Trespass Act 2023

The Act revolves around a set of defined legal concepts that determine who may act, how, and what conduct is criminalised.

Place (s 3) is a broad, deliberate definition. It includes buildings and structures whether permanent or temporary, land whether enclosed or not, motor vehicles, trailers, caravans, aircraft, boats and other vessels, and trains or rolling stock. This breadth captures mobile and fixed sites, and both private and public vehicles and vessels. The Act distinguishes Crown land from other land in s 3: "Crown land" means Crown land that is not leased or occupied under a licence or agreement. That definition matters for police initiative powers (s 9(2)(b), s 10(2)(b)) and the s 14 offence.

Occupier (s 3) varies by context. For Crown, Territory, Commonwealth or statutory corporation land, the occupier is a person "in charge" of the land. For other land, the occupier is a person in lawful occupation and any employee or other person acting under their authority, or, if there is no person in lawful occupation, the owner. The definition therefore allocates authority among managers, employees acting under that authority, and owners of unoccupied land.

Authority to enter and remain (s 4) is codified in a short list: occupiers, persons with express consent from the occupier, persons with implied consent, and persons authorised by law. Crucially, the statute declares that a direction or warning is treated as withdrawal of any express or implied consent (s 4(2)). The Act does not define "implied consent", leaving the contours for fact-finding and legal interpretation.

Direction and warning are operationally different. A direction to leave is an instruction given by an occupier or by police (s 9). Directions can include a short-term ban of up to 7 days (s 9(3)) or, if unspecified, operate automatically for 72 hours (s 9(4)). A warning to stay off (s 10) may ban entry for up to 12 months if specified (s 10(3)), or for 3 months by default (s 10(4)). Directions and warnings can be oral or written, and may be addressed to groups (s 11).

Authorisation and withdrawal of consent are central. Because a warning or direction is treated as withdrawal of any consent (s 4(2)), compliance depends partly on whether a person had consent in the first place, and whether they received and understood the direction or warning. The Act provides strict liability for lack of authorisation in a number of provisions (s 13(3), s 14(2), s 15(3), s 16(2), s 17(3)), so proof that the defendant was not authorised does not require proof of mens rea.

Offences attach both to entry and to remaining (s 13), and to non-compliance with directions, warnings and court orders (ss 15-17). The Act creates an aggravated offence where the place is a place of primary production and the defendant is reckless about that circumstance (s 13(4)-(6)); place of primary production is defined by activities such as agricultural, pastoral, horticulture or apicultural activities, cultivating soils, crops or livestock, and aquaculture propagation or harvesting (s 13(6)). The prosecution must plead the aggravating circumstance if it intends to rely on it (s 13(5)).

Procedural and evidential devices include police powers to remove people and property without arrest (s 19), permission to use reasonable force (s 20), the ability to charge multiple offences for sequences of conduct (s 21), and averment rules that let certain factual assertions stand as evidence in complaints for specified offences (s 22).

The Act preserves interaction with other statutory regimes. It excludes any effect on rights under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) and the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) (s 7). It also prohibits discrimination or use of powers to engage in conduct that would contravene the Anti-Discrimination Act 1992 (s 6). Part IIAA of the Criminal Code applies (s 8), and the Act references evidential burden provisions under that Part in its notes to specific defences.

The Act creates discrete decision-makers and affected groups. Primary actors are occupiers, police officers, persons who enter or remain on places, and courts.

Occupiers: Occupiers of places may give directions (s 9(1)) and warnings (s 10(1)) and therefore decide when to withdraw consent (s 4(2)). The definition of occupier (s 3) includes the person in lawful occupation, employees or persons acting under an occupier's authority, and owners when there is no lawful occupier. That definition places responsibility for initial exercise of the Act’s powers on those who control or manage land, structures and vehicles.

Police: Police are empowered to give directions and warnings either at an occupier's request or on their own initiative in relation to Crown or public land (s 9(2), s 10(2)). Police may also remove people and their property without arrest if there are reasonable grounds that an offence under the Act has been or is about to be committed (s 19). Police may use reasonable force and assistance to exercise powers (s 20(1)). The Act’s notes cross-reference the Police Administration Act 1978 and the Youth Justice Act 2005, signalling overlap with other police powers and procedural duties (note to s 19).

Members of the public: Any person who enters or remains at a place is potentially subject to direction, warning or criminal sanction. The Act’s strict liability elements (s 13(3); s 14(2); s 15(3); s 16(2); s 17(3)) mean that persons can be guilty of specified elements without proof of intention or knowledge as to authorisation. Specific subgroups are identifiable: persons engaged in hunting or pursuit of game may have a defence to the Crown-land posted-notice offence if they did not know the land was Crown land (s 14(3)(b)); persons experiencing severe hardship may rely on a statutory defence for non-compliance with directions, warnings or court orders (s 18).

Land managers and public authorities: The Act affects entities responsible for Crown land or land occupied by Territory, Commonwealth or statutory corporations. For example, police may act on their own initiative on such land (s 9(2)(b), s 10(2)(b)), and posted notices are a precondition of the s 14 offence on Crown land (s 14(1)(c)). These public entities must also observe s 5, which states that the Act does not affect anything authorised by other laws or any legally enforceable agreement.

Indigenous rights-holders: The Act expressly does not affect the existence, enjoyment or exercise of rights under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) or the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) (s 7). That textual preservation reduces statutory conflict, but practitioners should note the Act still operates in landscapes subject to native title and land rights, which will influence factual determination of occupation, consent, and authorised access.

Victims and accused persons: The Act establishes penalties, removal powers and evidentiary devices that affect accused persons. Defences exist , for example, lack of awareness of a posted notice on Crown land (s 14(3)) and severe hardship (s 18) , but the Act also places evidential burdens on defendants in specified defences (notes to s 14(3), s 16(3), s 18), referencing the Criminal Code. The averaging power in s 22 may simplify prosecution proof of facts such as the fact a direction or warning was given and its contents.

Service providers, businesses and primary producers: The aggravated offence in s 13 targets circumstances where the place is used for primary production and the defendant is reckless about that circumstance. Businesses that manage primary production sites will therefore encounter an elevated maximum penalty where unlawfully entered by someone reckless as to the land use; however, the statutory mechanism for elevating the penalty requires the prosecution to plead that fact (s 13(5)).

In short, who pays: individuals who enter or remain without authorisation, occupiers responsible for managing directions and warnings, police executing removal and enforcement powers, public land authorities responsible for signage on Crown land, and businesses and primary producers who may seek protection under aggravated offence provisions. Who decides: occupiers and police decide on directions and warnings; courts decide on orders to stay off and on guilt and sentencing.

The Act imposes duties on occupiers and police and creates rights and defences for persons affected.

Duties on occupiers:

• To direct or warn: Occupiers may direct a person to leave a place (s 9(1)) and warn a person to stay off (s 10(1)). The Act does not impose a statutory duty to give a warning before prosecuting; it instead provides these powers as the occupier’s tools for preventing entry or obtaining police assistance.
• Non-discrimination: Occupiers must not use powers under the Act to engage in conduct prohibited by the Anti-Discrimination Act 1992 (s 6(1)). That is an explicit constraint on how occupiers exercise direction and warning powers.
• Authority over employees: The occupier definition includes employees and persons acting under the occupier’s authority (s 3). Those persons may act for the occupier, so occupiers bear practical responsibility for delegating the powers.

Duties on police:

• To act at request or on own initiative: Police may give directions and warnings at an occupier’s request, and may act on their own initiative in relation to Crown or public land (s 9(2), s 10(2)).
• Reasonable grounds test for removal: A police officer may remove a person and property without arrest if the officer believes on reasonable grounds the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offence under the Act (s 19). The Act cross-references other police powers (note to s 19).
• Use of reasonable force: Police may use reasonable force and assistance in exercising powers under the Act (s 20(1)). The Act specifies that giving directions or warnings at an occupier’s request is within the officer’s duties (s 20(2)).

Rights and constraints for persons:

• Right not to be criminally penalised if authorised: Persons who are authorised to enter or remain include occupiers, people with express or implied consent, and those authorised by law (s 4(1)). A direction or warning withdraws that consent (s 4(2)).
• Defence grounds: The Act provides limited defences. For s 14 (Crown land with posted notice), a defence exists if the defendant was not aware and could not reasonably be assumed to have been aware of the posted notice, or if they did not know the land was Crown land and entered while hunting or pursuing game (s 14(3)). For entry after a warning, it is a defence if the person who gave the warning is no longer an occupier of the place (s 16(3)). For failure to comply with directions, warnings or court orders, s 18 provides a "severe hardship" defence where the conduct was reasonable to prevent or mitigate severe hardship, with examples given (substantial difficulty obtaining groceries or medication; unreasonable risk to health or safety; other hardship the court considers severe).
• Evidential burdens: Where the Act provides a defence, the notes indicate the defendant has an evidential burden under s 43BU of the Criminal Code (notes to s 14(3), s 16(3), s 18). That affects the allocation of proof at trial.
• Right to be warned: The Act permits warnings (s 10) and the court to make orders to stay off (s 12). Persons ordered to stay off have statutory obligations not to enter the place unless authorised despite the order (s 17(1)) and face criminal penalties for contravention (s 17(2)).

Other important operational rules:

• Direction and warning formality: Directions and warnings may be given orally or in writing and may be addressed to groups (s 11). That allows occupiers and police flexibility but creates evidentiary considerations for proof of receipt.
• Time limits: Directions can ban return for up to 7 days or default to 72 hours (s 9(3)-(4)). Warnings can ban entry up to 12 months or default to 3 months (s 10(3)-(4)). A court order can ban entry up to 12 months post-conviction (s 12(1)).
• Strict liability: Several offence elements are strict liability (s 13(3); s 14(2); s 15(3); s 16(2); s 17(3)), which shifts the focus to whether the defendant’s conduct fits the prohibited element rather than their state of mind.

Taken together, the Act creates the right for occupiers and police to withdraw consent and to impose time-limited bans, and it creates duties for occupiers and police to exercise those powers compatibly with anti-discrimination law and relevant procedural protections. Persons impacted have limited statutory defences and face strict liability in key areas.

Penalties: The Act prescribes monetary and custodial maxima across its offences.

• Entry or remaining without authority (s 13(1)-(2)): Basic offence maximum is 20 penalty units or imprisonment for 6 months. An aggravated offence, where the place is a place of primary production and the defendant is reckless about that circumstance, carries an increased maximum of 50 penalty units or imprisonment for 12 months (s 13(2), (4)). The prosecution must include the aggravating circumstance in the charge if relied upon (s 13(5)). The Act defines place of primary production by a list of agricultural, pastoral, horticultural, apicultural and aquaculture activities (s 13(6)).

• Trespass on Crown or other land with posted notice (s 14(1)): Maximum penalty is 20 penalty units. Strict liability applies to the elements that the land is Crown land and that a notice is posted (s 14(2)). Defences are provided for lack of awareness of the notice or for persons hunting/pursuing game who did not know the land was Crown land (s 14(3)).

• Failure to comply with a direction to leave (s 15(1)) or returning contrary to a direction (s 15(2)): Each carries a maximum penalty of 20 penalty units. These offences are strict liability (s 15(3)).

• Entering after a warning to stay off (s 16(1)): Maximum penalty of 20 penalty units, strict liability (s 16(2)). A defence exists where the person who gave the warning is no longer an occupier (s 16(3)).

• Contravention of a court stay-off order (s 17(2)): Maximum penalty 20 penalty units or imprisonment for 6 months. Strict liability applies to the existence of the order and that the entry contravened it (s 17(3)).

Enforcement powers:

• Police removal without arrest (s 19): A police officer may, without arrest, remove a person and that person’s property from a place if the officer believes on reasonable grounds the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offence under the Act. The note to s 19 cross-references s 123 of the Police Administration Act 1978 on arrest powers and s 23 of the Youth Justice Act 2005,indicating related arrest and youth procedures remain engaged where relevant.

• Reasonable force (s 20): Police may use reasonable force and assistance to exercise powers under the Act. The Act clarifies that where a police officer gives a direction or warning at an occupier’s request, that is in the officer’s duties (s 20(2)).

• Multiple charges (s 21): The Act allows multiple offences to be charged and convicted for a sequence of conduct that constitutes separate offences under the Act. That enables cumulative charging by reference to series of entries, returns or non-compliances.

• Averment (s 22): In complaints alleging offences under s 14(1), s 15(1) or (2), or s 16(1), the prosecution may make averments about facts set out in s 22(2) (for example, that a person was an occupier at a relevant time, that a person was a police officer, that a direction or warning was given and its contents). The averment is taken to be evidence concerning those facts. This mechanism simplifies proof of procedural facts that might otherwise be contested and reduces the need for calling witnesses on certain foundational matters.

Evidentiary burdens and strict liability:

• The Act creates strict liability in a number of places (s 13(3); s 14(2); s 15(3); s 16(2); s 17(3)), meaning the prosecution need not prove mens rea for those elements. Defences in s 14(3), s 16(3), and the severe hardship defence in s 18 carry evidential burdens for the defendant under s 43BU of the Criminal Code (as noted in the Act’s notes). This allocation shifts some burden to defendants to raise a plausible case on those defences, after which the prosecution may have to disprove the defence on the balance of probabilities depending on the Code’s allocation rules.

Court orders:

• A court may order a person convicted of a trespassing offence to stay off and not enter a place for up to 12 months (s 12(1)), and the Act defines "trespassing offence" for this purpose to include offences under this Act or the repealed 1987 Act (s 12(2)). Contravening such an order is an offence under s 17.

Sanctions and enforcement agent incentives:

• The Act gives occupiers the ability to initiate direction/warning processes and to request police intervention (s 9(1), s 10(1), s 9(2)(a), s 10(2)(a)). Police are empowered to act on their own initiative on Crown and public lands (s 9(2)(b), s 10(2)(b)), and to remove persons without arrest (s 19). These design features create an enforcement model relying on occupier action and police discretion rather than automatic statutory sanctions for all trespass events.

The Act expressly positions itself within existing legislative frameworks and cross-references other Northern Territory and Commonwealth statutes.

Non-derogation and preservation:

• The Act does not affect anything a person is authorised to do by or under other Territory laws or under any legally enforceable agreement (s 5). That clause preserves rights conferred elsewhere and prevents the Act from implicitly authorising conduct that other statutes might prohibit.

• The Act explicitly does not affect native title rights and interests under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) or rights under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) (s 7). This textual preservation reduces direct statutory inconsistency but does not eliminate fact-specific friction between trespass enforcement and exercise of native title or Aboriginal land rights in particular localities.

Criminal Code:

• Part IIAA of the Criminal Code applies to offences under this Act (s 8). The Act’s notes refer to Part IIAA establishing general principles of criminal responsibility, defences and burden of proof, and elaborating on concepts commonly used in offences. The Act further references the evidential burden provision s 43BU of the Criminal Code in the notes to s 14(3), s 16(3) and s 18, indicating that certain defences under the Act impose an initial evidential burden on a defendant.

Anti-discrimination:

• Section 6 requires that a person must not use a power under the Act to engage in prohibited conduct or otherwise contravene the Anti-Discrimination Act 1992. The Act imports the Anti-Discrimination Act’s definition of prohibited conduct by reference. This creates a legal limit on how directions, warnings and enforcement can be exercised.

Police and youth procedure:

• The note to s 19 cross-references s 123 of the Police Administration Act 1978, which authorises arrest where a police member believes on reasonable grounds that the person is committing or about to commit an offence, and s 23 of the Youth Justice Act 2005 requiring police to notify a responsible adult for youth arrests. These references signal that other arrest-related and youth-handling obligations continue to bind police exercise of the Act’s powers.

Repeal and transitional:

• The Trespass Act 1987 and the Trespass Amendment Act 2000 are repealed by s 23. Transitional provisions (ss 24-27) carry forward directions and warnings given under the repealed Act as if given under the new Act (ss 25-26) and preserve application of the repealed Act to offences committed before commencement (s 27). Thus, previous statutory history persists for pre-commencement conduct and continuing directions/warnings.

Evidentiary provisions and civil law:

• The Act’s averment mechanism (s 22) makes certain factual assertions admissible as evidence in specified complaints, which could interact with civil proceedings concerning the same facts but does not itself alter civil remedies. Section 5 preserves legally enforceable agreements; practitioners must therefore consider contractual rights (for example, lease or licence conditions) in parallel with these criminal sanctions.

Commonwealth laws:

• By preserving native title and Aboriginal Land Rights rights (s 7), the Act indicates an expected coexistence with Commonwealth law. Where Commonwealth law authorises entry (for example, under licence or agreement), s 5 prevents the Act from displacing that authorisation.

Operational interaction:

• Because directions and warnings can be given orally (s 11), and because averment can serve as evidence about content and receipt (s 22), the Act is designed to work alongside policing and prosecutorial practice rather than mandated formal service or notice processes. That design interacts with evidence law and prosecutorial disclosure obligations.

In sum, the Act functions as a statutory overlay on existing criminal, police and land-related law. It preserves other statutory and contractual rights, imports Criminal Code principles and evidential rules, and constrains exercise of powers by reference to anti-discrimination law. Practitioners should therefore assess trespass issues with cross-reference to the Criminal Code, the Anti-Discrimination Act, police procedural legislation, youth justice obligations and any relevant Commonwealth land title or rights regimes.

The Act as printed includes an Endnotes section summarising its legislative history to date.

• Original enactment: The Trespass Act 2023 (Act No. 7, 2023) received assent 6 April 2023 and commenced 1 May 2023 (Gazette references in the Endnotes). The Act repealed the Trespass Act 1987 and its 2000 amendment (s 23).

• Subsequent amendment: The Endnotes list that section 13 was amended by the Livestock and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024 (Act No. 7, 2024), with assent 9 April 2024 and commencement 30 April 2024 (Endnotes, List of Legislation and List of Amendments). The Notes specify "s 13 amd No. 7, 2024, s 40". The printed text of s 13 includes an aggravated offence provision tied to places of primary production and a definition of place of primary production (s 13(4)-(6)). That provision reflects a legislative change recorded in the Endnotes; legislators or drafters have incorporated the amendment into the consolidated text supplied.

• Repeals and redrafting: The Act repealed the Trespass Act 1987 and its amendments (s 23). Transitional provisions (ss 24-27) provide continuity: directions and warnings in effect under the repealed Act immediately before commencement continue in effect and are taken to be directions or warnings under the new Act (ss 25-26). Offences committed before commencement are governed by the repealed Act as in force immediately before commencement (s 27(1)), and conduct is taken to have occurred before commencement if any of the conduct constituting the offence occurred before commencement (s 27(2)).

• Structural replacement: The Act replaces the prior statutory framework and reconfigures enforcement powers, evidentiary devices and defences, consistent with the legislative objective to provide for offences related to trespass (long title). The Endnotes list extensive textual amendments and repeals of parts and sections from the 1987 Act (List of Amendments in the Endnotes), indicating a substantial statutory overhaul rather than minor edits.

Current status details:

• Commencement provisions (s 2) provide that the Act commenced on the day fixed by the Administrator by Gazette notice, but with a backstop that any provision not commenced before 13 February 2025 commences on that day. The Endnotes indicate commencement occurred 1 May 2023.

Practitioner implications of the amendment history:

• The amendment to s 13 in 2024 introduces , or confirms , an aggravated offence for trespass on places of primary production when the defendant is reckless as to that circumstance. The amendment history is relevant when advising clients because it affects maximum penalties and prosecutorial charging decisions, and it may reflect a targeted policy focus to protect agricultural and related enterprises. The transitional and repeals regime means that pre-commencement conduct is adjudicated under the 1987 Act until the new Act’s commencement, which is relevant for historical fact patterns spanning the commencement date.

The Endnotes thus provide essential context for statutory consolidation, repeal of earlier enactments and a specific amendment to s 13 in 2024. There is no further amendment history recorded in the supplied text.

The Act text and Endnotes do not include any case law or reported judicial decisions interpreting the provisions. No judicial authority is cited within the Act. Accordingly, as of the in-force date in the printed material (30 April 2024 for the consolidated text and amendments noted), there is no litigation history supplied in the statute.

Implications of the absence of reported decisions:

• Interpretive uncertainty: Several provisions contain open-textured concepts that are likely to be the focus of early litigation. Those include "implied consent" in s 4(1)(c); whether a posted notice is "clearly warning" for s 14(1)(c); the meaning of "in charge of the land" for occupier status on Crown, Territory, Commonwealth or statutory corporation land in s 3; and the contours of "severe hardship" in s 18. Courts will have to supply definitional content for these concepts in practice.

• Strict liability elements: The Act imposes strict liability in multiple provisions (s 13(3); s 14(2); s 15(3); s 16(2); s 17(3)). Absent judicial guidance, questions will arise about constitutional or common law challenges where strict liability may engage human rights or proportionality considerations, particularly where imprisonment is a possible sanction (s 13, s 17). The Act’s express application of Part IIAA of the Criminal Code (s 8) may shape judicial analysis of burdens and defences.

• Evidential and averment provisions: The averment mechanism (s 22) and the Act’s acceptance of oral warnings/directions (s 11) create evidentiary questions about adequacy of proof, reliability of oral group warnings and the operation of averments as default evidence. Early prosecutions will generate case law on admissibility and the limits of averment.

• Police removal without arrest: s 19 authorises removal without arrest where police have reasonable grounds to believe an offence has been or is about to be committed under the Act. Case law will be necessary to determine the threshold for "reasonable grounds" in this context, the limits on removal of property, whether removal triggers obligations under other statutes (for arrest, detention or care of youth), and the lawfulness of use-of-force choices in s 20.

• Interaction with native title and Aboriginal land rights: Although s 7 preserves statutory rights, litigation can be expected to clarify how trespass enforcement interacts with rights of access and occupation under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) and the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth), especially on land where ownership, occupation and traditional rights overlap.

• Aggravated offences: The aggravated offence in s 13(4) for places of primary production introduces a mental element ("reckless in relation to that circumstance") superimposed on strict liability for lack of authorisation (s 13(3)). Litigation will be required to reconcile strict liability as to authorisation with a mental state required for the aggravation.

Practical note:

• Until appellate decisions interpret these provisions, practitioners advising clients will need to rely on statutory text, legislative history and comparative practice from other jurisdictions where relevant, and prepare for fact-centric litigation around consent, notice, occupier status, and the content/receipt of directions and warnings.

This section highlights pitfalls that arise from the text and are likely to cause operational and legal traps for occupiers, police and members of the public.

1. Oral warnings and proof of receipt (s 11; s 22)

• Direction and warning may be oral (s 11(1)), and may be given to a group by addressing the group as a whole (s 11(2)). Yet averment (s 22) allows a complaint to assert that a warning or direction was given and its contents; the averment is taken as evidence (s 22(2)(c)-(d)). Practically, occupiers and police who rely on oral warnings risk disputes over whether the person actually heard and understood the instruction. While averment simplifies prosecution, defendants can challenge via cross-examination and the evidentiary context. Occupiers who wish to be certain should serve written warnings/directions and obtain evidence of receipt.

2. Withdrawal of consent effect and ambiguous "implied consent" (s 4(1)-(2))

• The Act treats a direction or warning as withdrawal of any express or implied consent (s 4(2)). But the Act does not define "implied consent". That omission leaves factual questions about longstanding uses of land, permissive signage, or informal toleration. Persons who think they have implied consent (for example, customary access) may be exposed because the Act places strict liability on not being authorised to enter or remain (s 13(3)). Practitioners should document any express permission to avoid strict liability exposure.

3. Strict liability and imprisonment exposure (ss 13(3), 15(3), 16(2), 17(3))

• The Act applies strict liability to critical elements in multiple offences (s 13(3); s 14(2); s 15(3); s 16(2); s 17(3)). For s 13 and s 17 imprisonment is a possible penalty (s 13(1)-(2), s 17(2)). Strict liability means defendants may be convicted without proof of fault with respect to those elements. Defence strategies must therefore focus on statutory defences, duress, necessity or the severe hardship defence (s 18), where available.

4. Notices on Crown land and ambiguity over "clearly warning" (s 14)

• The Crown-land trespass offence requires that a notice be posted on the land "clearly warning that trespassing on the land is prohibited" (s 14(1)(c)). The Act does not define "posted" or "clearly warning". Questions include where notices must be located on large parcels, what size and language are sufficient, and whether digital or temporary signage qualifies. Defendants may rely on s 14(3)(a) defence if they were not and could not reasonably be assumed to have been aware of the notice, triggering evidential burden considerations.

5. Hunting/pursuit-of-game exception narrowness (s 14(3)(b))

• The s 14 defence for those who did not know the land was Crown land and entered while hunting or in pursuit of game is narrow: it requires lack of knowledge of Crown-land status and the defendant's activity be hunting/pursuit of game. Recreational users whose activities do not fit that description may not qualify. Advisers for rural recreationists should ensure awareness of land status and signage.

6. Occupier identity disputes and "in charge" (s 3)

• For Crown, Territory, Commonwealth or statutory corporation land, the occupier is "a person in charge of the land" (s 3). That phrase invites dispute about who is "in charge" if multiple agencies, lessees or contractors operate on the same parcel. Where an occupier’s identity is contested, prosecutions under ss 15 and 16 could be complicated and the defendant may succeed on the s 16(3) defence if the person who gave the warning is no longer occupier. Practically, entities should document authorised occupiers and delegation of authority.

7. Interaction with native title and Aboriginal land rights (s 7)

• The Act preserves statutory native title and Aboriginal Land Rights. However, factual conflicts will arise on land where traditional rights authorise entry and occupation. The preservation is textual; it does not explain operational overlap. Parties should be alert to the need to reconcile directions/warnings with statutory rights and agreements under the Commonwealth statutes.

8. Police removal without arrest vs arrest powers (s 19)

• Police can remove persons and property without arrest where reasonably grounds exist that an offence under the Act has been or is about to be committed (s 19). The note to s 19 references arrest powers in the Police Administration Act 1978, but the practical boundary between removal and arrest is latent. Persons removed without arrest may still have rights triggered by an effective detention; practitioners should prepare for disputes about the lawfulness of removal and any use of force under s 20.

9. Multiple offences for a sequence of conduct (s 21)

• The Act permits multiple charges for sequences of conduct (s 21). A person who returns repeatedly may face several counts for the same factual episode. Occupiers and prosecutors may prefer cumulative charging, while defence counsel should consider double jeopardy and sentencing concurrency issues.

10. Severe hardship defence evidential burden and narrow examples (s 18)

• The severe hardship defence applies to non-compliance with directions, warnings and court orders (s 18). The Act gives examples (difficulty obtaining groceries or medications; unreasonable risk to health or safety). The defendant has an evidential burden under the Criminal Code (note to s 18). Courts may interpret the defence narrowly, so defendants should prepare contemporaneous evidence where reliance on the defence is intended.

11. Timing and default periods (ss 9(3)-(4), 10(3)-(4))

• Directions default to 72 hours if no period is specified (s 9(4)); warnings default to 3 months if no period is specified (s 10(4)). Occupiers and police who intend a longer ban must specify it in the direction or warning, and ensure the period does not exceed the statutory maximum.

12. Transitional continuity and offences spanning commencement (ss 25-27)

• Directions and warnings given under the repealed Act continue in effect as directions and warnings under the new Act (ss 25-26). Conduct occurring before commencement remains governed by the repealed Act per s 27(1). Advisers should scrutinise timetables for conduct that straddle commencement.

This section offers practice-focused, source-grounded steps for occupiers, police, businesses, and members of the public to reduce enforcement risk under the Act. The steps align with statutory specifics and evidential needs.

For occupiers and land managers:

1. Document authority and delegation. Record who is the occupier for each place (s 3). Where employees or agents act on your behalf, maintain written authorisations so that if a warning or direction is given by an employee the chain of authority is clear.

2. Prefer written directions and warnings, with signed receipt if possible. The Act permits oral directions and warnings (s 11), but written notices reduce evidentiary disputes when compliance or prosecution is later contested. When giving a direction, include the specific period where a ban is intended; otherwise the default 72-hour ban applies (s 9(3)-(4)). For warnings, specify the period up to 12 months or accept the default 3 months (s 10(3)-(4)).

3. Avoid discriminatory or prohibited conduct. Section 6 prohibits using powers under this Act to engage in behaviour that contravenes the Anti-Discrimination Act 1992. Maintain records demonstrating non-discriminatory decision-making when directing or warning people to stay off a place.

4. Keep a contemporaneous record of warnings/directions. Record date, time, identity of recipient, text of the instruction, and witnesses or CCTV. The Act’s averment provision (s 22) helps prosecution, but good records will also aid occupiers who may need to justify actions or defend a complaint that the notice was not given.

5. Consider signage for Crown land if you are a public authority. The s 14 offence requires a notice posted on Crown land that clearly warns trespassing is prohibited (s 14(1)(c)). If a public authority wishes to assert the s 14 offence, ensure signage is conspicuous, durable and located at likely points of access.

For police and enforcement agencies:

1. Train officers on scope of powers. Police may direct and warn at occupier request or on their own initiative regarding Crown/public land (s 9(2), s 10(2)), may remove persons and property without arrest on reasonable grounds (s 19), and may use reasonable force (s 20). Training should cover the reasonable grounds standard, limits on property removal, and documentation protocols for oral warnings and group addresses (s 11).

2. Align removal and arrest practice with other statutory obligations. The note to s 19 references the Police Administration Act and Youth Justice Act obligations. Ensure procedures for removal, arrest, and youth handling are consistent with those Acts.

3. Record and preserve evidence for averment. Because s 22 allows averment about the fact and content of directions and warnings and occupier or police status, officers should ensure contemporaneous reports, body-worn camera footage and logs are preserved.

For members of the public and visitors:

1. Seek express permission or written authorisation when relying on access rights. The Act treats a direction or warning as withdrawal of express or implied consent (s 4(2)), and strict liability applies to the lack of authorisation (s 13(3)). If you have ongoing access arrangements, keep copies of licences, leases or written consents.

2. Note signage on Crown land. If a posted notice clearly warns trespass is prohibited, entering may attract the s 14 offence unless you can avail yourself of the narrow defences (s 14(3)). Be particularly cautious on large properties where notices may be absent from particular access points.

3. If warned or directed, comply promptly. Failure to leave "as soon as reasonably practicable" after direction to leave is an offence (s 15(1)), and returning contrary to a direction is separately criminalised (s 15(2)). If you believe you have lawful justification to remain (for example, emergency or severe hardship), start assembling contemporaneous evidence to rely on the severe hardship defence (s 18).

For businesses and primary producers:

1. If you operate a place of primary production, be aware the Act creates an aggravated offence where a defendant is reckless regarding the primary-production status of the place (s 13(4)). Document your land use and activities to support charges where applicable, and consider signage and perimeter management to deter unauthorised entries.

2. Maintain contractual and licence records. The Act does not affect authorisations under other laws or enforceable agreements (s 5). Keep copies of leases, licences and access agreements to show whether someone was authorised.

For prosecutors and defence counsel:

1. Address strict liability and evidential burdens early. Identify which elements are strict liability (s 13(3); s 14(2); s 15(3); s 16(2); s 17(3)) and determine what evidence is required for those elements. For defences with an evidential burden, prepare or challenge the proffered evidence under the Criminal Code provisions referenced in the Act’s notes.

2. Use averment appropriately but be ready to support it with primary evidence where contested (s 22). Averment makes certain factual assertions evidence, but factual disputes about receipt of directions or occupier identity may still require witness testimony or contemporaneous records.

3. If relying on the aggravated offence in s 13(4), ensure the aggravating circumstance is included in the charge (s 13(5)) and prepare to prove recklessness as to the place being of primary production.

Operational checklist:

• Ensure signage on Crown/public land where an authority intends to rely on s 14 (s 14(1)(c)).
• Draft standard written warning/direction templates that state the ban period where a longer ban is needed (s 9(3), s 10(3)).
• Institute record-keeping protocols for directions and warnings, including a requirement to note whether a warning was oral or written and to record group warnings (s 11).
• Train staff to avoid discriminatory conduct in exercising powers under the Act (s 6).
• For police: ensure reports note reasonable grounds for removal and document use of force (ss 19-20).

Following these steps will reduce the risks associated with strict liability, evidentiary disputes and procedural challenges that the Act’s text makes likely.