Several aspects of the regulations are likely to trap the unwary. First, the definition of “contributor” for voting purposes in regulation 6 uses a lookback period tied to the “last business day before the 7 day period immediately preceding the day on which notice was published”. This complex date formula means a person who becomes a contributor just after the eligibility date cannot vote, even if they are a contributor by the time ballots are distributed. The superannuation boards must provide the eligibility list within seven days of publication; any delay by the board could disenfranchise contributors incorrectly omitted. There is no express mechanism for challenging a board’s list.
Second, the distribution of ballot papers via employers (regulation 9(4)(b)) introduces risk. An employer may fail to pass on the ballot paper, or pass it late, leaving the contributor with no remedy. The regulations do not impose obligations on employers to ensure delivery, nor do they provide a fallback if the contributor does not receive the envelope. Furthermore, the envelope must be signed by the voter; if it is unsigned or the signature is not recognised, the ballot may be rejected. The use of employer distribution also raises privacy concerns, as an employer may observe who receives a ballot, though the voting is secret.
Third, the word and photo limits for candidate promotional material (200 words, one photograph) are strict. The material must be provided “at or before the hour of nomination”. A candidate who submits material after that deadline will not have it included. The Electoral Commissioner has discretion as to the form of printing, so the candidate may not approve the final printed version.
Fourth, the preferential voting system uses a “tick or cross equals 1” rule. A voter who ticks multiple candidates does not create preferences; only a tick or cross is treated as a first preference, and the rest of the paper may be informal. The regulations do not allow for “just vote 1” and the preferences may not be exhausted; if a voter writes “1” only, the vote can be transferred only to the next preference if the first candidate is excluded. If no further preferences are marked, the ballot becomes exhausted and is not counted for the final candidate.
Fifth, the investment restriction deeming provision in regulation 16(3) is a double-edged sword. It says that if a derivative contract can be characterised as “obtaining financial accommodation”, it is taken to be authorised for the purposes of section 6(2) of the Act. However, this does not mean it is authorised for the purposes of regulation 16(2). Regulation 16(2) requires authorisation for entering into such contracts; regulation 16(3) only deems the contract to be authorised under section 6(2), but the wording is “for the purposes of section 6(2) of the Act”. It does not say it is authorised under regulation 16(2). The intersection is unclear: if the Corporation enters a derivative that is also financial accommodation, does the deeming provision exempt it from needing regulation 16(2) authorisation? The wording of 16(3) is “the contract or dealing will be taken to be authorised for the purposes of section 6(2) of the Act.” This does not expressly say it is authorised under regulation 16(2). A cautious reading would require separate ministerial authorisation regardless. This is a potential drafting trap.
Sixth, the transitional provisions clause 8 states that the repeal of the Prescribed Public Authorities Regulations 2010 “does not affect the declaration of any public authority under those regulations”. That suggests that any entity that was declared under the old regulations remains a prescribed public authority, even if not listed in regulation 18. However, regulation 18 is the operative provision declaring prescribed public authorities. There could be entities on the old list that are not on the new list, creating a situation where the new regulations intend to remove them but the transitional provision keeps them. It is impossible to resolve this without knowing the content of the old regulations, but it is a known pitfall for those relying solely on regulation 18.
Seventh, the evidentiary rule in regulation 16(5) that a ministerial certificate is conclusive evidence may be challenged. Courts usually construe “conclusive evidence” as conclusive only if there is no error of law or jurisdictional error. A party challenging an investment may argue the Minister’s certificate is not conclusive as to the fact of whether the transaction was actually authorised, or that the authorisation was invalid.
Eighth, the regulations do not prescribe a term for elected board members. Regulation 8 and 15 require the notice to specify “the length of the term”, implying that terms vary, but no default term is given. This might be in the Act or may be left to the board’s constitution.
Finally, the use of the Gazette and a website or newspaper for declarations means that interested parties must check multiple sources to confirm election results or the current status of authorisations.