6.1.6 Observations
93 As the submissions for the interest-bearing clients explained, the evidence discloses that:
(1) Dr Cheng and Mr McCloskey were provided with the same or substantially the same PDS, FSG and terms and conditions;
(2) Dr Cheng and Mr McCloskey opened their accounts with USIG in the same way;
(3) the USIG bank account details forms given to Dr Cheng and Mr McCloskey were identical except for the specific account number (Dr Cheng deposited funds to USG's USD account while Mr McCloskey deposited funds to USG's GBP account);
(4) Dr Cheng and Mr McCloskey received what appear to be identical emails confirming the opening of their accounts, the relevant log in details for the MT4 trading platform, and instructions on how they could commence trading;
(5) Dr Cheng and Mr McCloskey could and did both log into the MT4 platform, which included similar information on available trades that could be placed;
(6) Dr Cheng and Mr McCloskey's account statements bear the same formatting, with both including heading levels for "Closed Transactions", "Open Trades" and "Working Orders";
(7) (a) investing clients had bonuses credited on the positive balance of their accounts from time to time, styled as a "monthly bonus reward", with USIG reserving "the right to adjust the rate of bonus", and that there would be a "monthly announcement of bonus rate", whereas (b) trading clients were awarded "bonus" trading credits.
94 Apart from USIG's internal records, there is no evidence indicating that investing clients understood that they had or might have opened two accounts with USIG, one for investing and one for trading. As the submissions for the interest-bearing clients say, the evidence indicates that those clients believed they had established one account with one login. The MT4 platform disclosed a single account to them.
95 The liquidators identified four main differences between trading clients and investing clients.
96 First, investing clients appear to have been paid interest calculated on the balance in their account. Trading clients were assigned bonus credits. On Dr Cheng's evidence his payments were represented to be a "monthly bonus reward" with USIG reserving "the right to adjust the rate of bonus" and that there would be a "monthly announcement of bonus rate". He received these payments irrespective of undertaking any trading. The evidence shows that trading clients were awarded "bonus" trading credits calculated by reference to their trading volumes.
97 Second, the liquidators consider that USIG's AFSL authorised it to undertake its activities with trading clients but did not authorise it to accept deposits from investing clients.
98 Third, USIG's liabilities to trading clients are recorded in its financial records whereas its liabilities to investing clients are not.
99 Fourth, all investing clients resided in China and Taiwan, whereas trading clients included people residing in other countries.
100 Of these four differences I consider only the first to be potentially material. I am unable to see how the other matters can be relevant to the application of s 981A(1) or s 763E of the Corporations Act.
101 Related to the first difference is the fact that investing clients, or at least some of them (including Dr Cheng), were told that USIG would use their deposits to provide leverage in foreign exchange transactions of USIG. It was submitted for the trading clients that this prevented the investing clients from arguing that their moneys were subject to any trust.
102 This submission, however, must be confined to a non-statutory trust outside of the scope of s 981A(1). This is because the statutory trust created by s 981H(1) applies to "money to which this Subdivision applies that is paid to the licensee", and under s 981A(1) the Subdivision applies to money paid as specified in that provision. Section 981A(1) does not exclude money paid that may be able to be used by the licensee for the licensee's own purposes. The definitions of "financial services" and "financial product" which are at the heart of s 981A(1) include circumstances in which a client pays money to another person to enable that other person to use the money to generate a financial return to the client: s 763B(a); see also various kinds of financial products in s 764A.
103 Further, as noted, cl 11.3(a) of USIG's terms and conditions (which undisputedly applied to trading clients) provided that trading clients authorised USIG "to withdraw, apply or otherwise utilise the Monies" in order to meet, amongst other things, "obligations … incurred by USG in connection with Contracts" and this right was specified as extending to USIG doing so in connection with any liabilities it incurred on behalf of any clients. In other words, USIG was able to withdraw the money of one trading client to pay liabilities USIG incurred on behalf of another trading client.
104 On this basis, there is no material difference between the positions of trading clients and investing clients merely because USIG was authorised to use the moneys of investing clients to provide it with leverage capacity in Margin FX Contracts. USIG was also authorised to use the moneys of trading clients to meet any of its liabilities incurred in connection with contracts of any trading client (including but not limited to minimum floating margin requirements imposed by a "Related Entity" or "wholesale liquidity provider" (as those terms are used in USIG's terms and conditions), or other hedging requirements).
105 For these reasons the apparent potentially material differences between the trading clients and investing clients are that: (a) the trading clients made money through their own trading activities and the receipt of bonus payments from USIG connected to their trading volume, and (b) the investing clients made money through depositing their money and the receipt of bonus payments from USIG connected to their deposit balance.
106 The matters below indicate that the approach of the trading clients to the position of the investing clients involves an over-simplification.
107 First, the evidence of Dr Cheng is that, although he did not intend to trade in Margin FX Contracts when he made his initial and other deposits with USIG, at all times, he understood that he could trade on his account if he wished. Dr Cheng thus deposited money on the basis that if he wished to trade on his account he could do so through the MT4 platform and in accordance with the PDS, FSG, and terms and conditions provided to him relating to such trading. Accordingly, when he made the payments to USIG, Dr Cheng did so in connection with a financial service that will or may be provided by USIG to Dr Cheng. That financial service was both the capacity to deal in a financial product as provided for in s 766C and the making of a market as provided for in s 766D(1).
108 The words "will or may be provided" in s 981A(1)(a)(i) must be given effect. Those words are used in contradistinction to "has been provided" in the same provision. The various phrases have both a temporal and qualitative meaning. A financial service has been provided if the client has received the financial service. A financial service will be provided if the client has not yet received the financial service but will do so. A financial service may be provided if the client has not yet received the financial service but may do so. In the case of the apparent relationship between Dr Cheng and USIG, USIG would be bound to permit Dr Cheng to trade on USIG's MT4 platform through his USIG account, if and when Dr Cheng chose to do so, because Dr Cheng had opened that account and deposited money into it.
109 On this basis, the fact that Dr Cheng did not intend to trade when he opened his USIG account is not material provided it can be inferred that, at that time, Dr Cheng intended that if he wished to trade in the future he could do so using his USIG account (that is, that USIG was bound to provide that service to him).
110 I would draw this inference given Dr Cheng's evidence that: (a) he always understood that he could use that account to trade if he wished, (b) he subsequently acted in accordance with that understanding by attempting to trade, (c) he was advised by Eddy that he did not have to trade, which is consistent with Dr Cheng's belief he could choose to trade at any time and would be able to do so, (d) the documents with which he was provided focused on the trading service USIG offered, (e) he created an account that gave him access to the MT4 platform, which was USIG's trading platform, and (f) all of USIG's representations to him were to the effect he could trade as and when he chose.
111 The fact that Dr Cheng's subsequent attempts to trade were unsuccessful does not alter the character of his deposits, at the time they were made, as the payment of money in connection with a financial service that, at the least, may be provided to him (or, arguably, will be provided to him by USIG subject only to the contingency of Dr Cheng deciding to do so).
112 Other evidence supports the inference that the agreement between USIG and investing clients (not just interest-bearing clients) included, as part of the transaction, the capacity for the investing clients to trade with USIG as the counter-party as and when they chose to do so. The evidence includes that:
(1) it should be inferred that Eddy, an agent of USIG, dealt with other clients in much the same way as he dealt with Dr Cheng, including providing them with the same kinds of information;
(2) the experience of Mr Wang, another investing client, is consistent with that of Dr Cheng, including having to choose his leverage (relevant only to trading) and the requirement to acknowledge the PDS and terms of business, FSG and online terms and conditions all of which relate to trading;
(3) it is apparent that all such clients had access to the MT4 platform;
(4) it should be inferred that all such clients were subject to the same or similar representations by USIG;
(5) it should be inferred that Mr Huang, another agent of USIG, intended that investing clients should be provided with the PDS, FSG and other terms of trading, which reinforces the importance of the capacity to trade as and when those client chose, USIG being bound to provide that service;
(6) the 12% bonus program operated by reference to a minimum number of trades, reinforcing that the other investment products included a capacity to trade whenever the client wished; and
(7) USIG provided other products (the U-PLUS products) in which the client agreed that another entity (Shenzhen Hefu Asset Management Company) would trade on the clients' account.
113 The fact that Mr Wang used a "special account" portal to access the MT4 platform does not enable an inference to be drawn that this somehow precluded trading. Nor does the fact that Dr Cheng, when he tried to trade, could not do so. When he contacted Eddy about not being able to use the MT4 platform to trade, Eddy did not suggest that Dr Cheng was not entitled to do so. He said that there was a temporary suspension of trading due to clients having suffered large losses. If the position had been that Dr Cheng was unable to trade because of the type of account he had opened it is difficult to imagine a reason why Eddy would not have told him this from the outset given Dr Cheng's apparent lack of interest in trading at that time.
114 The distinction USIG drew in its systems, between trading clients and investing clients, does not mean that the latter were not entitled to trade. The distinction may have served numerous purposes given that there was a difference between the two groups in that the former received bonuses relating to the volume of trades and the latter received bonuses relating to the balance in their account.
115 The fact that USIG did not record its liabilities to investing clients in its accounts is also explicable other than on the basis that those clients held no entitlement to trade. Recording those liabilities would have affected its profit position adversely and may have exposed it to questions by regulatory authorities and others about its authority under its AFSL to take apparent deposits.
116 The fact that the liquidators' investigations show that 92% of investing clients also held trading accounts does not mean that 8% of investing clients were not entitled to trade. As noted, USIG's financial records are unreliable. The fact that those records show 8% of investing clients did not have a trading account is explicable other than by inferring those clients had no right to trade. The records may be wrong (as they are wrong in numerous other respects). The records may reflect clients who had not made or attempted to trade. In these circumstances, and to the extent the records are reliable to show the activities of trading clients, they must be equally reliable to show that the vast majority of investing clients had trading accounts.
117 There is another reason why it may be inferred that it was important for USIG to ensure that it had agreed with investing clients that, as and when they wished, they could trade through the MT4 platform. It is that USIG's licence, from about 2012, did not authorise USIG to take money on deposit. By agreeing with investing clients that it would be the counter-party for any trading activities they wished to undertake, it became arguable that USIG's dealings with these clients were authorised by its AFSL. It may be inferred that this was important to USIG.
118 Having regard to these matters, the better view is that s 981A(a)(i) of the Corporations Act (money paid in connection with a financial service) applies to the investing clients, just as it applies to the trading clients.
119 For s 981A(1)(a)(i) there is no provision equivalent to s 763E of the Corporations Act (incidental financial products). In any event, I would not accept the submission of the trading clients that s 763E of the Corporations Act applies to the investing clients. A matter which is "incidental" is something "fortuitous" or in "subordinate conjunction with something else" (Macquarie Dictionary Online). I would not consider the entitlement of investing clients to trade as and when they wished to be fortuitous or in subordinate conjunction with their purpose of investing. I infer that for both USIG and the investing clients the capacity to trade, from the inception of each account and deposit, was an important component of the service that USIG provided.
120 Second, and irrespective of the entitlement of investing clients to trade, I consider that s 981A(1)(a)(ii) of the of the Corporations Act (money paid in connection with a financial service) applies to the investing clients, by reason of s 763B(a)(ii) (the investor intends that the other person will use the contribution to generate a financial return, or other benefit, for the investor). An important aspect of the dealings between USIG and investing clients (which, as noted, despite appearances, was similar to the position of trading clients given cl 11 of the trading terms, discussed above) is that investing clients made money either by making their money available to USIG to use to leverage its deals as the counter-party with trading clients (and investing clients who traded) or by trading. Relevantly:
(1) Dr Cheng was expressly told by USIG's agent, Eddy, that USIG would use his money so USIG could use it to leverage USIG's foreign exchange transactions;
(2) Mr Huang, USIG's agent, also understood and, no doubt, would have informed investing clients that USIG would use their money to leverage USIG's foreign exchange transactions and that the client's money was safe because USIG would sell its position if losing money on the transaction before any client money was lost; and
(3) USIG or its agents, specifically Mr Huang, created documents which it should be inferred were to inform agents and prospective clients of the investing products which disclosed that "USGFX leverages the funds with a view to increase the transaction volume of transaction clients so that handling fee earnings may be enhanced. The company shares the handling fee earnings that it collects with the clients. This is the basis for the profits of the custodian account".
121 Accordingly, in making their money available to USIG to use to leverage its deals as the counter-party with trading clients (and investing clients who traded), it may be inferred that the investing clients knew and intended that USIG would use their money to generate a financial return for them in the form of the bonus monthly payments which, in fact, were a share of the transaction fees USIG earned from clients who traded through its MT4 platform.
122 The investing clients also had no day-to-day control over the uses which USIG made of their money to generate the return as required by s 763B(b).
123 Given that the way in which USIG could offer these bonus payments to investing clients was by using the clients' money to leverage its transactions as the counter-party, it is not apparent why the trading clients submit that the evidence does not permit the conclusion of a relevant connection between the making of the deposit and its use by USIG to generate a return. That connection is consistently disclosed in all of the available evidence about the terms on which USIG dealt with investing clients.
124 The nature of the deal between the investing clients and USIG also tends to explain why it was important that the investing clients be provided with the PDS, FSG, and terms and conditions under which trading occurred. As noted, I infer that all clients were given the same or substantially the same basic information which related to trading. Provision of information of that kind to a client not intending to trade at the time of opening the account would raise the obvious question of how USIG would pay the bonus amounts per month. Eddy and Mr Huang knew that USIG used the money to leverage its position in Margin FX Contracts as the counter-party, and that part of the transaction fees charged to clients who traded was the source of the bonus payments to the investing clients. Eddy did not hesitate to inform Dr Cheng that this was how the bonus payments were generated by USIG. Mr Huang, it may be inferred, also had a spiel ready for prospective clients advising that their money was safe because USIG could sell the position before it lost any client money. Mr Huang also prepared documents disclosing this to be the source of the bonus payments generated by USIG and to be paid to investing clients. The obvious inference is that he intended agents to use those documents to explain to prospective clients how they would get their return and why their money was safe.
125 In these circumstances, for the trading clients to describe the investing products as a cash deposit with a fixed rate of return and to stress that the PDS, FSG, and terms and conditions, while given to the investing clients, had nothing to do with the investing products, misses the point. The investing clients were investing in USIG's making of a market for its Margin FX Contracts. They made money by sharing part of USIG's transaction fees for clients (including investing clients who wished to do so) trading Margin FX Contracts. For such clients, it was important to be given the PDS, FSG, and terms and conditions relating to trading, because they were participating in USIG's market.
126 On this basis, it should be inferred that USIG's agents had two basic ways of enticing prospective clients: (a) offering them the capacity to trade themselves, and (b) if they did not wish to trade when opening their account, offering them a way to benefit from USIG's trading market by depositing money to leverage USIG's trades and sharing in USIG's trading transaction fees, as well as a capacity to trade at any time they wished.
127 Given all of the available information I do not accept the trading clients' characterisation of the dealings between USIG and the investing clients as a form of term deposit offering monthly interest, where the investing clients neither knew nor cared how USIG generated its funds. If this were so, there was no reason for investing clients to be provided with the information relating to USIG's trading arrangements. USIG's agents would not have been so willing to explain to clients how the investing products worked. The fact that the agents also described the investing products as like a savings account (as money was deposited and monthly bonus payments received) raised the obvious question which Dr Cheng asked as to how USIG made the money to pay the monthly bonuses. As noted, both the fact of Eddy's answer and the preparation of material giving that answer by Mr Huang indicate that it was an important part of USIG's marketing via agents to investing clients that they could share in USIG's profits from its derivatives market by making money available to USIG for leveraging. That the money would also provide a return to USIG does not change the fact that, from the investing clients' perspective, their purpose in making the deposit was for USIG to use the money to generate a return for the client.
128 In these circumstances, s 763E is also inapplicable. The financial product was not incidental to the facility. Nor was the inferred financial product purpose of the investing clients.
129 Otherwise, I consider that it cannot be the case that the statutory trust under s 981H is defeated merely because the licensee does not in fact pay the money into an account that satisfies s 981B. The operation of s 981H does not depend on compliance by the licensee with any of its obligations. This makes sense, as a licensee should not be in any better position in respect of a client merely because the licensee has breached any of its statutory obligations.
130 Although use of funds from trust accounts for hedging was unlawful from 4 April 2018 (as a result of the introduction of s 981D(2) and reg 7.8.02A), there is no reason to infer that USIG complied with this requirement. In any event, the commingling of funds continued and thus it should be inferred that moneys with hedging counter-parties are also impressed with the statutory trust.
131 These conclusions are consistent with the conclusions of Black J in MF Global, despite that case being decided before the introduction of s 981D(2) and reg 7.8.02A. Further, and contrary to the liquidators' submissions, I do not see why the reasoning in MF Global at [242] might be distinguishable in respect of moneys received back from hedging counter-parties. In particular, given the arrangements between USIG and its clients, I consider that such payments would be to the licensee in its capacity as a person acting on behalf of the client as referred to in s 981A(1)(b)(iii). Although the liquidators noted that "[o]f the $1,978,807 recovered since the date of appointment, $1,115,615.37 was recovered from a hedge provider with whom no transactions occurred other than through Operating Accounts", which is different from MF Global, the operating accounts themselves are impressed with the statutory trust.
132 Further, the fact that USIG, on a regular basis, compared client net equity as indicated on the MT4 platform with the balances of trust accounts and swept any excess or deficiency from or to those trust accounts from operating accounts (see Krejci 1 [133(b)]) is not determinative. The circumstances of commingling in the present case necessitate a more broad-brush approach than might otherwise be the case. This conclusion also applies to the fact that USIG treated moneys paid by hedging counter-parties as company assets, not client funds.
133 It will be apparent that in the above analysis I have drawn no distinction between investing clients and interest-bearing clients. I do not consider the distinction to be justified on the material for a number of reasons:
(1) there is no evidence supporting the inference that any investing client was not also an actual or potential trading client. The evidence that might point to the contrary, discussed above, is equally explicable by other circumstances;
(2) there is no evidence indicating that USIG distinguished between investing clients and interest-bearing clients. That is a distinction introduced by the legal representatives of Dr Cheng on the (proper) basis that there might be a group of investing clients who, unlike Dr Cheng, had no entitlement to trade;
(3) on the evidence, there is a group of investing clients (the U-PLUS clients) who did not trade on their accounts themselves, but agreed that another entity could trade on their accounts for them. There cannot be any serious doubt on the evidence that these clients knew that they were agreeing that the other entity could use their money to trade to make a profit for the client and themselves;
(4) there is no reason to infer that there is a class of investing clients who were not entitled to trade if they wished to do so. Inferring the existence of such a class raises the question of why such a class would exist. Nothing in the evidence explains why USIG would wish to prevent investing clients from trading if they so wished. If they traded and lost money, USIG earned transaction fees from their trading and the account balance would reduce thereby reducing the bonus payments USIG had to make. If they traded and made money, USIG would have to pay more in bonuses, but it also earned the transaction fees on their trading activities and had more money available to leverage its transactions; and
(5) given this and the other evidence referred to above, I infer that all investing clients were also actual or potential trading clients.
134 On this basis, in terms of the application of s 981A(1) of the Corporations Act, there is no proper foundation to distinguish between the trading clients and investing clients. They both have the benefit of the statutory trust provided by s 981H. The extent of the trust in favour of each such client is co-extensive.
135 While the liquidators submitted that, for example, any refund from the ATO would not be subject to the trust, I am unable to agree. It is necessary on the evidence to infer that tax liabilities were paid from commingled statutory trust and other funds. On that basis, any refund from the ATO should be treated as a refund of moneys into the commingled account from which the payment of the liability was made.
136 For the reasons given I have reached an equivalent conclusion in respect of payments by hedge counter-parties.
137 Further, and similarly, while there was no mixing as between term deposits and any account other than the operating accounts, the mixing that affected the operating accounts is sufficient to ensure the statutory trust also extends to the term deposits.
138 The money recovered from offshore money processors, on the evidence, must be client money. As the liquidators submitted, it would be odd if a licensee could escape the statutory trusts imposed by the Corporations Act by ensuring that clients paid moneys into foreign accounts that were not authorised. As the moneys that were repaid by money processors are not clearly referable to particular client deposits, the same pragmatic approach is necessary and appropriate in the circumstances. Mr Krejci's evidence is that these repayments far exceeded the amounts disclosed in USIG's records as owing from the money processors, apparently because they constituted a "rolling reserve", the source of which is unclear (see Krejci 1 [201], [202]).
139 The same conclusion applies to all potential sources of funds which the liquidators have identified.
140 I recognise that these conclusions will adversely affect unsecured creditors but that is a consequence of the circumstances and the operation of r .8.03(6)(c) of the Corporations Regulations.