The Surrogacy Act 2012 contains several provisions that can easily trip up practitioners and parties. First, a surrogacy arrangement is unenforceable (section 10(1)), meaning that neither the birth mother nor the intended parents can sue to enforce the core agreement to transfer the child or to perform the arrangement. The only enforceable obligation is the payment or reimbursement of the birth mother’s surrogacy costs, and even that is limited to specific scenarios (section 10(2)). This can leave intended parents exposed if the birth mother changes her mind. Second, the strict eligibility criteria for parentage orders: the birth mother must be at least 25 years old and must have previously given birth to a live child (section 16(2)(c)-(d)). If she is younger or has not previously given birth, the court may dispense with these requirements only if it is in the best interests of the child (section 16(3)), but this is not guaranteed. Third, intended parents must be at least 21 at the time the arrangement is made (section 16(2)(b)). Fourth, the requirement that the surrogacy arrangement be in writing, contain prescribed matters, and be signed by all parties (section 16(2)(e)) is mandatory for new arrangements. An oral agreement will not support a parentage order. Fifth, the residency requirement: all parties must be resident in Tasmania at the time the arrangement is entered into, and the intended parent(s) must be resident in Tasmania at the time of the hearing (section 16(2)(g), (j)(ii)). If a party moves interstate, the court may not be satisfied. Sixth, there must be a medical or social need for the arrangement (section 16(2)(h)). This is a substantive requirement that must be proven. The definition of “eligible woman” is narrow and requires medical grounds (section 7(2)). Seventh, if there are two intended parents, they must be spouses of each other at the time the arrangement is made to apply jointly; if they were not spouses at that time, neither may apply for a parentage order at all (section 14(5)). This can be a trap for couples who enter a surrogacy arrangement before formalising their relationship. Eighth, the time limit for applications: generally, applications must be made between 30 days and six months after the child’s birth (section 15(1)(a)). Late applications require exceptional circumstances and best interests satisfaction (section 15(2)). Missing this window can be fatal. Ninth, the multiple birth sibling rule: if a child has a living birth sibling, the court may only make a parentage order if it also makes one about each sibling, or considers it in the best interests of the child not to (section 17). This can complicate matters if intended parents only want to adopt one of twins or triplets. Tenth, the confidentiality and access restrictions: a child cannot obtain an extract from the surrogacy record or access court records unless they have received counselling from an accredited counsellor and provide a statutory declaration, unless they already know the name of their birth parents (sections 39, 46). This can create practical hurdles for adult children seeking information. Eleventh, the prohibition on payment beyond reasonable surrogacy costs: any payment, reward, or material benefit beyond the defined surrogacy costs makes the arrangement commercial and illegal (sections 8, 40). Even the offer to enter a commercial arrangement is an offence. Twelfth, the birth mother’s right to manage pregnancy cannot be waived (section 11); she retains full decision-making authority despite any agreement. This is a non-negotiable protection. Thirteenth, the court may dispense with some requirements (e.g., independent legal advice, counselling, age, residency, etc.) if it is in the best interests of the child (section 16(3)), but this is discretionary and should not be relied upon. Fourteenth, a pre-existing arrangement made before commencement of section 12 is subject to Division 2 (sections 19-22), which has less stringent requirements (e.g., no requirement for written agreement, counselling, or independent legal advice), but the court must still find the arrangement was not commercial and that the child is under 18 at the time of hearing (section 22(2)(c)(iii)). Fifteenth, the discharge grounds are limited to fraud, duress, improper means, lack of or paid consent, or exceptional reason (section 27(2)); a simple change of mind by a party is not enough.