5. The effect of the trustee's objection was that the Applicant's bankruptcy was extended to 13 May 2031.
6. On 6 January 2024, the Applicant requested review of the trustee's objection. The Inspector-General may review the decision to file a Notice of Objection if requested to do so by the bankrupt provided that the reasons appear to the Inspector-General to be sufficient to justify such a review.[3]
7. The Inspector-General must cancel the objection if satisfied of certain matters specified in section 149N(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). If the Inspector-General is not satisfied of those matters the decision must be confirmed.[4]
8. The Inspector-General must not cancel the objection if:[5]

(a) The objection specifies at least one special ground; and > > (b) There is sufficient evidence to support the existence of at least one special ground specified in the objection; and > > (c) The bankrupt fails to establish that the bankrupt had a reasonable excuse for the conduct or failure that constituted the special ground.

9. Each of the trustee's grounds for objection to discharge are special grounds under s 149N(1A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
10. On 21 February 2024, the delegate of the Inspector General decided not to review the trustee's decision to file a notice of objection pursuant to s 149K(5) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The delegate was not satisfied that there were sufficient grounds to justify a review.
11. The Applicant relies upon his affidavit sworn on 22 March 2026 and the annexures thereto. The Applicant has provided written submissions dated 22 March 2026 and a statement of facts, issues and contentions dated 25 February 2026.
12. The Respondent opposes the application for an extension of time and relies on written submissions dated 10 March 2026.
13. The Applicant was self-represented. The parties made oral submissions to the Tribunal on 24 March 2026.
14. Section 18 of the ART Act provides that an application to the Tribunal for review must be made within the period prescribed by the rules (namely 28 days). The Tribunal has a discretion pursuant to s 19(2) of the ART Act to extend the period during which an Applicant may apply for review "if the Tribunal considers that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so." The explanatory memorandum for the Administrative Review Tribunal Bill 2023 provides that s 19 of the ART Act is equivalent to ss 29(7), (8), (9) and (10) of the AAT Act and says that the minor updates reflect modern drafting practices and do not affect the operation or effect of the provision.
15. The exercise of the discretion is informed by the objective in s 9 of the ART Act of providing an independent mechanism of review that is, relevantly, fair and just; and that ensures that applications to the Tribunal are resolved as quickly as a proper consideration of the matters before the Tribunal permits.
16. From a consideration of Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen, Minister for Home Affairs and Environment[6] and Comcare v A'Hearn,[7] the following principles guide, not in any exhaustive manner, the Tribunal's discretion whether to grant an extension of time to apply to the Tribunal:

(a) The provision of an acceptable explanation for the delay. Special circumstances need not be shown but the Tribunal will not grant the application unless positively satisfied that it is proper so to do. The "prescribed period" of twenty-eight days is not to be ignored. Indeed, it is the prima facie rule that proceedings commenced outside that period will not be entertained. The length of delay is relevant. > > (b) Action taken by the Applicant, other than by making an application for review under the ART Act, is relevant to the consideration of the question whether an acceptable explanation for the delay has been furnished. A distinction is to be made between the case of a person who, by non-curial means, has continued to make the decision-maker aware that they contest the finality of the decision (who has not rested on their rights) and a case where the decision-maker was allowed to believe that the matter was finally concluded. > > (c) Any prejudice to the Respondent including any prejudice in defending the proceedings occasioned by the delay is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension. However, the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension. > > (d) The merits of the substantial application.

17. In terms of an assessment of the merits of the case French J (as His Honour then was) observed in Seiler v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs that: [8]

... To say a substantive application has a reasonable prospect of success is to say no more than that there is a finite non-trivial probability that it will succeed....It is difficult to imagine any case which appeared weak but not hopeless in which it would be proper to refuse an extension on that account. On the other hand, the stronger the case appears to be, the higher may be the probability that an injustice will be done if an extension is refused. So a strong case may be a positive factor in favour of the grant of extension, but an apparently weak case cannot be treated as a factor weighing against it...

1. As to the required extent of investigation into the merits Katzmann J said in Actew AGL Distribution v Australian Energy Regulator that:[9]

... it is inappropriate for this purpose to fully investigate the merits, although an obvious strength or weakness in the applicant's case is a factor for or against the exercise of the discretion. ...

1. Further, Besanko J said in Hamden v Secretary, Department of Human Services:[10]

As far as the merits of the substantive application are concerned, it is not for the Court to determine the application at this stage. However, an extension of time should not be granted if the substantive application is not reasonably arguable. Furthermore, if the prospects of success of a substantive application are plainly strong or plainly weak, then that may be a relevant consideration depending on the nature of the other factors (for example, the period of the delay and the explanation for it) relevant to the application for an extension of time.Applicant submissions and evidence

1. The Applicant submits that there is an adequate explanation for the delay in bringing the application for review, that he has an arguable case to set aside the decision under review and that no prejudice would be suffered by the Respondent if the extension of time is granted.
2. With respect to explanation for delay, the Applicant relies upon his medical history and in particular that he suffered from a major depressive disorder and renal failure. The Applicant attributes his failure to bring an application for review within time to his medical conditions.
3. The Applicant referred the Tribunal to a letter from a consultant respiratory and sleep physician dated 21 April 2022 which referred to a past medical history of renal impairment, multi-nodule goitre, hypertension, sleep apnoea, functional immunodeficiency, sleeve gastrectomy, obesity, GOUD and gout. The Applicant experienced deterioration in his kidney condition and was hospitalised at the Royal North Shore Hospital on or about 28 April 2025 from which time he commenced dialysis. He currently receives dialysis treatment three days a week at the Department of Renal Medicine in the Royal North Shore Hospital.
4. With respect to the major depressive disorder, the Applicant relies upon a letter from a consultant clinical psychologist dated 7 March 2024 which stated that the Applicant is under treatment which began on 16 February 2024 and that he will require ongoing intervention for some time. The Applicant also relies upon a medical assessment dated 21 June 2024 from a medical assessor arising from a motor vehicle accident on 18 August 2023 which refers to an assessment of major depressive disorder. In a letter from First Care Medical Centre Bankstown dated 5 March 2026 there is a reference to past medical history of insomnia on 2 April 2024 and reactive depression on 16 July 2024.
5. The Applicant said that his mental health and general well-being was impacted significantly by the unexpected death of his father on 26 May 2024. The Applicant suffered further loss when his brother died in late February or early March 2025.
6. The Applicant said that he was in no condition to make an application to the Tribunal and pursue proceedings. He said that his mental health condition was very serious and hinders how he functions. In addition, his renal condition poisons his body and mind. These medical conditions combined with the trauma of losing his father and brother explain the delay from March 2024 to August 2025.
7. When asked if he received the letter giving the decision under review dated 21 February 2024, the Applicant said

"I think I remember receiving it. I may have seen it, I just don't know. I'm not saying it wasn't sent, my brain was very foggy."

1. The Applicant said that he later retrieved the letter from his email account so he must have received it.
2. The Applicant said that he was engaging with the trustee which is evident from email communications in July 2024, September 2024 and March 2025. He said he was putting a lot of effort into resolving matters with the trustee. He accepted that he had brought an appeal seeking an annulment of the sequestration order in the Federal Court on 7 April 2024 and that he had filed a further application on 23 July 2024 in the Federal Court requesting that he be able to leave Australia to be with his son and wife in Honolulu for a period of five days. When asked how he was able to bring proceedings in the Federal Court despite his medical conditions, the Applicant said that it was not a simple matter to go to the Tribunal because he was not familiar with what was needed to engage with the Tribunal.

1. There is no doubt that the Applicant has had medical and personal issues since he received notice of the decision by email on 21 February 2024. However, I am not satisfied that they provide an adequate explanation for why the Applicant delayed applying to the Tribunal for approximately 15 months instead of within the 28 day period that was clearly stated in the 21 February 2024 communication.
2. The letter from the consultant clinical psychologist dated 7 March 2024 said that the Applicant had been under treatment from 16 February 2024 but it provided no diagnosis of a mental health condition or any detail of what that treatment was and how it impacted the Applicant. The Applicant relies upon a medical assessment from the personal injury commission dated 21 June 2024 which refers to a major depressive disorder as an injury "referred to me for assessment... and determined to be not caused by the motor accident". There are passing references to depression in the medical history taken from clinical notes which include an advice of depression and commencement of Zoloft to treat PTSD on 18 October 2017 with a further reference to depression on 6 July 2018 and 2019. The Applicant was referred to a psychologist on 5 March 2026 by letter from First Care Medical Centre which referred to a history of ADHD and mood disorder including reactive depression as at 16 July 2024 and insomnia on 2 April 2024.
3. The reference to reactive depression in July 2024 is consistent with the evidence from the Applicant that his father died unexpectedly on 26 May 2024.
4. The evidence does provide some grounds for the Applicant being impacted by mental health issues at around the time of or shortly after the date he was required to file his application for review in the Tribunal, namely 20 March 2024. This evidence would provide a satisfactory explanation for a delay of about three to four months but there is very little evidence as to his mental health condition and the treatment that he was receiving in the period later in 2024 and throughout 2025.
5. Even if I were to accept that there is satisfactory evidence of a diagnosis of an ongoing major depressive disorder, there is very little probative evidence as to how and to what extent the disorder impaired his functions and impacted upon him more generally. To the contrary, there is evidence that suggests that he was not significantly impaired by his mental health condition because he was able to file a notice of appeal seeking an annulment of the sequestration order on 7 April 2024 and file an application seeking consent to travel on 23 July 2024. Earlier in January 2024, the Applicant had applied to the Inspector-General of Bankruptcy for a review of the trustee's decision to object to discharge. Further evidence that he was not significantly impaired is that he was able to engage lawyers in July 2024 and deal with the Law Society in another matter. The question to which there is not an adequate response is why he was unable to file an application for review in the Tribunal in that same period if he was able to file two separate sets of proceedings in the Federal Court and engage lawyers for the purpose of a matter involving the Law Society.
6. With respect to renal impairment and associated conditions there is evidence of such a condition in the letter dated 21 April 2022 and there is further evidence of a deterioration in his kidney condition from April 2025. Once again, the evidence does not establish how this condition prevented him from filing an application for review in the Tribunal within time.
7. I am not satisfied that the Applicant's mental or physical conditions is a satisfactory explanation for the delay of 15 months in filing the application for review. The length of delay is very significant and weighs heavily against an extension.
8. The evidence of the Applicant's dealings with the trustee suggests that the Applicant was aware of the option to file an application for review in the Tribunal but decided not to act until much later. In the Applicant's email dated 25 September 2024 he explains to the trustee that he had been dealing with the Law Society which took longer than anticipated but that he had complied with requests and had nothing further to add. He asked the trustee to contact him if further information was required and said "if I don't hear back from you by Monday, 30 September 2024 then I will have no options but to file with the AAT to review the decision if it is still maintained of eight years." The email dated 25 September 2024 is the first evidence of notice to the trustee that the Applicant did not accept the decision of 21 February 2024 and that he was considering an appeal to the Tribunal.
9. I note that the trustee did respond to the Applicant by 30 September 2024 and confirmed that there were outstanding requests for information.
10. In a later communication with his trustee on 9 March 2025, the Applicant said that if he did not hear back by 13 March 2025 that he would "file an application with the AAT." However, the Applicant did not file his application for review until 31 August 2025 and it appears from his email communications that he was content to rest on his rights in relation to an appeal to the Tribunal and that he had an alternative strategy which was to try to deal with his trustee in relation to outstanding requests for information.
11. In any event there is no evidence that the Applicant advised the Respondent that he was contesting the decision. Further, in so far as notice was given to his trustee, I consider that the Applicant did not take appropriate or timely steps to inform the trustee of an intention to appeal to the Tribunal. This is a factor that weighs against granting an extension of time.
12. The Applicant contends that there would be no prejudice to the Respondent if an extension were granted. I disagree. I accept that prejudice is unlikely to be significant but there is a real chance that some prejudice would flow because it is now more than two years since the decision under review was made with a likely consequence of loss of memory of witnesses and ready access to relevant material. This is a factor in favour of not granting an extension, but I would give it little weight.
13. As to merits of the substantive proceeding, the question for the Tribunal, if an extension of time is granted, will be whether there is evidence to support the special grounds relied on and whether the Applicant had a reasonable excuse for the conduct constituting the special ground.
14. On the material currently before the Tribunal it appears that from 11 January 2023 the trustee was requesting the Applicant to provide books and records, to complete a Questionnaire and to surrender his passport. The responses from the Applicant or his representatives on 17 January 2023, 14 February 2023 and 1 September 2023 advised of health issues but did not comply with the trustee's requests. With respect to the passport, the Applicant declared in his statement of affairs on 12 May 2023 that he had an Australian passport but he failed to respond to a further request to deliver up the passport on 4 July 2023. The Applicant's passport was eventually seized by the Australian Federal Police when the Applicant was at the Sydney airport on 21 July 2023. As found by Katzmann J in the Federal Court matter of El-Hanania v Cull [2024] FCA 814, the Applicant had neglected to seek the trustee's consent before making arrangements to travel to Hawaii in July 2023.
15. The evidence currently indicates that the Applicant failed to provide the information and documentation requested by the trustee and that he failed to surrender his passport as required. Further, there is no probative evidence of a reasonable excuse for the abovementioned failures because the Applicant has not provided satisfactory evidence relating to his medical conditions (as set out earlier in these reasons). It follows that in my view the Applicant has poor prospects of success with respect to the substantive application. This is a further factor which weighs against granting an extension.
16. In summary, the Applicant has failed to provide an adequate explanation for the very lengthy delay of 15 months to bring his application for review of the 21 February 2024 decision. He rested on his rights and pursued an alternative strategy instead of an appeal to the Tribunal. There is likely to be prejudice, albeit minimal, to the Respondent in conducting a hearing after such significant delay. The Applicant's prospects of success on the substantive application are poor. In these circumstances, I do not consider it reasonable to grant an extension under s 19(2) of the ART Act. The application for an extension is refused.

I certify that the preceding 47 (forty-seven) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President P Britten-Jones.

....................................[SGD]....................................

[1] The Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 149(4).

[2] The Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 149B.

[3] The v Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 149K.

[4] The Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 149N(3).

[5] The Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 149N(1A).

[7] [1993] FCA 498; (1993) 45 FCR 441 at 444.

[8] [1994] FCA 12; (1994) 48 FCR 83 at [98].

[9] [2011] FCA 639; (2011) 195 FCR 142 at [111].

[10] [2013] FCA 3 at [40].