1. The 4-metre buffer applies only to certain courtyards/gardens, not all. Clause 4(1) defines “applicable courtyard or garden” narrowly. If the courtyard or garden is part of a public thoroughfare generally used by pedestrians other than building users, it is excluded. So a courtyard that is a public shortcut will not trigger the 4-metre buffer. This creates a boundary-drawing problem: the occupier or enforcer must determine pedestrian usage patterns to know if the buffer applies. A courtyard that is used by both building visitors and the general public may fall outside the definition, allowing smoking up to the entrance. This uncertainty undermines the rule of law.
2. The exemption from displaying signs (clause 7) is vague and risky. The test is “persons would reasonably be expected to know, by custom or otherwise, that smoking is not permitted” and “persons do not usually smoke”. This is highly fact-dependent. What qualifies as “custom”? A hospital is obvious; a cinema foyer may be; an indoor shopping centre may be. But a small restaurant with an outdoor area? The occupier cannot be confident. If they rely on the exemption and are wrong, they face a penalty for failing to display signs under s 9(1) of the Act. The prudent occupier will display signs anyway, making the exemption largely illusory, but it may still apply in places like courtrooms or libraries where no one would think of smoking.
3. The 75 per cent enclosure test includes open doors and windows that are not locked open. Clause 8(4)(b) includes “any door, window or moveable structure that is, or is part of, a ceiling or wall, regardless of whether the door, window or structure is open (other than the area of any locked-open door or window).” This means a door that is propped open but not locked is counted as part of the actual enclosed area. Only locked-open doors or windows are excluded. So a venue that wants to stay under 75 per cent cannot simply open a door; it must install a key lock and secure the door in its fully open position. This is a mechanical and cost burden. Many venues will need to retrofit locks.
4. The “locked-open” requirement must be maintained for the entire hours of operation each day. Clause 9 requires that if the occupier relies on locked-open doors or windows to allow smoking, those doors or windows must be “kept locked fully open for the entire hours of operation of the place on each day during which the occupier facilitates smoking there.” If a staff member closes the door for 10 minutes to adjust the air conditioning, the occupier commits an offence. The occupier cannot argue that the door was only briefly closed; the duty is absolute. This creates a zero-tolerance trap. Occupiers should consider automated locking systems to ensure continuous compliance, but that increases costs.
5. The penalty notice for smoking under clause 11 is $300, which exceeds the maximum court fine for the same offence. Under the Act, the maximum penalty for s 7(1) is 2 penalty units (currently $220). Yet the penalty notice is $300. This is not unique to this Regulation but is common in NSW penalty notice regimes. However, it means a person who pays the penalty notice pays more than the maximum a court could impose if they fought and lost. The person’s choice is: pay $300 and avoid the hassle, or contest and risk a maximum of $220 but with legal costs and time. This creates a perverse incentive for the state to push penalty notices rather than court proceedings, and a disincentive for individuals to contest even if they believe they are innocent. The higher amount also acts as a deterrent but is structured regressively.
6. The sign requirements are prescriptive and use a standard (AS 1319-1994) that may not be immediately available. The smoking prohibited symbol must be from that standard. The standard is a commercial document. A small business cannot simply draw a symbol; it must purchase the correct graphic or find a compliant sign supplier. The size (90 mm diameter) and text height (20 mm) are mandatory. Signs that are in any way different (e.g., no symbol, different wording) are non-compliant and could potentially defeat a prosecution for no-smoking if the area was not properly designated.
7. The definition of “ceiling” and “wall” in clause 8 is extremely broad. They include “any structure or device (whether fixed or moveable) that prevents or impedes upward airflow” or “lateral airflow”. This captures umbrellas, retractable awnings, and even dense vegetation if it impedes airflow. A venue with a row of tall hedges around a beer garden might need to consider those hedges as walls for the enclosure calculation. The occupier must physically test airflow or assume the worst. Moveable structures like umbrellas are included, but security grills that are fully open except when premises are closed are excluded. This distinction between moveable structures (included) and certain security devices (excluded) may lead to disputes about whether a lattice screen is a moveable structure or not.
8. The enforcement split (clause 10) may cause jurisdictional confusion. A person who smokes near a hospital entrance could be prosecuted by a police officer, but only a health chief executive can bring proceedings for the s 6A(1)(k) area. If a police officer issues a penalty notice for smoking in a hospital area, the validity of that notice could be challenged on the basis that the officer was not authorised to bring proceedings for that specific subsection. The Regulation does not give police authority to enforce all smoke-free areas; only those in s 6A(1)(d)-(h). A person issued a penalty notice in the wrong category could argue the notice is invalid. This drafting asymmetry may lead to technical defences.