Statement of Principles concerning animal envenomation (Reasonable Hypothesis) (No. 1 of 2026)

This instrument is a Statement of Principles about animal envenomation made by the Repatriation Medical Authority (RMA) under subsection 196B(2) of the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (the VEA) (Authority, s3). It comes into force on 19 January 2026 (Commencement, s2). The instrument repeals the earlier Statement of Principles concerning animal envenomation (No. 81 of 2016) (Repeal, s4). It applies specifically to a claim to which section 120A of the VEA or section 338 of the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004 (MRCA) applies (Application, s5).

Mechanically, the instrument does three things:

• Defines the medical concept it covers, "animal envenomation", and includes death from a terminal event or condition contributed to by animal envenomation (Kind of injury, disease or death, s7(1)-(3)). The Schedule 1 dictionary expands key terms such as "venomous animal", "terminal event", "relevant service", "VEA" and "MRCA" (Schedule 1 , Dictionary, Definitions).
• Sets the evidentiary factors which must exist, at a minimum, before a "reasonable hypothesis" can be said to link animal envenomation (or death from it) with a person’s relevant service. At least one of the specified factors in section 9 must be present (Factors that must exist, s9).
• States how those factors relate to relevant service and how cross-references to other Statements of Principles operate (Relationship to service, s10; Factors referring to another Statement of Principles, s11).

The RMA records its view that there is sound medical-scientific evidence indicating envenomation and death from envenomation can be related to relevant service (Basis for determining the factors, s8). The factors are concrete and time-bound: internal absorption by bite/sting/injection within three days before clinical onset (s9(1)), external contact from spitting/spraying by a snake or scorpion at time of clinical onset (s9(2)), internal absorption from a tick of family Ixodidae within 12 days before clinical onset (s9(3)), and inability to obtain appropriate clinical management before clinical worsening (s9(4)). The Schedule explicitly lists the kinds of organisms treated as venomous animals and excludes animals whose toxicity arises only via ingestion of tissue-borne toxins (Schedule 1, venomous animal definition). The Statement is therefore a medical-criteria instrument intended to guide compensation eligibility assessments under the VEA/MRCA framework.

This instrument rests on a small set of interlocking legal-medical concepts, each defined or operationalised in the text.

• Statement of Principles: the RMA, under s196B(2) VEA, issues statements setting the conditions under which a medical condition may be related to service. This instrument is one such Statement concerning animal envenomation (Authority, s3). The RMA states the scientific basis for its determinations (s8).

• Animal envenomation: defined as experiencing the toxic or hypersensitivity effects of contact with animal venom (Kind of injury, disease or death, s7(2)(1)). The instrument notes that animal envenomation corresponds to particular ICD-10-AM codes, but clarifies that for the purposes of this Statement the statutory definition in s7(2) controls (s7(2)(2)-(3)). This ties a clinical syndrome to the legal test.

• Death from animal envenomation: the definition extends to deaths from a terminal event or condition that the envenomation contributed to (s7(3)). "Terminal event" is defined in the Schedule (Schedule 1, terminal event) and includes pneumonia, respiratory failure, cardiac arrest, circulatory failure and cessation of brain function.

• Venomous animal: the Schedule provides an enumerated, non-exhaustive list of animal groups and examples (annelids, arachnids, centipedes, cnidarians, echinoderms, fish, frogs, insects, mammals, molluscs, reptiles) and expressly excludes animals whose toxins are only tissue-borne and act after ingestion (Schedule 1, venomous animal). That delineation affects what exposures count under the Statement.

• Relevant service: the instrument applies to service as defined in the Schedule , operational, peacekeeping, hazardous, British nuclear test defence service under the VEA, and warlike and non-warlike service under the MRCA (Schedule 1, relevant service). The Statement therefore operates only in the statutory veterans/servicemember compensation context (Application, s5).

• Factors and timing windows: section 9 lists four alternative factors, each with temporal or clinical thresholds: internal absorption from bite/sting/injection within three days before clinical onset (s9(1)); external spitting/spraying contact from snake or scorpion at time of clinical onset (s9(2)); internal absorption from an Ixodidae tick within 12 days before clinical onset (s9(3)); inability to obtain appropriate clinical management before clinical worsening (s9(4)). Section 10 requires any such factor to be related to the person’s relevant service.

The Statement applies to claims that fall within the statutory framework set out in the VEA and MRCA. The immediate legal effect is on claimants and decision-makers in the veterans’ compensation system.

• Claimants: the instrument applies to any person making a claim to which section 120A of the VEA or section 338 of the MRCA applies (Application, s5). Those provisions govern the statutory threshold of whether a condition is related to service; by cross-reference the Statement therefore affects veterans, members of Peacekeeping Forces, and members of the Forces covered by the MRCA, provided they rendered the kinds of "relevant service" listed in Schedule 1 (relevant service). The Schedule identifies the categories of relevant service: operational service, peacekeeping service, hazardous service, British nuclear test defence service (under the VEA), and warlike and non-warlike service under the MRCA (Schedule 1, relevant service).

• Decision-makers and administrators: although the instrument itself does not set compensatory payments, it prescribes the evidentiary factors the RMA views as necessary to raise a reasonable hypothesis linking animal envenomation to relevant service (s8-s9). Those factors will be used by administrative decision-makers when assessing claims under the referenced statutory provisions, because the Statement is made pursuant to s196B(2) of the VEA (Authority, s3). The RMA's view that "sound medical-scientific evidence" supports a service connection is recorded in s8. Administrative personnel will therefore treat the listed factors and their temporal thresholds as the RMA’s medically-grounded guidance when applying the statutory test.

• Medical practitioners and experts: clinicians providing evidence or opinions for claimants will need to align their reports with the timing and mechanism concepts the Statement sets out (e.g. demonstrating internal absorption within three days, identifying Ixodidae ticks within 12 days, documenting inability to obtain appropriate clinical management before clinical worsening) (s9). The Schedule’s list of venomous animals also informs species identification and exposure evidence.

• Record-keepers and service authorities: because the Statement requires a nexus between a listed factor and the person's relevant service (Relationship to service, s10(1)), service records, duty logs, location reports and contemporaneous medical records will be potentially material. Evidence that an exposure occurred while on relevant service, or that inability to access care was caused by circumstances of service, is therefore consequential.

The instrument itself imposes no new criminal offences or statutory duties on private parties; instead it prescribes evidential criteria to be applied in the assessment of claims. The primary operative duties and rights arise indirectly through their effect on claims adjudication under the VEA and MRCA.

• RMA’s duty to state principles: the RMA exercised its function under s196B(2) VEA to determine this Statement and record the medical basis for its factors (Authority, s3; Basis for determining the factors, s8). That is an administrative act producing evidence-guidance for decision-makers.

• Claimant’s right to have a claim assessed against these factors: because the Statement applies to claims under the specified statutory sections (Application, s5), a person lodging such a claim has the right to have assessors consider whether one or more of the factors in section 9 exist and whether those factors are related to relevant service (Factors that must exist, s9; Relationship to service, s10). The Statement thus shapes the statutory test rather than creating freestanding entitlements.

• Record and evidentiary obligations of claimants: although the Statement does not create explicit documentary obligations, the factors it prescribes create de facto evidentiary duties. To raise the required reasonable hypothesis a claimant will need to adduce evidence that one or more of the timing/mechanism factors exist (e.g. evidence of bite/sting/injection and timing relative to clinical onset, identification of a tick of family Ixodidae or evidence of contact with spitting/spraying snake/scorpion, or documentation of inability to obtain appropriate clinical management before clinical worsening) (s9). For deaths, medical evidence linking a terminal event listed in the Schedule and showing the envenomation contributed will be needed to bring death within the Statement (Kind of injury, disease or death, s7(3); Schedule 1, terminal event).

• Duty to relate factors to service: the Statement expressly requires that any factor relied on be related to the person’s relevant service (Relationship to service, s10(1)). This means that the claimant must show a nexus between the exposure or inability to obtain treatment and the relevant service circumstances (for example, location, timing and service activities).

• Interaction rights when another Statement applies: where a section 9 factor refers to an injury/disease already covered by another Statement of Principles under s196B(2), the claimant and decision-maker must apply that other Statement’s factors according to its terms (s11). This provides an administrative right to have the appropriate Statement applied when conditions overlap.

The Statement of Principles is not a punitive instrument and contains no penalty provisions. It is an evidentiary and medical-assessment instrument intended to be used in administrative decision-making under the VEA and MRCA. The instrument:

• Contains no offence provisions: the text does not create criminal or civil penalties for any private conduct. It sets out medical factors and definitions, not enforcement mechanisms.

• Does not grant enforcement powers: the RMA's act is to determine the Statement under s196B(2) (Authority, s3). The instrument does not confer investigatory, sanctioning or enforcement powers on the RMA or any other body. Enforcement of statutory obligations, or imposition of penalties for false statements in claims, would be governed by the VEA/MRCA and associated administrative rules, which are outside this instrument's text.

• Relies on administrative adjudication: the Statement’s practical force derives from its use by decision-makers charged with assessing claims under section 120A of the VEA or section 338 of the MRCA (Application, s5). Any consequences for claim outcomes arise through administrative findings (acceptance, rejection, liability for service connection) rather than through penalties embedded in this Statement.

• Repeal has no specified enforcement consequences: the repeal of the 2016 Statement (s4) is a legal update; the instrument does not specify retrospective enforcement or transitional penalty regimes connected to the repeal itself.

Accordingly, the instrument functions as a medical-legal guideline to be applied in adjudicative settings; any enforcement or penalties relevant to claims will be those established in the VEA, the MRCA or other applicable legislation, not in this Statement.

The instrument is explicitly made under and linked to the framework of the VEA and the MRCA. Its legal role is to supply medical criteria for the statutory reasonable hypothesis test; the interaction points in the instrument are the primary guides to how it integrates with other laws.

• Enabling provision: the Authority clause records that the Statement is made under subsection 196B(2) of the VEA (Authority, s3). That statutory provision empowers the RMA to determine Statements of Principles about the relationship between conditions and service. As such, the Statement is not standalone law but a statutory instrument intended to be applied under the VEA and MRCA claims processes.

• Application to statutory claim provisions: the instrument applies to claims to which section 120A of the VEA or section 338 of the MRCA applies (Application, s5). That creates a direct operational link: decision-makers applying those statutory provisions will use this Statement to evaluate whether a reasonable hypothesis exists that envenomation is related to a person’s relevant service.

• Repeal of prior Statement: the instrument expressly repeals the 2016 Statement of Principles concerning animal envenomation (s4). Where claim adjudication previously relied on the 2016 Statement, it now must proceed under the 2026 instrument. The text does not specify transitional arrangements; therefore relevant administrative rules or decision-makers will need to address whether and how earlier claims are affected.

• Cross-references to other Statements of Principles: section 11 provides a mechanism for interaction where a section 9 factor refers to an injury or disease already covered by another Statement determined under s196B(2) of the VEA. In such cases, the factors in the other Statement apply in accordance with its terms (s11). This creates an explicit hierarchy or routing rule where conditions overlap across Statements.

• Relationship to ICD-10-AM codes: the Statement notes that animal envenomation attracts certain ICD-10-AM codes (T63, X20-X27, and X29, excluding specified and unspecified plants in X26 and X29), but clarifies that for application of the Statement the statutory definition governs (s7(2)-(3)). This ties clinical coding systems used in health records to the legal definition but leaves the statutory text as controlling.

• Limits vis-à-vis consumer/tort law or general criminal law: the Statement does not purport to displace or alter the operation of other legal fields such as tort, occupational safety, or criminal law. Its function is narrow: to define the medical link for claims under the veteran compensation statutes. Any liability under other legal regimes would have to be assessed separately.

This Statement is a fresh instrument dated 19 December 2025 and commences on 19 January 2026 (Authority, s3; Commencement, s2). The only amendment history recorded in the text is the repeal of the previous Statement of Principles concerning animal envenomation (No. 81 of 2016) (Repeal, s4). The instrument contains no other amendment logs, transitional provisions or savings clauses.

Recorded timeline elements in the instrument:

• Date of instrument: the front page shows the instrument is dated 19 December 2025 (cover and signature page).
• Commencement date: the instrument explicitly commences on 19 January 2026 (Commencement, s2).
• Repeal: the 2016 Statement (No. 81 of 2016, Federal Register of Legislation No. F2016L01663) is repealed (Repeal, s4).

The instrument does not set out:

• Any transitional arrangements for claims lodged prior to commencement.
• Whether claims assessed under the 2016 Statement will be re-opened, re-assessed, or grandfathered.
• Any provision for staged introduction or consultation outcomes.

Because none of those matters are included, practitioners and claimants should treat the repeal as effective on commencement, and expect that claims subject to s120A of the VEA or s338 of the MRCA will be assessed under this 2026 Statement from 19 January 2026 forward unless administrative practice or other statutory rules provide otherwise.

The instrument itself contains no litigation history. It does not cite any cases, judicial decisions, or tribunal determinations. The Statement’s text records the RMA’s scientific view (s8), but it does not reference any judicial interpretation or litigation concerning the 2016 Statement or any other Statement.

Practical implications:

• There is no party-reported or instrument-contained jurisprudence to guide how tribunals or courts have applied the factors in section 9.
• Any future litigation or merits review proceedings about claims involving animal envenomation will need to interpret the factors in this 2026 Statement in the context of VEA and MRCA statutory tests and relevant administrative law principles; such litigation history will be developed in external sources, not in this instrument.

Because the instrument is silent on litigation, claimants, advisers and decision-makers should monitor tribunal and court decisions after commencement for interpretive guidance on how the factors and definitions are applied in practice.

The Statement contains several technical features and limits that can affect claim outcomes and evidence strategy. These are precise, statutory-based points likely to be decisive in adjudication.

• Tight timing windows for exposure: the first three factors impose narrow timeframes. Internal absorption from a bite/sting/injection must be within three days before clinical onset (s9(1)). Internal absorption from an Ixodidae tick must be within 12 days before clinical onset (s9(3)). These windows set precise temporal thresholds; evidence of exposure outside them will not meet those factors.

• Scope of external contact factor is narrow and mechanism-specific: external contact by means of spitting or spraying at the time of clinical onset is limited to snakes or scorpions (s9(2)). Other modes of external contact, or spitting/spraying by animals not identified as snake/scorpion, are not captured by that factor.

• Species-specific limitation for ticks: the internal absorption factor for ticks is limited to ticks of the family Ixodidae (s9(3)). Contact with other tick families or unclassified arthropods will not satisfy that factor unless covered by another factor or Statement.

• "Inability to obtain appropriate clinical management" is a factor only in relation to clinical worsening, and its application is constrained: the inability must have occurred before clinical worsening and is the determinant factor listed in s9(4). Section 10(2) further restricts the clinical worsening aspect: it applies only to material contribution to, or aggravation of, animal envenomation where the envenomation was suffered or contracted before or during (but did not arise out of) the person's relevant service. That phrasing creates a particular evidentiary posture , the claimant must show pre-existing envenomation and that inability to access appropriate care during relevant service materially contributed to worsening.

• "Related to relevant service" requirement: any factor in s9 must be related to the person’s relevant service (Relationship to service, s10(1)). The Schedule's definition of relevant service enumerates particular forms of service (Schedule 1, relevant service). Exposure occurring in private life or outside the defined relevant service circumstances will not satisfy the requirement.

• Definition of "venomous animal" excludes tissue-borne toxins acting after ingestion: the Schedule expressly excludes animals whose harmful toxins are distributed within bodily tissues and cause toxic effects or death after ingestion (Schedule 1, venomous animal). This exclusion means that poisoning via ingestion of tissue (for example, consuming certain toxic animals) is not within the Statement’s scope.

This Statement creates an evidential framework rather than prescriptive conduct obligations. Compliance in this context means assembling and presenting the material needed for an administrative finding that at least one factor in section 9 exists and is related to relevant service (Application, s5; Factors that must exist, s9; Relationship to service, s10). Practical steps for claimants, clinicians and advisers follow directly from the text.

1. Identify the claim’s statutory footing

• Confirm that the claim falls within section 120A of the VEA or section 338 of the MRCA, because the Statement applies only in those contexts (Application, s5). Determine which kind of "relevant service" the person rendered as defined in Schedule 1 (Schedule 1, relevant service).

2. Align the medical evidence to the stated factors

• Establish timing of exposure and clinical onset: for a bite/sting/injection, document the exact date/time of the exposure and the precise date/time of clinical onset to show the exposure occurred within three days prior to onset (s9(1)). For Ixodidae ticks, document that internal absorption occurred within 12 days before clinical onset (s9(3)). For spitting/spraying from snake/scorpion, document external contact occurring at the time of clinical onset (s9(2)).
• For death cases, obtain medical records and death documentation showing that the terminal event listed in the Schedule occurred and that envenomation contributed to that terminal event (s7(3); Schedule 1, terminal event).

3. Prove species/mechanism where necessary

• If the claimed exposure involves a tick, identify the tick as a member of the family Ixodidae. Clinical or entomological identification, photograph evidence, or treating clinician notes that identify the tick family will be material (s9(3); Schedule 1, venomous animal).
• For spitting/scorpion/snake events, contemporaneous clinical notes, witness statements, and photographic evidence of local signs at the time of clinical onset will help meet the s9(2) factor.

4. Document inability to obtain appropriate clinical management (where relied upon)

• If relying on s9(4) (inability to obtain appropriate clinical management before clinical worsening), obtain contemporaneous records showing attempts to access care, reasons for inability (e.g. remote location, transport limitations, lack of access to antivenom), and clinical records showing the sequence from inadequate or delayed care to clinical worsening.