AI McLean Pty Limited v Hayson

The legislation

Part 1A of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) concerns "Negligence" and Division 3 is headed "Causation", commencing with section 5D which provides: General principles (1) A determination that negligence caused particular harm comprises the following elements: (a) that the negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm (factual causation), and (b) that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person's liability to extend to the harm so caused (scope of liability). (2) In determining in an exceptional case, in accordance with established principles, whether negligence that cannot be established as a necessary condition of the occurrence of harm should be accepted as establishing factual causation, the court is to consider (amongst other relevant things) whether or not and why responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the negligent party. (3) If it is relevant to the determination of factual causation to determine what the person who suffered harm would have done if the negligent person had not been negligent: (a) the matter is to be determined subjectively in the light of all relevant circumstances, subject to paragraph (b), and (b) any statement made by the person after suffering the harm about what he or she would have done is inadmissible except to the extent (if any) that the statement is against his or her interest. (4) For the purpose of determining the scope of liability, the court is to consider (amongst other relevant things) whether or not and why responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the negligent party.
Whilst section 5D(3)(a) reflects and preserves the common law, sub-section (b) has been described as "an important departure from the common law": Villa, Annotated Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) at [1A.5D.080] (3rd ed., Lawbook Co, 2018). The Explanatory Note for the Civil Liability Amendment (Personal Responsibility) Act 2002 (NSW), which introduced section 5D into the Act, sheds no light on why the law was changed in this way but, in Neal v Ambulance Service of New South Wales [2008] NSWCA 346, Basten JA (with whom Tobias JA and Handley AJA agreed) had regard to extrinsic material when considering the section, noting that it was introduced in response to the Review of the Law of Negligence, Final Report (2002), which stated at [7.40] in respect of sub-section (b), extracted at [38] of his Honour's judgment: … the Panel is also of the view that the question of what the plaintiff would have done if the defendant had not been negligent should be decided on the basis of the circumstances of the case and without regard to the plaintiff's own testimony about what they would have done. The enormous difficulty of counteracting hindsight bias in this context undermines the value of such testimony. In practice, the judge's view of the plaintiff's credibility is likely to be determinative, regardless of relevant circumstantial evidence. As a result, such decisions tend to be very difficult to challenge successfully on appeal. We therefore recommend that in determining causation, any statement by the plaintiff about what they would have done if the negligence had not occurred should be inadmissible. Thus, the inherent unreliability of hindsight evidence as described by Gleeson CJ in Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434 at [16] and McHugh J in Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 at 246, combined with the forensic difficulty of dislodging such evidence in the absence of an adverse credit finding in respect of the person giving it, was considered to result in findings by trial judges which may not be based on reliable evidence but were also difficult to correct on appeal.
Most judgments on this section concern individual plaintiffs, for example, Neal v Ambulance Service of New South Wales (drunk who refused to be treated by ambulance officers) and Reed v Warburton [2011] NSWCA 98 (owner builder suing plumber who burnt down his house). Lym International Pty Limited v Marcolongo (2011) 15 BPR 29,465; [2011] NSWCA 303 warrants particular mention as ASOF submitted that it applies to the facts to hand. Mrs Marcolongo owned land in Mona Vale on which a building containing shops and residential units was constructed. A property developer excavating an underground car park on adjacent land damaged Mrs Marcolongo's building. Mrs Marcolongo sued the developer but did not give evidence as she was elderly. Instead, her son, who was a real estate agent living in the building and who acted on his mother's behalf in connection with the building work, gave evidence. The developer submitted that it would have been open to the son to give evidence of what he would have done had he been told of the developer's plans: the prohibition in section 5D(3)(b) did not apply to him as "the person … suffering the harm" was Mrs Marcolongo. Campbell JA, with whom Basten JA and Sackar J relevantly agreed, considered at [229]: In my view, that construction of s 5D(3)(b) is correct. Even so, the High Court has repeatedly warned that evidence from a plaintiff about what he or she would have done if the defendant had acted otherwise should be treated with caution in cases where the complaint is failure to warn (Chappel v Hart [1998] HCA 55; (1998) 195 CLR 232 at 246, 272-3; Rosenberg v Percival [2001] HCA 18; (2001) 205 CLR 434 at [26], [87]-[89], [158] and [221]; Vairy v Wyong Shire Council [2005] HCA 62; (2005) 223 CLR 422 at [226]). The same applies to evidence from someone like Mr Marcolongo who throughout has been acting as though he were the agent of a plaintiff. By comparison with his proved inaction in the face of real damage already sustained, evidence in hindsight from Mr Marcolongo about what he would have done had he known of those matters, would have been of such slight weight that its absence is also of very slight weight. Thus, as the son did not fall within the terms of section 5D(3)(b), which Campbell JA read strictly, his evidence was admissible and to be treated with the caution expressed in common law cases. ASOF submitted that Mr Easton should be considered as giving evidence as an agent for ASOF in much the same way as Mr Marcolongo gave evidence on behalf of his mother.
Several cases have considered the section where the plaintiff was a corporate entity, although only in any detail in AVWest Aircraft Pty Limited (as trustee for AVWest Aircraft Trust v Clayton Utz [2018] WASC 167. The first case to consider section 5D(3)(b) for a corporate plaintiff was AI McLean Pty Limited v Hayson [2008] NSWSC 927, where two corporate plaintiffs brought professional negligence proceedings against solicitors for failure to ensure that options were validly exercised. The sole director of both plaintiffs was Mr McLean, who did not give evidence. The defendants asked Bergin J to draw a Jones v Dunkel inference by reason of the plaintiffs' failure to call Mr McLean. The plaintiffs submitted that any evidence which Mr McLean could have given would have been inadmissible by reason of section 5D(3)(b), whilst the defendants submitted that the Act did not apply as the events in question occurred before the Act commenced. Her Honour concluded that the Act did apply to the proceedings and further, at [245]: … s 5D(3)(b) would have rendered inadmissible any evidence from Mr McLean about what he would have caused the plaintiffs to do if the solicitors had advised them to pursue the [exercise of the options in by giving non-negligent advice]. Self-evidently, Bergin J considered that "any statement made by the person after suffering the harm", where the person was a corporation, included any statement made by the sole director of the corporation, presumably because a statement by Mr McLean was, effectively, a statement made by the corporation.
In Wingecaribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Limited (2012) 301 ALR 1; [2012] FCA 1028, a group of local councils sued their investment advisor in respect for negligent advice to invest in complicated financial products which did not weather the global financial crisis. Council officers gave evidence as to what they would have done if they had been told about the attributes of the financial products. Rares J noted at [1124]: It was common ground between the parties that s 5D(3)(b) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) and its analogue had no application to these proceedings. That was because the subsection used the personal pronouns "he or she" and "his or hers" and the expressions "evidence of the injured person" and "made by the person after suffering the harm" which were inapposite to describe the Councils, as statutory bodies. Thus, the hypothetical responses of the Council officers as to what each would have done had particular matters been brought to his attention were admissible … As Rares J did not himself consider whether the 'common ground' was, in fact, solid ground, his judgment does not advance matters. The conglomeration of the New South Wales and Western Australian legislative language in this passage may also confuse readers slightly, as it will be seen at [20] that the texts are different.
In UGL Rail Pty Limited v Wilkinson Murray Pty Limited [2014] NSWSC 1959, UGL Rail sued an acoustic engineer for negligent advice in relation of the installation of acoustic panels in a railway tunnel. UGL Rail sought to rely on evidence given by Mr Johnson, an engineer at Alstom responsible for the management of the project, of what he would have done if proper advice had been given. Alstom's connection with UGL Rail should be explained. The NSW Government had entered into a contract with two joint venturers to build the tunnel. The joint venturers entered into a sub-contract with Alstom for the systems installation component of the work including the design, construction and testing of sound absorbent panels to be installed in the tunnels. Alstom entered into a consultancy agreement with the acoustic engineer, including advice on sound absorbent panels to be installed in the tunnels. UGL Rail bought the transport business of Alstom and the relevant contracts were assigned from Alstom to UGL Rail, including the consultancy agreement with the acoustic engineer. It is perhaps easy to see in these circumstances why Ball J considered that section 5D(3)(b) would not preclude Mr Johnson of Alstom giving evidence for UGL Rail. At [191]: There is a question whether this evidence is admissible under s 5D(3)(a) of the CLA. In AI Mclean Pty Ltd v Hayson [2008] NSWSC 927 at [245], Bergin J (as her Honour then was) took the view that s 5D(3)(a) applied where the evidence was given by a director of a company about what the plaintiff company would have done. However, as Villa points out, it is difficult to reconcile that approach with the actual working of the section: see D Villa, Annotated Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (2nd ed, 2013, Lawbook Co) at 152-3. The section appears to be restricted to cases where the person giving evidence is the person who suffered the harm. It does not obviously apply where the person suffering the harm is a corporation; and it is not clear that it can be used to exclude evidence given by any employee of what he or she might have done. It seems to me that Mr Johnson could fairly be described as an employee or even an employee of a related company and thus someone with sufficient distance from the corporation itself so that his hindsight evidence was not so infused with self-interest as to be devoid of weight. In Richtoll Pty Limited v WW Lawyers Pty Limited (in liquidation) [2016] NSWCA 308, Sackville AJA, with whom McColl JA and Barrett AJA agreed, noted the apparent controversy between the judgments of Bergin J and Ball J but did not consider or resolve it: at [54].
In Gunns Limited v State of Tasmania [2015] TASSC 52, Gunns Limited wanted to develop a vineyard called "Tamar Ridge Wines". Mr Lyons was the operations manager of "Tamar Ridge Wines" and responsible for the development. Gunns applied for a licence to take a quantity of water from a watercourse for a dam to be constructed for the purposes of irrigating the vineyard. Gunns was given permission to build the dam, and did so, but its application for the water licence was extensively delayed and, when approved, was for far less water than was needed. Gunns sued the Tasmanian government for damages and Pearce J noted at [84]: The evidence of Mr Lyon that, if he had known the licence would not be approved, he would not have proceeded with the work is not admissible: Civil Liability Act, section 13(3)(b). Thus, his Honour had no hesitation in concluding that Mr Lyons, apparently a key employee with responsibility for the project, was precluded from giving hindsight evidence.
In Geju Pty Limited v Central Highlands Regional Council [2016] QSC 279 (appeal allowed on other grounds: Central Highlands Regional Council v Geju Pty Ltd [2018] 3 Qd R 550; [2018] QCA 38), Geju Pty Ltd purchased a block of land believing that it was zoned industrial when it was in fact zoned as rural. The company sued the council claiming to have been misled by a town planning certificate. The "guiding mind" of Geju was Brian Birch (at [1]), although it is not explained how the judge came to regard Mr Birch as such. The Court of Appeal noted that Mr Birch was an experienced developer: at [16] per Fraser JA with whom McMurdo JA and Brown J agreed. In any event, McMeekin J noted at [122]: Section 11(3)(b) CLA prohibits the asking of the question of what Mr Birch (or more accurately Geju) would have done if Mr Birch had known of the true situation. That is, his Honour proceeded on the basis that the section precluded a person who was "the guiding mind" of a company from giving hindsight evidence.
In Lanai Unit Holdings Pty Limited v Mallesons Stephen Jacques (No 2) [2018] 3 Qd R 28; [2017] QSC 251, the plaintiff sought to amend its pleading to add further claims of negligence against a law firm. The plaintiff was the trustee of a unit trust and carried on business as a property developer in Mackay. The defendants opposed the amendments given the delay in seeking to amend the pleading, and the absence of any adequate explanation for it. His Honour Jackson J noted that there was no suggestion of prejudice to the defendants by reason of the delay and, in this context, noted at [106]: To the extent that the question of causation might involve evidence of what the decision makers for the trustee would have done, there is a restriction upon the scope of oral evidence on such a question in a negligence case. It would appear, thus, that Jackson J considered that the section might prevent decision-makers of the corporate trustee giving evidence, and this ameliorated any prejudice.
In AVWest Aircraft Pty Limited v Clayton Utz, the plaintiff company sued solicitors in respect of negligent advice. At the time the advice was given, Mr Roberts was the sole director of the plaintiff company and took all material business and financial decisions on behalf of the company. Mr Burton was responsible for the financial accounting and day to day administration, including contractual administration, of the group of companies of which the plaintiff was a member, and reported to Mr Roberts on all material matters of finance and administration. Mr Roberts and Mr Burton's affidavits deposed to what they would have done if the solicitors had given non-negligent advice. Objection was taken to this evidence, and in one of those strange turns of life, I was counsel making the objection without success, my opposing counsel is now the President of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales, and his Honour's substantive judgment is, I understand, on appeal. My appetite to critically review Vaughan J's judgment is thus at an historic low. As ASOF relied on it, I will tentatively do so.
Vaughan J considered section 5C(3) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), which provides: (differences to the NSW legislation marked) If it is relevant to the determination of factual causation to determine what the person who suffered harm (the injured person) would have done if the negligent person tortfeasor had not been negligent at fault: (a) the matter is to be determined subjectively in the light of all relevant circumstances, subject to paragraph (b), the matter is to be determined by considering what the injured person would have done if the tortfeasor had not been at fault; and (b) any statement made by the person after suffering the harm about evidence of the injured person as to what he or she would have done if the tortfeasor had not been at fault is inadmissible except to the extent (if any) that the statement is against his or her interest. His Honour referred to seven textual differences between the New South Wales and Western Australian legislation, of which one was key, being use of the phrase "evidence of the injured person" in sub-section (b): at [38]-[41]. Given the differences in the language of the section to New South Wales, Vaughan J considered that the available authorities had reduced significance and construed the provision without being constrained by prior decisions: at [48]. In the result, his Honour considered that the phrase "evidence of the injured person" meant that the section only applied to a natural person and did not prevent Mr Roberts and Mr Burton giving evidence on behalf of a corporate plaintiff.
His Honour considered that, although section 5 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) provided that "person" includes a company, the interpretive rule did not apply as the intent and object of the legislation was inconsistent with it. In reaching this conclusion, Vaughan J agreed that little significance should be given to Parliament's use of the personal pronouns "he or she" which was no more than a modern drafting convention and, 50 years ago, the convention would have been to use "he" to mean, in most circumstances, he, she or it: at [65]. Rather, Vaughan J reached this conclusion because of the impossibility of there being any "evidence of the injured person" where the injured person was a company as a company cannot give evidence at all except through its officers: at [73]-[74]. In light of this, his Honour concluded at [77]: … The subject and context of s 5C(3)(b) is inconsistent with its application to a corporate plaintiff. In referring to 'evidence of the injured person' in s 5C(3)(b) Parliament is necessarily referring to an injured person (ie, the person who suffered harm) who is giving evidence - meaning that he or she must be capable of giving evidence himself or herself. This restricts the operation of the statutory provision to a natural person plaintiff.
Consequently, the section had no application to a corporation and Mr Roberts and Mr Burton's hindsight evidence was admitted and treated with the caution ascribed by the common law. To proceed otherwise was considered to have presented difficulties, at [71]: … it is self-evidently correct that a company can only act through its officers. And it is also the case that, in some instances and in some areas of the law, it will be correct to speak of a company as being the alter ego of a natural person. But that does not mean that a plaintiff company and its directors are one and the same 'injured person' for the purpose of s 5C(3)(b). Section 5C(3)(b) is dealing with the admissibility of evidence. I do not accept, in that context, that Parliament intended that the evidence of certain persons on behalf of a corporate injured person would be inadmissible because the person was directing mind and will of the company or the company was his or her alter ego. Determination of admissibility might then necessitate a mini-trial as to the extent of the relationship or association between the witness and the corporate plaintiff. That is an inconvenient and improbable result.
For myself, I do not think that the need to have a voir dire to determine whether evidence is admissible or not is particularly problematic, although Equity Trustees were not tempted by my invitation to have one here. Further, whatever inconvenience may be occasioned by a voir dire will likely be less than admitting hindsight evidence, enduring cross examination of the witness who gave it sufficient to support a respectable submission that the witness' credibility is now such that their evidence should not be accepted, and considering all of this evidence and submissions to determine whether the hindsight evidence should be accepted or not, for example, AVWest Aircraft Pty Limited (as trustee for AVWest Aircraft Trust v Clayton Utz (No 2) [2019] WASC 306.
ASOF, relying on AVWest, submitted that the legislation was relevantly the same, and that the section did not preclude a person from giving evidence on behalf of a corporation. I do not think it can be said that the Western Australian legislation is relevantly the same: the New South Wales legislation has significant differences in language to the Western Australian legislation and thus AVWest is of limited assistance as to the meaning of the New South Wales legislation, although Vaughan J's approach to construing the section is of some assistance.
Finally, in PPK Willoughby Pty Limited v Baird [2019] NSWSC 704, a company sued a law firm in relation to negligent advice concerning the status of land it was proposing to buy. A director of the company, Graeme Webb, deposed to what he would have done if he had known that the land was subject to flood development control restrictions. Objection was taken to his evidence and the plaintiff company submitted that section 5D(3)(b) did not apply as the "person … suffering the harm" was the company and not its director. Harrison J rejected the offending paragraph of Mr Webb's affidavit at [6]-[7]: [6] I think that the issue can be sensibly determined having regard to the following realities. A company cannot give evidence other than through natural persons either as oral testimony or by the tender of documents created by them. If Mr Webb's evidence … is to achieve or to be given any relevance in the proceedings, given that he is not personally interested in the outcome, it can only be if it is given for or on behalf of the plaintiff. If the rhetorical inquiry at the end of the case is, "What does the evidence given by Mr Webb … go to?", the answer can only be that it is evidence upon which the plaintiff wishes to rely to advance its case. If the plaintiff therefore approbates the relevance of this evidence as material supporting the plaintiff's case, it can hardly reprobate the applicability of s 5D(3) as applying to evidence given by or on its behalf by natural persons such as Mr Webb as the plaintiff's agent for that purpose. [7] I note in passing that some authorities have appeared to place emphasis upon the use of the personal pronouns in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the provision, so as to suggest that the section could not have been intended to apply to a corporate plaintiff. However, the reference in the opening sentence of s 5D(3) to "the negligent person" must necessarily have been intended to extend to a corporate defendant. There is accordingly little to be said, as a matter of statutory construction, for limiting the exclusion for which the sub-section provides to plaintiffs who are also natural persons or, put another way, for not applying the exclusion to evidence given by natural persons on behalf of a corporate plaintiff. Although both Harrison J and Vaughan J disregarded the use of personal pronouns as excluding corporations from the section, Harrison J considered that section 5D(3)(b) applied to directors giving evidence for a company for precisely the same reason that Vaughan J considered that it did not: that is, a company cannot give evidence without a natural person to utter the words.
Thus, justices in New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania have had little hesitation construing section 5D(3)(b) and its equivalents as able to preclude an officer of the company (sole director (AI McLean), "guiding mind" (Geju), director (PPK), operations manager responsible for project (Gunns) or decision maker (Lanai)) giving hindsight evidence for a company, although Ball J expressed reservations in respect of an employee of a related company, who appeared to be sufficiently removed from the corporate entity to inform his Honour's concerns.
Considering the provision myself, section 21 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) provides: person includes an individual, a corporation and a body corporate or politic. In the absence of a definition of "person" in the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), this definition applies "except in so far as the context or subject-matter otherwise indicates or requires": section 6, Interpretation Act.
Section 3 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), "Definitions" draws attention to this in a note: Note. The Interpretation Act 1987 contains definitions and other provisions that affect the interpretation and application of this Act. Thus, unless the context or subject-matter otherwise indicates or requires, section 5D(3)(b) applies to corporate plaintiffs as well as individuals. There is nothing in section 5D which indicates or requires that "person" be interpreted other than in accordance with section 21 of the Interpretation Act as including a corporation, body corporate or politic. What tells against proceeding otherwise is that section 5D(1)(b) refers to a "negligent person's liability" and, unless "person" is being used in a different sense within the same section (which is possible but unlikely), then construing "person" as a reference to a natural person only would exclude corporate tortfeasors from the operation of the section, which I have no doubt is not what the Parliament intended.
Section 5D(3) prescribes how the question of what "the person who suffered harm would have done" in a counterfactual should be resolved. It is to be determined subjectively: what that person who suffered harm would have done, not what a reasonable person would have done. The section identifies the evidence which may be examined to ascertain what that person on the balance of probabilities would have done, and specifically excludes any statement made by that person after suffering the harm unless the statement is against their interest.
Whilst a corporation is an abstract concept, it is not without voice. A corporation can make a statement through its officers or authorised representatives. Where the admissibility of statements containing hindsight evidence is in question, then the answer must be whether the statement of the natural person is a statement "made by the person" who suffered harm, that is, the corporation. In some cases, this will be obvious: a sole director and shareholder is effectively the same thing as the corporation and a statement by them may readily be considered to be a statement made by the corporation. A statement by a former, disenchanted chair of the board of a large publicly listed corporation may be a different matter entirely. A statement by a shadow director may be different again. It may be the case that, if objection is taken to the admissibility of hindsight evidence sought to be given by a person with a past or present association with a corporate plaintiff then a voir dire will be needed to ascertain whether a statement by that person is a statement "by" the corporation under section 5D(3)(b). If it is, then the evidence is not admissible.

Mr Easton and ASOF

ASOF, formerly "The August Lind Special Opportunity Fund, LP", is a Delaware limited partnership, organised as such on 9 December 2010. There is no evidence as to what a limited partnership incorporated in Delaware, USA, is. Is ASOF a corporation, body corporate or politic and thus a person under the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)? It is not clear to me that ASOF is a corporation but it does seem to fit within the broader descriptions of "body corporate or politic". That ASOF brings proceedings in this Court implies that it has sufficient personality to fit within this description.
The Lind Partners LLC, an investment fund manager based in New York, manages ASOF. Mr Easton is the managing director of The Lind Partners LLC. Mr Easton founded The Lind Partners LLC in December 2010, which I note is also when ASOF came into existence. There was a Limited Partnership Agreement, which is not in evidence, but which it appears from the financial statements of ASOF governed the provision of services by The Lind Partners LLC to ASOF. I also note that Mr Easton's middle name, "Lind", appears in the names of both ASOF (when it came into existence) and The Lind Partners LLC and thus I infer that Mr Easton or his family have some connection with both entities.
Mr Easton is responsible for making final decisions regarding the investment and use of ASOF's assets, although he makes those decisions in consultation with senior members of his team as well as external consultants. Mr Easton does not give any details of the membership of "his team" or its senior members.
According to the financial statements for ASOF for the year ended 31 December 2012, The Lind Partners LLC was responsible for managing ASOF's investment activities and was also responsible for managing the administrative matters of ASOF. Admiral Administration (US) LLC was the administrator for ASOF and received $3,000 a month for its services. The notes to the financial statements record that, in respect of the value attributed to ASOF's investments: The Investment Manager has a Valuation Committee that review and approves the process for determining the fair value estimates prepared by the Investment Manager. The Committee meets on a monthly basis to review the fair value determinations for [ASOF]. The financial statements do not reveal the identity of the Investment Manager (although the financial statements for 31 December 2013 identify the Investment Manager, in that year at least, as The Lind Partners LLC) or the membership of the Valuation Committee.
The notes to the financial statements also record that The Lind Partners LLC is authorised to admit limited partners to ASOF, to accept additional capital contributions from existing partners, and to deal with requests from partners to withdraw their capital.
In respect of related party transactions, the notes to the financial statements record that The Lind Partners LLC does not charge ASOF a management fee in connection with the services that it provides to ASOF. The Lind Partners LLC is, however, entitled to a performance allocation and also to be reimbursed by ASOF for operational expenses (primarily rent and staff compensation) incurred by The Lind Partners LLC in connection with its delivery of services to ASOF in accordance with ASOF's Limited Partnership Agreement. In respect of "subsequent events", the financial statements noted that The Lind Partners LLC had evaluated events through to 7 May 2013, being the date that the financial statements were available to be issued.
By 31 December 2013, Lind Partners Australia LLC was responsible for ASOF's overall management and, according to the financial statements, had "complete discretion regarding [ASOF's] assets in accordance with [ASOF's] investment objectives". The Lind Partners LLC was responsible for managing the administrative matters of ASOF. Thus, Lind Partners Australia LLC had taken over the role of The Lind Partners LLC in admitting further partners, accepting additional capital contributions, dealing with withdrawal notices and receiving a performance allocation. Mr Easton's connection with Lind Partners Australia LLC is not known. Neither Lind Partners Australia LLC nor The Lind Partners LLC charged a management fee in connection with the services provided to ASOF and both were reimbursed for operational expenses incurred in connection with delivery of services to ASOF. Administration (US) LLC remained the administrator of ASOF.
Having regard to this evidence, can Mr Easton's statements of hindsight evidence be considered to be a statement "made by the person" who suffered harm, that is, ASOF. On the available evidence, can Mr Easton be regarded as ASOF's sole director, "guiding mind", director, person responsible for the project in question or decision maker, or is he more distant in the nature of an employee of a related company giving evidence in a sufficient dispassionate capacity that his statements cannot be considered to be a statement made by ASOF? On the evidence available to me, I am not satisfied that a statement made by Mr Easton is a statement made by ASOF. There is insufficient evidence as to the nature of ASOF, its relationship with The Lind Partners LLC and its relationship with Mr Easton for me to be satisfied that this is the case. Accordingly, I admit the hindsight evidence and will give it appropriate weight consistently with Chappel v Hart and Rosenberg v Percival.

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