Statement of Principles concerning coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) (Balance of Probabilities) (No. 47 of 2020)

The Statement operates by defining a disease, establishing the causal standard, and setting discrete factors and definitions that, if present and related to relevant service, permit a finding that COVID‑19 or death from COVID‑19 is connected with a person's relevant service.

Disease definition. The instrument defines "coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‑19)" for the Statement as an illness caused by infection with SARS‑CoV‑2 (s 6(2)). It explicitly includes death from a terminal event or condition that was contributed to by the person's COVID‑19 (s 6(3)). "Terminal event" is defined in the Schedule and lists proximate or ultimate causes of death such as pneumonia, respiratory failure, cardiac arrest, circulatory failure and cessation of brain function (Schedule 1, cl 1).

Causal standard. The Statement adopts the balance of probabilities principle. Section 7 records the Authority's view that, on the available sound medical‑scientific evidence, it is "more probable than not" that COVID‑19 and death from COVID‑19 can be related to relevant service. This establishes the Statement as an evidentiary bridge for decisionmakers who are applying the statutory causation tests under the VEA and MRCA provisions identified in s 4.

Prescriptive factors. Section 8 prescribes two alternative categories of factors, at least one of which must exist before a connection can be made: (1) specified exposure to SARS‑CoV‑2 within the 14 days before clinical onset (s 8(1)); (2) inability to obtain appropriate clinical management for COVID‑19 (s 8(2)). The Schedule then sets out what counts as "being exposed to SARS‑CoV‑2 as specified", in five specific sub‑paragraphs: being in a country or area with current SARS‑CoV‑2 transmission; being in the same household or immediate work or travel environment as an infected person; direct contact with a contaminated object or substance; direct contact with, or being within two metres of, an infected person; inhaling droplet nuclei or aerosols contaminated with SARS‑CoV‑2 (Schedule 1, cl 1).

Relationship to service. The Statement requires the factor relied on to be related to the person's relevant service (s 9(1)). "Relevant service" is itself defined narrowly in the Schedule to include eligible war service (other than operational service) under the VEA, defence service (other than hazardous service and British nuclear test defence service) under the VEA, or peacetime service under the MRCA (Schedule 1, cl 1). This frames who and what types of service are within the scope of the Statement.

Interaction with other Statements. Section 10 provides that where a factor in this Statement refers to an injury or disease that is the subject of another Statement of Principles made under s 196B(3) of the VEA, then the factors in that other Statement apply according to their terms. This creates a mechanism for chaining or deferring to specialised Statements where overlap exists.

Evidentiary function. The Statement does not itself operate as a benefit code or as a payment instrument. Instead it supplies defined medical and exposure criteria to be used in claims assessment under the identified statutory claim provisions. The Schedule contains the key definitional content which supplies granular factual elements decisionmakers must assess.

Temporal scope and commencement. The document is dated 12 June 2020 and commences 22 June 2020 (s 2 and front matter). It is titled and numbered so as to be identifiable among Statements made in 2020 (No. 47 of 2020).

Primary affected persons. The Statement expressly applies to claims that fall within section 120B of the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 or section 339 of the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004 (s 4). Accordingly the primary persons affected are claimants who are veterans or members of the Forces seeking to establish a causal connection between COVID‑19 (or death from COVID‑19) and their relevant service under the VEA or MRCA claim pathways triggered by those sections. The instrument itself defines "relevant service" in Schedule 1, cl 1 to include three categories: eligible war service other than operational service under the VEA; defence service other than hazardous service and British nuclear test defence service under the VEA; and peacetime service under the MRCA. Individuals whose service falls into those categories are within the Statement’s ambit when making relevant claims.

Decisionmakers and administrators. The Repatriation Medical Authority made the Statement under its statutory power (s 3) and sets the medical‑scientific criteria that will be applied by decisionmakers administering the VEA and MRCA claims referred to in s 4. While the Statement does not itself name the benefits payer or claim‑processing body, practitioners and claimants should expect the agency or officer who administers claims under the cited statutory provisions to use this Statement’s factors and definitions in adjudicating causation. The instrument therefore affects those administrators by prescribing the criteria they must use as part of their medical causation assessments.

Service record holders and employers. The Statement’s exposure criteria include being in the same household, immediate work or travel environment as an infected person, and being within two metres of an infected person, or inhalation of contaminated aerosols (Schedule 1, cl 1). For members and former members whose duties or postings placed them in those settings while undertaking "relevant service", the Statement defines the factual avenues through which a causal connection may be established. That will affect how employers and unit commanders document movements, work environments, household contact and exposures for service personnel, since such records may be material evidence in claims.

Medical practitioners. The Statement’s references to "clinical onset", exposure within 14 days before that onset (s 8(1)), and "inability to obtain appropriate clinical management" (s 8(2)) mean that treating clinicians will be asked to provide clinical timelines, diagnostic confirmation and contemporaneous records of treatment availability or lack thereof. Medical evidence about diagnosis dates, clinical progression, and the causal contribution of COVID‑19 to terminal events will be material.

Legal and advisory professionals. Practising lawyers, advocates, medical-legal advisers and contracted medical assessors will be affected because the Statement sets the elements they must address in pleadings, expert reports and submissions. They must align evidence gathering and argument to the Statement’s definitions and the requirement that the factor relate to the person's relevant service (s 9(1)).

Excluded groups. The relevant service definition excludes certain types of service as described in Schedule 1, cl 1: operational service, hazardous service, and British nuclear test defence service are not listed as relevant service for this Statement. Persons whose service is solely within those excluded categories, or whose claims are not caught by the statutory claim provisions cited in s 4, will not be affected by this Statement in the context of those particular claim pathways.

Wider public and employers. The Statement does not create direct rights or obligations for the general public or civilian employers outside the claims context. However, where civilian exposure in work or household settings intersects with a claimant's relevant service, the factual content of those settings is relevant to establishing an exposure factor as defined.

Who decides and who pays. The instrument was made by the Repatriation Medical Authority (s 3). It does not itself state who pays benefits; it merely applies to claims under specified sections of the VEA and MRCA (s 4). Payment decisions and the identity of the payer remain matters within the statutory regimes of the VEA and MRCA and their implementing agencies, which are not named or defined in this instrument.

This Statement does not create free‑standing duties in the way primary legislation does, but it imposes practical evidentiary duties on claimants and procedural obligations on decisionmakers through its definitions and factor requirements. It simultaneously confers a right to rely on the Statement’s specified factors when pursuing a claim under the VEA or MRCA provisions cited in s 4.

Claimant evidentiary duties. A claimant seeking to establish that COVID‑19 or death from COVID‑19 is connected with their relevant service must establish, on the balance of probabilities, at least one of the factors listed in s 8 and that that factor is related to their relevant service (s 9(1)). The factors are: (1) being exposed to SARS‑CoV‑2 as specified within 14 days before clinical onset of COVID‑19 (s 8(1)); or (2) inability to obtain appropriate clinical management for COVID‑19 (s 8(2)). The Schedule clarifies what constitutes "being exposed to SARS‑CoV‑2 as specified" with five concrete modes of exposure (Schedule 1, cl 1). Thus a claimant bears the task of producing evidence that matches one of those modes and aligns it temporally to a clinical onset date.

Duty to relate factor to relevant service. Section 9(1) requires that any factor used to establish connection must be related to the relevant service rendered by the person. The Statement does not prescribe the form of proof. However, by requiring relation to relevant service it places on claimants the duty to adduce service records, movement logs, postings, orders, or other contemporaneous documentation that link the exposure or inability to obtain management to the period, location or circumstances of their relevant service.

Constraints on the clinical‑management factor. Section 9(2) narrows operation of the s 8(2) factor. It applies only to material contribution to, or aggravation of, COVID‑19 where the person’s disease was suffered or contracted before or during, but did not arise out of, the person's relevant service. In other words, inability to obtain appropriate clinical management will not be used to create a nexus where the COVID‑19 itself arose out of the relevant service; it is limited to cases of aggravation or material contribution when disease was pre‑existing or contracted before/during service but not caused by service. This imposes a situational constraint on when evidence of treatment access problems can be advanced as a basis for a finding.

Decisionmaker obligations. The Statement is made under statutory power, and its factors and definitions are intended to be applied by decisionmakers adjudicating claims under the identified statutory provisions (s 4). While the Statement itself does not outline decisionmaker procedures, its content forms an authoritative medical‑scientific framework that decisionmakers must use in assessing causation. That gives rise to an obligation on administrative decisionmakers to consider the specified exposure modes, the 14‑day temporal window, the definition of relevant service, and the limitation on the clinical‑management factor in reaching determinations.

Right to rely on other Statements. Section 10 creates a right for parties to have other, already‑determined Statements applied where a factor in this Statement refers to an injury or disease covered by another Statement of Principles. The cross‑reference makes the other Statement’s factors applicable "in accordance with the terms of that Statement as in force from time to time." That right affects both claimants and decisionmakers by permitting reliance on, and application of, the detailed criteria in specialized Statements where overlap occurs.

No penalties created. The instrument contains no penal sanctions or enforcement penalties. It operates in the administrative evidentiary space and confers and constrains rights in claims assessment rather than creating criminal offences or civil remedies within the Statement itself.

Standard of proof. The Statement defines the causal threshold directionally, asserting that on sound medical‑scientific evidence it is "more probable than not" that COVID‑19 can be related to relevant service (s 7). This embeds the balance of probabilities standard into the Statement as the baseline causation test to be operationalised alongside the factors it prescribes.

Definitions as rights/duties. The Schedule provides the operative definitions that both claimant and decisionmaker must apply. For example, "being exposed to SARS‑CoV‑2 as specified" is given five discrete elements (Schedule 1, cl 1), supplying the burden elements that a claimant must meet and requiring decisionmakers to treat those modes as authoritative for assessing exposure.

Procedural silence. The Statement is silent on administrative procedures for presenting evidence, timeframes for filing, or appeal processes. Those procedural duties and rights remain governed by the VEA, MRCA and their procedural rules, which are not altered by this Statement; the Statement supplies medical criteria to be used within existing claim procedures.

The instrument contains no express penal provisions, fines or imprisonment provisions. It is not drafted as a code of sanctions. The Statement is an administrative instrument that defines medical and exposure criteria for use in claims determinations and thereby shapes enforcement indirectly through claim outcomes rather than by prescribing punishments.

Enforcement by implication through claims decisions. The Statement’s enforcement effect is indirect. Where a claimant relies on this Statement in a claim under section 120B of the VEA or section 339 of the MRCA (s 4), a decisionmaker will apply the Statement’s factors and definitions in assessing causation. A finding that the factors specified by the Statement are present and related to relevant service will influence a decisionmaker’s conclusion about entitlement under the underlying statutory scheme. Conversely, failure to establish the Statement’s required factor(s) will be a grounds for rejecting a causation-based claim. Thus the Statement’s enforcement occurs through benefit acceptance or rejection under the VEA/MRCA claims machinery, not by immediate sanctioning embedded within the Statement itself.

Who enforces application of the Statement. The Repatriation Medical Authority made and sealed the Statement (s 3 and front matter). The Statement does not itself name the administrative body that gives effect to entitlements, but by virtue of s 4 it applies where the statutory claim provisions of the VEA and MRCA are engaged. Enforcement in the sense of adjudication and payment would therefore fall to the bodies and officers responsible for administering claims under those Acts. The Statement does not identify those offices or alter their statutory powers, it merely supplies medical criteria they must apply.

No criminal liability. Because the Statement is confined to medical definitions and evidentiary factors for claims, it does not create criminal liability for conduct such as exposure or failure to obtain treatment. Any criminal or regulatory liability for other conduct remains governed by other laws, which are not addressed or altered by this Statement.

Potential for administrative review and appeal. The instrument itself makes no provision about review rights or appeal mechanisms. Those are provided by the underlying claim statutes , the VEA and the MRCA , and relevant administrative or judicial review mechanisms which are not repeated or varied in this Statement. The Statement’s role in enforcement will therefore be susceptible to challenge only within the procedural and review architecture of the VEA and MRCA claims processes.

Evidential weight and dispute. In contested claims, parties may dispute whether the Statement’s factors are established. The Statement’s value in such disputes is procedural and evidentiary: it provides the elements decisionmakers must assess and, where a factor refers to an injury or disease covered by another Statement, it instructs that the other Statement apply in accordance with its terms (s 10). The Statement itself does not prescribe how disputes over facts or medical opinion are to be resolved; that remains within the adjudicative process applicable to the underlying claim.

No sanctions for misstatement in the Statement. The Repatriation Medical Authority makes the Statement "on the sound medical‑scientific evidence available" (s 7). The instrument includes no mechanism for penalising the Authority or any party if future evidence supersedes the medical view expressed. Any change in medical understanding would be addressed by subsequent determinations or revisions to Statements, not by penalties in this instrument.

The Statement is an instrument made under the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (s 3) and expressly applies to claims falling under specified provisions of that Act and the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004 (s 4). It is therefore an ancillary instrument designed to operate within the statutory frameworks of the VEA and MRCA. Its interaction with other laws is primarily by reference and incorporation rather than by amendment.

Primary statutory interaction. Section 3 states the instrument is made under subsection 196B(3) of the VEA. Section 4 states it applies to claims to which section 120B of the VEA or section 339 of the MRCA applies. The Statement thus functions as a medical‑scientific input into the statutory causation and entitlement processes established by those Acts. The Statement does not repeal or modify the operative provisions of the VEA or MRCA; rather it provides content that decisionmakers must use under those statutes.

Incorporation by reference to other Statements. Section 10 creates an express interaction with other Statements of Principles. If a factor in this Statement refers to an injury or disease that is already the subject of another Statement of Principles made under the same subsection 196B(3) of the VEA, then the factors in that other Statement apply "in accordance with the terms of that Statement as in force from time to time." This means the instrument can defer to or incorporate the operative content of other Statements, enabling cross‑application and avoiding duplication of technical standards where overlap exists.

Definitions and statutory terms. The Schedule defines "MRCA", "VEA" and "relevant service". These definitions bind the Statement’s operation to the statutory concepts used in the VEA and MRCA. For example, "relevant service" is limited to particular categories of VEA and MRCA service (Schedule 1, cl 1). Because those statutory terms are themselves defined in the VEA and MRCA, the Statement’s scope depends on the substantive definitions and categories in those primary statutes.

No amendment to primary law. The Statement does not amend the VEA or MRCA. It is an administrative medical instrument that sits under the statutory power granted by the VEA. Any changes to entitlements, remedies, penalties or administrative processes remain matters for the primary legislation and its authorised regulators. The Statement supplies medical criteria without altering legal entitlements or creating new statutory rights or offences beyond its function as an authoritative input to causation determinations.

Procedural law left intact. The instrument does not set or vary administrative procedures, appeal routes, time limits or evidence rules for claims. Those procedural aspects remain governed by the VEA and MRCA and their procedural instruments. The Statement therefore interacts with procedural law only insofar as decisionmakers will apply its factors when exercising their statutory functions under the primary Acts.

Potential overlaps with other injury/disease Statements. Because s 10 contemplates factors that "refer to an injury or disease in respect of which a Statement of Principles has been determined", there will be instances where this Statement and other Statements interact substantively. In those cases the pre‑existing or subsequently issued Statements will apply according to their own terms, creating a layered interaction among Statements. The Statement requires decisionmakers to apply those other Statements "as in force from time to time", so amendments to other Statements also alter the operative interaction.

International or public health law. The Statement’s definition of exposure includes "being in a country or an area of a country that is experiencing current SARS‑CoV‑2 transmission" (Schedule 1, cl 1). This imports a public‑health factual concept but does not itself create or modify public health law. The Statement relies on contemporaneous epidemiological facts for assessing exposure, but responsibility for public health measures and infectious disease law remains with the existing public health legislative framework, which the Statement neither cites nor amends.

No effect on criminal or workplace law. The instrument contains no provisions that alter criminal law, occupational health and safety law, or other regulatory law. Issues that arise under those bodies of law, such as employer obligations or quarantine orders, are not altered by this Statement; only the assessment of causation for VEA/MRCA claims is affected.

The instrument itself contains minimal internal history. It is identified as the Statement of Principles concerning coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‑19) (Balance of Probabilities) (No. 47 of 2020). The document is dated 12 June 2020 and the commencement clause states the instrument commences on 22 June 2020 (front matter; s 2). The Repatriation Medical Authority affixed the Common Seal, and the document bears the Chairperson’s signature on the front page, indicating formal adoption (front matter).

No subsequent amendments or revisions are recorded within the text supplied. The instrument includes a savings or updating mechanism by cross‑reference where it defers to other Statements "as in force from time to time" (s 10). That language permits inter‑instrument updates by reference, but it does not itself record any amendment events to this specific Statement.

What the instrument records about its creation and authority. Section 3 affirms that the instrument is made under subsection 196B(3) of the VEA. Section 7 states the Repatriation Medical Authority made the Statement "on the sound medical‑scientific evidence available" and that it is "of the view that it is more probable than not" that COVID‑19 and death from COVID‑19 can be related to relevant service. Those phrases document the evidentiary basis and the Authority's view underpinning the Statement at the time of its making.

Absence of amendment schedule. The text does not include an explicit review date, sunset clause, or staged amendment schedule. It also does not record prior versions of the Statement for comparison. The only temporal markers are the instrument number and dates referred to above.

Implication for those relying on the instrument. Because the Statement can be superseded or varied by later Statements or amendments made by the Repatriation Medical Authority under the same statutory power, users should check for any later Statements or revisions after the commencement date. The Statement itself, as provided, contains the authoritative wording as at 22 June 2020. Section 10’s "as in force from time to time" language explicitly anticipates that other Statements may be amended and that such amendments will be reflected when those other Statements are applied in conjunction with this one.

Internal revision mechanism not specified. The instrument gives no procedure for how or when it will be revisited by the Authority. The absence of an internal review timetable or automatic revision mechanism means that any updates will depend on subsequent determinations by the Authority under the enabling statutory head of power.

The instrument does not record any litigation history. It contains no citations to cases, no references to judicial determinations, and no annexed decisions or reasons that indicate legal challenge. The Statement is an administrative determination made under s 196B(3) of the VEA and the text supplied neither cites judicial authority nor asserts any outcome of litigation.

Implication of silence. The absence of litigation references in the instrument itself does not preclude subsequent litigation concerning its application in particular claims. The Statement supplies medical and exposure criteria that will be applied in administrative determinations, and those determinations may be subject to administrative review or judicial challenge under the procedural and review mechanisms embedded in the VEA, the MRCA, or other applicable administrative law. However, any such challenges are not recorded in this instrument.

No settled judicial interpretation in the text. Because the instrument contains no discussion of case law, there is no statutory or judicial gloss provided within the document on how to interpret ambiguous terms such as "clinical onset" or "inability to obtain appropriate clinical management." Any interpretive guidance would therefore arise from administrative practice or subsequent judicial decisions, neither of which are contained in this Statement.

Evidence‑based basis but not litigated rationale. Section 7 records that the Authority made the Statement "on the sound medical‑scientific evidence available" and that it is of the view that the relation to service is more probable than not. That statement establishes the Authority’s evidentiary posture but does not include, and the instrument does not append, the evidence or expert reports. Therefore in litigation over application of the Statement parties may need to engage evidence external to this instrument to litigate whether the Authority’s position is supported or to contest its application in a particular claimant’s circumstances.

No precedential weight set within the document. The Statement is an administrative instrument with force within the VEA/MRCA claims process as the Authority’s determination of medical factors. The document itself does not claim precedential status before courts. Whether and how courts treat such Statements when adjudicating appeals or judicial reviews will depend on the broader legal framework and any subsequent litigation, none of which is documented in the instrument.

Recommendation for practitioners. Given the instrument’s silence on litigation, practitioners who anticipate contesting its application should prepare to rely on medical evidence, service records and administrative law principles when litigating claims. The Statement’s definitions and factor structure will form part of the contested factual and legal landscape, but authoritative judicial interpretation is not provided by this instrument.

Several aspects of the Statement present interpretive or evidential pitfalls that practitioners and claimants must navigate carefully. The instrument’s brevity and reliance on defined terms shift the burden of clarity to evidence and argument. Below are concrete "gotchas" grounded in the text.

Clinical onset undefined. Section 8(1) requires exposure "within the 14 days before the clinical onset of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‑19)". The Statement does not define "clinical onset". That omission means parties will need to rely on clinical records and expert opinion to fix a date of clinical onset, and decisionmakers must determine the appropriate medical evidence that establishes that date. Disputes may arise between date of first symptoms, date of diagnosis, and date of laboratory confirmation. The Statement supplies a temporal rule but not the means of applying it in contested factual scenarios.

Broad exposure criterion. The Schedule’s definition of "being exposed to SARS‑CoV‑2 as specified" (Schedule 1, cl 1) contains wide modes of exposure, including being in a country or area experiencing current transmission (cl 1(a)) and being in the same household or immediate work or travel environment as an infected person (cl 1(b)). These are fact‑intensive, context dependent propositions. For example, "being in a country or an area of a country that is experiencing current SARS‑CoV‑2 transmission" potentially covers many service postings and risks drawing in claims where exposure is asserted by virtue of presence in such a jurisdiction without specific contact evidence. Establishing that presence and linking it temporally to the 14‑day window is necessary.

Ambiguity in "inability to obtain appropriate clinical management". Section 8(2) allows reliance on "inability to obtain appropriate clinical management for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‑19)". The Statement contains no definition of "appropriate clinical management", no threshold for what constitutes inability, and no specification of the causal link required between inability to obtain management and the relevant service. Section 9(2) constrains the application of s 8(2) to circumstances where disease was suffered or contracted before or during, but did not arise out of, relevant service, and only to material contribution or aggravation. Practitioners must therefore assemble evidence not only of lack of access to treatment but also of timing, pre‑existence or contraction prior to/during service, and medical proof of material contribution or aggravation by lack of treatment.

Narrow definition of relevant service. The Schedule defines "relevant service" in a way that excludes certain service categories: it includes eligible war service other than operational service, defence service other than hazardous service and British nuclear test defence service under the VEA, and peacetime service under the MRCA (Schedule 1, cl 1). This means that particular kinds of service are outside the Statement’s scope. A claimant whose service falls outside these categories may not be able to use this Statement to establish causation under the specified claim provisions.

Relation‑to‑service requirement. Section 9(1) requires that any factor in s 8 used to establish a connection must be "related to the relevant service rendered by the person." That language is broad but demands a factual link. Where exposure occurred in civilian life, or treatment was unavailable for reasons unrelated to service, claimants must show how those circumstances are related to their relevant service. The instrument does not specify the standard of "related to", so contestable inference and argument will be required in proof.

Cross‑reference complexity. Section 10 mandates that if a factor refers to an injury or disease covered by another Statement, the other Statement applies "in accordance with the terms of that Statement as in force from time to time". That creates multi‑instrument dependency risk. A factor in this Statement that invokes another Statement may import unfamiliar or stricter criteria, and amendments to either Statement will alter how the interaction operates. Practitioners must check the current text of both Statements, not rely on the text of this instrument alone.

Terminal event scope. Section 6(3) includes death from a terminal event that was contributed to by the person’s COVID‑19. The Schedule lists examples of terminal events such as pneumonia and respiratory failure (Schedule 1, cl 1). A claimant seeking to link COVID‑19 to death must therefore show that COVID‑19 contributed to an enumerated terminal event, which will require medical evidence on causation and contribution. The inclusion of "terminal event or condition" and the listed examples does not restrict other terminal events beyond the list, but the instrument provides the listed examples as indicative, thus medical proof of contribution will be central.

No process detail. The Statement supplies no procedural guidance on how claimants should present evidence, how decisionmakers should weigh competing medical opinions, or how disputes are to be resolved. Procedural choices will therefore fall to the administering statutory framework and normal administrative practice, which can create uncertainty for claimants.

Temporal limitation unknown. The instrument does not specify retrospective or prospective application boundaries beyond its commencement date. Practitioners should be alert to questions about whether claim events before the Statement’s commencement are caught; the Statement does not explicitly address that issue in the text supplied.

Evidence of "current transmission". The Schedule requires that an area be "experiencing current SARS‑CoV‑2 transmission" to count as exposure under cl 1(a). The Statement does not identify how "current transmission" is to be established or whose epidemiological assessments govern that determination. This creates a potential evidentiary debate about what sources or timeframes establish the "current" transmission status of a location.

For claimants, practitioners and decisionmakers working within the VEA or MRCA claims framework, compliance with this Statement requires targeted evidence gathering and alignment of factual proof to the Statement’s elements. Below are practicable steps grounded in the instrument’s text.

Identify the statutory claim trigger. Confirm that the claim is one "to which section 120B of the VEA or section 339 of the MRCA applies" (s 4). The Statement only applies in those claim contexts. If a claimant’s claim is pursued under different sections or outside the VEA/MRCA frameworks cited, the Statement will not govern causation for that claim.

Match to the determinative factor(s). The claimant must establish at least one factor in s 8 and that the factor is related to their relevant service (s 9(1)). Therefore identify whether the case will rely on s 8(1) , exposure within 14 days before clinical onset , or s 8(2) , inability to obtain appropriate clinical management. Where possible, plan to establish both the exposure factor and any clinical‑management issues as complementary lines of evidence.

Evidence for exposure (s 8(1) and Schedule). For an exposure‑based claim, collect contemporaneous evidence that satisfies one or more of the Schedule’s sub‑criteria for "being exposed to SARS‑CoV‑2 as specified" (Schedule 1, cl 1):

• Travel and posting records to show presence in a country or area with "current SARS‑CoV‑2 transmission" within the relevant period. Documentary proof such as movement orders, travel manifests, duty rosters and leave records will be material.
• Household and workplace records showing co‑habitation or shared immediate work or travel environment with an infected person, including rosters, accommodation allocations, witness statements, and any local testing data that establish infection in the contact.
• Evidence of direct contact with contaminated objects or substances, such as handling of contaminated equipment, laboratory records, or incident reports documenting exposure to contaminated surfaces or substances.
• Evidence of being within two metres of a person with SARS‑CoV‑2 infection, including witness statements, CCTV or location data if available, and contemporaneous incident records.
• Evidence that the claimant inhaled droplet nuclei or aerosols contaminated with SARS‑CoV‑2, which will ordinarily require medical expert evidence explaining the likely route of transmission given the circumstances.

All exposure evidence must be temporally linked to the 14‑day window before "clinical onset" (s 8(1)). Therefore medical records that fix the date of clinical onset are critical. Where diagnosis and symptom onset dates diverge, obtain GP and hospital notes, testing dates, and clinical histories to support an ascertainable onset date.

Evidence for inability to obtain treatment (s 8(2)). If relying on s 8(2), assemble records showing attempts to obtain "appropriate clinical management" and contemporaneous evidence of absence or denial of access. This may include hospital records, triage notes, referral denials, communications with military medical services or civilian healthcare providers, and contemporaneous statements about capacity constraints. Given s 9(2) limits the application of this factor to cases where disease was suffered or contracted before or during, but did not arise out of, relevant service, also gather evidence establishing that COVID‑19 pre‑existed or was contracted prior to or during service and that the failure to obtain management materially contributed to or aggravated the condition.

Link exposure/management to relevant service (s 9(1)). Produce service documentation that ties the exposure or the inability to obtain treatment to relevant service. This will include posting orders, movement orders, stationing records, duty rosters, and any military medical records reflecting the interplay between service and medical events. Where the exposure occurred in a civilian setting, explain and document how that exposure is nonetheless related to service through duties, location or travel arrangements.

Medical causation evidence. Obtain contemporaneous clinical records and expert medical reports that:

• Establish the date of clinical onset.
• Confirm diagnosis of COVID‑19 (e.g. laboratory confirmation if available).
• Explain the causal link between identified exposure and infection.
• For death claims, provide expert opinion linking COVID‑19 to terminal events listed in the Schedule (pneumonia, respiratory failure, etc) and explaining the contributory role of COVID‑19.
• Where inability to obtain management is alleged to have materially contributed or aggravated the condition, expert evidence should address the counterfactual: what would have occurred with timely and appropriate management, and how the absence of management changed the course of disease.

Address definitional and temporal uncertainties. Because the Statement does not define "clinical onset", "appropriate clinical management", or "current transmission" in operational terms, prepare to have experts define and justify the dates and medical thresholds used in the claim. Provide contemporaneous evidence wherever possible to reduce reliance on retrospective hearsay.

Consider other Statements of Principles. If any factor refers to a disease or injury covered by a different Statement, identify that other Statement and ensure compliance with its terms (s 10). Check the current text of any referenced Statements "as in force from time to time" because amendments to those Statements will affect how their factors apply.

Document the chain of causation for death claims. For claims involving death, ensure the medical evidence addresses whether COVID‑19 contributed to the listed terminal events and the extent of its contribution (s 6(3) and Schedule 1, cl 1). Death claims will require a clear proximate cause analysis from competent clinicians or pathologists.

Prepare for administrative adjudication and review. Because the Statement supplies an evidentiary framework within statutory claim processes, ensure that applications and submissions to decisionmakers clearly map the evidence to the Statement’s clauses (cite ss 6, 7, 8, 9 and Schedule), and preserve material for any review or appeal mechanisms that the primary statutes provide.

Keep records of contemporaneous actions during service. Because the Statement places emphasis on connection to relevant service, preserving contemporaneous records of postings, accommodation, transport, workplace interactions and medical consultations during the period of service will materially support claims. Where records are incomplete, obtain witness statements and affidavits that deal with the factual gaps, and have them corroborated where possible.

Monitor for updates. The Statement anticipates cross‑application of other Statements "as in force from time to time" (s 10). Practitioners should check for any later Statements or amendments by the Repatriation Medical Authority that might change definitions or factors relevant to COVID‑19 or related conditions.

Use precise legal mapping in submissions. When making submissions, explicitly cite the operative paragraphs relied on , for example s 8(1) together with the relevant subparagraph of Schedule 1, cl 1 that is said to be met , and explain how the evidence satisfies the statutory wording. For clinical management claims, explain compliance with the limitation in s 9(2) and the medical basis for material contribution or aggravation.

In sum, compliance requires focused evidence collection mapped precisely to this Statement’s language, contemporaneous and expert medical documentation that fixes onset and causation, and clear connection to the categories of relevant service identified in the Schedule.