Statement of Principles concerning sarcoidosis (Balance of Probabilities) (No. 61 of 2025)

The instrument defines several core concepts that structure how a claim will be evaluated.

• Sarcoidosis. Subsection 7(1) provides the governing medical definition: a chronic, multisystem disorder characterised by T lymphocyte and mononuclear phagocyte accumulation, non‑caseating epithelioid granulomas, and derangement of normal tissue architecture. The instrument also states that, while ICD‑10‑AM code D86 is the relevant coding reference, the legal meaning is the clinical description in subsection 7(1) (s 7(1)-(3)). The instrument thereby combines a clinical definition with an explicit coded reference.

• Death from sarcoidosis. The Statement treats sarcoidosis as including death from a terminal event or condition that was contributed to by sarcoidosis (s 7(4)). “Terminal event” is defined in Schedule 1 to include pneumonia, respiratory failure, cardiac arrest, circulatory failure, and cessation of brain function (Schedule 1).

• Factors that must exist. Section 9 lists the discrete factors that must exist before a causal connection can be accepted on the balance of probabilities. Those factors are: (a) taking one of three categories of medicines within five years before clinical onset or clinical worsening (BRAF/MEK inhibitors; immune checkpoint inhibitors; interferons), with non‑exhaustive examples provided in notes; (b) having received an organ or tissue transplant (other than corneal transplant) from a donor with sarcoidosis within two years before clinical onset; or (c) inability to obtain appropriate clinical management for sarcoidosis before clinical worsening (s 9).

• Temporal windows and clinical onset/worsening. The instrument imposes temporal limitations: medication exposure must be within the five years before clinical onset or clinical worsening; donor sarcoidosis must be within two years before clinical onset (s 9). The instrument distinguishes clinical onset from clinical worsening, and the relationship‑to‑service provision explicitly limits the application of the clinical‑worsening aspects: those aspects apply only where the person’s sarcoidosis was suffered or contracted before or during (but did not arise out of) the person’s relevant service (s 10(2)).

• Relationship to service and relevant service. Section 10 requires that any listed factor be related to the person’s relevant service. Schedule 1 defines relevant service for the instrument as eligible war service (other than operational service) or defence service (other than hazardous service and British nuclear test defence service) under the VEA, or peacetime service under the MRCA (Schedule 1).

• Cross‑reference to other Statements of Principles. Section 11 provides that if a listed factor in section 9 refers to an injury or disease already covered by another Statement of Principles made under subsection 196B(3) VEA, the factors in that other Statement of Principles apply in accordance with their terms as in force from time to time (s 11). This creates a hierarchical or referential mechanism between Statements of Principles.

• Authority and application. The instrument is expressly made under subsection 196B(3) of the VEA and applies to claims to which the specified provisions of the VEA and MRCA apply (s 3, s 5). It replaces the prior statement (s 4).

These concepts organise the causal gate‑keeping function the RMA performs: a clinical definition, a short catalogue of qualifying factors with fixed look‑back periods, a requirement that those factors be related to the defined categories of relevant service, and a mechanism to import other Statements of Principles where a factor refers to another disease.

The instrument is directed at the population eligible to bring claims under the specified provisions of the VEA and MRCA. It explicitly applies to a claim to which section 120B of the VEA or section 339 of the MRCA applies (s 5). Schedule 1 defines “relevant service,” and that definition determines which categories of veterans and members fall within the coverage of the Statement: eligible war service (other than operational service), defence service (other than hazardous service and British nuclear test defence service) under the VEA, and peacetime service under the MRCA (Schedule 1). The RMA made the Statement under its statutory power (s 3).

Directly affected persons are therefore claimants who assert that their sarcoidosis, or death from sarcoidosis, is connected with their relevant service. The instrument prescribes which medical and service‑related facts must be shown before that causal link can be accepted on the balance of probabilities (s 9-10). The parties who will need to gather and supply evidence include claimants and their advisers, treating clinicians and hospitals (for medication records, transplant records and clinical management histories), and decision‑makers administering the VEA/MRCA claims processes who apply Statements of Principles to determine causal connection.

Health professionals prescribing medicines listed in s 9 (BRAF/MEK inhibitors; immune checkpoint inhibitors; interferons) will be implicated because administration of those medicines within the specified five‑year window can be a qualifying factor (s 9(1)). Transplant services and tissue banks are implicated where an organ or tissue transplant (other than corneal transplant) was received from a donor with sarcoidosis within two years before clinical onset (s 9(2)). Similarly, providers and systems of clinical care are implicated by the factor “inability to obtain appropriate clinical management for sarcoidosis before clinical worsening” (s 9(3)), because records or contemporaneous evidence of access or lack of access to care will be central to establishing that factor.

Administrative bodies that adjudicate VEA and MRCA claims will use the Statement as the RMA’s formal determination of causative factors. The instrument does not itself create an entitlement or award; it sets the medical‑scientific thresholds for causal connection to relevant service for claims within the VEA/MRCA framework (ss 3, 5, 8-9). Where a listed factor refers to an injury or disease already the subject of another Statement of Principles, persons and advisers must consult that other Statement because section 11 makes those other Statements applicable as in force from time to time.

Organizations and advisers should note the commencement date (21 July 2025) and the repeal of the previous Statement (No. 60 of 2016) so that evidence gathering and claim framing align with this Statement rather than the repealed instrument (ss 2, 4).

The instrument structures duties and evidentiary hurdles rather than imposing criminal or regulatory sanctions. The key legal duties and rights arising from the instrument are administrative and evidentiary in nature.

Duties and thresholds created by this Statement

• Duty to establish a qualifying factor. Before it can be said, on the balance of probabilities, that sarcoidosis or death from sarcoidosis is connected with relevant service, at least one of the factors listed in section 9 must exist (s 9). The Secretary or decision‑maker applying the VEA/MRCA will therefore be constrained to accept a causal connection only where evidence supports at least one of these factors in the statutory terms.

• Duty to show relationship to relevant service. Section 10 requires that the existence of any factor in section 9 “must be related to the relevant service rendered by the person” (s 10(1)). That imposes an additional linkage: it is not enough that a factor exists; it must be shown to have a relationship to the person’s relevant service as defined (Schedule 1). The Schedule defines relevant service categories that determine the population and the kinds of service that will qualify (Schedule 1).

• Limitation on use of clinical‑worsening factors. Section 10(2) makes clear that the clinical worsening aspects of factors in section 9 apply only to material contribution to, or aggravation of, sarcoidosis where the person’s sarcoidosis was suffered or contracted before or during (but did not arise out of) the person’s relevant service (s 10(2)). This is a specific restriction on when the clinical‑worsening limb of the list applies.

Rights and procedural consequences

• Use of the RMA’s scientific view. Section 8 records the RMA’s position that, on the sound medical‑scientific evidence available, it is more probable than not that sarcoidosis and death from sarcoidosis can be related to relevant service (s 8). That view operates as the expert medical statement that decision‑makers must apply in determining causal connection under the relevant VEA/MRCA provisions. The Statement therefore vests a claimant with the right to have their claim assessed against these formally declared factors.

• Cross‑application of other Statements of Principles. Where a factor in section 9 refers to an injury or disease already covered by another Statement of Principles determined under subsection 196B(3) VEA, section 11 requires that the other Statement’s factors apply as in force from time to time (s 11). This creates a right for claimants to rely on up‑to‑date determinations in other Statements when a listed factor refers to them.

Practical consequences for evidence gathering

• Evidence must address both the factor itself (for example, medicine exposure within five years, or donor diagnosis within two years) and the relationship of that factor to relevant service (s 9-10). Clinical records, medication dispensing records, transplant documentation and evidence of attempts to obtain appropriate clinical management will be the primary evidence fields required to discharge the statutory thresholds.

The Statement contains no provisions for penalties or enforcement mechanisms within itself; it operates as a component of the statutory claim assessment regime under the VEA and MRCA (s 3, s 5). The duties the instrument articulates are therefore within an administrative adjudicative process rather than a criminal or civil regulatory enforcement regime.

The instrument contains no penalty provisions and does not itself create criminal, civil or administrative penalties. It is a Statement of Principles made by the Repatriation Medical Authority under subsection 196B(3) of the VEA (s 3), intended to set the medical‑scientific criteria used in the assessment of claims under the VEA and MRCA (s 5). That structure means enforcement in the ordinary sense does not arise from the Statement itself: it is applied as the expert medical framework within the VEA/MRCA claims processes.

What the instrument does impose, operationally, is an evidentiary gate. Decision‑makers applying s 120B of the VEA or s 339 of the MRCA will use the Statement to determine whether, on the balance of probabilities, sarcoidosis or death from sarcoidosis can be connected with relevant service (ss 5, 8-9). The consequences for claimants of failing to meet the criteria are administrative: a claim will not be accepted as service‑connected if none of the factors in section 9 can be established and related to the relevant service as required by section 10. Those consequences are procedural determinations under the VEA/MRCA claim processes; the Statement itself does not set separate sanctioning powers.

Enforcement risk and dispute pathways

• Administrative review and appeal. The Statement will be used by the decision‑maker within the statutory claims procedures, and any disputes about how the Statement is applied will be addressed through the authorised review and appeal mechanisms in the VEA and MRCA framework. The instrument does not specify appeal routes or enforcement procedures; those are provided by the parent Acts referenced in the instrument (s 3, s 5).

• Potential for evidentiary contest. Because the Statement fixes particular temporal windows and concrete factors (for example, medicines within five years; donor sarcoidosis within two years; inability to obtain appropriate clinical management), the primary enforcement pressure will take the form of contested factual findings: whether the claimant took a listed medicine within the five‑year window; whether the donor had sarcoidosis and the transplant occurred within two years before clinical onset; whether the claimant lacked appropriate clinical management before a deterioration. The Statement contains no guidance about standards of proof beyond the balance of probabilities standard; it therefore leaves questions about the sufficiency and type of evidence to the adjudicative context.

• Interaction with other Statements. Section 11 provides that where a section‑9 factor refers to an injury or disease already covered by another Statement, the other Statement applies as in force from time to time, which can create enforcement complexities where multiple Statements are periodically updated (s 11).

In short, the instrument does not impose statutory penalties. It functions as an administrative rulebook for adjudicators and therefore creates an enforcement environment in which the principal issues are evidentiary and procedural within the VEA/MRCA claim and review systems.

The Statement explicitly links to and operates within the statutory framework set by the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 and the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004. The RMA makes the Statement under subsection 196B(3) of the VEA (s 3). The instrument applies specifically to claims to which s 120B of the VEA or s 339 of the MRCA applies (s 5). Those references establish that the Statement is part of the body of expert medical determinations that decision‑makers must apply under the VEA and MRCA claims processes.

Cross‑reference to other Statements of Principles

• Section 11 creates a mechanism for cross‑application: if a factor in section 9 refers to an injury or disease already the subject of another Statement of Principles determined under subsection 196B(3) of the VEA, the factors in that other Statement apply in accordance with its terms as in force from time to time (s 11). Practically, this means the Statement is not an isolated instrument; when a listed factor depends on another disease, that disease’s Statement governs the precise factor application, including the other instrument’s look‑back periods, definitions and qualifications.

Coding and diagnostic classifications

• The Statement references ICD‑10‑AM code D86 as the coding anchor for sarcoidosis but makes the clinical definition in subsection 7(1) the operative legal meaning (s 7(2)-(3)). It specifies the ICD‑10‑AM edition: Tenth Edition, effective date 1 July 2017. That places reliance on a particular edition of an external classification standard. Interactional risk arises if other laws, administrative rules or clinical coding practices adopt different ICD editions or coding conventions.

Definitions and service categories

• Schedule 1 defines MRCA and VEA and sets out the definition of relevant service for this Statement (Schedule 1). The particular categories of relevant service specified in the Schedule determine which categories of service members and veterans fall within the instrument’s scope. The instrument therefore interacts with the broader statutory definitions of service categories in the VEA/MRCA framework.

Temporal and evidentiary interplay

• The Statement’s temporal windows and factor list will interact with medico‑legal concepts used elsewhere in the VEA/MRCA regime, such as how “clinical onset” and “clinical worsening” are treated administratively. The Statement itself does not define clinical onset or clinical worsening in detail, but it constrains their legal effect by attaching look‑back periods and by limiting the application of clinical‑worsening concepts where sarcoidosis was suffered or contracted before or during (but did not arise out of) relevant service (s 9-10). Those interaction points will be resolved within the existing claims and review remedies under the parent Acts.

Repeal and succession

• The Statement expressly repeals the prior Statement of Principles concerning sarcoidosis (No. 60 of 2016) (s 4). That repeal means that the current Statement replaces the legal and medical template used to assess sarcoidosis claims. Any claims or decisions relying on the prior Statement should, after commencement, be considered under the terms of the new Statement, subject to transitional arrangements that may be set out in the VEA/MRCA administrative practice (the instrument contains no transitional provisions).

Limits on external legal consequences

• The Statement is an administrative medical determination instrument. It does not, by itself, alter criminal offences, civil liability regimes outside the VEA/MRCA claim context, or professional regulatory obligations of clinicians. Its legal effect is to set the causation criteria for service‑connection in the VEA/MRCA framework; any application beyond that statutory context would require separate legal basis which is not present in the instrument.

This Statement is identified as No. 61 of 2025 and is dated 20 June 2025 (front page). It commences on 21 July 2025 (s 2). Section 4 expressly repeals the earlier Statement of Principles concerning sarcoidosis (Balance of Probabilities) (No. 60 of 2016) (Federal Register of Legislation No. F2016L01143), which had been made under subsections 196B(3) and (8) of the VEA. The instrument is made under subsection 196B(3) only (s 3).

The text supplies a single clear amendment action: replacement of No. 60 of 2016 with No. 61 of 2025. The instrument does not record any intermediate amendments between 2016 and 2025; it does not specify transitional arrangements or savings for decisions made under the prior Statement. It also does not contain an explicit power to further amend within the instrument itself; any amendment will need to be carried out by the RMA under its statutory power pursuant to the VEA.

Relevant dated elements

• Instrument dated: 20 June 2025 (front page).
• Commencement: 21 July 2025 (s 2).
• Repeal: No. 60 of 2016 repealed (s 4).

Cross‑referencing other Statements

• The instrument’s section 11 contemplates that other Statements of Principles will be maintained and updated “as in force from time to time,” and that where a section‑9 factor refers to an injury or disease covered by another Statement, the other Statement’s factors will apply (s 11). This design means that, going forward, the effective law applicable to particular factors may change over time through updates to other Statements independently of this instrument. The instrument therefore anticipates an operational regime of iterative updates across Statements.

No other amendments, rescissions or legislative instruments are noted in the text. The instrument does not include a transitional schedule or retroactivity clause. Practitioners should therefore assume the new Statement will be applied to relevant claims from its commencement date unless the relevant primary legislation or administrative practice provides otherwise; the Statement itself contains no transitional detail (s 2, s 4).

The instrument does not record any litigation history. It is a fresh Statement (No. 61 of 2025) replacing the previous Statement (No. 60 of 2016) by repeal (s 4). The text contains no citations to precedent, judicial decisions, or prior litigation in which the Statement or its provisions were considered. It does not refer to determinations of courts or tribunals.

Areas likely to generate disputes in the claims context

Although the instrument itself provides no litigation record, its structure identifies specific factual and legal edges that commonly produce contested questions in administrative claim processes. Each of the following points is grounded in the instrument’s text and therefore represents a plausible focus of dispute in administrative review or appeals within the VEA/MRCA framework:

• Timing questions: The instrument attaches strict look‑back windows to certain factors (five years for medicines in s 9(1); two years for donor sarcoidosis in s 9(2)). Disputes will arise about precise dates of clinical onset, clinical worsening and medicine exposure because establishing whether an exposure falls within the statutory window will determine whether the statutory factor exists (s 9).

• Clinical onset and clinical worsening definitions: The instrument uses the terms “clinical onset” and “clinical worsening” (s 9) but does not define them operationally. Adjudicators will therefore be required to make case‑specific findings about when onset or worsening occurred; those factual findings can be contested on review where medical records or expert opinions differ.

• “Inability to obtain appropriate clinical management”: Section 9(3) creates a factor based on lack of access to appropriate clinical management before clinical worsening. The instrument gives no detail about what constitutes “appropriate clinical management” or the burden of proof required to establish inability to obtain it. That absence of specificity is a predictable locus of disagreement about sufficiency and type of evidence.

• Relationship to relevant service: Section 10(1) requires that any section‑9 factor “must be related to the relevant service rendered by the person.” The instrument does not elaborate the degree or type of relationship needed; disputes could arise about whether a particular medicine exposure, transplant event or access issue is sufficiently connected to the form of service defined as relevant service in Schedule 1.

• Cross‑referenced Statements: Section 11 imports other Statements of Principles where a section‑9 factor refers to an injury or disease covered by another Statement. That creates potential disputes about which version of the other Statement applies at a given time and whether differences between Statements affect the claimant’s case.

Because the instrument itself contains no litigation history, the foregoing points are analytical in nature and follow directly from the instrument’s provisions. Any actual litigation outcomes will depend on how administrative decision‑makers and tribunals apply the instrument within the VEA/MRCA framework, and those outcomes are not contained in the instrument.

This instrument contains a number of narrow drafting features and definitional choices that create common practical pitfalls for claimants, advisers and decision‑makers. The following are concrete “watch‑outs” drawn from the instrument’s wording.

Temporal windows are strict and categorical. Section 9 requires, for the medicines factor, intake of a BRAF/MEK inhibitor, immune checkpoint inhibitor or interferon “within the 5 years before clinical onset or clinical worsening” (s 9(1)). For transplant‑related transmission, the donor must have had sarcoidosis and the transplant must have been “within the 2 years before clinical onset” (s 9(2)). If exposure or transplant falls outside these windows, the instrument’s listed factor is not satisfied. The instrument does not provide an alternative temporal test or grace period.

Examples vs exhaustive lists. The instrument lists categories of medicines (BRAF/MEK inhibitors; immune checkpoint inhibitors; interferons) and provides notes naming example drugs (Notes 1-3 under s 9). The notes say the medicines “include” certain drugs (e.g., dabrafenib, lorlatinib, trametinib, vemurafenib, ipilimumab, nivolumab, pembrolizumab, interferon alpha/beta and peginterferons). The use of “include” suggests examples rather than a closed list, but the instrument provides no rule as to how to treat novel agents or combinations. Advisers should therefore ensure that medical reports describe both the class and the specific agent(s) and dates of use.

Donor diagnosis evidentiary gap. Section 9(2) turns on whether the organ or tissue donor had sarcoidosis within two years before clinical onset. The instrument does not specify the evidentiary standard or particular proofs required to establish the donor’s diagnosis, nor does it specify which tissue or organ types beyond excluding corneal transplant. Transplant recipients and their advisers should obtain transplant records, donor screening and diagnostic information, and contemporaneous correspondence to show that the donor had sarcoidosis and the timing of the transplant (s 9(2)).

Exclusion of corneal transplants. The instrument expressly excludes corneal transplants from section 9(2) (s 9(2) note). That exclusion is categorical. If a claimant’s only transplant exposure was a corneal transplant from a donor with sarcoidosis, that factor will not be satisfied under this Statement.

“Clinical worsening” tied to pre‑existing disease and service timing. Section 10(2) restricts the application of the clinical worsening aspects of the factors: they apply only where the person’s sarcoidosis was suffered or contracted before or during (but did not arise out of) the person’s relevant service (s 10(2)). This construction creates an interpretive trap: if sarcoidosis arose out of relevant service, the clinical‑worsening limb appears not to apply under this wording. Advisers must pay attention to whether the claimant’s sarcoidosis was contracted before, during or as a result of service.

“Related to the relevant service” is a second‑stage test. Even if a claimant can demonstrate one of the section‑9 factors, section 10(1) requires that the existence of that factor “must be related to the relevant service rendered by the person.” Evidence must therefore go beyond demonstrating the factor in isolation and must show the connection to the defined relevant service category in Schedule 1.

Reliance on ICD code with clinical definition controlling. While subsection 7(2) cites ICD‑10‑AM code D86, subsection 7(1) sets out the clinical legal meaning of sarcoidosis. Practitioners should therefore ensure medical reports address the clinical features listed in subsection 7(1) (T lymphocyte and mononuclear phagocyte accumulation, non‑caseating epithelioid granulomas, derangement of tissue architecture) rather than relying only on coded diagnostic labels (s 7(1)-(3)).

“Inability to obtain appropriate clinical management” is open‑textured. Section 9(3) makes lack of access to appropriate clinical management a qualifying factor. The Statement supplies no objective metric for what counts as “appropriate,” no list of necessary attempts to access care, and no standard for proof. Evidence needs to demonstrate both attempts to obtain care and the lack of appropriate management, preferably with contemporaneous records, correspondence and expert opinion (s 9(3)).

Cross‑referenced Statements evolve. Section 11 imports other Statements “as in force from time to time.” That means the rules governing a factor that refers to another disease may change if the other Statement is updated. Practitioners should check the current version of any referenced Statement at the time of making or adjudicating a claim (s 11).

No transitional provisions recorded. The instrument repeals the 2016 Statement and commences on 21 July 2025 (ss 2, 4). The text contains no transitional or saving clauses; practitioners should therefore verify whether decisions taken under the earlier Statement remain subject to earlier standards within the VEA/MRCA administrative regime.

This section sets out concrete steps for claimants, clinicians and advisers to align evidentiary strategy with the Statement’s requirements. All references below are to the relevant provisions of the instrument.

1. Confirm applicability to the claim. Establish that the claim is one to which s 120B of the VEA or s 339 of the MRCA applies (s 5). Check that the person’s service falls within the instrument’s definition of “relevant service” in Schedule 1: eligible war service (other than operational service), defence service (other than hazardous service and British nuclear test defence service) under the VEA, or peacetime service under the MRCA (Schedule 1).

2. Demonstrate sarcoidosis according to the instrument’s clinical definition. Ensure medical reports address the clinical elements set out in subsection 7(1): chronic multisystem disorder; accumulation of T lymphocytes and mononuclear phagocytes; non‑caseating epithelioid granulomas; and derangement of normal tissue architecture (s 7(1)). While ICD‑10‑AM code D86 is referenced (s 7(2)-(3)), the clinical description is the operative legal meaning.

3. Select and document the qualifying factor(s) from section 9. The claimant must establish at least one of the listed factors:

   • Medicine exposure within five years. If the claimant was exposed to BRAF/MEK inhibitors, immune checkpoint inhibitors or interferons, obtain dispense and prescribing records with dates to show that intake occurred within five years before clinical onset or clinical worsening. Identify the drug class and specific agent(s) and provide dates (s 9(1) and associated notes).

   • Transplant exposure within two years. If the claimant received an organ or tissue transplant other than a corneal transplant, obtain the transplant operative report, recipient records and donor screening documentation demonstrating that the donor had sarcoidosis and that the transplant occurred within two years before clinical onset (s 9(2)).

   • Inability to obtain appropriate clinical management. If the claimant asserts lack of access to appropriate management prior to clinical worsening, gather contemporaneous primary care and specialist correspondence, appointment records, referral letters, waiting‑list evidence, any triage or refusal letters, and an expert medical opinion linking those access issues to the deterioration (s 9(3)).

4. Establish timing of clinical onset and clinical worsening. Because the look‑back periods in section 9 refer to periods before “clinical onset or clinical worsening,” obtain dated clinical records, symptom histories, imaging, pathology, and specialist assessments that authoritatively identify onset and any worsening. Where onset and worsening are disputed, explicitly address the record‑based basis for the dates in expert reports (s 9).

5. Show relationship to relevant service. For any proven factor, adduce evidence that the factor is related to the person’s relevant service as required by section 10(1). This may involve showing that the prescription or transplant occurred while the person was serving, while on or proximate to service, or demonstrating how service conditions led to inability to obtain appropriate management where that is the factor relied upon (s 10).

6. Address the clinical‑worsening limitation. If relying on clinical worsening, confirm that the claimant’s sarcoidosis was suffered or contracted before or during (but did not arise out of) relevant service where required by section 10(2). Obtain records showing when the sarcoidosis was first suffered or contracted and whether it originated in the course of service or pre‑existed it (s 10(2)).

7. Where a factor refers to another disease, check other Statements. If a section‑9 factor refers to an injury or disease that is the subject of another Statement of Principles, consult that other Statement as it applies “as in force from time to time” (s 11). Ensure evidence is tailored to the other Statement’s factors where applicable.

8. Anticipate evidentiary issues and supply corroboration. Given the instrument’s open‑textured elements (for example “appropriate clinical management”) provide corroborating evidence such as contemporaneous correspondence, waiting‑list proof, appointment histories, pharmacy dispensing logs, pathology reports and expert opinion linking the medical history to service. For donor transplants, seek donor diagnostic material or official transplant screening summaries.

9. Ensure medical experts address the RMA’s formulation. Experts should address the RMA’s stated view in section 8 that, on the medical‑scientific evidence available, it is more probable than not that sarcoidosis and death from sarcoidosis can be related to relevant service (s 8). Medical opinions should expressly tie clinical findings to the factual factors and to the nature and timing of the claimant’s relevant service.

10. Record ICD coding but prioritise clinical description. Include ICD‑10‑AM D86 coding in medical reports for administrative convenience (s 7(2)-(3)), but ensure reports explicitly describe the clinical features listed in subsection 7(1), because the legal meaning of sarcoidosis in this instrument is the clinical description rather than the code alone.

11. Observe commencement and repeal dates. The Statement commences on 21 July 2025 and repeals the 2016 Statement (ss 2, 4); ensure claims and evidence are aligned to the new Statement from the commencement date.

12. Keep current with other Statements. Because section 11 imports other Statements “as in force from time to time,” advisers should verify the operative text of any cross‑referenced Statement at the time of lodging or adjudicating a claim (s 11).

Collecting and organising evidence using the above checklist aligns the factual record with the instrument’s narrow factors and temporal limitations. Given the absence of detailed definitions for some terms, contemporaneous documentation and expert evidence that links the factual record to the statutory words will be particularly important.