Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency Fit and Proper Person Determination 2018

The central concept in the Determination is ‘fit and proper person’, though the instrument does not define it. Instead, Part 2 lists factors that TEQSA may take into account. Because the Determination is expressed in permissive terms - ‘may have regard’ - the concept is inherently flexible and context‑dependent. The factors are not weighted, and TEQSA is free to give any factor as much or as little significance as it thinks fit. The only constraints come from the general law of judicial review (e.g. reasonableness, no improper purpose, consideration of relevant matters) and the spent convictions regime in Part VIIC of the Crimes Act 1914, which is noted in section 6 but not elaborated.

Six broad categories of consideration emerge. First, compliance with the law (section 6): criminal convictions and pecuniary penalty orders under Commonwealth, state, territory or foreign law. The 2025 amendment added foreign offences. The seriousness of any offence may be considered. TEQSA may also look at whether the person is currently involved in court or tribunal proceedings, which could include civil proceedings that have not yet resulted in any finding. This is notable because it allows TEQSA to form a view before any adverse outcome is established.

Second, financial record (section 7): bankruptcy, insolvency, composition with creditors, assignment of remuneration, external administration, and outstanding debts to the Commonwealth. The term ‘outstanding debts to the Commonwealth’ is not limited to tax or student loan debts; it could encompass any debt owing to a Commonwealth agency, such as a penalty or overpayment. A person who has had a temporary cash‑flow difficulty that led to a small overdue amount might technically have an outstanding debt, giving TEQSA a basis to consider that person’s fitness.

Third, management history (section 8): previous cancellation, revocation, suspension or non‑renewal of registrations or approvals under various education laws (TEQSA Act, ESOS Act, VET Student Loans Act, Higher Education Support Act), accreditation of courses, subsidy funding arrangements with states or territories, and any conditions imposed or breached on such approvals. Also disqualification from managing corporations under the Corporations Act 2001 (Part 2D.6). This factor is backward‑looking and catches persons who have had regulatory difficulties in any part of the Australian education sector or in state‑funded training.

Fourth, provision of information (section 9): whether the person provided false or misleading information to a list of bodies (TEQSA, the National VET Regulator, state education bodies, the Department, tuition assurance administrators, state subsidy authorities). The condition is that it must be reasonable to assume the person knew the information was false or misleading. This is a lower threshold than a criminal conviction for fraud; it relies on an objective assessment of the person’s knowledge.

Fifth, previous conduct and involvements (section 10): this is the broadest category. It includes prior findings of not being fit and proper under the Act itself or under other named laws (now including ‘any other law’). It also includes whether the person or anyone acting for them has engaged in conduct that ‘reasonably suggests a deliberate pattern of unethical behaviour, or of acting inconsistently with laws’ in relation to education or training. The term ‘unethical behaviour’ is not defined. The provision also allows TEQSA to look at whether the person was previously involved in a business that provided education, and whether at that time the business would have been considered fit and proper. This means a person can be assessed based on the hypothetical fitness of a business they were associated with, even if that business never faced any adverse finding. The 2025 amendment introduced the public confidence test in subsection 10(3A): whether the public is unlikely to have confidence in the person’s suitability to make or participate in decisions affecting the whole or substantial part of a provider. This is a forward‑looking, reputational assessment that does not require any proven misconduct. Finally, section 10(4) sweeps in any other matter relevant to the person’s honesty, knowledge or ability.

The overall effect is that the Determination constructs a system of ‘regulatory character assessment’ with few fixed boundaries. The concepts of ‘deliberate pattern of unethical behaviour’, ‘public confidence’ and ‘any other matter’ give TEQSA very wide latitude. For a person with a long career or complex business interests, the risk that some aspect of their history would be considered adverse under one of these open‑ended factors is material. The instrument does not require TEQSA to give reasons for its conclusion, though administrative law principles may imply such an obligation.

The Determination directly affects individuals who are, or seek to become, persons who make or participate in making decisions that affect the whole or a substantial part of a registered higher education provider’s affairs. This phrase is taken from subsection 10(3A) and is the only place in the Determination where the class of persons subject to the fit and proper person requirement is described. It would encompass directors, chief executive officers, company secretaries, and senior managers with strategic or operational control. It could also extend to significant shareholders, members of governing councils, or individuals in a position to exert substantial influence through contractual arrangements, such as a holding company’s representative. The Determination does not limit the class to formally appointed officers, so TEQSA may examine any person who in substance exercises that level of decision‑making power.

Because TEQSA can consider the fitness of persons when deciding whether to grant, refuse, suspend or cancel registration of a higher education provider under the TEQSA Act, the Determination affects every provider in the sector. A provider cannot afford to have key personnel who TEQSA might assess as not fit and proper; if a new director is appointed who has a relevant background, the provider’s registration could be at risk. Consequently, the instrument imposes an indirect compliance burden on all providers to conduct due diligence on their key people and to monitor them continuously.

Potential new entrants to the higher education market are also affected. An individual seeking to establish a new provider must be assessed as fit and proper, and the factors set out in the Determination are the criteria TEQSA will apply. The expanded list, especially the foreign offences and public confidence factors, creates particular difficulty for overseas‑educated entrepreneurs or for individuals with backgrounds in jurisdictions where educational regulation is less transparent. The cost of establishing fitness may be disproportionate to the size of the proposed provider, creating a barrier to entry that favours incumbent providers with established regulatory relationships.

The Determination also affects persons who have previously been involved in education businesses, even if that involvement was not as a director but as an advisor, consultant, or employee in a managerial role. Section 10(3) allows TEQSA to have regard to whether the business would have been a fit and proper person at the time of the person’s involvement. This could capture, for example, a former employee of a deregistered training college, even if the employee was not personally responsible for the misconduct that led to deregistration. The person then bears the burden of showing they are nevertheless fit and proper.

Persons with foreign criminal convictions are a newly explicit class affected by the 2025 amendment. The Determination does not distinguish between convictions for truly serious offences and minor infractions under foreign laws that have no Australian equivalent. The lack of an equivalency filter means TEQSA could consider a conviction for, say, a regulatory violation in a jurisdiction with weak rule of law, creating risks of unfairness.

Beyond individuals, the Determination affects the broader higher education sector by shaping the pool of personnel available. If TEQSA applies the factors aggressively, it could discourage experienced managers from entering or remaining in the sector, particularly those with past business failures or complex international backgrounds. This could reduce the quality of governance in the sector over time. Providers will incur legal and administrative costs to conduct background checks, engage with TEQSA about personnel changes, and potentially defend challenges to a person’s fitness. Small providers and niche colleges bear these costs more heavily per unit of revenue, potentially reducing competition and diversity in the sector.

The Determination does not impose any duties directly on persons. It confers a power on TEQSA, not an obligation. The duties arise indirectly through the operation of the TEQSA Act: providers have duties to ensure they meet the threshold standards, and those standards include the requirement that the provider’s governing body and key personnel be fit and proper persons. The practical effect is that a provider must ensure that any person who falls within the scope of the fit and proper person requirement is, and remains, fit and proper. That is a duty of outcome, not merely a duty to take reasonable steps, because TEQSA can make its own assessment and if it concludes a person is not fit and proper, the provider’s registration may be affected.

Rights are also limited in the Determination itself. A person has no explicit right to be notified that TEQSA is considering their fitness, nor a right to be heard before a determination is made. However, the common law of procedural fairness (natural justice) would likely require TEQSA to give a person an opportunity to respond to adverse information before relying on it to refuse or cancel registration. The note in section 6 about Part VIIC of the Crimes Act 1914 gives a right to have spent convictions disregarded, but that right is qualified and may not apply in all circumstances. The Determination does not mention any right to a written statement of reasons; that would depend on the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 or on the general law.

The only obligation on TEQSA that is explicit in the Determination is that it ‘may have regard’ to listed matters. The use of ‘may’ means TEQSA can also disregard them. TEQSA could decide a person is not fit and proper on grounds outside the Determination entirely, provided those grounds are relevant to honesty, knowledge or ability. The catch‑all in section 10(4) arguably authorises that already. Therefore, a person cannot rely on the Determination to confine the scope of TEQSA’s inquiry.

The 2025 amendment introduced a subtle shift in the balance of power. The public confidence test in section 10(3A) gives TEQSA a basis to form adverse views based on general reputation or public sentiment, not just on proven conduct. A person has no effective right to rebut a claim about ‘public confidence’ because it is inherently subjective. This diminishes the protective value of procedural fairness compared to a test based on objective facts.

For providers, the key duty is to self‑assess and report. The Determination does not oblige a provider to proactively inform TEQSA about a change in a key person, but the TEQSA Act may impose notification requirements upon certain events (e.g. change of ownership, change of key personnel). If a provider appoints a person with a known adverse background without TEQSA’s knowledge, and TEQSA later finds that person unfit, the provider could face enforcement action. This creates an incentive for providers to voluntarily disclose potentially problematic personnel and seek TEQSA’s blessing, effectively transferring the risk assessment from the provider to the regulator. That dynamic increases transaction costs and slows down personnel changes.

The Determination itself carries no penalties. It is a decision‑making instrument, not a prohibition or offence‑creating law. Enforcement occurs through the TEQSA Act. If TEQSA decides that a person is not fit and proper, it may refuse an application for registration, impose conditions on registration, suspend registration, or cancel registration. The provider then loses its ability to offer higher education awards, which can be financially devastating. Individuals who are assessed as not fit and proper may be prohibited from being involved in a registered provider, effectively barring them from the sector.

The TEQSA Act includes enforcement mechanisms such as civil penalties for non‑compliance with conditions or for providing false or misleading information to TEQSA. A person who provides false information to TEQSA in response to a fit and proper person inquiry could be subject to those provisions. The Determination’s section 9 provides a specific factor about false or misleading information, which TEQSA can use as a reason to find a person not fit and proper, potentially stacking regulatory consequences.

There is no right of review under the Determination itself. Review of TEQSA’s decisions is available under the TEQSA Act (internal review or review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, now the Administrative Review Tribunal). The scope of that review includes whether the decision was the correct or preferable one, but the tribunal would consider the same factors as TEQSA. Because the factors are discretionary, a tribunal is likely to give considerable deference to TEQSA’s assessment of matters like ‘public confidence’ or ‘deliberate pattern of unethical behaviour’, which are evaluative rather than factual. This limits the practical value of external review for persons who have been found unfit.

The cost of enforcement is borne by the regulated entity and the individual. A provider facing a cancellation proceeding must engage lawyers, prepare evidence, and potentially lose its business. The Determination’s breadth means TEQSA can rely on a wide array of evidence, making it harder for a provider to mount a successful defence. The public confidence test is particularly difficult to challenge because it is based on an amorphous concept that TEQSA can define as it sees fit.

From an economic perspective, the enforcement framework creates concentrated costs (on the affected provider and individual) and diffuse benefits (protecting students and the reputation of the sector). The discretion in the Determination enables TEQSA to act decisively against persons it regards as undesirable, which can enhance consumer protection. However, the lack of clear standards also raises the risk of inconsistent application and potentially erroneous decisions that destroy shareholder value and careers. The 2025 amendment’s expansion to foreign offences and any other law increases the likelihood that TEQSA will find adverse information in many persons’ backgrounds, increasing enforcement activity.

The Determination sits within a network of education and corporate regulation. It explicitly references several pieces of Commonwealth legislation: the TEQSA Act itself, the Australian Education Act 2013, the Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000, the Higher Education Support Act 2003, the National Vocational Education and Regulator Act 2011, the VET Student Loans Act 2016, the Higher Education Standards Framework (Threshold Standards) 2015, and the Corporations Act 2001. Under section 8(3), TEQSA may consider whether a person has been disqualified from managing corporations under Part 2D.6 of the Corporations Act. This links the higher education regulatory regime to corporate governance law: a director disqualified by ASIC for misconduct in any company can be deemed not fit and proper for a higher education provider. Similarly, a person who has been found unfit by a state or territory education authority under a subsidy funding arrangement can be caught by section 8(1)(f) and section 10(1)(i).

The reference to the Higher Education Standards Framework (Threshold Standards) 2015 (now superseded by the Higher Education Standards Framework 2021) in section 10(1)(g) shows that the Determination is intended to work in conjunction with the standards that providers must meet. Those standards include requirements about the suitability of governing body members. The Determination provides the method for TEQSA to assess that suitability.

Interaction with the criminal law is mediated by Part VIIC of the Crimes Act 1914, which prevents TEQSA from taking into account spent convictions (those that are old and minor) unless an exception applies. The Determination notes this in the commentary to section 6 but does not create any further exceptions. The 2025 amendment’s inclusion of foreign offences raises a potential conflict: Australia may not have reciprocal arrangements with the foreign jurisdiction for spent convictions, so a person could have a foreign conviction that would be spent in that country but which TEQSA could still consider because Australia lacks a mechanism to treat it as spent.

The interaction with state and territory laws is significant. The Determination references subsidy funding arrangements with states and territories in sections 8(1)(f) and 10(1)(h). This means that a person who has had funding withdrawn by a state training authority can be considered not fit and proper by a Commonwealth regulator. This creates a de facto national consistency in personnel standards across different education sectors (higher education and vocational education). It also means that state policy decisions about funding can have regulatory consequences under Commonwealth law, even if the state decision was based on criteria different from those in the Determination.

There is potential for overlap with the National VET Regulator’s own fit and proper person assessments under the National Vocational Education and Regulator Act 2011. The Determination mentions the National VET Regulator in sections 9 and 10, but does not clarify whether a finding by the VET Regulator is binding on TEQSA. TEQSA can have regard to such a finding as one factor, but can also reach a different conclusion. This could lead to inconsistent regulatory outcomes between the two regulators for the same individual.

The Determination does not interact directly with privacy laws, but TEQSA’s collection of information about foreign convictions, bankruptcies, and business involvements would be subject to the Privacy Act 1988. The Determination does not address how TEQSA will handle sensitive information or what rights an individual has to access their file. This gap may be concerning for individuals whose data is used in a fit and proper person assessment.

The Determination was originally made on 13 December 2018 and registered as F2018L01753, commencing on 14 December 2018. The original version included sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 (then with subsections 10(1) to (4) only). It did not include foreign offences, the expanded list of laws in section 10(1), or the public confidence test. The original section 6 dealt only with domestic offences. The original section 10(1) listed the Act, Australian Education Act 2013, ESOS Act, HESA, NVETR Act, VET Student Loans Act, Higher Education Standards Framework (Threshold Standards) 2015, and subsidy funding arrangements. There was no paragraph (i) for any other law.

The only amendment to date is the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency Fit and Proper Person Determination 2018 - Amendment No. 1 of 2025, registered on 4 April 2025 and in force from 5 April 2025 (F2025L00482). The amendment made three substantive changes and one editorial change. Substantively, it:

• inserted a new subsection 6(1A) allowing TEQSA to have regard to foreign convictions (within the meaning of section 85ZL of the Crimes Act 1914). This brought within TEQSA’s purview criminal conduct overseas, regardless of whether the conduct would be an offence in Australia.
• added a new paragraph 10(1)(i) extending the list of laws under which a person may have been previously found not fit and proper to ‘any other law of the Commonwealth, a State or Territory’. This removed the limitation of specific named laws, turning the list into an open‑ended reference.
• inserted a new subsection 10(3A) permitting TEQSA to consider whether the public is unlikely to have confidence in the person’s suitability to be a decision‑maker for a provider. This introduced a reputational and subjective element.
• editorially, the compilation noted that paragraph 10(1)(i) was renumbered to maintain consistency (the inserted paragraph was originally (i) but the editor changed it to (i) which appears correct; the endnote states the editorial change was to renumber it from (i) to (i) - likely a formatting correction).

The endnotes also show that section 2 (Commencement) was repealed by section 48D of the Legislation Act 2003, a standard provision that removes spent commencement sections from compilations.

The 2025 amendment significantly broadened TEQSA’s discretion. The government’s rationale (not stated in the instrument but likely articulated in the explanatory statement) would probably centre on protecting the integrity of the higher education sector and preventing persons with problematic backgrounds from holding influential positions. However, the amendment’s effect is to reduce predictability for regulated entities. The addition of ‘any other law’ means TEQSA can trawl through every regulatory action a person has ever faced, no matter how minor or tangential, and the public confidence test allows TEQSA to act on perceptions rather than proven facts.

There is no indication of any further amendments in preparation. The compilation date is 5 April 2025.

The Determination itself has not been the subject of any reported litigation, at least none that is noted in the instrument. The endnotes do not reference any court cases. This means the Determination has not been judicially considered or interpreted by the courts as of the compilation date. However, it is likely that TEQSA’s use of the Determination has been challenged in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (now the Administrative Review Tribunal) under merits review provisions of the TEQSA Act. Those decisions would be on the Register (www.legislation.gov.au) but are not part of this compilation.

Given the breadth of the Determination, several grounds for judicial review can be anticipated. A person found not fit and proper could argue that TEQSA took into account an irrelevant consideration (e.g. a foreign conviction for conduct that is not unlawful in Australia and that does not reflect on the person’s honesty or ability). Or that the public confidence test is so vague that it amounts to an improper delegation of legislative power, though this argument is weak given the high discretion courts allow in character‑based licensing. Alternatively, a person could argue that TEQSA failed to give proper weight to the spent convictions regime, or that the decision was unreasonable in the legal sense (see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541). The ‘deliberate pattern of unethical behaviour’ test in section 10(2) is also ripe for challenge: ‘unethical’ is undefined and may be considered impermissibly vague or leading TEQSA to apply its own moral code.

There is also potential for a constitutional challenge if TEQSA were to rely on a foreign conviction obtained under a law that does not meet minimum Australian standards of fairness, though the High Court might treat this as a matter of weight rather than jurisdiction.

From a practical standpoint, the lack of litigation may reflect the high cost of challenging TEQSA relative to the value of the provider’s registration, or the fact that most adverse findings lead providers to negotiate conditions or surrender registration rather than fight. The 2025 amendment may trigger litigation if TEQSA uses the new powers aggressively, particularly against persons with international backgrounds who have resources to litigate. The uncertainty created by the Determination’s open‑textured factors makes settlement more likely than trial, because a provider cannot easily predict a court’s view of a subjective criterion like public confidence.

Several traps exist that regulated persons and their advisers should watch for. First, the phrase ‘may have regard’ is permissive but can be read in context as nearly mandatory in practice. If TEQSA ignores a clearly relevant factor (e.g. a spent conviction that should have been disregarded), that could be an error of law. But if TEQSA considers an irrelevant factor not listed in the Determination, a person may have a challenge. However, section 10(4) (‘any other matter relevant to honesty, knowledge or ability’) is so broad that almost any factor could be argued as relevant, making it difficult to win an irrelevant‑consideration challenge.

Second, the public confidence test in subsection 10(3A) is a sleeper provision. It does not require any evidence of actual public sentiment; TEQSA can infer public confidence from the nature of the person’s background. This could be used against a person who has been the subject of adverse media coverage, even if the coverage was inaccurate or unfair. The person has no right to demand that TEQSA conduct a public opinion poll.

Third, the foreign offence provision (subsection 6(1A)) does not require that the foreign offence have an Australian equivalent. A conviction in a foreign country for a regulatory offence that has no parallel in Australia (e.g. a conviction under a law that criminalises running an unlicensed school in a country where licensing is corruptly withheld) could be held against a person. The determination gives TEQSA no guidance on how to assess the seriousness or legitimacy of foreign proceedings.

Fourth, section 7(f) (outstanding debts to the Commonwealth) catches any unpaid debt, not just large ones. A person with a small overdue HELP debt or a minor ATO tax debt could technically have an ‘outstanding debt’. TEQSA could use that as a factor, even if the debt is being repaid or is in dispute. This creates a perverse incentive for persons to ensure they have zero debt to the Commonwealth at all times, which is administratively burdensome.

Fifth, the concept of ‘deliberate pattern of unethical behaviour’ in section 10(2) is undefined. It does not require a breach of law, only conduct that ‘reasonably suggests’ such a pattern. This could cover things like aggressive recruitment practices that are legal but perceived as exploitative. The person may not even know TEQSA is forming this view until it is too late.

Sixth, the ‘involvement in a business that provided education’ factor (section 10(3)) looks back at a business the person was involved in, and assesses whether that business would have been a fit and proper person at the time. This can catch individuals who were not responsible for the business’s failings. For example, a person who worked as a consultant to a now‑defunct training college could be found unfit because the college would not have passed a fit and proper person test at that time, even if the person had no knowledge of the problems.

Seventh, the Determination does not require TEQSA to give reasons for considering a person not fit and proper. While administrative law may imply a duty, TEQSA could give very brief reasons that are hard to challenge. Combined with the broad factors, the burden of proof effectively shifts to the person to demonstrate they are fit and proper, because TEQSA can simply assert that one of the factors justifes its conclusion.

Eighth, the interaction with state subsidy funding (sections 8(1)(f) and 10(1)(h)) means a person could be considered unfit based on a funding decision by a state department that was driven by political or budgetary reasons, not by an assessment of the person’s character. TEQSA is not required to evaluate the quality of the state’s decision.

Finally, the 2025 amendment’s inclusion of ‘any other law’ under section 10(1)(i) means a person could be found unfit because they were found not fit and proper under a law that has nothing to do with education, such as a law regulating real estate agents or child care. The person would not expect that regulatory history to affect their work in higher education.

Compliance with the Determination is not a direct obligation - it is a consequence of ensuring that all key personnel meet the fit and proper person standard that TEQSA will apply. The practical steps are as follows.

First, providers must identify which individuals fall within the scope of the fit and proper person requirement. This includes all directors, the chief executive, company secretary, and any other person who makes or participates in making decisions that affect the whole or a substantial part of the provider’s affairs. When in doubt, err on the side of including more people, because TEQSA can always widen the net. Providers should document their reasoning for excluding someone (e.g. a junior manager with no strategic role).

Second, for each such individual, conduct a thorough background check covering all factors in the Determination. This includes: criminal history checks in all countries where the person has lived (using official police checks or equivalent); a review of any court or tribunal proceedings they are involved in; credit checks and bankruptcy searches; a review of any regulatory actions against them under education laws, state funding schemes, the Corporations Act (disqualifications), and any other law; a search for any finding that they were not a fit and proper person under any law; and a review of any debts to the Commonwealth (including ATO, HELP, DSS overpayments). Also review the person’s history in any business that provided education, even if they were not a director.

Third, assess whether there is any ‘deliberate pattern of unethical behaviour’ in relation to education or training. This requires a qualitative judgement. Obtain the person’s own account of any incidents that could be seen as unethical. Consider obtaining references from previous education sector employers. Document the assessment.

Fourth, assess the public confidence risk. This is inherently subjective. Consider whether the person has any factors (e.g. past media controversy, association with disreputable entities) that could lead a reasonable member of the public to lack confidence in their suitability. If such factors exist, consider whether they can be mitigated (e.g. by providing evidence of reforms, apologies, or successful subsequent conduct). TEQSA’s view may differ, so document the provider’s own assessment.

Fifth, maintain ongoing monitoring. The fit and proper person assessment is not a one‑off. A person who was fit at appointment may later be convicted of an offence, become bankrupt, or engage in unethical conduct. Providers should have policies requiring key personnel to report any adverse developments (criminal charges, bankruptcy, regulatory action, etc.) promptly. Annual declarations of fitness can be required.

Sixth, when a new person is proposed for appointment, proactively engage with TEQSA if there are any potential red flags. A provider can seek informal guidance from TEQSA about whether a person would be considered fit and proper before making the appointment. This reduces the risk of an adverse finding later. The provider should be prepared to provide all relevant information and any mitigating circumstances.

Seventh, ensure that any information provided to TEQSA or other bodies is accurate and not misleading. Section 9 makes providing false or misleading information a separate factor against fitness. Providers should have internal controls to verify the accuracy of all regulatory submissions, especially those concerning personnel.

Eighth, maintain records of all due diligence and assessments for each key person. If TEQSA later questions the person’s fitness, the provider can demonstrate that it took reasonable steps to ensure fitness. While the Determination does not impose a ‘reasonable steps’ defence, having a documented process shows good governance and may influence TEQSA’s discretion.

Finally, seek legal advice for any person with a complex background, especially involving foreign convictions, past business failures, or prior regulatory findings. The 2025 amendment’s expansion to ‘any other law’ and ‘public confidence’ makes self‑assessment risky. A lawyer can help frame mitigating arguments and prepare a submission to TEQSA.

The cost of compliance is substantial. For a small provider with limited resources, conducting full background checks and monitoring may be a significant burden. However, the alternative - having TEQSA find a key person unfit and potentially cancel registration - is far more costly. Providers should budget for ongoing compliance costs and consider whether the regulatory environment justifies the expense relative to the size of the business.