Statement of Principles concerning chemical burn (Reasonable Hypothesis) (No. 3 of 2024)

The SoP is built around a small number of tightly specified legal-medical concepts. Those concepts structure how decision-makers will assess whether a reasonable hypothesis exists connecting a veteran’s chemical burn (or death from chemical burn) to relevant service.

Key defined and operational concepts in the instrument are:

• Chemical burn: The primary medical condition the SoP addresses. The statutory definition is in s 7(2) and repeated in the Schedule 1 dictionary. Chemical burn, for the instrument’s purposes, means injury to the skin and external body covering tissues due to external contact with chemical agents (s 7(2)(a)). The definition explicitly includes deep tissue and organ chemical burns only where they form part of a multiple chemical burn injury that includes skin/external tissue injury (s 7(2)(b)). The instrument excludes irritant contact dermatitis from the meaning of chemical burn (s 7(2)(c)). A note in s 7(2) observes that chemical burn may include systemic responses such as systemic inflammation and vascular shock; Schedule 1 provides the cross-reference to that chemical burn definition.
• Death from chemical burn: The SoP treats death that is contributed to by the person’s chemical burn as “death from chemical burn” for the purposes of the instrument (s 7(3)). The Schedule 1 definition of “terminal event” clarifies items that count as proximate or ultimate causes of death (pneumonia, respiratory failure, cardiac arrest, circulatory failure, cessation of brain function).
• Relevant service: The SoP only applies when the claim is one to which s 120A of the VEA or s 338 of the MRCA applies (s 5). The Schedule 1 dictionary defines “relevant service” as operational, peacekeeping, hazardous, British nuclear test defence service under the VEA, or warlike or non-warlike service under the MRCA (Schedule 1,Definitions). Section 10(1) requires any factor in s 9 to be related to the person’s relevant service.
• Reasonable hypothesis: The instrument is expressly drafted to identify the minimum factors required to raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting chemical burn or death from chemical burn to relevant service (s 9). Section 9 makes factual, temporally precise medical findings the gate for that threshold.
• The two threshold factors (s 9): The first factor (s 9(1)) requires contact with vesicant or corrosive chemicals sufficient to cause at least erythema at the affected area within the 48 hours before clinical onset. The second factor (s 9(2)) requires inability to obtain appropriate clinical management for chemical burn before the clinical worsening of the chemical burn. The instrument states that at least one of these factors must exist as a minimum before a reasonable hypothesis can be said to be raised (s 9 opening).
• Temporal and causal linkage constraints: Section 10(2) constrains application of the second factor,lack of appropriate clinical management,so it applies only to material contribution to, or aggravation of, chemical burn where that burn was suffered or contracted before or during, but did not arise out of, the person’s relevant service.

Other structural concepts include the cross-application rule in s 11, which requires that if a s 9 factor refers to an injury or disease covered by another SoP, then the other SoP’s factors apply as in force from time to time.

Note the instrument intentionally leaves certain technical terms (for example “vesicant”, “corrosive”, “erythema”, “clinical onset”, “clinical worsening”, and “appropriate clinical management”) undefined in the body or schedule. The schedule defines chemical burn, terminal event, VEA and MRCA and relevant service categories, but does not define all clinical or toxicological terms used in s 9. The presence or absence of definitions is likely to affect how decision-makers, clinicians, and experts operationalise the thresholds in s 9 and how they identify the elements required to raise a reasonable hypothesis.

This Statement of Principles affects persons making claims to which section 120A of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 or section 338 of the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004 applies (s 5). Those statutory cross-references limit the SoP’s application to claims under the statutory rehabilitation and entitlements frameworks for veterans and current/former members of the Forces as specified in Schedule 1’s definition of “relevant service” (Schedule 1,Definitions).

Parties directly affected include:

• Claimants (veterans, members of peacekeeping forces, and members of the Forces whose service meets one of the “relevant service” categories): To have a reasonable hypothesis connecting chemical burn or death from chemical burn to relevant service, the claimant’s case must show at least one of the factors in s 9 and that the factor is related to relevant service (s 9; s 10(1)). For claims involving death, the claimant must present evidence that the terminal event that caused death was contributed to by the chemical burn (s 7(3); Schedule 1 terminal event list).
• Medical experts and clinicians providing opinions for claim documentation: The SoP requires clinical detail the clinician will be asked to support , for example, the temporal relationship in s 9(1) (erythema within 48 hours before clinical onset) or evidence about inability to obtain appropriate clinical management that precedes clinical worsening (s 9(2)). Clinicians therefore must supply findings, time-marked observations, and opinions explaining causation or contribution to death to assist a decision-maker to apply the SoP.
• Decision-makers and case officers administering claims under s 120A VEA and s 338 MRCA: The SoP is an evidentiary instrument to be applied in adjudication. Decision-makers must test whether the elements in s 9 exist and are related to relevant service (s 10(1)). They must also apply s 11 where factors touch injuries or diseases covered by other SoPs.
• The Repatriation Medical Authority (RMA): The RMA is the author of the SoP; it records its view about the medical-scientific basis for the instrument in s 8. The RMA decides the form and content of the SoP under subsection 196B(2) of the VEA (s 3).
• Providers of medical records, service records, and death records: The instrument’s temporal and clinical linkages make contemporaneous clinical records, medical photographs, service logs, and death certification material more consequential when assembling evidence to meet the s 9 thresholds and the s 10(1) requirement.

Who does not fall within the instrument’s reach is also important. The instrument excludes “irritant contact dermatitis” from the meaning of chemical burn (s 7(2)(c)). The s 9(2) factor is expressly limited in application to burns “suffered or contracted before or during (but did not arise out of) the person’s relevant service” when the legal issue is material contribution to or aggravation (s 10(2)). The SoP does not itself award benefits and does not set out penalties or enforcement mechanisms (no penalty provisions are included).

Finally, the instrument references other SoPs: where a s 9 factor refers to an injury or disease that is the subject of another SoP determined under subsection 196B(2) of the VEA, the other SoP’s factors apply (s 11). That cross-reference can pull additional affected parties and additional evidentiary requirements into a particular claim if overlapping conditions are alleged.

The instrument is not a statute conferring administrative duties and rights in the style of primary legislation; rather, it functions as a medical-evidentiary standard that adjudicators and claimants must apply when testing whether a “reasonable hypothesis” connects chemical burn (or death from chemical burn) to relevant service. Nevertheless, the instrument creates specific operational duties for decision-makers and practical rights (or thresholds) for claimants.

Duties and obligations traceable to the SoP include:

• Duty to apply the SoP when relevant: The instrument applies to claims to which s 120A VEA or s 338 MRCA applies (s 5). Decision-makers administering those claim pathways have the duty to apply the SoP’s factors as part of determining whether a reasonable hypothesis is raised. The instrument itself is made pursuant to s 196B(2) of the VEA (s 3), which frames the RMA’s statutory function to determine SoPs.
• Duty to establish relation to relevant service: Any fact that meets a s 9 factor must be related to the person’s relevant service (s 10(1)). In practice, decision-makers must determine whether provided evidence shows the factor occurred in a context connected to relevant service, using service records or contemporaneous documentation.
• Duty to consider other SoPs where overlap occurs: Section 11 requires decision-makers to defer to the terms of other SoPs when a s 9 factor refers to an injury or disease covered by another SoP, and apply those other SoP factors “in accordance with the terms of that Statement of Principles as in force from time to time.” This imposes a duty to check for and correctly apply overlapping instruments.

Rights and thresholds for claimants include:

• Right to have a claim assessed against an explicit, enumerated evidentiary threshold for a reasonable hypothesis: Section 9 provides two concrete factual routes to raise the reasonable hypothesis threshold. A claimant can seek to meet either s 9(1) (exposure with erythema within 48 hours) or s 9(2) (inability to obtain appropriate clinical management before worsening), subject to s 10(1) and s 10(2).
• Right to have death considered as related to chemical burn if the terminal event was contributed to by the chemical burn: Section 7(3) links death from a terminal event or condition that was contributed to by the person’s chemical burn with the instrument’s scope. The Schedule 1 definition of “terminal event” lists examples that will be treated as proximate or ultimate causes of death for this purpose.

What the SoP does not impose, and what is worth noting as an absence:

• There are no penalty provisions in the instrument. The instrument does not itself sanction behaviour or create enforcement provisions. It is an evidentiary instrument for claim adjudication (see s 3 and s 5).
• The instrument does not attempt to define every technical term used. Terms such as “vesicant”, “corrosive”, “erythema”, “clinical onset”, and “appropriate clinical management” are used as operative elements of the s 9 test but are not defined in the SoP or its Schedule. This omission creates a zone in which medical or toxicological interpretation is required for application.
• The instrument does not create benefits; it provides a framework that must be applied to claims in order to test whether a reasonable hypothesis exists. Whether an entitlement is ultimately granted remains a matter for the statutory decision-making process under the VEA and MRCA, which the instrument informs.

Practical implication for practitioners and decision-makers: duties will centre on assembling, testing, and adjudicating factual proof on the narrow, defined pathways in s 9 and ensuring any factor found is related to relevant service (s 10). Rights for claimants are to have those factors considered and, where relevant, to have cross-application with any overlapping SoPs (s 11).

The Statement of Principles instrument itself contains no penalty clauses, fines, or criminal or civil sanctions. The instrument is a medical-evidentiary determination made by the Repatriation Medical Authority under subsection 196B(2) of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (s 3). Its role is to identify the medical-scientific factors that must exist before a “reasonable hypothesis” may be said to link chemical burn (or death from chemical burn) to relevant service. It therefore functions as a rule for evidentiary assessment within the larger statutory frameworks of the VEA and MRCA, rather than as an instrument that imposes compliance obligations enforceable by penalties.

Enforcement in practical terms occurs through administrative decision-making processes under the VEA and MRCA. The SoP applies to claims to which section 120A of the VEA or section 338 of the MRCA applies (s 5). Application of the SoP will influence whether a decision-maker considers that the “reasonable hypothesis” threshold is met. The statutory process that actually grants or refuses entitlements, or provides rehabilitation or compensation, is governed by the primary legislation and its decision-making procedures (those statutory provisions are referenced in s 5, but the SoP does not itself set out those procedures or penalties).

Where disputes arise about whether the SoP has been correctly applied, remedies and administrative review mechanisms will be those provided under the VEA and MRCA or by the relevant review bodies and courts; the instrument does not itself specify the mode of review. The SoP does not set evidential burdens beyond stating the minimum factors required to raise a reasonable hypothesis (s 9). It does not specify the standard of proof beyond the language “reasonable hypothesis” used in the title and in s 9; the instrument defines factual elements that decision-makers must look for before concluding the reasonable hypothesis threshold is raised.

In short, the instrument imposes no direct penalties and provides no enforcement apparatus. Its enforcement-effect is indirect and operational: it does so by shaping the factual and medical criteria that decision-makers must apply when determining claims under the VEA and MRCA (s 5). Because the instrument leaves technical terms undefined (for example, “vesicant”, “corrosive”, “erythema”, and “appropriate clinical management”), contestation over interpretation is a plausible route to disputes and administrative review, but the instrument itself does not set out procedures for resolving such disputes.

The SoP is expressly an instrument made under subsection 196B(2) of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (s 3). It applies to claims to which section 120A of the VEA or section 338 of the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004 applies (s 5). The instrument therefore functions as a subordinate, evidentiary instrument within the statutory frameworks of the VEA and the MRCA.

Specific interactions and cross-references in the instrument itself:

• Application to statutory claim pathways: Section 5 expressly states that the SoP applies to claims to which s 120A VEA or s 338 MRCA applies. That means the SoP’s factors are intended to be used when testing whether a reasonable hypothesis exists as part of those statutory adjudication processes. The SoP accordingly interacts with the operative procedural and entitlement provisions of the VEA and MRCA, though the text of the SoP does not replicate or restate those primary provisions.
• Relationship to other Statements of Principles: Section 11 sets out an internal cross-instrument interaction rule. If a factor in s 9 refers to an injury or disease covered by another SoP determined under subsection 196B(2) of the VEA, then the factors in that other SoP apply according to their terms as in force from time to time. This creates an interactional hierarchy where overlapping medical conditions are to be adjudicated using the pertinent SoPs in combination, with the decision-maker obliged to follow the other SoP’s factors where relevant. Practically, this means that a claim involving chemical burn plus another condition (for example, a systemic disease covered by another SoP) must be analysed with reference to both instruments.
• Repeal and succession: The instrument expressly repeals the Statement of Principles concerning external burn No. 110 of 2015 (s 4). That repeal means that, as from commencement (s 2), the prior instrument is no longer in force and is replaced in this area by the new SoP. Practitioners therefore must ensure they are applying the current SoP (No. 3 of 2024) where relevant, and not relying on No. 110 of 2015.
• Definitions and statutory terms: Schedule 1 defines MRCA, VEA and “relevant service” in terms that bring into scope specific service categories under the VEA and MRCA (Schedule 1,Definitions). Because the SoP applies by reference to relevant service, it interacts with the substantive definitions of service in both Acts. Where the application of “relevant service” in a particular claim is contested, the decision-maker must reconcile the SoP’s requirement that a factor be related to relevant service with the primary legislation’s definitions and thresholds for service categories.
• Interaction with death certification and cause-of-death frameworks: The SoP treats death from chemical burn as including death from a terminal event or condition contributed to by chemical burn (s 7(3)). The Schedule 1 definition of terminal event lists specific proximate or ultimate causes of death (pneumonia, respiratory failure, cardiac arrest, circulatory failure, cessation of brain function). Any claim involving death will require interaction with death certification, coronial material or other statutory cause-of-death evidence to show that the terminal event was contributed to by the chemical burn.

What the SoP does not do in relation to other laws:

• It does not amend or displace the substantive entitlement, review or appeal mechanisms provided in the VEA or MRCA. It is an instrument for medical linkage, not a code of procedure or substantive entitlement.
• It does not prescribe how tribunals or courts should interpret undefined clinical terms; decisions about interpretation will be made in individual claims and, where contested, through the statutory review mechanisms of the VEA and MRCA pathways.

In summary, the SoP is a subordinate instrument that interfaces with the primary statutory schemes by defining the medical-factual gates for raising a reasonable hypothesis connecting chemical burn or death from chemical burn to relevant service (s 5, s 8, s 11). It cross-refers to other SoPs where overlap exists and replaces the 2015 external burn SoP (s 4). Any interaction beyond these provisions , such as how to resolve disputes about the meaning of clinical terms , falls to the primary decision processes under VEA and MRCA and the available review or appeal channels, none of which are detailed in the instrument.

This SoP is dated 22 December 2023 and labelled as Statement of Principles concerning chemical burn (Reasonable Hypothesis) (No. 3 of 2024). It commences on 22 January 2024 (s 1; s 2; instrument header). The instrument was executed with the common seal of the Repatriation Medical Authority at the direction of Professor Terence Campbell AM, Chairperson, as shown in the formal attestation on the instrument.

The instrument expressly repeals the prior Statement of Principles concerning external burn No. 110 of 2015 (Federal Register of Legislation No. F2015L01330), which had been made under subsections 196B(2) and (8) of the VEA (s 4). The repeal is direct and unqualified in the instrument. The replacement SoP therefore stands as the operative SoP for chemical burn issues from commencement onward.

The text records no other amendments, transitional provisions, or savings clauses beyond the repeal. It does not include a scheduled transitional scheme for claims in progress; it is silent on whether, and to what extent, claims lodged prior to commencement are to be assessed under the old SoP or the new one. Practitioners will need to draw on the operative administrative practice of the department handling VEA and MRCA claims to determine how claims-in-progress are treated at the point of commencement, since this instrument contains no express transitional direction.

Schedule 1 (Definitions) accompanies the main instrument text. The Schedule sets out the instrumental definitions used in the SoP, including chemical burn (cross-reference to s 7(2)), MRCA, relevant service categories, terminal event examples, and VEA. The presence of that schedule is integral to the SoP and is part of the instrument’s operative content; any amendment altering definitions in Schedule 1 would materially affect interpretation of the thresholds in s 9 and the scope in s 7.

No subsequent amendments or variations are recorded in the instrument text supplied. Any future amendments would need to be made by the Repatriation Medical Authority under the enabling provision, subsection 196B(2) of the VEA (s 3), and published in the Federal Register of Legislation in the manner required by the relevant administrative process. Practitioners should monitor the RMA’s instruments and the Federal Register for any updates or replacement SoPs that modify the definitions, factors, or cross-application rules.

The instrument text itself records no litigation history. It is a fresh Statement of Principles (No. 3 of 2024) that replaces the Statement concerning external burn No. 110 of 2015 (s 4). The SoP includes no references to case law, judicial determinations, or tribunal decisions, and the instrument does not summarise any prior appeals or litigation regarding its content.

That absence of recorded litigation in the instrument does not eliminate the possibility of future disputes. The SoP contains precise but partly technical thresholds that require factual and medical interpretation , for example, the need to establish exposure to “vesicant or corrosive chemicals sufficient to cause at least erythema … within the 48 hours before the clinical onset” (s 9(1)) and the alternative threshold of “inability to obtain appropriate clinical management … before the clinical worsening” (s 9(2)). The instrument does not define several key technical terms used in those thresholds, such as “vesicant”, “corrosive”, “erythema”, “clinical onset”, “clinical worsening”, and “appropriate clinical management” (see s 9 and Schedule 1 which defines chemical burn, terminal event and relevant service but not those clinical terms).

Ambiguity in technical terms is a common source of contestation in decisions that rely on expert medical opinion. Potential loci of dispute likely to give rise to litigation or merits review include:

• Whether the claimant did, in fact, have contact with a vesicant or corrosive substance that was sufficient to cause erythema within the 48-hour window specified (s 9(1)). This will require medical and toxicological evidence, and challenges can arise about how to interpret contemporaneous clinical notes, photographs, or expert reports that bear on timing and causation.
• What constitutes “appropriate clinical management” and whether the claimant was “unable to obtain” it before any “clinical worsening” (s 9(2)). Disputes may examine local availability of services, timeliness of presentation, and what standard of care is invoked by the term “appropriate”.
• How the requirement that any factor must be “related to the relevant service rendered by the person” is to be satisfied for particular factual matrices (s 10(1)). Litigated cases could examine how service records, situational reports or witness statements are weighed in relation to medical evidence.
• The application of s 10(2), which constrains the application of s 9(2) to cases where the chemical burn was suffered or contracted before or during, but did not arise out of, the person’s relevant service. This complex drafting will require interpretation in claims involving pre-existing conditions, service-era exposures, and competing cause narratives.

Where such disputes arise, the resolution mechanisms will be those provided by the VEA and MRCA frameworks and the ordinary administrative review and judicial review processes. The SoP itself neither prescribes those dispute resolution routes nor records relevant precedents.

Practitioners should therefore expect the possibility of merits review or judicial review where application of the SoP turns on technical medical or factual issues. The absence of immediate litigation history in the instrument is therefore a statement of present fact in the text supplied, not a guarantee of future litigation-free application.

This SoP contains a number of specific textual features that create practical pitfalls for claimants, clinicians, and decision-makers. These are not policy judgments; they are concrete interpretive and evidential risks that flow directly from the instrument’s wording and structure.

1. Two alternative, narrowly worded threshold factors (s 9)

   • The instrument requires at least one of the two factors in s 9 to exist before a reasonable hypothesis is raised. The first factor requires contact with vesicant or corrosive chemicals sufficient to cause at least erythema within 48 hours before clinical onset (s 9(1)). The second factor is inability to obtain appropriate clinical management before clinical worsening (s 9(2)). Either pathway must be met; failure to establish either narrows the claimant’s ability to show the reasonable hypothesis.
   • The first factor’s temporal precision (48 hours before clinical onset) is a tight evidentiary window that will often be difficult to meet if documentation is sparse or delayed. The instrument’s reliance on erythema as a minimally required clinical sign creates a specific clinical evidentiary demand.

2. Key clinical terms are not defined

   • Terms that are operative to the thresholds , “vesicant”, “corrosive”, “erythema”, “clinical onset”, “clinical worsening”, and “appropriate clinical management” , are not defined in the SoP or the Schedule (see s 9 and Schedule 1). This absence creates interpretive discretion for clinicians and decision-makers and increases the likelihood that expert opinion will be required. The burden on claimants to obtain such expert evidence may be significant.

3. Exclusion of irritant contact dermatitis (s 7(2)(c))

   • The instrument expressly excludes irritant contact dermatitis from the definition of chemical burn. Claims rooted in skin reactions that are categorised as irritant contact dermatitis will fall outside the SoP’s application and therefore cannot rely on its two-factor pathways. Practitioners must be careful to ensure diagnoses are consistent with the SoP definition if they intend to use it.

4. The second factor is tightly constrained by service timing (s 10(2))

   • Section 10(2) states that the factor in s 9(2) applies only to material contribution to, or aggravation of, chemical burn where the burn was suffered or contracted before or during, but did not arise out of, the person’s relevant service. This drafting produces a specific and potentially counterintuitive limitation: inability to obtain appropriate clinical management is a route to show material contribution or aggravation only where the burn pre-existed or was contracted during service but was not an event that arose out of the service. Cases where the burn clearly “arose out of” service may not be able to rely on s 9(2) for material contribution/aggravation. Practitioners must map the chronology and causal origin of the burn precisely when advancing s 9(2).

5. Death claims require showing contribution to a terminal event (s 7(3) and Schedule 1)

   • For death to count as “death from chemical burn” under the SoP, the person’s chemical burn must have contributed to a terminal event or condition (s 7(3)). The Schedule 1 list of terminal events (pneumonia, respiratory failure, cardiac arrest, circulatory failure, cessation of brain function) is illustrative and will require medical opinion linking the burn to those proximate causes. Death certificates and medical records must be marshalled to show contribution, not just temporal proximity.

6. Repeal of the 2015 external burn Statement (s 4)

   • The prior external burn SoP No. 110 of 2015 is repealed. Practitioners who have relied on the older instrument must ensure current claims are assessed against this instrument instead. The instrument does not articulate transitional arrangements for claims in progress; administrative practice will determine how replacement affects pending matters.

7. Cross-application with other SoPs (s 11)

   • If a s 9 factor refers to an injury or disease covered by another SoP, the other SoP’s factors apply “in accordance with the terms of that Statement of Principles as in force from time to time” (s 11). Practitioners must check for overlap with other SoPs and ensure that evidence addresses each instrument’s requirements. Failure to do so can leave gaps in a claim’s evidence.

8. No penalties or procedural guidance included

   • The instrument does not set out procedures for challenging interpretations, nor does it provide guidance as to evidentiary standards beyond describing the two factors. It does not specify how gaps in documentation should be resolved. Those procedural matters will be addressed under the primary statutes and administrative practice rather than within the SoP itself.

9. Burden of proof and evidence assembly

   • While the SoP does not prescribe burdens or standards beyond the “reasonable hypothesis” language and the enumerated factors, the specificity of the factors implies a need for precise clinical and service evidence. The need for specific temporal markers, service relation proof (s 10(1)), and possible expert opinion creates a practical evidentiary burden for claimants.

In summary, the “gotchas” are concrete consequences of the SoP’s precise wording: narrow, temporally specific medical thresholds; undefined technical terms that invite expert interpretation; a restricted application of the second factor tied to the timing and causal origin of the burn; exclusion of irritant contact dermatitis; and the repeal of the previous external burn SoP without transitional text. Practitioners should plan evidence collection and expert instruction with those textual constraints in mind.

Complying with the SoP for a claim that alleges chemical burn, or death from chemical burn, requires organising evidence that maps directly to the instrument’s operative factors and to the requirement that any factor be related to relevant service (s 9; s 10(1)). The SoP presents two alternative factual pathways; ensuring compliance means preparing evidence that supports one or both pathways and, where relevant, showing the connection to relevant service as defined in Schedule 1.

Practical steps, grounded in the SoP’s text:

1. Identify the route under s 9 you will pursue

   • If relying on s 9(1), assemble evidence demonstrating contact with a vesicant or corrosive chemical that was sufficient to cause at least erythema in the affected area within 48 hours before clinical onset. That evidence should include contemporaneous clinical notes, photographs of the injury with date stamps where available, triage or emergency department records, and an expert report that links exposure to the clinical sign of erythema and confirms the 48‑hour temporal relationship. The SoP’s requirement is precise: erythema within 48 hours before the clinical onset is the minimum showing required under s 9(1).
   • If relying on s 9(2), assemble evidence demonstrating inability to obtain appropriate clinical management before clinical worsening of the chemical burn. Evidence here includes contemporaneous medical records showing presentation dates, records of referrals or denials, witness statements about inability to access care, correspondence about unavailability of treatment, and expert opinion explaining how lack of timely treatment materially contributed to worsening. Be aware that s 10(2) constrains this factor to burns that were suffered or contracted before or during, but did not arise out of, relevant service. You must therefore document the timing and the causal origin of the burn carefully.

2. Demonstrate relation to relevant service (s 10(1))

   • The SoP requires that any s 9 factor be related to the person’s relevant service. Collect and provide service records, unit logs, incident reports, operational reports, and witness statements that situate the exposure or the inability to obtain treatment within the context of the relevant service category as defined in Schedule 1 (operational, peacekeeping, hazardous, British nuclear test defence service under the VEA, or warlike or non-warlike service under the MRCA). Ensure dates, locations and descriptions are consistent between medical and service records to show relation to relevant service.

3. For death claims, document contribution to a terminal event (s 7(3))

   • Where the claim concerns death from chemical burn, obtain cause of death documents, hospital records, coronial findings where relevant, and expert opinion that explains how the chemical burn contributed to the terminal event listed in Schedule 1 (pneumonia, respiratory failure, cardiac arrest, circulatory failure, cessation of brain function). The SoP requires that the death be from a terminal event that was contributed to by the person’s chemical burn.

4. Address exclusions and overlaps

   • The SoP excludes irritant contact dermatitis (s 7(2)(c)). If the diagnosis is in doubt, procure a specialist dermatological or toxicological opinion clarifying why the presentation meets the SoP’s definition of chemical burn rather than irritant contact dermatitis.
   • Check for other SoPs that may be relevant under s 11. If a s 9 factor refers to an injury or disease covered by another SoP, ensure evidence satisfies the other SoP’s factors as well. Locate the current version of any referenced SoP “as in force from time to time” and ensure evidence addresses its requirements.

5. Anticipate and manage undefined terms

   • Because terms such as “vesicant”, “corrosive”, “erythema”, “clinical onset”, “clinical worsening”, and “appropriate clinical management” are not defined in the instrument, anticipate that decision-makers will look to expert clinical and toxicological evidence to interpret them. Obtain expert reports that (a) identify the chemical agent involved and its classification (vesicant/corrosive), (b) describe the expected clinical course and signs such as erythema and timing in relation to exposure, and (c) opine on what would have constituted appropriate clinical management in the relevant setting and whether inability to obtain it could reasonably be said to have caused clinical worsening.

6. Time-stamp, document and corroborate

   • Because the SoP contains several narrow temporal requirements (the 48-hour window in s 9(1); the requirement that inability to obtain appropriate treatment precede clinical worsening in s 9(2); the timing restrictions in s 10(2)), preserve and submit time-stamped evidence such as medical registration times, admission notes, date-stamped images, and service logs. Corroborative witness statements from unit members, medics, or civilian healthcare providers can be important to establish timelines and service relation.

7. Plan expert instructions carefully

   • Experts should be instructed to address the SoP’s specific phrases. For example, when preparing evidence for s 9(1), ask the expert to express an opinion about whether the exposure was to a vesicant or corrosive agent, whether the exposure was sufficient to cause erythema, and whether erythema occurred within 48 hours of clinical onset. When relying on s 9(2), instruct experts to describe the standard of appropriate clinical management in the geographic and temporal context of the claim and to state whether inability to obtain such management materially contributed to any clinical worsening.

8. Cross-check the repeal and current SoP status

   • The prior external burn SoP No. 110 of 2015 has been repealed (s 4). Ensure all claim preparation references the current SoP (No. 3 of 2024) and make sure historical evidence is framed to meet the requirements of the new instrument, not the repealed one.

9. Prepare for cross-application issues under s 11

   • Identify whether any alleged factor implicates another SoP. If so, obtain the current version of that SoP and ensure the evidence package addresses both instruments’ factors.

10. Record clinician and service inquiries contemporaneously

• Requests to health services, evidence of failed attempts to obtain care, and contemporaneous communications with unit medical officers or health facilities should be preserved. The SoP’s second factor specifically requires evidence of inability to obtain appropriate clinical management before clinical worsening (s 9(2)). Such contemporaneous evidence will be central to meeting that pathway.

In sum, compliance is a matter of precise evidence-mapping to the SoP’s two alternative factors and to the requirement of relation to relevant service. The SoP prescribes the form of the medical linkage that decision-makers must find; compliance therefore requires assembling medical records, service documentation, eyewitness evidence and targeted expert opinion that speak directly to the SoP’s phrasing and timing constraints.