Telecommunications (Interception) Act 2012

Eligible authority is the foundational concept. It currently means SA Police and the Independent Commission Against Corruption (s 2(1)). Only these two bodies can apply for warrants under the Commonwealth Act through the state mechanism. The Act was amended in 2021 to add ICAC, reflecting its expanded investigatory role.

Chief officer means the Commissioner of Police for SA Police, and the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption for ICAC (s 2(1)). That person bears personal statutory responsibility for the record-keeping, security and destruction obligations in s 3, and for the reporting obligations in s 4. The chief officer must also ensure officers provide assistance to the review agency (s 5(9)).

Restricted record is defined as a record (other than a copy) obtained by means of an interception of a communication passing over a telecommunications system, whether or not the interception contravened s 7(1) of the Commonwealth Act (s 2(1)). This covers both lawfully intercepted communications and unlawfully intercepted communications that come into the authority’s possession. The Act excludes from its scope records of communications intercepted under s 7(2)(aaa) of the Commonwealth Act (emergency calls - s 3(2)), meaning those are not subject to the same record-keeping and destruction obligations. The “copy” exclusion means duplicates are not subject to the secure-keeping and destruction rules, though the original remains a restricted record.

Warrant means a warrant issued or to be issued to an eligible authority under Part 2-5 of the Commonwealth Act (s 2(1)). The Act does not define or create any warrant process itself; it simply operates on the assumption that such warrants can be issued.

Review agency means, for both eligible authorities, the Inspector under Schedule 4 of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 2012 (s 2(1)). This was changed by amendments in 2016, 2018 and 2023. Previously the review agency may have been a different entity; now it is unified under the ICAC Act’s Inspector. The review agency’s core mandate is to inspect records at least every six months (s 5(1)(a)). It also has the power to initiate investigations and report non‑compliance.

Premises is defined expansively to include land, structures, buildings, aircraft, vehicles, vessels and places (whether built on or not) and parts thereof (s 2(1)). This definition supports the review agency’s power to enter premises occupied by an eligible authority.

Officer of an eligible authority means, for SA Police, a police officer or a police officer of another jurisdiction seconded to SA Police; for ICAC, an investigator under the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 2012 (s 2(1)). Only officers can be required to give information or answer questions under s 5, and they are the individuals subject to the offence provisions for non-compliance.

The Act also defines possession to include custody or control (s 2(1)), ensuring the obligations extend to records held on behalf of the authority but not physically in its buildings.

The Act directly affects three groups: the two eligible authorities (SA Police and ICAC), the review agency (the Inspector under Schedule 4 of the ICAC Act), and the state Attorney‑General. It indirectly affects the Commonwealth Minister who receives reports, and potentially any person whose communications are intercepted under a warrant issued to one of the authorities.

For SA Police and ICAC, the Act imposes internal compliance burdens. The chief officer must establish and maintain secure storage for restricted records, keep records corresponding to those required by the Commonwealth Act, and cause destruction of records no longer needed for a permitted purpose (s 3). This requires investment in physical security, access controls, document management systems, and staff training. The chief officer must also generate two types of reports: post-warrant reports within three months of expiry (s 4(a)) and annual reports by 30 September each year (s 4(b)). These reporting obligations consume administrative resources and create legal risk if deadlines are missed or reports are incomplete.

For officers of the eligible authorities - police officers, seconded officers, and ICAC investigators - the Act creates potential personal liability. They can be required by the review agency to attend and answer questions, give information, or produce documents (s 5(4)-(6)). Refusal without reasonable excuse is an offence punishable by $5,000 or one year imprisonment (s 5(10)). Hindering the review agency or knowingly giving false or misleading information carries the same penalty (s 5(11)). Unauthorised disclosure of information obtained under the Act carries a higher penalty of $10,000 or two years imprisonment (s 5(13)). Officers therefore face real criminal sanctions if they obstruct oversight or mishandle intercepted material.

For the review agency (the Inspector under the ICAC Act), the Act imposes a mandatory inspection cycle: at least once every six months, the Inspector must inspect the records of each eligible authority (s 5(1)(a)). This is a non-discretionary duty - the word “must” is used - and the Inspector must report to the Attorney‑General within two months after each inspection (s 5(1)(b)). The review agency also has the power to investigate suspected non-compliance and must include details of any such findings in its report (s 5(2)). The Inspector must give the chief officer an opportunity to comment before including adverse findings (s 5(3)), which adds a procedural step but also protects against unfair reports.

For the Attorney‑General, the Act creates a ministerial gateway: all reports from the review agency and from the chief officers must be received and then forwarded to the Commonwealth Minister (s 6). This imposes a clerical function but also positions the Attorney‑General as the accountability intermediary between state agencies and the Commonwealth.

For persons whose communications are intercepted, the Act provides no direct rights. There is no provision for notification, access, or challenge. However, the oversight mechanisms are designed to ensure that interception is properly authorised and that material is not misused, which indirectly protects individual privacy.

The Act imposes duties primarily on the chief officer and the review agency, and creates ancillary duties on officers of eligible authorities. Rights under the Act are mostly procedural rather than substantive.

Chief officer’s duties - record-keeping and security (s 3). The chief officer must record particulars corresponding to those required under s 81 of the Commonwealth Act “as soon as practicable” after the event (s 3(1)(a)). This includes details of the interception, warrant, and any dealing with the record. Those records must be kept in the authority’s records (s 3(1)(b)). The chief officer must cause any restricted record in the authority’s possession to be kept in a secure place, not accessible to persons not entitled to deal with it, except while being dealt with under this Act or the Commonwealth Act (s 3(1)(c)). The chief officer must also cause destruction immediately if satisfied the record is not likely to be required for a permitted purpose (s 3(1)(d)). The definition of “permitted purpose” in the Commonwealth Act is modified so that an inspection by the review agency under s 5 does not count as a purpose that would prevent destruction (s 3(3)). This means records can be destroyed even if they have not yet been inspected, which reduces the risk of indefinite retention but also may reduce the ability of the review agency to inspect past records.

Chief officer’s duty - reporting (s 4). The chief officer must give the Attorney‑General a written report within three months after a warrant ceases to be in force, detailing use made of the intercepted information and communication to persons other than officers of the authority (s 4(a)). Additionally, by no later than three months after each 30 June, the chief officer must provide a written report setting out such information as the Commonwealth Act requires the Commonwealth Minister to report on, as can be derived from the authority’s records (s 4(b)). This annual report mirrors the Commonwealth reporting regime.

Chief officer’s duty - ensure cooperation (s 5(9)). The chief officer “must ensure that officers of the authority provide the review agency … with such assistance … as the review agency reasonably requires.” This imposes an obligation on the chief officer to issue instructions, allocate staff, and possibly enforce discipline to facilitate inspections.

Review agency’s duties (s 5). The review agency must inspect records at least once every six months (s 5(1)(a)); report within two months after each inspection (s 5(1)(b)); include details of any non-compliance with the Act or Commonwealth Act found during an investigation (s 5(2)); and before including such details, give the chief officer an opportunity to make written comments and submit those comments with the report (s 5(3)). These procedural duties aim for fairness and transparency.

Review agency’s powers (s 5(4)-(6)). The review agency (or a person authorised by it) may enter premises occupied by an eligible authority at any reasonable time after notifying the chief officer; have full and free access to all records; make copies and take extracts; and require an officer to give information relevant to the inspection. The review agency can also issue written notices requiring an officer to give information in writing or attend to answer questions (s 5(5)). If the officer’s identity is unknown, the review agency can require the chief officer or a nominee to attend and answer questions (s 5(6)). These powers are broad and override other laws, including public interest immunity and the privilege against self-incrimination (s 5(7)). However, any information or answer given, or documents derived from them, are not admissible in evidence against the person except in proceedings for an offence under s 5 (s 5(8)). This use immunity protects individuals from self-incrimination while still compelling disclosure.

Rights of officers. Officers have a right not to be compelled to provide information unless it is relevant to the inspection (s 5(14) gives a broad non-exclusive list of relevance). They also have a right to claim a “reasonable excuse” defence against charges under s 5(10) for failing to comply, though the Act does not define what constitutes a reasonable excuse. They are protected by the limited use immunity in s 5(8).

Rights of the review agency to disclose information. The review agency may give information obtained under s 5 to the Commonwealth Ombudsman if relevant to the Ombudsman’s functions under the Commonwealth Act (s 5(12)). This facilitates inter-agency coordination. However, the review agency and its authorised persons must not otherwise divulge or communicate information acquired under the Act except as required for administration or authorised by the Act, on pain of a $10,000 fine or two years imprisonment (s 5(13)).

The Act creates four criminal offences, all located in s 5. There are no civil penalty provisions; enforcement is by criminal prosecution. Maximum penalties are modest relative to the serious nature of the subject matter (interception of communications), but imprisonment terms are available.

Offence 1 - Failure to comply with a requirement to attend, give information, or answer questions (s 5(10)). A person who is required under s 5 to attend, give information, or answer a question and who, without reasonable excuse, refuses or fails to comply is guilty of an offence. Penalty: $5,000 or imprisonment for one year. The “reasonable excuse” defence is undefined, leaving courts to determine its scope. Potential excuses could include physical incapacity, non-possession of the information, or duress, but not the overridden privileges (s 5(7) removes the excuse of incrimination or public interest immunity). This offence could apply to officers of eligible authorities, and theoretically to the chief officer themselves if required under s 5(6).

Offence 2 - Hindering the exercise of powers (s 5(11)(a)). A person who, without reasonable excuse, hinders a person exercising powers under s 5 is guilty of an offence. Penalty: $5,000 or one year imprisonment. “Hindering” may include physical obstruction, delaying access, concealing records, or refusing to cooperate. The duty of the chief officer under s 5(9) to ensure assistance would be relevant.

Offence 3 - Providing false or misleading information (s 5(11)(b)). A person who gives to a person exercising powers under s 5 information knowing it to be false or misleading in a material particular is guilty of an offence. Penalty: $5,000 or one year imprisonment. The mental element is knowledge, so recklessness or negligence would not suffice. This is a specific intent offence.

Offence 4 - Unauthorised divulging or communication of information (s 5(13)). The review agency and persons authorised by it must not, directly or indirectly, divulge or communicate information acquired under this Act except as required for administration or authorised by the Act. Penalty: $10,000 or two years imprisonment. This is a strict confidentiality obligation with no “reasonable excuse” defence on its face. It applies only to the review agency and its authorised persons, not to officers of the eligible authorities (who would be dealt with under the Commonwealth Act’s secrecy provisions or other law). The higher penalty reflects the sensitivity of intercept-related information.

Enforcement. Offences under s 5 would be prosecuted by the Director of Public Prosecutions (SA). There is no provision for infringement notices or administrative penalties. The review agency does not have power to impose sanctions; its role is to inspect and report. Non-compliance could also be reported to the Attorney‑General, who may take administrative or disciplinary action against the chief officer or officers, but the Act does not create any such powers. The primary enforcement mechanism is criminal prosecution.

Use immunity (s 5(8)). Information, answers, access to documents, and anything derived from them are not admissible in evidence against a person except in proceedings for an offence against s 5. This is a significant limitation: a person cannot be prosecuted for a different offence based on what they disclose during an inspection, but they can be prosecuted for the specific offences under s 5 (such as false information or failure to comply). This creates an incentive for officers to cooperate fully and accurately.

The Act operates in the shadow of the Commonwealth Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. The Commonwealth Act is incorporated by reference: all undefined terms take their meaning from the Commonwealth Act (s 2(2)). The State Act does not replicate or expand the substantive interception regime; it is purely machinery. However, it modifies the Commonwealth Act’s concept of “permitted purpose” for the purpose of destruction decisions (s 3(3)). That modification is limited to the State Act’s operation; it does not alter the Commonwealth Act’s meaning for other purposes.

The Act expressly overrides other laws in s 5(7): “Despite any other law, a person is not excused from giving information, answering a question, or giving access to a document … on the grounds that it would contravene a law, would be contrary to the public interest or might tend to incriminate the person or make the person liable to a penalty.” This abrogates legal professional privilege, the privilege against self-incrimination, public interest immunity, and any statutory confidentiality obligations. The only protection is the use immunity in s 5(8), which is limited. This is a strong incursion into common law rights, justified by the need for effective oversight of interception.

The Act interacts with the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 2012 in multiple ways. The review agency for both eligible authorities is the Inspector under Schedule 4 of the ICAC Act (s 2(1)). That Inspector’s powers and functions are defined partly by the ICAC Act and partly by this Act. The 2021 amendment (Act 38/2021) added ICAC as an eligible authority, bringing it within the interception framework. The 2016 amendment (Act 60/2016) changed the review agency from an earlier body to the Inspector under the ICAC Act’s Schedule 4, aligning oversight with the ICAC framework.

The Act also interacts with the Police Complaints and Discipline Act 2016, which was the vehicle for the 2016 amendment to the review agency definition. The 2018 and 2023 Statutes Amendment Acts made further technical changes to the review agency definition.

Although not explicit, the Act’s reporting obligations under s 4 feed into the Commonwealth Minister’s report under Part 2-8 Division 2 of the Commonwealth Act. The Attorney‑General must forward state reports to the Commonwealth Minister (s 6), ensuring the Commonwealth oversight regime receives state-level data. This is a coordination mechanism that prevents duplication of reporting while maintaining state accountability.

The Act repealed the earlier Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1988 (SA). There is no savings provision for that repeal in the text provided, but the current Act’s legislative history notes the 1988 Act was repealed by the 2012 Act. Any transitional issues would be governed by the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA).

The Act also references warrants issued under Part 2-5 of the Commonwealth Act. That Part deals with state and territory warrants. The State Act does not affect the validity or procedure for obtaining those warrants; it only attaches state-level obligations after the warrant is obtained.

The Act was originally passed in 2012 as Act No 56 of 2012, assented to and commencing on 20 December 2012. It replaced the former Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1988. The original long title referred only to SA Police; ICAC was added later.

The first significant amendment came via the Police Complaints and Discipline Act 2016 (Act 60/2016), Schedule 1 clause 34, effective 4 September 2017. This amended the definition of “review agency” to refer to the Inspector under Schedule 4 of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 2012, replacing whatever previous oversight body existed. This brought the review function under the ICAC Inspector framework.

The second amendment was the Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General’s Portfolio) Act 2018 (Act 29/2018), Part 6 section 12, effective 15 November 2018. This further amended the definition of “review agency”, presumably refining the language to match the 2016 changes.

The third and most substantial amendment was the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (CPIPC Recommendations) Amendment Act 2021 (Act 38/2021), Schedule 1 clauses 60, 61 and 76, effective 7 October 2021. Clause 60 amended the long title to include ICAC. Clause 61 made multiple amendments to s 2(1): it amended “chief officer” to include the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption; amended “eligible authority” to include the Independent Commission Against Corruption; inserted the definition of “Independent Commission Against Corruption”; amended “Independent Commissioner Against Corruption” (which previously referred to a different body?); amended “officer” to include ICAC investigators; and amended “review agency” to reflect the unified Inspector framework. Clause 76 provided a savings and transitional regulation power. This amendment was the most significant, effectively extending the entire interception oversight regime to ICAC.

The fourth amendment was the Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General’s Portfolio) (No 4) Act 2023 (Act 27/2023), Part 3 section 4 and Schedule 1 clause 1(2), effective 21 September 2023. Section 4 amended the definition of “review agency” again, likely for consistency with other legislative changes. Schedule 1 clause 1(2) provided a transitional provision: any review required under s 5 after 31 August 2022 that had not been completed before the commencement of the clause (21 September 2023) was instead required to be conducted as part of the next review after that date. This effectively waived the overdue inspections, merging them into the next cycle.

The legislative history also notes that the long title was amended under the Legislation Revision and Publication Act 2002 on 4 September 2017 (likely a formal renumbering or style change). Schedule 1 was omitted under the same Act.

Historical versions are available for 4 September 2017, 15 November 2018, and 7 October 2021. These allow practitioners to trace the exact language at each point.

The source text provided does not contain any references to court cases, judicial decisions, or pending litigation involving this Act. The Act is largely administrative and unlikely to generate direct litigation because it primarily imposes duties on state agencies and oversight bodies, not on private individuals. The offence provisions in s 5 could theoretically be prosecuted, but the maximum penalties are modest, and the likelihood of prosecutions reaching appellate courts is low.

However, the Act’s abrogation of privilege against self-incrimination and public interest immunity (s 5(7)) could give rise to constitutional challenges under the implied right to a fair trial or state privilege. No such challenge is recorded in the source. Similarly, the modification of “permitted purpose” in s 3(3) might be contested if it leads to premature destruction of records relevant to a criminal appeal or to civil proceedings, but again, no cases are cited.

The 2023 transitional provision (Schedule 1 clause 1(2)) suggests that reviews were overdue, but whether this led to any legal action is not stated. The provision itself retroactively validates the delay.

The Act’s strong interrelationship with the Commonwealth Act means that litigation about the validity of a state warrant, or about the handling of intercepted material, would likely focus on the Commonwealth Act rather than this Act. The State Act is a procedural overlay, not the source of interception authority. Therefore, any challenge to an interception itself would be under the Commonwealth Act, not the State Act. The State Act’s record-keeping obligations might be relevant in the context of an unlawful interception challenge, but the source provides no examples.

In summary, litigation history under this Act appears to be nil or negligible. Practitioners should not expect to find relevant case law from this Act alone. Oversight and enforcement occur through the administrative and reporting mechanisms, not through private litigation. The Act may be referenced in judicial review of ICAC or SA Police actions, but primarily as part of the statutory context.

The Act contains several provisions that could trap the unwary.

1. The definition of “restricted record” is broader than expected. It includes records obtained by interception even if the interception contravened s 7(1) of the Commonwealth Act (s 2(1)). That means an unlawfully intercepted communication that comes into the authority’s possession is still a restricted record and must be dealt with under s 3 - secure storage, recording, and possible destruction. The authority cannot simply ignore it or treat it as tainted. The Act applies regardless of the lawfulness of the underlying interception.

2. Records destroyed before inspection cannot be revived. Section 3(3) modifies the definition of “permitted purpose” so that an inspection by the review agency is not a purpose that would prevent destruction. The chief officer can destroy a record even if it has not yet been inspected. While this avoids indefinite retention, it also means the review agency will never see that record. If the destruction is later challenged, there is no evidence to inspect. This creates an incentive for chief officers to destroy records quickly to avoid scrutiny, but also exposes them to risk if a record becomes relevant later.

3. The review agency’s powers override all other laws, but the use immunity is limited. Section 5(7) abrogates legal professional privilege, public interest immunity, and self-incrimination. However, s 5(8) only protects the person from the information being used against them in proceedings except for offences under s 5. That means if an officer discloses information that incriminates another person, or discloses information that reveals a non-compliance by the authority, that information can be used against the authority or other persons. The officer themselves cannot be prosecuted for another offence based on what they said, but the authority can be exposed.

4. The confidentiality obligation on the review agency is strict and carries a higher penalty. Section 5(13) prohibits the review agency from divulging information acquired under the Act except as required for administration or authorised by the Act. The penalty is $10,000 or two years imprisonment - double that for other offences. There is no “reasonable excuse” defence. This could trap authorised persons who mistakenly believe they can share information with the police or the media.

5. The review agency for SA Police is the ICAC Inspector, not an internal police body. This may be overlooked. The same Inspector reviews both SA Police and ICAC records. This could create conflicts of interest or workload issues, especially given the six-monthly inspection cycle. The 2023 transitional provision suggests that reviews backed up and needed to be merged, highlighting the potential for systemic non-compliance with the inspection timetable.

6. The definition of “officer” for SA Police includes seconded police officers from other jurisdictions (s 2(1)). Those seconded officers are subject to the same duties and offence provisions as South Australian police officers. They may not be aware of the state-specific obligations.

7. The reporting deadline for warrant-specific reports is within three months after the warrant ceases to be in force (s 4(a)). If a warrant is renewed or extended, “ceases to be in force” may be ambiguous. The chief officer should treat each warrant separately and report on each expiration. Failure to report on time is not itself an offence under this Act, but it would be a breach of duty that the review agency could report.

8. The annual report under s 4(b) must set out information that can be derived from the records. If records are incomplete or have been destroyed, the chief officer may not be able to derive the required information. This could put the chief officer in breach of the reporting obligation. The Act does not provide a defence of impossibility, so chief officers must ensure the underlying records are sufficient to generate the report.

9. The review agency can require the chief officer to attend and answer questions if the identity of a relevant officer is unknown (s 5(6)). This could place the chief officer in a position of having to answer questions about suspected non-compliance by their own subordinates, potentially exposing personal liability or disciplinary action.

10. The Act has no provision for notifying individuals whose communications were intercepted. Unlike some privacy regimes, this Act does not require notification to the subject of an interception. A person whose communications were lawfully intercepted may never know. The oversight is entirely state-to-state.

For each eligible authority, compliance requires a systematic approach to record management, reporting, and cooperation with oversight.

Secure storage and access controls (s 3(1)(c)). The chief officer must designate a physical or electronic location for restricted records that is secure and not accessible to persons who are not entitled to deal with them. Access logs should be maintained. The secure place should be locked (if physical) or password-protected with audit trails (if electronic). The exception for while the record is being “dealt with in accordance with this Act or the Commonwealth Act” means authorised officers can remove records for lawful purposes, but must return them promptly.

Record-keeping systems (s 3(1)(a)-(b)). The authority must maintain records corresponding to those required under ss 80 and 81 of the Commonwealth Act. The chief officer should ensure that systems capture: the date and time of interception, the warrant details, the identifier of the person who accessed the record, the purpose, and any communication of the information. These records should be created “as soon as practicable” after the event - a standard that will require automated logging where possible. Manual recording creates risk of delay and inaccuracy.

Destruction policy (s 3(1)(d), (3)). The chief officer must determine when a restricted record is “not likely to be required for a permitted purpose.” A written policy should set out criteria: age of record, concluded investigation, no current appeal or legal proceeding. The policy must note that an upcoming review agency inspection does not count as a permitted purpose, so destruction can proceed before inspection. However, premature destruction could harm oversight, so a conservative approach is prudent - destroy only when demonstrably no longer needed. The chief officer must cause destruction “immediately” upon satisfaction, so the policy should designate a person authorised to order destruction and a procedure (e.g., secure shredding, electronic wiping).

Reporting (s 4). The chief officer must establish a calendar and assignment of responsibility for: (a) post-warrant reports within three months of each warrant ceasing, and (b) annual reports by 30 September each year. The annual report must extract from authority records the information required under Part 2-8 Division 2 of the Commonwealth Act. Registers of warrants, interceptions, and communications of intercepted information are essential to compile this report. The chief officer should also retain copies of all reports sent to the Attorney‑General, in case of later disputes or audits.

Cooperation with review agency (s 5). The chief officer must designate a liaison officer to facilitate inspections. All officers must be informed of their obligations: to provide full and free access to records (s 5(4)(b)); to answer questions relevant to the inspection (s 5(4)(d)); to attend if required (s 5(5)-(6)); and not to hinder the reviewer (s 5(11)). Training should emphasise that no claim of legal professional privilege or self-incrimination can be used to refuse (s 5(7)), but that use immunity protects the individual from prosecution for other offences (s 5(8)). Officers should be warned of the offence provisions, including the false information offence and the confidentiality obligation.

Handling of review agency requests (s 5(5)-(6)). If the review agency issues a written notice requiring information or attendance, the recipient must comply unless a reasonable excuse exists. The authority’s legal unit should be consulted promptly. If the chief officer is required to attend under s 5(6), they should consider having a lawyer present, though the Act does not explicitly allow that.

Confidentiality (s 5(13)). The review agency must train its own staff and authorised persons on the prohibition on divulging information except as required for administration or authorised by the Act. Any disclosure to the Commonwealth Ombudsman must be preceded by a formal determination that it is relevant to the Ombudsman’s functions under the Commonwealth Act (s 5(12)). Informal disclosures should be avoided.

Monitoring compliance with inspection cycle (s 5(1)(a)). The review agency must schedule inspections at intervals no longer than six months. The 2023 transitional provision shows that backlogs can occur. The agency should maintain a calendar and allocate sufficient resources to meet the mandatory cycle. If capacity is insufficient, the agency should alert the Attorney‑General and seek additional resources or legislative amendment - rather than simply missing the deadline.

Attorney‑General’s role (s 6). The Attorney‑General’s office must log receipt of reports and forward them to the Commonwealth Minister. A simple register with dates of receipt and dispatch should suffice. No substantive review of the reports is required by this Act, but the Attorney‑General could separately raise concerns.