Telecommunications (Financial Hardship Industry Standard) Direction 2023

The instrument structures the regulation around four main concepts: the directive power, scope of application, objectives to be achieved, and the permissive content list. Each concept is anchored to specific text in the instrument.

1. Directive power and legal basis. The Minister issues a direction under s 125AA(4) of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (s 3). The operative power is for ACMA to determine a standard under subsection 125AA(1) of the Act, with the Minister specifying minimum matters the standard must deal with (s 5(1)). The instrument does not itself purport to create criminal or civil offences; it instructs the regulator to make the standard.

2. Scope of application. The standard is to apply to carriage service providers in their dealings with residential, small business and not‑for‑profit customers (s 6(1)). The ACMA may draw distinctions between different classes of carriage service providers or grant exemptions for particular classes from certain provisions (s 6(2)). The instrument therefore contemplates tailored obligations rather than a strict one‑size‑fits‑all imposition.

3. Objectives. The direction sets five principal objectives the standard must give effect to as they relate to telecommunications activities of carriage service providers (s 7(1)):

   • promotion and accessibility of financial hardship policies and assistance information (s 7(1)(a));
   • early identification and assistance for customers who may be experiencing financial hardship (s 7(1)(b));
   • eligibility criteria and assessment processes that have appropriate regard to the essential nature of carriage services (s 7(1)(c));
   • provision of adequate, appropriate and tailored assistance to manage payment obligations and associated debts (s 7(1)(d));
   • prioritisation of keeping customers connected, with disconnection as a last resort in credit management actions (s 7(1)(e)).

4. Permissive content list. The instrument lists matters ACMA may include in the standard (s 7(2)). These include requirements to establish written financial hardship policies (s 7(2)(a)); promotion and provision of information (s 7(2)(b)); early identification and ongoing evaluation of customers’ circumstances (s 7(2)(c)); customer service requirements for those experiencing hardship (s 7(2)(d)); procedures for assessment and provision of assistance (s 7(2)(e)); training and conduct rules for staff (s 7(2)(f)); rules for credit management actions including restriction, suspension or disconnection (s 7(2)(g)); and any other matters ACMA considers necessary to meet the objectives (s 7(2)(h)). The standard may also handle complaint arrangements and confer functions and powers on the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman, subject to that Ombudsman’s consent (s 7(3) and note regarding s 114 of the Act). ACMA may define terms as necessary (s 7(4)).

Underpinning definitions. The instrument’s definitions section points to key definitions being located in section 7 of the Telecommunications Act 1997, including ACMA, carriage service, carriage service provider and Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman, and defines the Act as the Telecommunications Act 1997 for the instrument’s purposes (s 4). That makes the instrument reliant on existing statutory vocabulary for operational meaning.

In sum, the main conceptual framework is a ministerial direction requiring regulator action to impose an industry standard aimed at improving information, identification, assistance and credit management for customers in financial hardship, applied across residential, small business and not‑for‑profit customers with scope for differentiation by class of provider.

The instrument’s stated primary legal target is carriage service providers, and it specifies the customer groups these providers must consider in their dealings. The standard is to apply to carriage service providers in their dealings with residential, small business and not‑for‑profit customers (s 6(1)). The instrument therefore names three categories of end customers that must be covered: residential customers, small business customers and not‑for‑profit customers.

Carriage service providers are not defined within the instrument itself; the definitions section directs the reader to s 7 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 for defined expressions including carriage service provider and related terms (s 4). That means the class of regulated entities is the statutory class established by the Act, not a bespoke list in the direction.

The instrument also contemplates differentiated regulatory burdens across providers. The ACMA may deal with matters differently for different classes of carriage service providers, or exempt certain classes of carriage service providers from particular provisions of the standard (s 6(2)). That creates formal scope for lighter obligations on certain providers, or tailored duties for others, rather than a uniform set of obligations across the whole industry.

Third‑party entities with a role in complaints handling are implicated. The standard may confer functions and powers on the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman in respect of financial hardship matters (s 7(3)), subject to the Ombudsman’s consent (note referencing s 114 of the Act). Where the TIO accepts such functions, providers will have an external dispute resolution body with specified powers under the standard.

Who bears compliance costs. The instrument places the duty to design and implement financial hardship policies and procedures on carriage service providers via the ACMA standard. The instrument lists potential rule areas including written policies, promotional obligations, early identification mechanisms, staff training, modified customer service approaches, assessment processes for assistance, and constraints on credit management measures including disconnection (s 7(2)). Each of those areas implies operational, administrative and potentially technological costs for carriage service providers who are subject to the standard.

Who benefits. Customers in the specified categories who are, or may be, experiencing financial hardship are the intended beneficiaries. The objectives require promotion and accessibility of policies (s 7(1)(a)), early identification (s 7(1)(b)), assessment criteria mindful of essential services (s 7(1)(c)), tailored assistance for payment obligations and debts (s 7(1)(d)), and prioritisation of continued connection with disconnection as last resort (s 7(1)(e)). Not‑for‑profit and small business customers are explicitly included among intended beneficiaries (s 6(1)).

Regulatory actors. The Minister initiates the direction and sets deadlines (s 5(1)-(3)). The ACMA is the body required to determine and vary the standard (s 5(1)-(3), s 7(4)). The Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman may acquire additional functions or powers for complaint handling, if it consents (s 7(3) and note on s 114). Responsibility for monitoring compliance and enforcement will depend on what ACMA includes in the standard and existing powers under the Telecommunications Act; the instrument itself does not specify enforcement mechanisms.

Temporal impact. The instrument imposes near‑term deadlines on ACMA: determination by 15 February 2024 and commencement in full at the earliest practical opportunity and no later than 29 March 2024 (s 5(2)). Carriage service providers therefore face an expectation of regulatory change within a condensed timeframe.

The instrument itself does not directly create operational duties on carriers; instead it compels the ACMA to craft a standard that will impose duties. Nevertheless, the instrument prescribes required objectives and a list of matters ACMA may include, which define the contours of the duties ACMA is likely to impose and the rights available to customers.

Duties likely to be prescribed by the standard, in line with the instrument’s permissive list, include requirements to establish written financial hardship policies that set out processes for assisting customers experiencing financial hardship and any other policy content ACMA deems appropriate (s 7(2)(a)). Carriage service providers can therefore expect duties to prepare and maintain written policies.

Duties to promote and make available information and advice about hardship policies and assistance are explicitly mentioned (s 7(2)(b)). That creates an expectation of active disclosure and accessible information for customers and potential customers, consistent with the objective that such policies and information be easily found and accessed (s 7(1)(a)).

Duties around early identification and ongoing evaluation of customers’ circumstances are contemplated (s 7(2)(c)), aligning with the objective to identify customers early and assist them (s 7(1)(b)). Carriers may therefore be required to implement identification measures and ongoing monitoring or review procedures.

Customer service duties tailored to customers experiencing financial hardship are permissible under the standard (s 7(2)(d)). This could translate into obligations to provide priority or alternative customer service channels, adapt complaint handling, or follow special service scripts or procedures for hardship customers.

Assessment and provision of financial hardship assistance is a likely duty (s 7(2)(e)), linked to the objective that customers receive adequate, appropriate and tailored assistance (s 7(1)(d)). This may require carriers to define eligibility criteria, assessment processes and specific assistance options.

Training and staff conduct requirements are flagged (s 7(2)(f)). Providers may need to train staff and establish conduct standards for those identifying and supporting customers in hardship.

Credit management duties, including rules governing restriction, suspension and disconnection of services for customers in financial hardship, are listed (s 7(2)(g)). The objectives require that credit management actions prioritise keeping customers connected and use disconnection only as a measure of last resort (s 7(1)(e)). Carriers therefore may face constraints on when they can suspend or disconnect services where customers are experiencing hardship.

Complaint handling and external dispute resolution. The standard may set arrangements for handling customer complaints and may confer functions and powers on the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (s 7(3)). Any conferral of powers requires the Ombudsman’s consent (note regarding s 114 of the Act). If the ACMA adopts such provisions, customers gain specified complaint and redress pathways through the TIO.

Rights for customers. The objectives articulate rights‑like outcomes for customers: access to publicised and easily located policies and assistance information (s 7(1)(a)); early identification and assistance (s 7(1)(b)); fairness in eligibility criteria reflecting essential service status (s 7(1)(c)); receipt of adequate, appropriate and tailored assistance for payment obligations and debts (s 7(1)(d)); and a presumption in favour of keeping connected with disconnection as last resort in credit management (s 7(1)(e)). The concrete legal rights will depend on how ACMA frames obligations and remedies in the standard.

Regulatory discretion and variability. The ACMA has discretion to vary the standard as necessary over time provided variations comply with the instrument (s 5(3)). The ACMA may also define terms used in the direction (s 7(4)) and may treat different classes of providers differently or exempt classes from particular provisions (s 6(2)). That introduces flexibility in duties and rights across provider classes and over time.

Limitations in the instrument. The direction does not itself prescribe sanctions, enforcement mechanisms, or compliance timelines for carriers; those are matters for the ACMA standard and the underlying Telecommunications Act framework (s 5, s 7). The standard will therefore be the document that translates these prescribed topics into specific legal duties and customer rights.

The direction itself does not set out penalties, fines or criminal sanctions. It instructs the ACMA to determine a standard under subsection 125AA(1) of the Telecommunications Act 1997 and to include specified objectives and possible content areas (s 5(1), s 7). The instrument contains no express enforcement provisions; it neither prescribes infringement notices nor creates new offences. Therefore, the existence, form and severity of penalties and enforcement mechanisms will be a function of:

• what the ACMA includes in the standard when it is determined under s 125AA(1) of the Act; and
• the enforcement powers and remedies available under the Telecommunications Act or other existing regulatory frameworks referenced by ACMA in the standard.

The instrument does permit the ACMA to confer functions and powers on the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman for handling complaints relating to financial hardship matters (s 7(3)). The note reminds that the TIO’s consent is required to confer functions and powers (referencing s 114 of the Act). If the TIO consents and ACMA confers functions, the TIO may obtain additional operational authority for dispute resolution in relation to the matters covered by the standard. The instrument does not specify what those functions or powers will be; that will depend on ACMA’s determinations and the TIO’s consent.

ACMA’s own regulatory toolkit under the Telecommunications Act is not set out in this direction. The instrument gives ACMA the power to define terms, vary the standard over time provided variations comply with the instrument (s 7(4); s 5(3)), and determine the substantive rules that will govern providers (s 7(2)). How ACMA will monitor compliance, how it will investigate breaches, and what sanctions or corrective measures it will deploy are matters the standard may address but are not stated in the direction.

For carriage service providers and compliance officers, the operational takeaway is that penalties and enforcement regimes will crystallise when ACMA publishes the standard and its compliance and enforcement provisions. Until then, the direction creates a clear expectation of forthcoming regulatory obligations but does not itself create or disclose the enforcement instruments ACMA will use.

The instrument is made under and expressly references the Telecommunications Act 1997 as its legal foundation (s 3; s 4). It relies on statutory definitions contained in the Act for key terms including ACMA, carriage service, carriage service provider and the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (s 4). That anchoring means the standard ACMA will determine must operate within the broader legislative architecture of the Telecommunications Act and rely on the Act’s definitions, powers and compliance mechanisms.

The direction contemplates interaction with the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman. The standard may confer functions and powers on the TIO in relation to financial hardship matters (s 7(3)), but such conferral requires the TIO’s consent as required by s 114 of the Act (note to s 7(3)). Any such conferral will therefore alter how dispute resolution and complaint handling operate for the affected matters by formally integrating the TIO’s role into the regime established by the ACMA standard.

Because the instrument focuses on carriage service providers and uses the Act’s terms, regulated providers should expect coverage to align with the reach of the Telecommunications Act in terms of which services and suppliers are in scope. The instrument does not remove or modify other legal obligations carriers have under the Telecommunications Act or other statutes; instead, it requires ACMA to create a standard “as they relate to the telecommunications activities of carriage service providers” (s 7(1), s 7(2)). That means the standard must be read and implemented in the context of existing telecommunications law and any applicable consumer protection regimes, though the instrument does not expressly mention consumer law or other sectoral statutes.

The direction permits ACMA to define terms it considers appropriate or necessary, including terms used in the direction but not defined in s 4 of the instrument (s 7(4)). That gives ACMA the power to harmonise or delineate how the standard interacts with overlapping legal concepts. For example, ACMA could adopt or adapt definitions that align with consumer credit, bankruptcy, social security or privacy law concepts where relevant, but any such harmonising definitions will be in the standard itself, not in the direction.

The instrument’s prescription that carriers’ eligibility criteria and assessment processes have appropriate regard to the essential nature of carriage services (s 7(1)(c)) signals an intended alignment with broader policy recognition of telecommunications as essential. How that interacts with other statutory duties (for instance, existing emergency services obligations or consumer protections) will depend on standard drafting and existing legislative priorities; the instrument does not set out conflict resolution mechanisms.

Finally, because the instrument is a direction to the ACMA under the Telecommunications Act, any challenges to the standard or to ACMA’s actions in determining or varying the standard will engage administrative law principles and judicial review avenues available under the Commonwealth’s legal framework. The instrument itself contains no procedural constraints on judicial review; it rather defines the ministerial instruction that ACMA must implement.

The instrument identifies its title and date of making: Telecommunications (Financial Hardship Industry Standard) Direction 2023, made and dated 31 August 2023 (s 1; header). It commences the day after registration (s 2). The instrument states that the ACMA is to determine the standard by 15 February 2024 and that the standard is to commence in full at the earliest practical opportunity and no later than 29 March 2024 (s 5(2)). Beyond those temporal requirements and the authority clause, the instrument contains no subsequent amendments or amendment mechanisms for the instrument itself.

The instrument does, however, permit the ACMA to vary the standard over time, provided any variation complies with the direction (s 5(3)). That means while this direction is not itself subject to a stated amending process in the text, the substantive regulatory instrument (the ACMA standard) is expected to be dynamic and capable of being revised by ACMA. The direction constrains such variations only by requiring that they remain compliant with the direction’s objectives and requirements.

There are no transitional provisions or sunset clauses in the instrument. The only timing elements concerned are the determination deadline for ACMA and the commencement no later than 29 March 2024 (s 5(2)). There is no recorded history of prior versions, amendments or subsequent notes within the text provided. The instrument does not specify any review dates for the direction itself.

Practically, the amendment history for obligations on carriers will begin once ACMA issues the standard and then records its own amendment history in relation to that standard. The direction permits ACMA to vary the standard subject to compliance with the direction, so any amendment log will appear in ACMA’s determinations and related instruments rather than in this ministerial direction.

The instrument contains no record of any litigation, legal challenges, or judicial consideration. It is a ministerial direction made under subsection 125AA(4) of the Telecommunications Act 1997 and contains no references to court decisions, prior determinations, or adjudications (s 3). The text supplies no information about disputes or legal proceedings challenging either the direction or the ACMA’s subsequent actions.

Because the instrument directs ACMA to determine and potentially vary a standard, future litigation could arise from ACMA’s determinations, the content of any standard, or enforcement actions taken under that standard. However, the instrument itself does not document any such history. The only cross‑reference to another body is the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman, where the instrument acknowledges that the Ombudsman’s consent is required to confer functions and powers (s 7(3) and the note referencing s 114 of the Act). That procedural requirement could have implications for administrative contestation if the TIO’s consent were withheld or if disagreement arose about powers conferred, but the instrument does not record any litigation or disputes.

For legal practitioners, auditors and compliance officers: there is no litigation precedent supplied within the instrument to guide interpretation. Any legal analysis of the standard’s application or disputes will need to rely on the text of the standard ACMA determines, the Telecommunications Act provisions referenced by the direction, and the facts of specific cases as they arise.

Several practical and legal points in the instrument merit attention because they may create implementation friction, uncertainty or operational traps for carriers and compliance teams.

1. The direction imposes firm ACMA deadlines with limited lead time. The ACMA must determine the standard by 15 February 2024 and have it commence no later than 29 March 2024 (s 5(2)). Providers should not assume a long transition period; the instrument requires relatively rapid regulatory action. Preparatory work should anticipate the standard taking effect within a short time frame after ACMA determination.

2. The instrument does not define core operational terms; it defers to the Telecommunications Act definitions and to ACMA for further term definitions (s 4; s 7(4)). This means that until ACMA defines any additional terms in the standard, there may be uncertainty about the precise scope of obligations, for example what constitutes “financial hardship,” who qualifies as a “small business,” or what constitutes “adequate” assistance.

3. The standard may impose substantive operational changes across multiple business areas. The list of permissible rule topics includes written policies, promotion and disclosure, early identification systems, tailored customer service, assessment processes, staff training, and constraints on credit management including suspension or disconnection (s 7(2)(a)-(g)). Implementing all of these can require coordination between legal, compliance, billing, customer service, complaints and IT teams.

4. Differentiation and exemptions create compliance complexity. ACMA may treat different classes of carriage service providers differently or exempt certain classes from particular provisions (s 6(2)). Providers cannot assume uniform obligations across the sector; they must closely monitor ACMA’s classification choices to know which provisions apply to them.

5. The instrument prioritises keeping customers connected and calls for disconnection to be a last resort (s 7(1)(e)). That creates a potential tension with existing commercial credit management practices. Carriers will need to reconcile any new constraints with revenue collection and debt recovery policies once the standard specifies precise limits.

6. Conferral of powers on the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman requires the Ombudsman’s consent (s 7(3); note regarding s 114). If ACMA attempts to expand the TIO’s role and the TIO does not consent, complaint handling arrangements may be altered or delayed. The need for consent is a procedural gate that could affect timing and operational arrangements for dispute resolution.

7. The instrument does not itself describe enforcement measures or penalties. Enforcement will depend on the ACMA standard and relevant provisions of the Telecommunications Act (s 5; s 7). Providers must therefore watch ACMA’s determination for any new sanctioning approaches and integration with the Act’s existing enforcement framework.

8. Breadth of ACMA discretion. ACMA may vary the standard as necessary so long as the variation complies with the direction (s 5(3)), and may define any terms necessary (s 7(4)). That flexibility is operationally useful for regulators but creates ongoing regulatory uncertainty for carriers who may face periodic changes to rules and definitions.

9. Potential scope creep in “other matters” clause. The instrument allows ACMA to include “other matters that the ACMA considers necessary to meet the objectives” (s 7(2)(h)). That clause can generate obligations that are not enumerated in the earlier list, broadening regulatory reach beyond the specific examples.

10. Reliance on Act definitions. The instrument points to section 7 of the Act for several fundamental definitions including “carriage service provider” (s 4). If a provider’s status under the Act is ambiguous for particular services or delivery models, that ambiguity will affect whether the standard applies to their activities.

These features mean that carriers should not treat the direction as a complete or final rulebook. Instead, the direction is a framework mandating ACMA to produce detailed standards, and the operational impact will depend on the content and drafting choices ACMA makes within the permitted scope.

The instrument creates an obligation on carriage service providers to comply with the standard ACMA will determine. Until the standard is published, carriers should adopt a staged preparedness approach aligned with the matters the instrument expressly permits ACMA to regulate. The following are concrete steps, each tied to the instrument’s text, to prepare for compliance:

1. Monitor ACMA outputs and timeline. ACMA is to determine the standard by 15 February 2024 and have it commence no later than 29 March 2024 (s 5(2)). Ensure regulatory monitoring and legal review capacity to receive and act on ACMA’s draft and final standard promptly.

2. Inventory affected customer groups and services. The standard applies in dealings with residential, small business and not‑for‑profit customers (s 6(1)). Map which products and customer cohorts fall into those categories and assess current hardship policies and processes relevant to each cohort.

3. Prepare or update a written financial hardship policy. The instrument contemplates requirements to establish written financial hardship policies that include processes for assisting customers (s 7(2)(a)). Draft or adapt a policy that sets out eligibility criteria, assessment procedures, types of assistance (payment plans, fee waivers, plan downgrades, etc.), timelines for assessment and review, and escalation procedures.

4. Design accessible promotion and disclosure processes. ACMA may require providers to promote and make available information and advice to customers and potential customers about financial hardship policies and assistance (s 7(2)(b)); the objective states these must be easily found and accessed (s 7(1)(a)). Audit public digital channels, incoming sales and onboarding scripts, account management portals and customer communications to ensure information on hardship assistance can be surfaced quickly.

5. Implement early identification and monitoring mechanisms. The instrument highlights early identification of customers who may be experiencing hardship and ongoing evaluation of their circumstances (s 7(2)(c); objective s 7(1)(b)). Review billing, payment default triggers and customer contact workflows to build early warning indicators, referral paths, and ongoing review windows.

6. Modify customer service workflows for hardship customers. The standard may require appropriate customer service for those experiencing hardship (s 7(2)(d)). Identify dedicated contact handling approaches, priority service channels, written guidance for frontline staff, and case management protocols.

7. Create assessment and assistance procedures. The instrument expects requirements for assessment and provision of financial hardship assistance (s 7(2)(e)). Establish documented assessment criteria (consistent with the objective to have regard to the essential nature of carriage services, s 7(1)(c)), assessment timeframes, record‑keeping standards and a menu of assistance options tailored to different customer needs.

8. Train staff and set conduct standards. ACMA may require training and conduct standards for staff in identifying and supporting customers in hardship (s 7(2)(f)). Develop and roll out training modules for frontline billing, collections and customer service staff, and institute audit or supervisory checks to ensure compliance with conduct requirements.

9. Revise credit management policies to reflect connectivity priority. The instrument requires that credit management actions for customers experiencing hardship prioritise keeping those customers connected and use disconnection as a last resort (s 7(1)(e); s 7(2)(g)). Rework suspension and disconnection triggers, internal approvals for disconnection, notification timelines and alternative remedies to ensure disconnection is genuinely a last resort.

10. Prepare complaint handling and coordination with the TIO. The standard may deal with complaint handling and may confer functions on the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (s 7(3)). Map current complaint workflows against possible TIO roles, and be ready to adapt internal escalation and record‑keeping to align with any new complaint jurisdiction ACMA sets out.

11. Documentation, record keeping and audit trails. Given the focus on assessment, ongoing evaluation and complaint handling, ensure systems capture key decision points, dates, communications and reasons for acceptance or denial of assistance. Good record keeping will support both compliance and dispute resolution.

12. Identify which class of carriage service provider applies and seek clarification or exemptions if appropriate. Because ACMA may treat classes of providers differently or exempt certain classes from parts of the standard (s 6(2)), carriers should determine whether they fit within any specific classes ACMA might create and, if appropriate, engage with ACMA to seek clarification or exemption where justified.

13. Legal review and policy alignment. Review existing terms and conditions, privacy policies, hardship eligibility criteria and collection scripts for consistency with the standard’s likely objectives and content (s 7). Update customer terms and communications templates as needed.

14. Engage with ACMA and the TIO during consultation. While the instrument does not reproduce ACMA’s consultation process, engaging proactively in ACMA consultations will provide an opportunity to influence definitions ACMA may adopt (s 7(4)), the delineation of provider classes (s 6(2)), and the standard’s practical mechanics.

15. Budget and operational planning. Anticipate resource allocation for system changes, additional staffing or training, and potential impacts on cash flow from modified credit management. The instrument’s content list implies operational costs in policy creation, communications, IT changes and staff training (s 7(2)(a)-(f); s 7(2)(g)).

16. Prepare for change management and variation risk. ACMA may vary the standard as necessary provided any variation complies with the direction (s 5(3)). Build processes to monitor and implement ACMA variations quickly.

Following these steps will position carriage service providers to respond to the ACMA standard when it is published and to operationalise the instrument’s objectives and permissible rules. The exact legal duties and compliance obligations will be determined by the ACMA standard itself; this instrument identifies the matters and objectives ACMA must address (s 5; s 6; s 7).