contention that I should give significant weight to the Minister's willingness to consider intervening.
10. I must, though, consider the legal consequences of the refusal decision on the Applicant, including having regard to Australia's non-refoulement obligations in respect of unlawful non-citizens.[31] The non-refoulement issue is not yet engaged here as no positive protection finding has been made in the Applicant's favour.
11. There are a range of legal consequences of a decision not to grant the bridging visa, which include:

(a) the likelihood of the Applicant remaining in detention pending his removal to India (if that is to occur);[32]

(b) refusal of any other visa applications he has made and cancellation of other visas he may hold;[33]

(c) a prohibition on the Applicant applying for other visas whilst in the migration zone (other than a protection visa or a bridging (removal pending) visa);[34] and

(d) periods of exclusion and special return criteria may apply.[35]

1. Generally, without a visa, the Applicant remains an unlawful non-citizen.[36] Under s 189, he must remain detained and be removed as soon as reasonably practicable under s 198.[37] That could occur on completion of his judicial review proceedings and consideration of Ministerial intervention. On that basis, his ongoing detention will not be indefinite if the visa is not granted, but it may continue for an extended period. The prospect of such further detention weighs in favour of granting a visa.
2. I note that it is the 'practical realities' in 'human terms' of the legal consequences that are important, rather than the legal consequences in the abstract.[38] I proceed on that basis.
3. I accept that the removal and visa limitations which result from a decision not to grant the visa are an intended consequence of the operation of s 501.
4. However, that does not mean that they affect all applicants equally.
5. The refusal of other visas and special return criteria would have a significant impact on Applicant's ability to physically reintegrate into his daughter's life by visiting her if that can be arranged or is ordered by a Court. I will give this consideration modest weight in favour of granting the bridging visa.

1. Paragraph 9.2 of Direction no. 110 provides that, taking into account the matters identified in paragraphs 9.2(1)(a)-(c) of Direction no. 110, the Tribunal must consider the extent to which the Applicant would face an impediment or impediments in establishing himself and maintaining basic living standards in the context of what is generally available to other citizens of that country. The matters identified under paragraphs 9.2(1)(a)-(c) are:

(a) The Applicant's age and health; > > (b) Whether there are substantial language or cultural barriers; and > > (c) Any social, medical and/or economic support available to the Applicant in their country.

2. The Applicant accepts that he could obtain work, albeit less well-paid, if he returned to India. Primarily, he focusses on his lack of family and community support there, given his extended absence. He submits that it would cause further detriment to his mental health for that reason. He acknowledges that he is otherwise generally in good health, apart from needing to manage his cholesterol. I note that he is still a relatively young man at age 32.
3. The Minister submits there is no evidence of any significant language or cultural barriers for the Applicant to overcome in India given he can speak the official language of Punjabi, and it is reasonable to assume that he would retain a considerable degree of familiarity with the culture given he lived there for the first 22 years of his life. Additionally, as an Indian citizen, the Applicant would have access to the same social, medical, and economic support as other citizens.
4. Whilst accepting that the Applicant may face some difficulty in re-establishing himself in India, the Minister submits these are not insurmountable. The Applicant has transferable skills and vocational knowledge which can lead to employment and a productive life. However, the Minister accepts that the Applicant may face a degree of practical, financial and emotional hardship on return, particularly in light of the evidence that he no longer has the practical support of his parents.
5. I take into account the Applicant's age and that there is no evidence that the Applicant's physical health conditions are debilitating or require significant medical management. In terms of his depression, I am satisfied it may be worsened by his removal, albeit there is no independent evidence as to its current significance. Given the Applicant has managed it to date without feeling compelled to take prescribed medications, I infer that it is currently well managed and will not pose a significant impediment if the Applicant is removed. There are no significant language or cultural barriers facing the Applicant if he is removed to India however, I accept that Applicant's evidence that he would likely be financially disadvantaged and have less medical and social supports available to him if returned, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. He has transferrable skills and vocational qualifications, some of which he obtained in India, that should reduce the possibility of him experiencing unemployment if returned there.
6. I will attribute this consideration only minor weight in favour of granting the bridging visa in the Applicant's circumstances. That is because the Applicant's potential removal to India is tied to his judicial review proceedings and Ministerial intervention application, and will not occur directly due to my decision, which will only dictate whether he is free to live in the community until those matters are resolved.

1. Paragraph 9.3 of Direction no. 110 requires the Tribunal to consider this issue, where relevant.
2. The Applicant notes that he had a business and operated several trucks. They are in the safe keeping of someone else whilst he is in detention. However, given the length of time that he has been detained, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, I infer that the business that he had operated has either been subsumed by someone else, or has been lost. Whilst the Applicant has otherwise maintained employment prior to his detention, it was not in respect of a major project or important service, such that it should be afforded weight.
3. I agree with the Minister's submission that this consideration should be given neutral weight, in that it weighs neither for nor against granting the bridging visa.

1. Whilst not a mandatory consideration in this case, I have also considered the Applicant's strong community ties as operating in favour of granting the bridging visa, albeit that they have now been maintained from detention for longer than they were when living in the community.
2. The Applicant does not pass the character test under s 501.
3. I have then weighed and balanced the relevant considerations in this matter as part of a single evaluation, to determine whether the discretion should be exercised to refuse the Applicant's bridging visa.
4. I have considered that paragraph 7(2) of the Direction states that the primary consideration in paragraph 8.1 (protection of the Australian community) is 'generally to be given greater weight than other primary considerations', and that, otherwise, the relevant 'primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than the [relevant] other considerations'. This is consistent with the principle at paragraph 5.2(2), that 'the safety of the Australian community is the highest priority of the Australian government'. However, this does not mean that the other considerations are secondary to the primary considerations, or that they should always be given less weight.[39] I have found no reason not to follow those qualified directions in this matter.
5. It was necessary, for transparency and due to the need to set this statement of reasons out sequentially to make it more accessible, to deal with each of the mandatory and other listed and otherwise relevant considerations in turn. However, I have considered the exercise of the discretion in a holistic manner, having regard to all of the relevant considerations (viewed in the manner that paragraph 7 of the Direction says the listed relevant considerations are to be taken into account and weighed, and noting the import of paragraph 5.2).
6. On that basis, there is no advantage in repeating the mandatory and other considerations and describing the weight and effect I am satisfied they should each be given in my assessment.
7. Having weighed the considerations in favour of refusing the bridging visa and the considerations in favour of granting it in that manner, I am satisfied that the considerations weighing in favour of refusing the bridging visa, being the primary considerations of the protection of the Australian community, the Applicant's family violence conduct, and the expectations of the Australian community outweigh the considerations in favour of granting the bridging visa, being the primary considerations of the strength, nature and duration of the Applicant's ties to Australia and the impact on minor children, and the other considerations of the legal consequences of the decision and the extent of impediments if the Applicant is removed.
8. In summary, having regard to all of the mandatory and otherwise permissible considerations, I am satisfied that the correct or preferable decision is to affirm the decision under review.

1. The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

I certify that the preceding 185 (one-hundred and eighty-five) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member Suthers

.................[SGD].....................................................

[4] Save that I have not had regard to a draft statement not adopted by the proposed author: Exhibit 1,pp HB372-374.

[6] See, for example Suleiman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 594 ('Suleiman'), Minister for Home Affairs v HSKJ [2018] FCAFC 217; (2018) 266 FCR 591.

[7] [2023] FCAFC 138 ('CRNL').

[9] Gaspar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1166 at [38].

[10] FCFY v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2019] FCA 1990, [63] (Thawley J); Deng v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 1456, [119] (Halley J).

[14] Calvey v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 104, [45].

[15] Kumar v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 94; (2023) 412 ALR 502, [26] ('Kumar').

[18] [2022] FCAFC 19.

[20] CRNL, [28], [34]-[35], [37]-[38].

[22] Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, [27] (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ).

[24] Direction no.110 para 8.1.1(1)(iii).

[25] See BSJ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1181, [68] (Moshinsky J); Hambledon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 7, [41] (Kenny J).

[26] Tanielu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 225 FCR 424; [2014] FCA 673, [95].

[27] Exhibit 1, pp HB478-621 at p HB518.

[29] Kelly v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 396, [100], [108]-[109].

[30] Ali v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 650, [31]-[33] (Flick J).

[35] The Act, s 503, special return criteria (SRC) 5001.

[37] The Court in BHL19 v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2022] FCA 313, [112]-[122] followed AJL20 v Commonwealth of Australia [2020] FCA 1305 to find the applicant's detention had at all times been lawful.

[38] Rano v Minister for Home Affairs, Minister for Cyber Security [2024] FCA 1003, [5] (Feutrill J), cited in CRRN v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 192, [60].