Statement of Principles concerning gunshot injury (Reasonable Hypothesis) (No. 23 of 2020)

The Statement centres on a small set of interlocking concepts: gunshot injury, death from gunshot injury (including terminal events), relevant service, the reasonable hypothesis threshold, and a closed list of factors that must exist as a minimum to raise that threshold.

Gunshot injury. The instrument gives a focused clinical definition: “damage to body tissue, organs or bone as a result of a gunshot” (s7(2), Schedule). That definition limits the scope to direct physical damage produced by a projectile from a gun; other sequelae that are not damage to tissue, organs or bone are not captured by this definition as primary “gunshot injury” within the instrument.

Death from gunshot injury. The instrument explicitly imports death into the covered condition where the gunshot injury contributed to a terminal event or condition (s7(3)). The Schedule defines “terminal event” as proximate or ultimate causes of death and lists exemplars: pneumonia, respiratory failure, cardiac arrest, circulatory failure, and cessation of brain function (Schedule). Thus, where a gunshot injury contributes to one of those proximate or ultimate causes, death is within scope.

Relevant service. The instrument applies to claims linked to specified categories of service. The Schedule defines “relevant service” by reference to VEA and MRCA service categories: operational, peacekeeping, hazardous, British nuclear test defence service under the VEA; warlike or non-warlike under the MRCA (Schedule). The instrument itself is made under s196B(2) of the VEA (s3) and applies to claims to which s120A VEA or s338 MRCA applies (s5), anchoring the Statement to the particular claim contexts where the reasonable hypothesis standard is invoked.

Reasonable hypothesis standard. The title and text repeatedly frame the Statement as operating at the “reasonable hypothesis” standard: the factors in s9 are the minimum that must exist “before it can be said that a reasonable hypothesis has been raised” connecting the injury or death to service (s9). The instrument does not define “reasonable hypothesis” itself; instead it specifies the minimum factual or clinical factors the RMA considers sufficient as a matter of medical‑scientific judgment to meet that standard in relation to gunshot injury.

Factors. The instrument contains a short, conjunctive list of factors: (1) experiencing a gunshot; and (2) inability to obtain appropriate clinical management for gunshot injury (s9). Only one of the factors needs to exist. The second factor is limited in the service nexus sense: it applies only to material contribution or aggravation where the gunshot injury was suffered or contracted before or during, but did not arise out of, the relevant service (s10(2)). This creates a specific causal framing for pre-existing injuries that are worsened by service-related lack of care.

Interaction with other Statements. Section 11 provides that if a s9 factor refers to an injury or disease covered by another RMA Statement, the factors in that other Statement apply according to their current terms. This creates a cross-reference mechanism allowing RMA Statements to be mutually referential and subject to subsequent alteration without re-enacting this instrument.

RMA’s evidentiary claim. Section 8 states the RMA’s view that “there is sound medical‑scientific evidence” indicating gunshot injury and associated death can be related to relevant service. That assertion functions as the RMA’s evidentiary predicate for issuing the Statement; the Statement then translates that predicate into the two minimal factors at s9.

Taken together, the concepts consolidate a narrow, medical‑scientific template for raising the reasonable hypothesis in gunshot injury matters, with express limits on the second factor’s application to pre-existing injuries and an explicit cross-reference regime for other RMA Statements.

The Statement affects four concentric groups directly and other stakeholders indirectly, by operation of the VEA/MRCA claims process in which the RMA Statements are used.

Primary affected persons. The instrument applies to persons making claims where s120A of the VEA or s338 of the MRCA are relevant (s5). Those statutory provisions (not reproduced in this instrument) are the statutory hooks on which RMA Statements operate; in practice that means veterans, members of Peacekeeping Forces and members of the Defence Forces who seek entitlements where causation between injury/disease/death and relevant service must be assessed using the “reasonable hypothesis” standard the RMA addresses (s3, s8).

Decision-makers and administrators. The Repatriation Medical Authority is the author and the source of the clinical view (s3, s8). Administrative decision-makers (e.g. within the Department of Veterans’ Affairs or agencies administering MRCA entitlements) will rely on this Statement as the RMA’s specified medical matrix to decide whether a reasonable hypothesis has been raised in a gunshot injury matter. The instrument expressly ties in with specific claim provisions (s5), so those administrators are a primary audience functionally obliged to apply these factors.

Claimant representatives and treating clinicians. Lawyers, advocates, medical practitioners and rehabilitation providers who prepare evidence to support claims will be affected by the Statement because it defines the minimal medical facts that must be adduced to put a matter within the reasonable hypothesis. For example, to rely on s9(1) a claimant must have evidence relevant to “experiencing a gunshot”; to rely on s9(2) the claimant must show evidence consistent with “inability to obtain appropriate clinical management” linked to service per s10.

Interconnected Statements and conditions. Other RMA Statements and their covered conditions are indirectly affected. Section 11 provides that where a s9 factor refers to an injury or disease that is itself the subject of another RMA Statement, the factors in that other Statement will apply. That creates an operational dependency: parties and decision-makers must consult other Statements as they change over time.

People with pre-existing gunshot injuries. Section 10(2) specifically identifies persons whose gunshot injury was suffered or contracted before or during (but did not arise out of) the relevant service. For those persons s9(2) can apply, but only in respect of material contribution to, or aggravation of, the injury due to inability to obtain appropriate clinical management. Thus the Statement affects how pre-existing conditions are approached where service may have changed access to care.

Persons interested in repeal effects. The instrument repeals the prior Statement on “physical injury due to munitions discharge” No. 48 of 2012 (s4). Persons whose claims engaged the prior Statement may need to consider differences between the two Statements (timing and transitional considerations are not specified in this instrument).

Who does not get new criminal liabilities or administrative penalties from this Statement. The instrument itself does not create offences, fines, or discrete enforcement mechanisms; its function is determinations on medical-scientific factors used in claims processes (see s3). Therefore, criminal or disciplinary consequences are not introduced here; rather the practical effect is on claims assessment thresholds.

In short, the instrument affects claimants (particularly veterans and defence members), administrators who adjudicate VEA/MRCA claims, medical and legal representatives who prepare or contest evidence, and other RMA Statements through cross-references. It formalises what medical facts will be treated as minimally sufficient to raise the reasonable hypothesis in gunshot injury matters (s9), and limits how pre-existing injuries are handled (s10(2)).

This Statement is an administrative medical‑scientific instrument; it specifies no private duties or statutory rights directly but creates obligations and practical rights indirectly through its role in claims assessment under the VEA/MRCA.

Duty of the Repatriation Medical Authority to state principles. The instrument is made under s196B(2) of the VEA (s3). That provision is the RMA’s statutory authority to determine Statements of Principles; the instrument fulfils that function by setting out the RMA’s view and the minimum factors required to raise a reasonable hypothesis for gunshot injury. The RMA therefore has the institutional duty to publish these principles; the instrument records that duty having been exercised.

Duty on decision-makers to use the Statement in relevant claims. The Statement applies to claims to which s120A VEA or s338 MRCA applies (s5). While the instrument itself does not include an express instruction that decision-makers must apply it, the statutory architecture (the RMA’s determinations made under s196B(2)) is designed for use by decision-makers assessing causation under the specified VEA/MRCA provisions. The practical effect is that decision-makers should treat this Statement as the RMA’s medical view for assessing the reasonable hypothesis in gunshot injury claims.

Minimum factual requirements for claimants. Section 9 identifies the minimal factors a claimant must establish to raise the reasonable hypothesis: experiencing a gunshot or inability to obtain appropriate clinical management for gunshot injury. A claimant therefore has the right, in the sense of admissible grounds, to rely on either factor to establish the threshold. The Statement makes explicit that only one of these factors must be present to raise the reasonable hypothesis (s9).

Service-relationship requirement. Section 10 imposes a nexus requirement: any factor relied upon under s9 must be “related to the relevant service rendered” by the person (s10(1)). For claims invoking s9(2) (inability to obtain appropriate clinical management), s10(2) restricts application to cases of material contribution to or aggravation of pre-existing injuries that were suffered or contracted before or during but did not arise out of the relevant service. Practitioners must ensure that the evidentiary material addresses the relationship between the factor and the relevant service.

Cross-application of other Statements. Section 11 creates a conditional duty to consult other RMA Statements where a s9 factor refers to an injury or disease that is the subject of another Statement. If that situation arises, “the factors in that Statement of Principles apply in accordance with the terms of that Statement … as in force from time to time” (s11). That means decision-makers and practitioners have a duty to consult and apply the current wording of relevant RMA Statements.

No express private right or penalty provision. The document does not create a new statutory benefit or a private right of action; instead it informs the causation assessment used in statutory entitlement decision-making (s3, s5). It likewise does not set out enforcement mechanisms, compliance sanctions, or criminal offences. Any procedural or remedial rights (review, merits appeal, judicial review) remain governed by the VEA, MRCA and their administrative processes; they are not specified in this Statement.

Summary of practical duties/rights. For claimants and their advisers the Statement means there is a clear, limited set of medical facts that will be treated as minimally sufficient to raise the reasonable hypothesis (s9). For decision-makers and the RMA the Statement records the RMA’s obligation to publish its medical‑scientific view (s3, s8) and establishes the cross-referencing duty to apply other Statements where applicable (s11). For persons with pre-existing injuries the Statement prescribes a narrower path to have a pre-existing gunshot injury treated as materially contributed to or aggravated by service, through the inability-to-obtain-care factor with its specific temporal limitation (s10(2)).

The Statement of Principles instrument itself contains no express penalty, offence or enforcement provisions. It is a medical-scientific determination made under subsection 196B(2) of the VEA (s3), and it functions as a determinative evidentiary tool for decision‑makers assessing claims under the VEA and MRCA (s5). The Statement does not purport to create criminal liabilities, civil sanctions, or administrative penalties.

What the instrument does specify about enforcement is procedural and contextual rather than punitive. It prescribes the clinical and service-related factors that, if present, raise the reasonable hypothesis that a gunshot injury (or death from it) is connected to relevant service (s9, s10). That evidentiary effect is the instrument’s operational enforcement mechanism: the Statement informs entitlement decision-making under statutory schemes by identifying the minimum medical conditions that will, as a matter of RMA medical‑scientific view, be treated as sufficient to raise the statutory standard.

Where enforcement, penalties, or sanctions might be implicated in practice, they derive from the VEA or MRCA administrative and legal frameworks, not from this Statement. The instrument expressly applies to claims to which s120A VEA or s338 MRCA applies (s5), and those primary Acts contain the procedural, review and appeal mechanisms and any sanctions tied to false claims, fraud, or disciplinary action. This Statement does not alter those provisions or introduce separate enforcement paths.

Administrative discretion and decision-making. The instrument’s effect on decisions arises through administrative discretion: decision-makers are required by statute to have regard to RMA Statements (in the broader statutory scheme), and this Statement will inform that discretion by defining the minimal factors used for a reasonable hypothesis finding. The Statement itself does not prescribe how administrators must evaluate evidence beyond listing the minimal factors; it leaves the weighing of evidence and factual evaluation to the statutory adjudication processes under VEA/MRCA.

No inspectorate or compliance unit created. The Statement contains no provision establishing a new compliance body, inspectorate, reporting requirement, audit mechanism, or enforcement process. The RMA’s role is declaratory and advisory (medical-scientific), not enforcemental.

Implications for providers and institutions. Although the Statement does not impose penalties on hospitals, clinics, or providers, its recognition of “inability to obtain appropriate clinical management” as a factor (s9(2)) may bring institutions into claim narratives where access to care is alleged to have materially contributed to or aggravated an injury (subject to the service nexus limits in s10(2)). Any institutional accountability or regulatory consequences would flow, if at all, through other legal or administrative processes rather than directly from this Statement.

In short: the instrument creates no standalone penalties or enforcement mechanisms. Its operational effect is evidentiary: it changes the medical threshold used by decision-makers in VEA/MRCA claims, and the practical “enforcement” of the instrument is translation into acceptance or rejection of claims within the existing statutory administrative processes.

This Statement is designed to sit within a statutory architecture comprised of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (VEA), the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004 (MRCA) and other RMA Statements. The instrument itself acknowledges those interactions in several places and creates direct cross-references.

Authority and scope under VEA. The instrument is made under subsection 196B(2) of the VEA (s3). That is the RMA’s statutory power to determine Statements of Principles. The instrument therefore operates as an authoritative RMA Statement within the VEA framework. It expressly applies to claims to which section 120A of the VEA is relevant (s5), signalling that decisions under that VEA provision must have regard to this Statement when the reasonable hypothesis threshold is in play.

Application to MRCA claims. The Statement also applies to claims to which section 338 of the MRCA applies (s5). The instrument’s Schedule defines MRCA and includes the MRCA service categories in the definition of “relevant service” (Schedule). This means the Statement is the RMA’s medical view for MRCA claims where the statutory framework invokes the reasonable hypothesis standard under s338 of the MRCA.

Repeal of prior Statement. Section 4 repeals the earlier Statement of Principles concerning “physical injury due to munitions discharge” No. 48 of 2012 (Federal Register No. F2012L01789). Practitioners must therefore compare the prior and current Statements when dealing with claims spanning the repeal date. The instrument does not itself provide transitional detail about legacy claims; that is governed by the VEA/MRCA statutes and administrative practice outside the instrument.

Cross-references to other RMA Statements. Section 11 provides that if a s9 factor refers to an injury or disease covered by another RMA Statement determined under s196B(2), then “the factors in that Statement of Principles apply in accordance with the terms of that Statement of Principles as in force from time to time” (s11). This creates a dynamic interdependence: other RMA Statements can be updated and those updates affect how the s9 factors operate. Practitioners must therefore consult the current versions of relevant RMA Statements when a factor references another condition.

Interface with statutory causation standards. The Statement is expressly tied to claim provisions (s120A VEA and s338 MRCA), which are the statutory mechanisms applying the reasonable hypothesis standard. While this instrument sets the minimal medical factors, the legal standards for causation, procedural time limits, evidentiary rules, entitlement calculations and appeal rights remain governed by the VEA and MRCA. The instrument does not replace or modify statutory provisions; it supplies the medical-scientific content decision-makers use when applying the statutory tests.

Definitions and interpretive interaction. The Schedule’s definitions of “relevant service” and “terminal event” narrow interpretive interaction points with both Acts. For instance the Schedule lists the specific VEA and MRCA service categories that constitute “relevant service”; this will interact with statutory definitions and case fact patterns about whether a person’s service falls within those listed categories. The Schedule’s list of terminal events (pneumonia, respiratory failure, cardiac arrest, circulatory failure, cessation of brain function) provides a bounded set of examples for death causation analysis, but how those causes interface with statutory proximate cause concepts will depend on the VEA/MRCA adjudicative framework.

No alteration of statutory entitlement rules. The instrument does not amend the VEA or MRCA entitlement provisions, nor does it specify benefits, rates, or administrative remedies. Its role is medical-scientific and evidentiary: it supplies the RMA’s view for decision-makers applying statutory causation tests.

Practical consequence: necessity to read statutes together with the Statement. Because the Statement applies only where s120A VEA or s338 MRCA apply (s5), practitioners must read the Statement alongside those statutory provisions and any procedural regulations to understand fully how the RMA’s factors will be operationalised in a given claim.

In summary: the instrument interacts directly with the VEA and MRCA by providing the RMA’s medical factors for causation assessments, repeals an earlier RMA Statement, cross-references other RMA Statements whose current versions must be consulted, and otherwise leaves statutory entitlement and procedural frameworks intact.

The instrument itself records a single express amendment event: the repeal of an earlier RMA Statement. It was made and dated 24 April 2020 and commenced on 25 May 2020 (s2; instrument heading), and it expressly repeals the Statement of Principles concerning physical injury due to munitions discharge No. 48 of 2012 (Federal Register No. F2012L01789) (s4).

What the instrument documents:

• New determination date and commencement. The new Statement is dated 24 April 2020 and commences on 25 May 2020 (instrument heading; s2). That sets the effective date from which it operates as the RMA’s current Statement about gunshot injury on the reasonable hypothesis standard.
• Repeal of prior Statement. Section 4 explicitly repeals the 2012 Statement No. 48 concerning physical injury due to munitions discharge. The instrument does not provide transitional provisions or savings clauses within its text about how the repeal affects claims already decided or in progress; it simply states the repeal. Practitioners must therefore rely on the VEA/MRCA statutory framework and administrative practice for any transitional treatment.
• No other amendments or replacements recorded. The instrument contains no other amendment entries, modifications, or schedules of previously amended text. There is no indication within the instrument of prior amendment iterations to this particular Statement itself.

What is not in the instrument. The instrument does not include:

• A history of prior RMA determinations beyond the 2012 Statement being repealed. No earlier versions, amendment dates or incremental changes are recorded.
• Transitional rules for claims made before commencement. There is no clause stating whether claims lodged before the 25 May 2020 commencement are to be assessed under the prior or the new Statement; that detail is not provided in this document.
• Details of any subsequent amendments after commencement. The instrument is a standalone determination; any further amendments would have to be separately made and published under the RMA’s statutory powers, but they are not recorded here.

Practical implications of the recorded amendment. The repeal of the No. 48 of 2012 Statement means practitioners need to compare the new Statement’s scope, definitions and factors with the prior instrument when dealing with claims that span the repeal. Because the instrument does not state transitional provisions, responsibility for determining transitional application falls to the statutory adjudication processes under the VEA/MRCA and any administrative guidance published by the Department or RMA.

Record-keeping and citation. The instrument identifies itself as Statement No. 23 of 2020 and provides the formal legal citation context. Practitioners should cite the instrument by its number and date when relying on its provisions in claims or reviews.

In short: the only formal amendment action recorded in the instrument is the repeal of the 2012 RMA Statement; the instrument itself is the new 2020 determination that supersedes that earlier Statement from 25 May 2020.

The instrument contains no litigation history, case references or summaries of judicial consideration. It is a statutory RMA determination under subsection 196B(2) of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (s3), and the text does not include or purport to summarise any court decisions, tribunal outcomes or appeals that interpret or test the Statement.

What the instrument states and does not state:

• No case citations. The Statement does not cite any judicial authorities, tribunal decisions, or precedent. It contains only the RMA’s view that “there is sound medical‑scientific evidence” linking gunshot injury and death from gunshot injury to relevant service (s8).
• No administrative decisions recorded. The instrument does not list administrative decisions or Departmental rulings that have applied the Statement. It is a primary source of the RMA’s medical view but does not document how that view has been used in particular claim outcomes.
• No mention of disputes or judicial review. There is no express mention of prior litigation, judicial review challenges, or other contestation of this Statement in the instrument.

Implication for researchers and practitioners. Because the instrument itself contains no litigation history, practitioners seeking how courts or tribunals have treated the Statement must look outside this instrument to administrative decisions, merits review outcomes and judicial decisions under the VEA and MRCA where this or successor Statements have been applied. The instrument’s silence means it cannot be relied upon as evidence that courts or tribunals have endorsed its medical-scientific conclusions; it is the RMA’s formal determination and must be operationalised and tested in administrative and judicial processes separately.

Recommended next steps for fact-finders wanting litigation context. To obtain litigation history practitioners must consult the relevant case law databases, tribunal decisions and administrative records that address causation under s120A of the VEA and s338 of the MRCA, specifically in gunshot injury matters, and consider how decision-makers have applied RMA Statements when assessing the reasonable hypothesis. This Statement does not itself provide that application history.

In short: the instrument contains no litigation history; any litigation history must be researched externally to see how tribunals or courts have interpreted or applied this RMA Statement.

The Statement is compact but contains several technical features that can produce practical pitfalls if overlooked. The following points highlight those nuances with direct references to the instrument.

Minimal-but-exclusive factor list. Section 9 prescribes two factors “as a minimum” that must exist before a reasonable hypothesis can be said to be raised: (1) experiencing a gunshot; or (2) inability to obtain appropriate clinical management for gunshot injury. Only one of these is required. The small size of the list can tempt reliance on a general claim without addressing the specific wording. Practitioners must ensure that evidence squarely maps onto one of these two formulations (s9).

Scope of “gunshot injury” is clinical and narrow. The Schedule defines gunshot injury as “damage to body tissue, organs or bone as a result of a gunshot” (s7(2); Schedule). Non‑physical sequelae (for example, purely psychological responses unaccompanied by specified physical damage) are not captured by that definition as the primary condition. Where a claim involves non‑physical harm allegedly arising from a gunshot event, the claimant should ensure an appropriate diagnosis of tissue, organ or bone damage is presented.

Death inclusion is limited to contributions to terminal events. Section 7(3) includes “death from a terminal event or condition that was contributed to by the person’s gunshot injury”, and the Schedule enumerates examples of terminal events. The inclusion of death is not open-ended; it requires that the gunshot injury contributed to a proximate or ultimate cause of death (per the Schedule examples). Evidence must address contribution to such an event.

Temporal and causal limits on s9(2). The “inability to obtain appropriate clinical management” factor has a specific service-nexus limit: it applies only to material contribution to, or aggravation of, gunshot injury where the injury was suffered or contracted before or during (but did not arise out of) relevant service (s10(2)). That is a potential gotcha for claimants with a gunshot injury arising during service: if the injury “arose out of” the service, s9(2) is not the appropriate pathway; instead s9(1) might be engaged if there was an actual gunshot during service. The text creates a narrower route for pre-existing injuries than for injuries arising out of service.

Cross-references to other Statements can shift outcomes. Section 11 requires that if a s9 factor refers to an injury/disease covered by another RMA Statement, the factors in that other Statement apply “as in force from time to time.” That introduces potential volatility: changes to other RMA Statements after this instrument may alter how a factor is applied in a particular claim. Practitioners must check current versions of referenced Statements at the time of decision-making.

No procedural or transitional clauses. The instrument repeals the prior No. 48 of 2012 Statement (s4) but does not provide transitional provisions or guidance on how to treat claims in progress at the time of repeal. That creates uncertainty about which Statement applies to claims lodged before the commencement date; resolving that requires reference to the VEA/MRCA administrative rules or Departmental guidance, not this instrument.

“Reasonable hypothesis” is not defined here. The instrument repeatedly references the requirement that the factors raise a “reasonable hypothesis” (s9). The Statement does not define that legal standard; consequently, applying the instrument requires reference to the statutory provisions (s120A VEA, s338 MRCA) and judicial/tribunal interpretation outside this document to understand how fact-finders should treat the phrase in practice. This gap is a procedural risk point if practitioners assume the Statement alone defines the standard.

Potential evidentiary gaps for inability-to-obtain-care claims. The second factor (s9(2)) requires evidence of inability to obtain appropriate clinical management. The instrument does not elaborate what constitutes “appropriate” clinical management or the level of proof required. Claimants will need to assemble medical records, contemporaneous evidence of access or denial of care, and evidence connecting that lack of care to material contribution/aggravation with the service nexus required by s10(2). The instrument leaves those evidentiary specifics to decision-makers.

Definitions of “relevant service” are act-crossing. The Schedule’s definition of relevant service lists categories across both the VEA and MRCA, linking the Statement to multiple statutory regimes. Care must be taken to match the claimant’s service history precisely to the listed categories; mischaracterising the service type could remove the claim from the Statement’s intended scope.

No penalty or enforcement provisions. The instrument contains no enforcement mechanism or remedies if the factors are not met. That is not a defect in law but a practical gotcha: absence of an alternative remedy clause means claimants must rely on the broader VEA/MRCA frameworks for procedural recourse.

In sum, the main pitfalls are the narrow factor list and its specific temporal/service limits, the need to map evidence precisely to the clinical definitions and cross-reference rules, and the absence of procedural and definitional elaboration which requires users to consult the primary statutes and current RMA Statements.

The Statement prescribes two discrete factual pathways to raise a reasonable hypothesis for gunshot injury claims (s9). Compliance for claimants, advocates and decision-makers therefore focuses on assembling and presenting evidence that fits those pathways, and ensuring the evidentiary material addresses the service nexus requirements in s10 and any cross-referenced RMA Statements per s11.

Step 1 , Identify the statutory hook and timing. Confirm the claim is one to which s120A of the VEA or s338 of the MRCA applies, because the Statement only applies in those contexts (s5). Check whether the relevant incident falls on or after the commencement date (25 May 2020) where relevant to administrative handling (s2); the instrument itself supersedes the prior 2012 Statement as of that date (s4).

Step 2 , Determine which s9 factor to pursue. The instrument allows reliance on either:

• s9(1) experiencing a gunshot; or
• s9(2) inability to obtain appropriate clinical management for gunshot injury.

A claimant need only establish one of those as a minimum. Select the factor that the available evidence best supports.

Step 3 , Map clinical evidence to the definition of gunshot injury. The Schedule defines “gunshot injury” as damage to tissue, organs or bone due to a gunshot (s7(2); Schedule). Medical records, diagnostic imaging, operative notes, pathology reports and contemporaneous clinical summaries that document tissue, organ or bone injury from a gunshot are the core evidence to map the fact pattern to the instrument’s clinical definition. For claims involving death, provide documentation showing the gunshot injury’s contribution to a terminal event listed in the Schedule where applicable (s7(3); Schedule).

Step 4 , Establish the service nexus. For any factor relied upon, the claimant must show the factor is related to relevant service (s10(1)). Document the nature of the relevant service (operational, peacekeeping, hazardous, British nuclear test defence service under the VEA, or warlike/non-warlike under the MRCA , Schedule). Provide service records, deployment records, witness statements and timelines that connect the factor (for example, the event of being shot or the period of inability to obtain care) to the person’s relevant service.

Step 5 , If relying on s9(2), meet the temporal and causation limits. s10(2) restricts s9(2) to cases where the gunshot injury was suffered or contracted before or during, but did not arise out of, the relevant service; the factor then applies only to material contribution to or aggravation of the injury. Therefore, for s9(2) cases:

• Produce clear evidence that the injury pre-existed or was contracted before or during service but did not arise from service activities;
• Document the inability to obtain appropriate clinical management during the period relevant to the service involvement (for example, denial of access, evacuation failures, facility unavailability, interrupted treatment);
• Provide medical opinions linking the lack of clinical management to material contribution or aggravation of the gunshot injury.

The Statement does not define “appropriate clinical management”, so evidence should aim to show what standard of care was clinically indicated and how it was unavailable or not delivered.

Step 6 , Use other RMA Statements where relevant. If any factor refers to an injury or disease that is the subject of another RMA Statement, obtain and apply the current version of that Statement because s11 requires the factors in that other Statement to be applied “as in force from time to time” (s11). Document which other Statements are relevant and ensure cross-referenced factors are addressed.

Step 7 , Provide medical expert opinion tethered to the RMA factors. Although the Statement sets the minimum factors, decision-makers will need evidence that the factor(s) have been met in the claimant’s case. Clinical expert reports should explicitly address whether the facts meet s9(1) or s9(2), whether the injury fits the Schedule’s definition of gunshot injury (s7(2)), whether the injury contributed to a terminal event (if relevant) and how the factor(s) relate to the declared relevant service per s10.

Step 8 , Anticipate and address evidentiary weaknesses. Because the instrument is concise and prescriptive, be proactive about potential weaknesses: if relying on inability to obtain care, include contemporaneous records of attempts to obtain care, official communications, evacuation logs or witness statements. If relying on experiencing a gunshot, corroborate with incident reports, service logs, credible witness accounts and medical treatment records.

Step 9 , Cross-check for repeal and prior claims. For matters spanning the repeal of the 2012 Statement (s4), review whether any submissions or decisions made while the No. 48 of 2012 Statement was in force require re-assessment under this Statement or whether transitional rules in the primary statutes apply. The instrument is silent on transition; administrative practice and counsel guidance should be sought.

Step 10 , File and plead with statutory framing. When lodging or advancing a claim, plead explicitly that the RMA’s Statement No. 23 of 2020 is relied upon and identify which s9 factor is advanced, how the claimant’s evidence meets the Schedule definitions, and how the factor relates to relevant service. This makes it explicit to decision-makers which RMA medical pathway is being invoked.

Administrative follow-through. Because the Statement is used by decision-makers in adjudication, ensure any application or appeal references how the Statement should be applied to the facts. For appeals or reviews, argue how the medical evidence maps to the RMA’s stated minimal factors and the service nexus requirement.

In short: compliance is primarily documentary and medical: select the correct s9 pathway, marshal medical and service records that match the instrument’s clinical definitions and temporal/service nexus rules, obtain targeted medical opinion that addresses the RMA factors explicitly, and check cross-referenced RMA Statements where relevant (s11). The Statement provides a compact rule-set; compliance is achieved by aligning the factual record to its precise wording.