AAA21 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 391

1. The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 10 December 2020 which affirmed an earlier decision of a delegate of the first respondent (delegate) not to grant the first applicant a Protection (Class XA) (subclass 866) visa (protection visa) under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).

1. On 27 June 2016, the applicant, a citizen of Bangladesh, lodged an application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration. On 12 May 2017, a delegate refused to grant the applicant a protection visa.
2. On 5 June 2017, the applicant lodged an application for merits review of the delegate's decision with the Tribunal.
3. On 9 December 2020, the applicant appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments.
4. On 10 December 2020, the Tribunal gave its decision.

1. Before the Tribunal, the applicant advanced three claims for protection. One of those claims was a new claim, not raised previously.
2. The first claim, which was a new claim not raised in his protection visa application, was a claim that he worked as an 'illegal money launder' laundering money in Bangladesh for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League, neither of whom would protect him if he returned to Bangladesh. He claimed that his family were harmed because of his involvement, and he faced "trouble" because of it. He claimed that he was sent to Australia by the boss of the money laundering operation. He claimed was his boss who organised everything and transferred property into the applicant's name and a factory, so he could be issued a visa to come to Australia.
3. The second claim was that if returned to Bangladesh he would face a false criminal case that had been filed against him in the Magistrates' Court in Bangladesh.
4. The third claim was a claim that if he returned to Bangladesh, as a member of the BNP, he would be harmed by the Awami League thugs, or arrested from Awami League police where he would be tortured in jail without trial, or that Bangladeshi terrorists would kill him.
5. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant was a credible witness with respect to the first money laundering claim, noting that claim was not raised in his protection visa application or in the interview with the delegate. The Tribunal found that he had created a narrative with respect to the money laundering claims to bolster his protection claims.
6. The Tribunal set out the applicant's evidence surrounding the second claim, the claim of a false criminal case, or 'false case' against him. The Tribunal noted the applicant had told the delegate he applied for a protection visa because he had found out there was a warrant against him, with the allegation that he was holding explosives for a bus attack, which was "very different" to the current explanation that he applied for a protection visa because he was "in the middle of something" involving money laundering, and that his criminal case had already been 'cleared...up' before he left Bangladesh.
7. The Tribunal found the claimed 'false case' had been fabricated to bolster the applicant's protection claims, noting the inconsistencies in his evidence and the failure to provide such details to the delegate.
8. As to the third claim, the Tribunal recorded that it received evidence from the author of a letter submitted to it by the applicant at the Tribunal hearing, who it found to be a credible witness. The Tribunal was satisfied the author's evidence established that the applicant was a member of the 'convener committee' in the BNP in 1998 and was involved from around 1995 to 1998, however was not satisfied he was involved in any political activity from 1998 onwards. The Tribunal noted that country information suggested that senior members of the BNP faced travel bans, and the applicant's ability to leave Bangladesh suggested he was not of interest to the authorities. The applicant's explanation that his departure was organised by his money laundering boss, was rejected by the Tribunal as it had earlier rejected the claim that he had been involved in any money laundering. The Tribunal accordingly found the applicant was not involved in any political activity after 1998 and had never been harmed previously in Bangladesh due to his political opinion or activity and would not face such harm upon return to Bangladesh.
9. The Tribunal noted the additional documents that had been submitted by the applicant and asked him to explain how the letters from Reverend Raymond Kim were relevant to his protection claims. The applicant claimed they were important because they teach him the Bible.
10. The Tribunal asked the applicant how the various medical reports were relevant to this claim He said he was unwell and now legally blind. The Tribunal asked how that related to his protection claims. The applicant said that in 2016 he was admitted to hospital and that is the reason that his delegate interview was rescheduled and he provided that material.
11. The Tribunal accepted the applicant suffered from glaucoma and had diabetes and other physical and mental health issues, however, did not accept any of those health problems could be attributed to claimed past harm in Bangladesh, or that there was a risk of harm due to his medical conditions.
12. The Tribunal concluded the applicant had fabricated the money laundering claims such that everything arising out of those claims were rejected in their entirety, and that the applicant had embellished his profile as a member of the BNP and he had joined the BNP in Australia for the sole purpose of claiming protection in Australia as he had not been involved in the BNP since 1998.
13. The Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant's protection visa.

1. The applicant relies on an amended application filed on 24 May 2021. The amended application contains nine grounds of review. They are (as written):
   1. The Administrative Appeal Tribunal (The Tribunal) made a jurisdictional error in that the applicant was denied procedural fairness and denied natural justice.

2. The tribunal in its decision made and signed on 10 December 2020 relied upon

country information and inconsistencies in the appellant's claims set out in the protection visa application and the claims made before the Tribunal as part of the reason for affirming the decision under review. It failed to put those inconsistencies in writing to the appellant for comment. Please refer to NAZY v MIMIA [2005] FCA 744 (23 June 2005) and MIMIA v AL Shammy (2001) I 10 FCR 27 (24 July 2001).

1. The tribunal did not provide the applicant with particulars of information whatever they obtained, if they, through the DFAT of Australian High Commission in Dhaka, Bangladesh. The applicant was not given an opportunity to comment on any adverse information available to the tribunal before the hearing.
2. The applicant is the appellant of an application for review a decision of the Tribunal (second respondent), which was rejected by the tribunal on IO Dec 2020. A legal issue which is 'Internal relocation' was not properly raised by the tribunal, to comment on, during the review process and no adverse material were put to the applicant that were take into consideration while the second respondent made his decision.
3. The tribunal has briefly described the definition of the refugee defined by the UN Convention and the definition of Complementary Protection visa (ss36(2A) of Migration Act 1958) that the Tribunal has assessed and reviewed the primary decision. The Tribunal, at any stage, did not confirm with the applicant whether he understood that crucial issues at all. Such failure amounted to a denial of procedural fairness and natural justice.
4. A further possible ground relates to the non-compliance by the Tribunal with s424A of the Migration Act 1958 in relation to that extract from the primary decision on which it relied. There is a reasonable argument that provided under s 422, there was a failure to comply with s424A in relation to the decision of the Tribunal. The tribunal was quite influenced and biased by the primary decision given by the delegate.
5. Post hearing the tribunal did not put any adverse issues, to the applicant, to make any comments, in writing, which were the reason, or part of the reason, for deciding that the applicant was not entitled to a protection visa.
6. The Tribunal did not use the country information as specific however, the general information gathered by the Tribunal considered to weigh against applicant's case in the final outcome. The Tribunal used all the information for a matter of reasoning and evaluation of the applicant's case for the protection visa. The tribunal 'misjudged' the claim and did not have a fresh look on to the claim.
7. In section "Analysis and Assessment" of the Tribunal 's decision it is clearly evident that the tribunal was rather interested to discredit the applicant's claim than to have a proper and fair look into the reason of his ' well-founded fear'. The tribunal was desperate to damage the applicant's credibility by unreasonably pursuing him on the aforementioned issue which was one of the information and or part of the information for which the Tribunal affirmed the primary decision.

1. On 10 December 2025, the proceedings were docketed to me and set down before me for final hearing on 25 February 2026.
2. The applicant filed submissions on 31 January 2026, which contains further grounds of review. Both the grounds in the amended application and the applicant's written submissions are considered below.
3. In reply to all grounds of review the first respondent filed written submissions on 11 February 2026, which the Minister relied upon at the hearing.
4. The Court can only grant relief in his case if it can be established that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by a jurisdictional error: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476.
5. In LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321 (LPDT), the plurality of the High Court stated that jurisdictional error can refer to breach of an express or implied condition of a statutory conferral of authority as follows at [2]-[3] (footnotes omitted):

Because an express or implied condition of a statutory conferral of decision-making can take many different forms, and because breach can occur in many different circumstances, the categories of jurisdictional error are not closed. Jurisdictional error on the part of a statutory decision-maker in making a decision can include: misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness.

1. It is settled law that the Court cannot review the merits of the Tribunal decision: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, and Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 (Djokovic) per Allsop J, Besanko and O'Callaghan JJ at [17]..

1. At the hearing of this matter on 25 February 2026 before me, the applicant appeared, unrepresented. He was assisted by a Bengali interpreter. Mr Wong of Minter Ellison appeared for the first respondent.
2. At the hearing, I asked the applicant if he wanted to rely upon any evidence in support of his case. He said no. After I admitted the Court Book and the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal, Mr Wong informed the Court, consistent with his model litigant obligations, that one of the grounds relied upon by the applicant in his written submissions would require evidence that is not in the Court Book or the Tribunal transcript. Mr Wong said he would not object to that evidence being given orally by the applicant.
3. Mr Wong referred the Court to page 3 of the applicant's written submissions where it was stated that the applicant was told by a Tribunal officer, outside the Tribunal hearing room and before the hearing, that only matters relevant to his existing political claim would be considered. The applicant also submitted that, acting on this guidance, he believed he was not permitted to raise his new claim regarding religious conversion. The applicant submitted this amounted to a denial of procedural fairness by the Tribunal.
4. I asked the applicant if he wanted to give oral evidence to the Court on this claim. He said yes. I permitted to the applicant to give evidence in the witness box on this issue. He was briefly cross-examined by Mr Wong. I will deal with this evidence below under the ground 13 (or the fourth ground raised in his written submissions).
5. After he gave evidence, I invited the applicant if he wanted to make submissions on his grounds of review in both his amended application and in his written submissions. The applicant told the Court everything he wanted to say was already in his written submissions.
6. Mr Wong made brief submissions on each of the grounds, re-iterating essentially what was said in the first respondent's written submissions.
7. In reply, the applicant made very brief submissions. He said it was unfair the Tribunal took less than a day to decide his case and submitted the Member could not have read everything in such a short period of time before giving his decision. The applicant then said all his problems had started after his conversion to Christianity in November 2021, and right after that event his wife and son went in to hiding in Bangladesh. Mr Wong said in reply to this submission, events which happened after the date of the Tribunal decision were not relevant to whether the Tribunal committed any error. I agreed, after explaining to the applicant the limited role the Court has to examining the Tribunal decision which was dated 10 December 2022.

1. Below the Court sets out its consideration of the grounds of judicial review in this matter, and whether the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error.

1. Firstly, I deal with the nine grounds set out in the amended application. In summary none of them disclose the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error.

1. In grounds 1, 2 and 3 the applicant makes a similar argument. He submits on these grounds that the Tribunal did not put the inconsistencies, which the Tribunal found in the applicant's evidence given to the Tribunal, to the applicant in writing for him to comment upon, before making the decision to affirm the delegate's decision. In relation to the country information, the applicant alleged the Tribunal did not provide him with particulars of information that the Tribunal had obtained through the DFAT office of the Australian High Commission in Bangladesh in advance of the decision so he could comment on it.
2. Each of these grounds have no merit. As to grounds 1 and 2, I do not accept the applicant's submissions that s 424A applied. It is well settled the Tribunal is not under any obligation in s 424A (or any other provision in Part 7 of the Act) to give to the applicant for comment its preliminary thought processes going to the assessment of the applicant's evidence given to the Tribunal. The High Court in SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [1981] HCA 26; (2007) 147 CLR 297 (SZBYR) at [18] held that "information" does not include the Tribunal's subjective appraisals, thought processes and determinations, findings of inconsistency, defects, gaps or lack of detail in an applicant's evidence.
3. I also agree with the first respondent's submission made at the hearing, the Tribunal is not required to provide the applicant with a running commentary on any of its preliminary subjective assessments of the applicant's evidence, or any inconsistencies in that evidence: see also MZXBQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 166 FCR 483; [2008] FCA 319 at [29]; SZTGV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 229 FAR 90; [2015] FCAFC 3 at [24].
4. As to ground 3, under s 424A(3)(a) the Tribunal is not obliged to put adverse country information, such as the DFAT report (referred to in TD [54]) to the applicant for comment, under s 424A(1). It is not "information " within the meaning of s 424A under the exception in s 424A(3)(a). In any event, the Tribunal did invite the applicant to comment on country information suggesting only high profile BNP figures were of interest to the Bangladeshi government: see TD [54].
5. Ground 1, 2 and 3 are rejected.

1. In ground 4 the applicant purports to Challenge the Tribunal decision on the basis that it failed to raise the issue of "internal relocation". I reject this ground of review on the basis that no issue of internal relocation arose in the present case. The Tribunal in its decision entirely rejected all the claims made by the applicant on the basis of adverse credibility findings. No issue of possible internal relocation arose or was considered by the Tribunal in the circumstances.
2. Ground 4 has no merit.

1. Under this ground the applicant argues the Tribunal did not confirm with the applicant whether he understood the crucial issue for determination in the review, namely weather he satisfied the refugee or complementary protection criteria under the Act and the applicant was therefore denied procedural fairness.
2. At the hearing Mr Wong took the Court to page 1 and 2 of transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal (exhibit R2). I consider that it is clear from those pages of the transcript (in particular TP1.35-TP2.50) that the Tribunal Member clearly explained to the applicant what the issues were for determination by the Tribunal in the review. In particular, the Tribunal Member correctly stated to the applicant what the relevant refugee or complementary protection criteria were under the Act and what the tribunal needed satisfied about in relation to that criteria.
3. Ground 5 has no merit.

1. As to ground 6, the applicant argues the Tribunal breached s 424A of the Act and was biased.
2. The obligations under s 424A were not engaged by any "information" that was before the Tribunal in the review. The information before the Tribunal was either information given to the Tribunal by the applicant, or country information. The law is settled under s 424A, information given by the applicant to the Tribunal for the purpose of his or her application for review is not "information" under s 424A under an exception in s 424A(3)(b) of the Act, and therefore no obligation arises under s 424A to provide that information to the applicant for comment, or to respond to it. For the reasons outlined in answer to ground 3 above, the Tribunal had no obligation under s 424A in respect of any country information it had before it.
3. On the argument of bias, there was no evidence of any bias given by the applicant to the Court. Nor was any written or oral submission made about what the particulars were for the alleged bias. Bias must be "distinctly made and clearly proved": see Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [69]. Without evidence, such an allegation must be dismissed.
4. Ground 6 has no merit.

1. This ground merely repeats in a slightly different way what was alleged in grounds 1, 2 and 3.
2. The Tribunal had no obligation under Part 7 of the Act to put to the applicant any "adverse" finding, i.e. subjective appraisal, to the applicant for comment before a decision was made. The Tribunal did not have any obligation to give a running commentary of its reasoning process to the applicant during the review hearing: see SZBYR.
3. Ground 7 is rejected.

1. In ground 8 the applicant alleges the Tribunal did not give the applicant's claim a "fresh look". It is argued that the Tribunal's did not properly consider the applicant's claims.
2. There are no particulars given for this argument. The applicant's written submissions do not address this ground in particular. Nor did the applicant make any oral submissions about this ground.
3. The Tribunal, after carefully considering all three claims, completely rejected them based on adverse credibility findings, including a finding that he had fabricated his claims of past harm and risk of future harm (see TD [64]). I accept the first respondent's submission at paragraph [36] of its written submissions as being an accurate summary of the Tribunal's consideration of the claims:

The Tribunal considered the applicant's protection claims associated with his activities as a money launderer in Bangladesh (at [35]-[43]), the false case criminal case (at [44]-[49]), and his involvement with the BNP in both Bangladesh and Australia (at [50]-[55]). The Tribunal also gave the applicant the opportunity to explain whether the other supporting documentation he had provided was relevant to his claims for protection (at [56]-[63]). The Tribunal noted that when given the opportunity to explain how each piece of additional evidence was relevant to his claim for protection, the applicant notably did not claim that he would suffer harm due to his attendance at Dr Kim's church and his study of the Bible, or due to his medical conditions (at [61]).

1. The Tribunal considered all the claims clearly articulated that arose squarely on the material before it. For these reasons ground 8 has no merit.

1. In this ground the applicant asserts the Tribunal was focussed on discrediting the applicant's claims, rather than having a proper and fair look at his well founded fear.
2. This ground is not particularised. There was no written or oral submission made about this ground by the applicant.
3. As has been discussed above, the Tribunal analysed in detail each of the claims of the applicant, including giving the applicant the opportunity to explain how each of the documents he submitted to the Tribunal support his claims for protection. The applicant did not detail any substantive response to any of the requests to explain the additional material. In my view the Tribunal's attempts to understand his claims at TD [56]-[63] show the Tribunal was seeking to inquire fairly about the claims he was making. I also accept the first respondent's submission that the Tribunal was not required to simply accept the claims uncritically.
4. As set out in TD [64] and elsewhere, the Tribunal after considering the evidence in detail, identified multiple aspects of the applicant's evidence which were inconsistent, and/or a fabrication. These findings were reasonably open on the evidence in my view.
5. Ground 9 has no merit.

GROUNDS REFERRED TO IN THE APPLICANT'S WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS DATED 31 JANUARY 2026

1. There were four more grounds referred to in the applicant's written submissions. I deal with those below as ground 10-13.

1. In ground 10 the applicant claims the Tribunal delivered its decision too quickly. The hearing before the Tribunal was on 9 December 2020, and the Tribunal delivered its written decision the next day, 10 December 2020. The applicant claims the "expedited nature of the decision" breached the requirements of procedural fairness on the basis that the Tribunal would not have been able to adequately assess the evidence or the relevant legal questions.
2. The applicant does not point to any specific problem or issue that arose as a consequence of the Tribunal delivering its written reasons the day after the hearing. He merely makes the general assertion that because the written decision was delivered the next day the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error. I reject that submission. I accept the first respondent's submission that just because a Tribunal delivers its decision swiftly, without more, is not of itself evidence of insufficient attention to the claims made by an applicant. The Tribunal did not commit jurisdictional error because it delivered its written decision the day after the hearing.
3. Ground 10 is rejected.

1. In ground 11 the applicant complains that there were significant deficiencies in the quality and accuracy of the interpretation materially affected the conduct of the hearing, resulting in a denial of procedural fairness.
2. This ground is not particularised in the applicant's written submissions, nor did he make any oral submissions about this ground before me. In Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 507; (1999) 92 FCR 6 (Perera), Kenny J held at [38] that in cases where it is alleged there were deficiencies in interpretation of the applicant's evidence the crucial question is whether there is evidence sufficient to make out a case that the interpretation before the Tribunal was so incompetent that he was prevented from giving his evidence to the Tribunal.
3. Justice Kenny also held in Perera,
   1. It is relevant that the applicant made timely complaint about the quality of the interpretation. I do not think it reasonable to expect, as the Tribunal apparently did, that a person, who is not sufficiently proficient in English to give evidence on his own behalf, would make immediate complaint at the hearing about the quality of his interpretative assistance.
4. In the present matter no complaint was made about the quality of the interpretation in the Tribunal on 9 December 2020, until the applicant filed his written submissions on 31 January 2026. Nor has any evidence been led about the quality and accuracy of the interpretation by the applicant.
5. I also note that according to the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal on 9 December 2020 at TP2, Line 93 to TP3, Line 98, the applicant confirmed he could understand the interpreter and was happy to use the interpreter that day.
6. Ground 11 has no merit.

1. In ground 12 the applicant claims the Tribunal failed to consider a claim, namely, a claim based on his conversion to Christianity which caused him to be disowned by his family and for his wife and son to be attacked by religious extremists. The applicant also claims under this ground the Tribunal referred to his religion as Islam at paragraph [13], which was an error, and failed to engage with his claim to have converted to Christianity, including his decision to swear on the Bible.
2. It is well established that the Tribunal is not obliged to deal with claims which are not articulated, and which do not "clearly arise" from the materials before it: see the Full Court in NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1. See also: VQAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 104 at [25] and [31.
3. The applicant in his written submissions does not make any further submission on this ground other than asserting he made a religious claim on the basis of his conversion to Christianity, and the Tribunal did not consider it.
4. On the issue of a failure to consider the claim based on his conversion to Christianity, the first respondent submitted that at the hearing before the Tribunal on 9 December 2020 the Member asked the applicant letters he had provided from Reverend Raymond Kim, and how they were relevant to the applicant's claim. The Tribunal records that the applicant responded, the letters were important because they taught him the Bible, and that he did not feel blind when he attended church (TD [59]). In other words, the first respondent submits, and I agree, the applicant did not make any express claim to fear harm in Bangladesh based on his conversion to Christianity.
5. The Tribunal found that the applicant at no point raised that he would be harmed due to his attendance at Dr Kim's church or study of the Bible (at [61]). This finding was reasonably open on the evidence. The argument the Tribunal did not consider a claim based on the applicant's conversion to Christianity has no basis, in my view.
6. On the issue of the claim that he has disowned by his family, and that his wife and son have been attacked by religious extremists in Bangladesh, again no such claim was ever made in the Tribunal. It is made for the first time in the applicant's written submissions to this Court.
7. Finally, the first respondent submitted the Tribunal's finding at paragraph [13] simply recorded what the applicant's religion was on his Protection visa application. The applicant himself had written "Islam" as his religion when he prepared it. There was no jurisdictional error in TD [13].
8. Ground 12 does not disclose the Tribunal committed any jurisdictional error.

1. In ground 13 the applicant claims he was advised by a Tribunal officer prior to the hearing at the Tribunal that he was not permitted to raise any new claims, and that only matters relevant to his existing political claims would be considered. He claimed he was therefore denied procedural fairness.
2. As outlined above, I permitted the applicant to give oral evidence before me in support of this claim as he had not filed any affidavit as to this issue. I also allowed Mr Wong to cross-examine the applicant.
3. The applicant gave evidence before me with the assistance of a Bengali interpreter. As he was unpresented, I asked the applicant if he could tell the Court what happened prior to the Tribunal hearing and what conversations he had with any officer of the Tribunal. He said he recalled having a conversation with a "girl" who asked him if he wanted to take an oath on a bible. I asked him if he had any discussion with a Tribunal officer before the hearing started, and if he wanted to give evidence about that conversation. He said, the only evidence I can give is that I touched the bible. He also said, he had already given the Court evidence of a certificate of conversion, that since 2021 he made mistakes, and that his eye doctor told him he was losing his eyesight. In cross examination the applicant said he could not remember if a Tribunal officer had told him that only matters relevant to his existing claim would be considered.
4. Given the applicant's evidence, I find there is no basis for the allegation the applicant was told by a Tribunal officer prior to the start of his hearing that, either, he was not permitted to raise any new claims, or that, only matters relevant to his existing political claims would be considered.
5. I consider ground 13 to have no merit.

1. The applicant has not established that the Tribunal's decision is affected by jurisdictional error.
2. As the applicant is unrepresented, I am required to consider whether any arguable substantive jurisdictional error in the decision sought to be reviewed arises from the material before me: see MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392 at [112] and [113]. I am satisfied that no arguable substantive jurisdictional error arises from my review of the Tribunal decision in this matter.
3. The application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding eighty-seven (87) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Cleary.