Vexatious proceedings is defined expansively in section 3. It includes proceedings that are an abuse of process, proceedings instituted to harass, annoy, cause delay, or achieve another wrongful purpose, proceedings instituted or pursued without reasonable ground, and proceedings conducted in a way that achieves those improper ends. The definition is not exhaustive; it uses “includes” and covers both the initiation and the manner of conduct. This means that even a proceeding that started reasonably may become vexatious if conducted oppressively. The definition applies across all Australian courts and tribunals when the Court assesses whether a person has “frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia” (section 6(1)(a)). The Court may have regard to proceedings instituted before the Act’s commencement (section 6(5)), making the regime retrospective in the evidence it considers, though not in the making of the order itself.

Vexatious proceedings order is defined in section 3 as an order made under section 6(2). There are three categories of order: a stay of all or part of any proceedings already instituted in Tasmania; a prohibition on instituting proceedings (or proceedings of a particular type) in Tasmania; and any other order the Court considers appropriate, including an order as to costs. The Court may make any or all of these. A “prohibition” order is the most significant because it triggers the leave requirement in Part 3.

Proceedings is broadly defined in section 3 to mean any cause, matter, action, suit, proceeding, trial, complaint, inquiry of any kind, and any interlocutory or incidental proceedings, as well as any calling into question of a decision (including by appeal, review, or challenge). This covers criminal, civil, and tribunal matters, including steps taken before proceedings formally start. The definition of institute in section 3 reinforces this breadth: it includes steps necessary before proceedings can start (such as making a complaint, obtaining an arrest warrant, or applying for a tribunal referral) as well as steps necessary to start an appeal.

Australian court or tribunal is defined in section 3 as a court or tribunal of the Commonwealth or of any State or Territory, and includes bodies prescribed by regulation. This means the Court can base a vexatious proceedings order on a person’s conduct in any Australian jurisdiction, not just Tasmania. However, the reach of the order is limited to proceedings in Tasmania.

Acting in concert is a key concept in sections 6(1)(b) and 10(1)(b). A person who is not themselves a vexatious litigant may be made subject to an order if they act in concert with a person they know is subject to an existing order or who they know has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings. This provision aims to prevent evasion by allowing a third party to litigate on behalf of a restricted person. However, it creates uncertainty. There is no statutory definition of “acting in concert” in the Act, so the term will be interpreted by the courts, importing principles from equity and civil procedure about common purpose. The knowledge requirement is subjective: the person must know the other person’s status. This may be difficult to prove but also creates risk for anyone who assists a person they know to be a frequent vexatious litigant.

Sufficient interest appears in section 5(1)(g) as a basis for applying for a vexatious proceedings order, but only with the Court’s leave. This gatekeeping ensures the process is not itself abused by applicants with no real stake.

The Act affects a wide range of actors, both public and private. The primary target is any natural person or legal entity who has a track record of bringing vexatious proceedings in Australian courts or tribunals. There is no requirement that the person be a litigant in person; the Act applies equally to corporations, unincorporated associations, and individuals. The threshold is “frequently” - a term not defined in the Act, leaving it to the Court’s discretion. This creates uncertainty for litigants who may not know when their conduct crosses the line from persistent but arguable to frequent and vexatious.

Public officials are given standing to apply for a vexatious proceedings order without needing leave: the Attorney-General, the Solicitor-General, the Director of Public Prosecutions, a registrar or other officer of an Australian court or tribunal, and the Administrator of the Magistrates Court (section 5(1)(a)-(e)). These applicants are likely to be repeat players who can identify serial vexatious litigants. Private persons (a person against whom proceedings have been instituted, or a person with a sufficient interest) may also apply but only with the leave of the Court (section 5(2)). This is a filtering mechanism to prevent private applicants from using the Act itself to harass.

Persons against whom a vexatious litigant has brought proceedings are directly affected. They can apply for an order, and if an order is made, they gain protection from future harassment. However, they bear the cost and burden of an application to the Supreme Court. Lower courts and tribunals are also affected: under section 10(3), a court or tribunal in which a proceeding is instituted in breach of an order may make consequential orders, including declarations and costs orders. Tribunal members and magistrates therefore need to be aware of the register of orders.

The Act also affects the associates of a restricted person. Anyone who knows that another person is subject to a vexatious proceedings order or has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings, and who then acts in concert with that person to institute proceedings, can themselves be made subject to an order (section 6(1)(b)) and may also commit a breach by instituting proceedings (section 10(1)(b)). This catches lawyers, family members, friends, or business partners who try to litigate on behalf of the restricted person. A lawyer who accepts instructions from a known vexatious litigant to file proceedings in the lawyer’s own name could face personal exposure if the Court finds they acted in concert. This imposes a due diligence burden on legal practitioners.

The registrar of the Supreme Court is responsible for maintaining the register and publishing orders in the Gazette (section 9). The cost of administering the register is borne by the court system and ultimately by taxpayers. There is no provision for cost recovery from the restricted person.

The most significant duty is the prohibition on instituting proceedings. Under section 10(1)(a), a person subject to a vexatious proceedings order that prohibits them from instituting proceedings (or proceedings of a particular type) in Tasmania must not do so without leave. Section 10(1)(b) imposes the same duty on anyone acting in concert with that person, knowing of the restriction. Breach triggers an automatic permanent stay, not a criminal penalty, but the stay is irrevocable and the person may be ordered to pay costs.

For a person who is not yet subject to an order but who has been notified of an application, the Act gives a right to be heard before the order is made (section 6(4)). Similarly, before an order is reinstated, the person must be heard or given an opportunity to be heard (section 8(4)). These rights are procedural and do not guarantee the person will succeed in preventing the order.

The right to apply for variation or setting aside of an order is available to the person subject to the order, as well as to the original applicant classes (section 7). This is an important safeguard, but the Act does not specify the grounds for variation. The Court has broad discretion. The person may need to show a change in circumstances, for example that they have ceased litigating or that their behaviour has improved. However, the Act provides no guidance, and the person bears the burden of persuading the Court.

The principal right for a restricted person is the ability to apply for leave to institute proceedings under section 11. The applicant must file an affidavit listing all occasions on which they have previously applied for leave, all other proceedings they have instituted in Australia (including before the Act commenced), and all facts material to the application - whether supportive or adverse (section 11(3)). This is a heavy disclosure obligation. The applicant must not serve the application or affidavit unless the Court orders service under section 13(1)(a). This prevents the applicant from using the leave process itself to harass the proposed defendant.

The Court must dismiss the application if the affidavit does not substantially comply with section 11(3) or if the proceedings would themselves be vexatious (section 12(1)). The Court may dismiss even if the applicant does not appear (section 12(2)). If the Court considers granting leave, it must first order service on relevant persons (including the proposed defendant, and possibly the Attorney-General or others) and give them an opportunity to be heard (section 13(1)). The Court may receive evidence from earlier proceedings (section 13(2)). Leave may be granted subject to conditions (section 13(3)), but only if the Court is satisfied the proceedings are not vexatious (section 13(4)). The onus is squarely on the applicant to satisfy the Court.

Notably, section 11(6) provides that the applicant may not appeal from a decision disposing of the application. This is a significant limitation on the right to seek judicial review. It means the Court’s decision on leave is final for that proposed proceeding. The only potential avenue is an application for judicial review on jurisdictional error, but the Act does not explicitly preserve that remedy. The lack of an appeal right concentrates power in the single judge hearing the leave application.

The Act does not impose fines or imprisonment for breaching a vexatious proceedings order. The enforcement mechanism is procedural and civil. Section 10(2) states that proceedings instituted in contravention of the prohibition are permanently stayed. The stay operates automatically by force of law. No further order is needed to trigger it, though the Court or tribunal may make an order declaring that the proceedings are stayed (section 10(3)(a)). This declaration is probably useful for recording purposes and for clarity, but the stay is effective immediately on institution.

The Court or tribunal may also make “another order in relation to the stayed proceedings it considers appropriate, including an order for costs” (section 10(3)(b)). This gives the tribunal power to award costs against the restricted person, potentially on an indemnity basis, and to make other ancillary orders such as striking out pleadings or dismissing the proceeding. The costs order is the primary financial deterrent. A restricted person who attempts to file proceedings without leave risks having to pay the other side’s legal costs, which can be substantial.

The Act also envisions that the Court itself may act on its own initiative to enforce the stay. Section 10(4) allows the Court or tribunal to make orders under section 10(3) “on its own initiative”. This is important because it means a tribunal member who notices a prohibited person filing documents can step in without waiting for the respondent to apply.

There is no statutory penalty for a person who acts in concert with a restricted person and institutes proceedings. The same automatic stay and potential costs order apply. However, the acting-in-concert doctrine may also expose that person to being made the subject of a fresh vexatious proceedings order under section 6(1)(b), creating a spiral effect.

The register and publication requirements under section 9 are administrative, not penal. Failure to comply with the requirement to publish in the Gazette within 21 days or to enter in the register within 7 days does not affect the validity of the order (section 9(5)). This means an order is enforceable even if the Registrar fails to publish it on time. However, the practical consequence is that a person subject to the order might not know they are on the register, though presumably they were heard before the order was made and thus have actual notice. Third parties, such as court registry staff, rely on the register to identify prohibited litigants. If the register is not kept up to date, a restricted person might inadvertently be allowed to file proceedings without detection, but the stay would still apply.

Section 4 expressly provides that the Act does not affect any inherent jurisdiction of a court or tribunal, or any other powers they have to restrict vexatious proceedings. This means that existing common law powers - such as the inherent power of superior courts to stay or strike out abuse of process, to make limited civil restraint orders, or to award indemnity costs - continue to operate independently. The Act is an additional tool, not a replacement. A court or tribunal might prefer to rely on its inherent powers if the statutory threshold under the Act is not met, for example if the conduct is vexatious but not “frequent” enough to satisfy section 6(1)(a). Conversely, the Act may be used where inherent powers are insufficient, such as for lower courts or tribunals with limited inherent jurisdiction, or to impose a broader prohibition covering multiple types of proceedings.

Schedule 1 lists consequential amendments to seven Tasmanian Acts: the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998, Guardianship and Administration Act 1995, Justices Act 1959, Magistrates Court (Administrative Appeals Division) Act 2001, Magistrates Court (Civil Division) Act 1992, Mental Health Act 1996, and Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal Act 1993. The specific amendments are not set out in the source text, but the purpose is likely to insert provisions that empower those tribunals or courts to stay proceedings brought by persons subject to a vexatious proceedings order under this Act, or to give effect to the order within their own jurisdictions. For example, the Justices Act amendments probably allow a magistrate to stay a complaint by a prohibited person. The amendments ensure that the prohibition order made by the Supreme Court is effective across the Tasmanian court system.

The Act also interacts with laws of other jurisdictions through the definition of “Australian court or tribunal”. A person may be found to have frequently instituted vexatious proceedings in, say, the Federal Court or the Supreme Court of New South Wales, and on that basis a Tasmanian order may be made restricting them only in Tasmania. The Act does not purport to give Tasmanian orders extra-territorial effect; the prohibition is limited to proceedings in Tasmania. But the same person could be subject to similar orders in other states.

The Act does not override the right to apply for habeas corpus or other fundamental writs, but it does not explicitly except them either. The broad definitions of “proceedings” and “institute” would seem to cover such applications. This could raise constitutional questions if a federal matter is involved, but the Act does not address that.

The source text provided is a consolidated version as at 12 April 2026. It contains no amendment history table, noting clause, or list of amending Acts. The Act itself is identified as “Vexatious Proceedings Act 2011” (Act No. 31 of 2011). The text does not indicate any amendments since its original enactment. Section 2 provides that the Act commences on a day to be proclaimed. The source does not state whether proclamation has occurred, but the fact that the text is consolidated and includes Schedule 1 consequential amendments suggests it has been proclaimed and is in force. A researcher would need to check the official Tasmanian legislation database for any subsequent amending Acts or regulations. For the purposes of this deep dive, no amendment history is derivable from the source.

The source text does not cite any cases or refer to any litigation history. The Act has likely been the subject of judicial interpretation, particularly around the meaning of “frequently”, “vexatious proceedings”, and “acting in concert”. The High Court may have considered similar legislation in other states, such as the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) or similar Acts in other jurisdictions, but the source does not mention these. The Act’s section 11(6) (no appeal from a leave decision) may have been challenged on constitutional grounds, but no case is referenced. A practitioner would need to conduct independent legal research to find Tasmanian case law under this Act. The absence of litigation history in the source is a limitation.

Several provisions in the Act create traps for the unwary. The definition of “institute” in section 3 is broader than expected. It includes steps taken before proceedings can formally start, such as making a complaint or obtaining a warrant. A person subject to a prohibition order who lodges a police complaint about a neighbour, for example, could be found to have instituted proceedings, triggering the automatic stay. Similarly, filing a caveat or lodging a strata complaint might be caught.

The “proceedings” definition extends to appeals and reviews. A person who has been prohibited from instituting proceedings cannot lodge an appeal against a previous decision without leave, even if that decision was made before the order. Section 10(1) says the person may not institute proceedings “in Tasmania” without leave. An appeal is a proceeding. The Act does not provide a carve-out for appeals from decisions made while the person was not subject to an order.

The acting in concert provision is vague. Section 6(1)(b) applies to someone who “acting in concert with a person whom he or she knows is subject to a vexatious proceedings order or who he or she knows is a person mentioned in paragraph (a)” has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings. This means a person can be made subject to an order even if they have never themselves engaged in vexatious conduct, simply by helping a known vexatious litigant. The knowledge requirement is subjective, but the Court may infer knowledge from circumstances. Lawyers and family members are at risk.

The no appeal provision in section 11(6) is absolute. It applies to “a decision disposing of the application”, which includes both a grant and refusal of leave. If the Court refuses leave, the person has no means to challenge that decision on the merits. The only possible avenue would be an application for judicial review on jurisdictional error, but that is not an appeal and may not be available if the Court acted within jurisdiction. This creates a risk of a single judge making a final determination on the merits of a proposed proceeding without the usual appellate safeguards.

The leave application itself requires the applicant to disclose all material facts known to them, including facts adverse to the application (section 11(3)(c)). Failure to do so can lead to dismissal under section 12(1)(a). This means the applicant must prosecute their own case against themselves. There is no penalty for inadvertent omission, but if the Court finds the affidavit does not substantially comply, the application is dismissed. There is no discretion to cure the defect.

The register is publicly available. A person subject to an order will have their name and details accessible to anyone, including employers, landlords, and the media. The Act does not provide for removal on request unless the person dies (section 9(4)). Even if the order is set aside, the register presumably notes that. The stigma may outlast the restriction.

Finally, the Act allows the Court to make a vexatious proceedings order “on its own initiative” under section 6(3). This means a judge who notes a pattern of vexatious conduct during a case can start the process without any formal application. The person may be caught off guard. The Court must give the person an opportunity to be heard (section 6(4)), but the procedural fairness requirement is minimal - an opportunity, not necessarily an adversarial hearing with legal representation.

For a person who believes they may be at risk of being found to be a frequent vexatious litigant, the safest approach is to limit the number of proceedings they initiate to those with clear legal merit, and to conduct them in a manner that is not abusive, harassing, or delay-oriented. However, compliance is not voluntary once an order is made. The key steps are as follows.

If you are subject to a vexatious proceedings order that prohibits institution of proceedings: Do not file any new proceeding in any Tasmanian court or tribunal. Do not lodge complaints that could be considered “instituting” proceedings. Do not instruct another person (family member, friend, lawyer) to file a proceeding on your behalf. That person could be found to be acting in concert and also breach the order. If you want to initiate a new proceeding, you must first apply for leave under section 11. That application is made to the Supreme Court, not the tribunal where you wish to litigate. You must file an affidavit that (a) lists every previous occasion you have applied for leave under this Act; (b) lists all other proceedings you have instituted in Australia (any court or tribunal) at any time, including before the Act began; and (c) discloses all facts material to the application, even those that hurt your case. The affidavit must be thorough - a court may dismiss for substantial non-compliance. You must not serve the application or affidavit on anyone unless and until the Supreme Court orders service under section 13(1)(a). At a hearing, the Court may receive evidence from any Australian proceeding you were involved in. The Court will only grant leave if it is satisfied the proposed proceedings are not vexatious. If leave is granted, conditions may be imposed (for example, a limit on the number of documents you may file, or a requirement to pay security for costs). There is no appeal if leave is refused.

If you are a potential applicant for a vexatious proceedings order (e.g., you are a person against whom a vexatious litigant has brought proceedings): Gather evidence of the frequency and vexatious nature of the person’s proceedings. “Frequently” is not defined, so document every proceeding, including appeals, applications, complaints, and pre-litigation steps. Show how each proceeding meets the definition of vexatious proceedings. You will need to apply to the Supreme Court. If you are a person under section 5(1)(f) (someone against whom proceedings have been instituted), you must first obtain the Court’s leave to apply. That preliminary leave application is not onerous but must demonstrate a sufficient interest. Consider whether the Attorney-General, DPP, or a registrar might be willing to apply instead, as they do not need leave. Provide that official with your evidence.

If you are a solicitor or barrister instructed by a person you know or suspect is subject to a vexatious proceedings order: Check the register kept by the Supreme Court. If the client is on the register, you must not file any proceeding on their behalf without first confirming that they have obtained leave from the Supreme Court. If you file without leave, you may be found to be acting in concert and could be made subject to a personal order. You should request a copy of the leave order before taking any step. If the client is not subject to an order but has a history of vexatious litigation, consider whether your involvement might still risk an acting-in-concert finding under section 6(1)(b) if the Court later finds the client frequently instituted vexatious proceedings. The safe course is to decline instructions that appear to be part of a pattern of abusive litigation.

If you are a court or tribunal officer (registrar, clerk): Check the register before accepting any new proceeding from a known or suspected vexatious litigant. If the register shows the person is prohibited, do not accept the filing; instead, bring it to the attention of a judicial officer who can make a declaration under section 10(3) that the proceeding is stayed. Ensure that orders under this Act are promptly entered in the register and published in the Gazette within the time limits in section 9, but note that failure to do so does not affect the order’s validity.

If you are a person subject to an order that has been set aside: Be aware that if you institute proceedings within five years of the setting aside, and the Court finds those proceedings are vexatious, the original order may be reinstated without a fresh finding of frequency. The five-year period acts as a probationary period. You should therefore exercise particular caution in any litigation during that time.