Statement of Expectations for the Civil Aviation Safety Authority from 1 November 2025 to 30 June 2027

The central concept is the Statement of Expectations itself, a mechanism under s 12A of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 that allows the Minister to communicate strategic and operational guidance to CASA without amending the Act or making binding regulations. This is a soft-power instrument: it does not create legally enforceable duties but sets benchmarks against which the Minister and the Department will assess CASA’s performance. Non-compliance risks ministerial criticism, potential changes to CASA’s board membership, or more prescriptive direction under other provisions of the Act.

Governance is a cluster of expectations directed at the CASA Board and the Director of Aviation Safety (DAS). The Board is expected to be responsible for strategic direction, risk management, and corporate planning, and to facilitate effective interaction with stakeholders. Transparency is emphasised: the Board must publish communiques of each meeting and its conflict-of-interest procedures. The DAS, as CEO, is responsible for operational management and regulatory activities. The separation of board governance from operational management mirrors private-sector governance norms but imposes additional reporting burdens on a government agency.

Strategic direction and manner of performance includes the expectation that CASA will comply with the Civil Aviation Act 1988, the Airspace Act 2007, the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013, and Australia’s international obligations under the Chicago Convention and ICAO. The reference to world-leading regulatory status and Asia-Pacific commitments signals that CASA’s actions will be judged against global benchmarks, not just domestic statutory minima. The expectation to publish a regulatory philosophy document is significant: it forces CASA to articulate its approach, making it easier for industry to predict enforcement patterns and for the Minister to hold CASA accountable if actual enforcement deviates.

Key initiatives list specific projects that the Minister expects CASA to advance. These include: releasing draft regulations for consultation before submission to the Minister (with an exception for urgent safety matters); providing a forward annual regulatory program; working with Airservices Australia and Defence on the OneSKY air traffic management system; integrating remotely piloted aircraft and advanced air mobility operations; overseeing major aerodrome projects; applying resources to Western Sydney International Airport; sharing safety information with the ATSB; working with the Australian Space Agency; and developing long-term financial sustainability options. The instrument also references the Aviation White Paper, which includes initiatives such as the Uncrewed Traffic Management ecosystem, the Australian Future Airspace Framework, satellite-based augmentation systems, and skills and licensing reforms for aviation workforce pathways.

Stakeholder engagement expects CASA to be clear, transparent, and regular in its interactions with industry, government agencies, and the public. It also requires CASA to proactively provide information and advice for policy formulation. These expectations are broad and could be interpreted to require CASA to devote significant staff time to meetings, briefings, and submissions, diverting resources from core regulatory oversight.

The instrument does not define the term “world leading” or set measurable criteria for it, creating ambiguity. Similarly, “proportionate and fit-for-purpose regulatory oversight” for emerging aviation operations is a concept that invites debate over what is proportionate: an operator with a lower safety risk profile may receive lighter oversight, but the instrument does not specify how proportionality will be determined or audited.

The primary entity affected is CASA itself, including its Board, the DAS, and all staff. The instrument imposes expectations on their governance, prioritisation, and reporting. The Board must self-assess its skills and capabilities, manage conflicts of interest, and publish meeting communiques. The DAS must manage operations and ensure quarterly progress reports. Compliance with the SoE becomes a factor in resource allocation: initiatives like Western Sydney International Airport, OneSKY, and RPAS integration are expected to receive “sufficient resources”, which may mean diverting staff from routine certification, surveillance, or enforcement activities.

The aviation industry is the largest indirect affected group. Commercial airlines, charter operators, general aviation (including flight schools, agricultural operators, and private pilots), rural and remote operators, and emerging entrants such as drone operators and advanced air mobility companies will all feel the effects of how CASA implements the SoE. The expectation to “fully consider the impact of new regulations on general aviation, and rural and remote regions” could slow regulatory reform or force CASA to adopt exemptions or tiered requirements for smaller operators. Conversely, the push for mutual recognition and bilateral arrangements may reduce costs for operators seeking to hire foreign-licensed engineers or pilots.

Western Sydney International Airport (Nancy-Bird Walton Airport) is explicitly singled out. The expectation that CASA apply sufficient resources to its regulatory oversight, and the Government’s stated intent of opening in 2026, means CASA is under political pressure to meet a timeline that may be unrealistic given safety certification processes. Any delay at the airport will likely be attributed to CASA, not the developer.

The Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts (the Department) receives an expectation of being kept informed and receiving quarterly progress reports. The Department’s role in policy formulation includes advising the Minister on CASA’s performance, so the SoE effectively creates a reporting channel that could lead to ministerial intervention if CASA is deemed non-compliant.

Other agencies affected include Airservices Australia (cooperation on OneSKY and satellite-based augmentation), the Department of Defence (OneSKY partner), the ATSB (safety information sharing under the Safety Information Policy Statement), the Australian Space Agency (space policies and industries), and Geoscience Australia (satellite-based augmentation). These agencies may have to coordinate with CASA in ways that increase their own administrative costs, particularly if CASA’s resource constraints cause delays.

Parliament and the public are also affected: CASA is expected to cooperate with parliamentary committees and public accountability mechanisms. The instrument mentions keeping the Minister informed about submissions, media releases, and major speeches, which suggests that CASA’s public messaging is subject to ministerial oversight.

Industry bodies representing general aviation, rural operators, and maintenance engineers will be affected by the skills and licensing initiatives. The expectation to streamline training and accreditation pathways for licensed aviation maintenance engineers could reduce labour shortages but also affect the commercial interests of existing training providers.

The Office of the Industry Complaints Commissioner within CASA is expected to receive sufficient resources and due consideration of its findings. This may encourage industry participants to use the complaints mechanism, but it also imposes an obligation on CASA to act on recommendations it might otherwise ignore.

The instrument creates no statutory duties or rights enforceable by private parties, but it establishes expectations that function as de facto duties for CASA. The key duties are:

• Governance duties: The Board must self-assess skills, manage conflicts of interest, publish conflict procedures and meeting communiques. The DAS must manage operations and ensure quarterly reporting.
• Reporting duties: CASA must provide quarterly progress reports on adherence to its Corporate Plan and compliance with the SoE. It must promptly advise the Minister and Department of any events materially impacting operations, and keep them informed of submissions, media releases, and speeches.
• Safety duties: CASA must regard safety of air navigation as the most important consideration.
• Compliance duties: CASA must perform functions in accordance with the Civil Aviation Act 1988, Airspace Act 2007, PGPA Act, other applicable legislation, and international obligations.
• Consultative duties: CASA must release exposure drafts of proposed regulations for public consultation before submission to the Minister, except in urgent safety matters. It must provide a forward annual regulatory program showing how industry and stakeholder views were considered.
• Project-specific duties: CASA must work with Airservices, Defence, ATSB, Geoscience Australia, the Space Agency, and the Department on specified initiatives. It must apply resources to Western Sydney International Airport and the RPAS/AAM integration.
• Transparency duties: Publish a regulatory philosophy document; publish board communiques; provide summaries of surveillance activities.
• Complaint mechanism duties: Give due consideration to findings of the Industry Complaints Commissioner.

As for rights, the instrument confers rights on the Minister to receive information and to expect compliance. The Minister also has the right to remove board members or issue binding directions under other provisions of the Civil Aviation Act 1988. Industry stakeholders have a right to be consulted on regulatory changes (via exposure drafts and the annual program) and to use the Industry Complaints Commissioner, though the instrument does not give them a right to compel CASA to adopt their views.

General aviation and rural/remote operators have a right to have the impact on them considered, but that consideration is not required to be proportional or to produce any particular outcome. The instrument does not create a right to appeal or review if consideration is inadequate.

This SoE is not a penal instrument. It imposes no fines, licence suspensions, or criminal penalties. Enforcement is indirect and political. If CASA fails to meet expectations, the Minister’s remedies include: issuing a revised SoE with more prescriptive language, replacing board members (the Minister appoints the CASA Board under the Civil Aviation Act 1988), directing CASA under other provisions of the Act, reducing CASA’s budget through the Department, or publicly criticising CASA, which could affect staff morale and public confidence.

The quarterly progress reports and the obligation to promptly advise of material issues provide the Minister with early warning and the basis for intervention. The Board’s self-assessment of skills and capabilities allows the Minister to identify gaps and potentially replace members. The expectation to manage conflicts of interest and publish procedures suggests that actual or perceived conflicts could be grounds for removal if mishandled.

For CASA itself, non-compliance with the SoE may be cited in parliamentary committee hearings or in ministerial statements as evidence of poor management. The instrument’s reference to “best practice principles and guidelines” for resource use implies that wasteful or inefficient spending could be treated as a failure of governance, though the Minister has no specific power under this SoE to claw back funds.

Industry participants have no private right of action for breach of the SoE. However, if a regulatory decision or enforcement action is challenged in court, a party could argue that CASA acted inconsistently with the SoE as evidence of unreasonableness or procedural unfairness. Such arguments are unlikely to succeed because the SoE is not a legislative instrument and does not create legitimate expectations enforceable in judicial review, but the instrument could be used in submissions to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal or in political advocacy.

The only repeals in the schedule are of prior SoEs, which ensures that only the current version applies. No transitional provisions are included, meaning the new SoE takes full effect from 1 November 2025.

The SoE operates under s 12A of the Civil Aviation Act 1988, which permits the Minister to give written notice of expectations to CASA. That section also allows the Minister to give directions, but this instrument uses the softer expectations mechanism. If CASA fails to comply, the Minister could shift to binding directions under other parts of the Act, such as s 12C (directions about performance of functions) or s 12D (directions about use of resources). The SoE explicitly cross-references the Airspace Act 2007 and the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 as sources of compliance obligations for CASA.

The expectation to comply with international obligations ties into the Chicago Convention and ICAO standards. This means CASA’s regulatory decisions must not only satisfy domestic law but also align with Australia’s treaty commitments. If a conflict arises between the SoE’s expectations (e.g., to be “world leading”) and a mandatory ICAO standard, the instrument does not resolve the tension.

The Aviation White Paper initiatives listed in the SoE are policy documents, not legislation, but they carry political weight. CASA is expected to deliver initiatives from that White Paper, which may require regulatory amendments or new regulations. The SoE does not give CASA additional statutory power to implement those initiatives.

The reference to mutual recognition and bilateral arrangements implicates the Air Navigation Act 1920 and regulations made under it, as well as agreements with foreign states. CASA’s ability to minimise red tape in transitioning licences depends on existing or future treaties, which are outside CASA’s direct control.

The Safety Information Policy Statement agreed with the ATSB is a non-binding document, but the SoE expects CASA to “share safety information consistent” with it. That may require CASA to disclose information that would otherwise be confidential, potentially affecting operators’ willingness to self-report safety incidents.

The OneSKY project involves the Department of Defence and Airservices Australia. CASA’s role is approval and certification, not implementation. The SoE’s expectation to “develop and implement” the project through timely approval may pressure CASA to certify systems before they are fully tested, raising liability risks if a safety failure occurs.

The requirement to have a “publicly available document setting out its regulatory philosophy” is novel. It interacts with the PGPA Act’s requirement for corporate plans and annual reports, but the philosophy document is a separate publication. It could be used in legal proceedings as evidence of CASA’s stated approach, potentially limiting CASA’s discretion if the philosophy is more permissive or more restrictive than the Act provides.

The SoE as issued is a new instrument, not an amendment to existing legislation. However, its Schedule 1 repeals four predecessor SoEs:

• Statement of Expectations for the Board of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority for the Period 27 March 2017 to 30 June 2019 (F2017L00288)
• Statement of Expectations for the Board of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority for the Period 15 July 2019 to 30 June 2021 (F2019L00977)
• Statement of Expectations for the Board of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority for the period 31 January 2022 to 30 June 2023 (F2022L00061)
• Statement of Expectations for the Civil Aviation Safety Authority from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2025 (F2023L00920)

The prior instruments had varying timeframes: 2017-2019 (about 27 months), 2019-2021 (24 months), 2022-2023 (17 months), and 2023-2025 (24 months). The current SoE covers 20 months (1 November 2025 to 30 June 2027). The shortening of the period and the mid-year start date (rather than 1 July) suggest that the Minister wanted to align the SoE with the financial year or with the Government’s own electoral cycle.

Notably, the earlier SoEs referred to the “Board of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority”, whereas the two most recent (2023 and this one) refer to “the Civil Aviation Safety Authority” as the entity. This change reflects a broadening of focus from board governance to the entire organisation, including the DAS and staff.

The instrument does not explain why the previous SoEs were replaced years before their expiry. The 2023 SoE was due to run until 30 June 2025, but the current SoE starts 1 November 2025, creating a five-month gap with no current SoE. That gap may be unintentional, or it may allow the Minister to review CASA’s performance before issuing the new one. The Act does not require a SoE to be in place at all times.

No changes in substance between predecessors and the current instrument are described, but a comparison would show shifts in emphasis: the 2023 SoE included expectations about COVID recovery and aviation workforce shortages; the current one focuses on Western Sydney Airport, RPAS integration, and the Aviation White Paper. The repeal of the earlier SoEs ensures that only the current expectations are in force, preventing reliance on outdated guidance.

No litigation has arisen from this instrument, as it is newly issued and not yet tested in court. However, its predecessors have been involved in legal challenges indirectly. Cases involving CASA’s regulatory decisions have occasionally referred to statements of expectations as background but have not relied on them as binding. The High Court has held that ministerial statements of expectation are not enforceable directions under the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (see R v Hunt; Ex parte Sean Investments (1979) but that is not aviation-specific).

The most relevant area of potential litigation is judicial review of CASA decisions under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 or s 75 of the Constitution. A party could argue that CASA failed to consider a relevant factor (such as impact on general aviation) or took into account an irrelevant factor (such as urgency when safety was not at risk). The SoE could be used as evidence of what factors CASA ought to consider, but it would not be dispositive.

The expectation to “fully consider” impact on general aviation and rural/remote regions creates a potential ground for review if CASA adopts a regulation without any documented analysis of those impacts. However, an argument that CASA did not “fully consider” is weak because courts rarely second-guess the depth of consideration.

The requirement to publish a regulatory philosophy document could be used in litigation to argue that CASA is bound by its stated approach, particularly if the philosophy promises lighter touch regulation for low-risk operators. If CASA later takes aggressive enforcement action against such an operator, the operator might argue that the decision was inconsistent with the philosophy and therefore irrational. This type of argument has limited success in Australian courts, which give agencies broad discretion.

The instrument’s requirement to share safety information “consistent with” the ATSB policy statement could create tension with privacy obligations under the Privacy Act 1988 or confidentiality provisions in aviation regulations. If a lawsuit arises from the disclosure of information, the SoE would not override statutory privacy protections.

No class actions or representative proceedings have been brought against CASA based on a SoE. The instrument is not a source of civil liability.

Several provisions in the SoE carry hidden costs or risks that practitioners should flag for clients.

Mandatory consultation with an urgency exception. The SoE expects CASA to release exposure drafts for consultation before submitting regulations to the Minister, “unless the matter is urgent, and/or any delay would impact on aviation safety”. That exception is broad: CASA could claim urgency for almost any safety issue. Industry may find itself excluded from consultation on regulations that have significant economic impact. The government interprets “urgent” and “impact on aviation safety” without independent oversight.

“Sufficient resources” language. The SoE expects CASA to apply “sufficient resources” to Western Sydney International Airport, the Office of the Industry Complaints Commissioner, and other projects. That is a blank cheque. If CASA’s budget is fixed, applying sufficient resources to one project necessarily reduces resources available for other activities such as routine surveillance of general aviation operators or timely processing of certification applications. There is no offset requirement.

“Full consideration” of impact on general aviation and rural/remote regions. This sounds protective, but it is a process expectation, not a substantive one. CASA can consider the impact and still proceed with a regulation that harms those sectors. The phrase “full consideration” is also ambiguous: it could mean a cost-benefit analysis, a consultation process, or simply noting the impact in a document. No independent audit of the consideration is required.

Regulatory philosophy document. The SoE requires CASA to have a publicly available document setting out its regulatory philosophy. If CASA publishes a philosophy that promises proportionate and risk-based regulation, it may constrain CASA’s enforcement discretion if inconsistent later actions are challenged. Conversely, if the philosophy is vague, it provides no constraint. The creation of the document itself consumes staff time.

The Insurance gap. The instrument says nothing about insurance requirements or liability caps for CASA’s certification decisions. The expectation to certify Western Sydney Airport and OneSKY on time may create pressure on CASA staff to approve systems with unresolved safety risks, increasing potential liability for the Commonwealth. The instrument does not indemnify CASA or staff.

The five-month gap. The current SoE applies from 1 November 2025 to 30 June 2027. The previous SoE expired on 30 June 2025. That leaves a gap from July to October 2025 with no current SoE. CASA operates under its statutory functions regardless, but the lack of expectations gives the Minister less leverage during that period. It also creates uncertainty for industry about what the Minister expects CASA to prioritise during that time.

No sunset clause for the gap between SoEs. The instrument repeals the 2023 SoE effective on a date that creates a transition gap. If the Minister intended a seamless transition, the gap appears to be an oversight. Operators should not assume that older expectations apply during the gap, as they are repealed.

The “world leading” expectation. This creates an unmeasurable standard. It invites CASA to adopt regulatory approaches from other jurisdictions that may not suit Australian conditions, increasing compliance costs. It also exposes CASA to criticism if an international body ranks another country’s safety system above Australia’s.

The Office of the Industry Complaints Commissioner. The SoE expects CASA to “ensure the complaints mechanism is independent and transparent”. However, the Commissioner sits within CASA. The expectation to “give due consideration” to findings does not require CASA to implement them. Industry may be lulled into thinking complaints will produce change, when the mechanism is largely advisory.

The uncrewed traffic management ecosystem and future airspace framework. These are policy documents, not binding rules. The SoE expects CASA to “support the development and implementation” of a UTM ecosystem, but does not specify whether that support includes regulatory enforcement or financial subsidies. The cost of setting up the ecosystem will likely be borne by industry through fees and charges.

For CASA itself, compliance is a matter of implementing governance structures and reporting systems. The Board should conduct its skills assessment and publish the results or a summary, along with conflict-of-interest procedures, on the CASA website. Board meeting communiques should be published promptly after each meeting. The DAS should ensure quarterly progress reports are prepared, covering adherence to the Corporate Plan and compliance with each expectation in the SoE. Those reports should be submitted to the Minister and the Department.

CASA should develop and publish its regulatory philosophy document. It should also release a forward annual regulatory program showing how stakeholder views were considered. When developing regulations, CASA must release exposure drafts for consultation unless it determines the matter is urgent and/or delay would impact safety. In such cases, CASA should document the rationale for bypassing consultation, to demonstrate compliance if later questioned.

For the key initiatives, CASA should allocate staff and budget to the OneSKY certification, Western Sydney International Airport oversight, RPAS/AAM integration, and the Aviation White Paper deliverables. It should establish liaison mechanisms with Airservices Australia, Defence, the ATSB, Geoscience Australia, and the Australian Space Agency. The Office of the Industry Complaints Commissioner should be given adequate resources, and CASA should document its response to each recommendation made by the Commissioner.

Surveillance activities under s 9(1)(f) of the Act should be regular, and summaries should be provided to the Minister and Department. CASA should also keep the Minister informed of public submissions, media releases, and major speeches, presumably by pre-clearance or prompt notification.

For industry stakeholders, compliance with the SoE means engaging with CASA’s consultation processes. When CASA releases an exposure draft, industry should provide submissions and highlight impacts on general aviation and rural/remote regions. Those submissions will form the record that CASA is expected to “fully consider”. If CASA bypasses consultation citing urgency, industry should request a written explanation and consider raising the issue with the Department or the Minister directly.

Operators affected by specific projects (e.g., Western Sydney Airport, drone operations, or airspace changes) should monitor CASA’s resource allocation and urge the Minister to ensure sufficient resources are applied if delays occur. They can also use the Industry Complaints Commissioner for grievances about CASA’s regulatory decisions, though outcomes are not guaranteed.

For legal advisors, the SoE can be used in submissions to parliamentary committees or in media campaigns to argue that CASA is failing to meet specific expectations. It cannot be enforced directly, but it can create political pressure. If CASA makes a regulatory decision that contradicts its published regulatory philosophy, that inconsistency may be raised in judicial review proceedings as evidence of unreasonableness.

Compliance for the Department involves monitoring CASA’s quarterly reports and advising the Minister on any gaps. The Department should also coordinate with CASA on the financial sustainability options and the mutual recognition arrangements, as those involve departmental policy input.

Overall, compliance with the SoE is a process-oriented task: document everything, meet deadlines, publish the required documents, and respond to stakeholders. The instrument rewards transparency and consultations, but it does not require CASA to adopt any particular regulatory outcome.