Advisory Committee: A body of up to 10 members appointed by the Minister under the Act, tasked with providing advice on funding, strategy, and industry matters. Its decisions are not binding on the Secretary or Minister. The committee may create subcommittees, which can include non-members? The regulation only says a subcommittee need not consist of all members including the chairperson; it does not expressly authorise external appointments, but the Act may permit it. The subcommittee that manages funding allocation is a specific example.

Chairperson and deputy chairperson: The chairperson is appointed by instrument and must have significant industry expertise. The deputy chairperson is similarly appointed but must lack significant industry expertise. This asymmetry is unusual: if the chair is unavailable, the meeting is presided over by a deputy who is specifically chosen for not having deep industry knowledge. The chair has a deliberative and casting vote; the deputy’s voting rights are not specified separately but presumably as a member they have a deliberative vote, and if presiding they hold the casting vote under clause 15? However, clause 15 says the chairperson presides; if the chair is absent, the deputy would need a specific provision. The regulation does not address who presides in the chair’s absence. That gap may lead to procedural disputes.

Functions: The committee’s role is advisory only, but its functions include both reactive (responding to council accreditation submissions) and proactive (advocating for IP rights, recommending strategic direction). The function to “advocate for and promote awareness of the intellectual property rights of persons employed in the screen and digital games industries in relation to emerging technologies and evolving distribution platforms” is notably specific. It implies the committee will take a position on IP policy, potentially influencing government stances on copyright, moral rights, or platform liability. This could have real economic consequences for platform operators, production companies, and workers.

Pecuniary interest disclosure: Members must disclose any direct or indirect pecuniary interest that appears to raise a conflict. They may make a blanket disclosure about being a member of a company or having a specified interest, which suffices for future meetings. After disclosure, the member must not be present or vote unless the Minister or committee otherwise determines. Crucially, clause 11(9) provides that contravention does not invalidate a committee decision. This limits the legal risk but also weakens the incentive to comply. The disclosure record must be kept and made available for inspection on payment of a reasonable fee determined by the committee. The committee sets the fee, creating a potential barrier to transparency.

Vacancy and removal: A member’s office becomes vacant on death, term expiration, resignation, removal by the Minister, absence from four consecutive meetings without excuse, personal insolvency, mental incapacity, or conviction for a serious offence. Notably, removal by the Minister under clause 9(d) is not limited to cause; the clause simply says “is removed from office by the Minister under this section.” There are no stated grounds. This gives the Minister a backdoor power to dismiss any member, even during their fixed term. Combined with the three-year term renewable up to six years, member security is weak.

Interaction with other employment: Members are not subject to Government Sector Employment Act rules; they may hold other employment despite provisions requiring full-time devotion elsewhere; and the office is not an office of profit under the Crown. This enables industry participants to serve without losing their primary jobs, but also removes any superannuation or pension benefits associated with Crown service.

The regulation directly affects individuals appointed or considered for appointment to the Advisory Committee. They must meet the composition requirements: the chair must have significant industry expertise; the deputy must not; at least one member must be from digital games; at least one must be Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander; at least one must be a regional industry participant; the rest must have relevant experience. This limits the pool of potential appointees and may force the Minister to choose between qualified candidates and demographic fit. Existing industry participants who might otherwise be appointed as deputy chair are excluded by the “no significant expertise” rule.

The regulation affects the Secretary and the Minister, who are required to receive and presumably consider the committee’s advice before making funding allocation decisions and approving council accreditations. They must also determine remuneration in consultation with the Public Service Commissioner. The Minister has the power to remove members without cause, giving the executive significant control over the committee’s composition.

The primary indirect beneficiaries are screen and digital games businesses and workers who seek government funding. The committee’s advice on funding allocation will influence which projects receive money. The committee’s IP advocacy role may shape government policy on issues like copyright safe harbours or platform revenue sharing, affecting all industry players. However, the advisory nature means businesses cannot rely on committee recommendations; the Secretary retains ultimate discretion.

Local councils seeking accreditation under section 8 of the Act may be affected: the committee advises on their submissions, so a negative recommendation may reduce chances of accreditation.

Taxpayers and other industry participants who do not receive funding bear the cost of the committee’s operation (remuneration and allowances determined by the Minister), plus the opportunity cost of government funds being allocated based on committee advice rather than market mechanisms. The mandatory regional and Indigenous representation requirements may alter funding patterns toward those groups, potentially at the expense of other applicants.

Duties of members: Disclose any direct or indirect pecuniary interest that appears to raise a conflict as soon as the relevant facts become known. After disclosure, the member must not be present or vote unless the Minister or committee determines otherwise. A member who has an interest must not participate in the committee’s determination of whether to allow participation. Members must attend meetings; absence from four consecutive meetings without leave or excuse results in office becoming vacant. Members must also perform their prescribed functions: advising, considering recommendations, and advocating for IP rights.

Rights of members: To be paid remuneration, including travelling and subsistence allowances, as determined by the Minister. To have their term specified in their instrument of appointment, up to three years, with eligibility for reappointment (subject to the six-year cap). To resign by written instrument. To vote at meetings (deliberative vote, and the chair has a casting vote). To participate in subcommittees. To have the committee determine its own procedures subject to the regulation. To have the Minister or committee determine that a conflicted member may remain present and vote.

Rights of the Advisory Committee: To determine its own procedure for calling meetings and conducting business, subject to the regulation. To establish subcommittees. To grant leave of absence to members. To excuse a member for absence after four weeks. To determine a reasonable fee for inspection of the disclosure record. To make decisions by majority vote.

Rights of other persons: Any person may inspect the disclosure record at all reasonable hours on payment of the fee determined by the committee. The regulation does not grant any right to be heard by the committee or to compel the committee to consider a matter. Local councils can make submissions seeking accreditation, and the committee will advise on those, but the process is not specified.

The regulation does not impose monetary penalties, fines, or criminal sanctions. Enforcement relies on internal mechanisms and the Minister’s discretion. The most direct enforcement is the automatic vacation of office if a member fails the attendance requirement (four consecutive unexcused absences). The Minister may also remove a member at any time under clause 9(d) for any reason or no reason, which is a strong enforcement tool against non-compliant members even if no explicit penalty is attached.

Disclosure obligations are enforced through the risk of removal or reputational damage. Clause 11(9) provides that contravention of the disclosure rules does not invalidate a committee decision, so a member who fails to disclose could still have their vote count, but they may be removed by the Minister. The disclosure record must be made available for inspection; failure to maintain or produce the record could be a breach of the regulation, but the regulation does not specify a consequence for that failure. Presumably, the Minister could direct compliance or remove committee members who fail to maintain the record.

The requirement that the deputy chair must not have significant industry expertise is a qualification for appointment, not a continuing duty. If a deputy chair later gains significant expertise, there is no provision requiring resignation, creating a potential gap.

There is no independent enforcement body; enforcement is at the Minister’s pleasure. This creates a risk of differential enforcement depending on political priorities. The lack of external oversight contrasts with other advisory bodies that have statutory accountability measures. The committee’s advice to the Secretary and Minister is not enforceable by any third party; an industry participant unhappy with a funding decision cannot challenge the committee’s advice directly, only the Secretary’s decision under administrative law, and even then, the weight given to the committee’s advice would be a matter for the decision-maker.

Screen and Digital Games Industries Act 2025: This regulation is made under that Act, specifically sections 6(3), (4), and (5), which deal with the composition, functions, and procedure of the Advisory Committee. The regulation fills out the detail left by the Act. The Act also establishes the funding programs and the accreditation scheme for local councils. The committee’s role under clause 5(d) advises on council accreditation submissions, linking directly to section 8 of the Act.

Government Sector Employment Act 2013: Clause 12(1) disapplies the provisions relating to Public Service employees to members of the Advisory Committee. This means members are not subject to the employment rules, code of conduct, or performance management of the public service. This allows industry participants to serve without becoming public servants, but also means they are not bound by public service ethical standards beyond the disclosure rules in the regulation.

Interpretation Act 1987: The regulation is subject to the definitions and interpretation provisions of that Act. The note in clause 3 alerts readers to that fact. This is standard.

Other Acts requiring full-time devotion: Clause 12(2) overrides any provision in an Act or instrument that requires a person to devote the whole of their time to a specified office or prohibits outside employment. This enables a person who holds a full-time position in the private sector to also serve as a member. For example, a person who is a director of a production company could serve, even if their employment contract or another Act requires them to devote full time to that role. This is a specific carve-out to avoid conflict with other laws.

Office of profit under the Crown: Clause 12(3) states that for any Act, the office of a member is not an office or place of profit under the Crown. This is relevant for constitutional and statutory eligibility rules. For example, the New South Wales Constitution Act 1902 disqualifies holders of offices of profit under the Crown from being members of Parliament. This clause ensures that committee members are not automatically disqualified from standing for Parliament. It also may affect taxation of remuneration; members will likely be treated as independent contractors rather than Crown employees for tax purposes.

Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009: The clause requiring that the disclosure record be made available on payment of a reasonable fee may interact with the GIPA Act, which gives a general right of access to government information. The regulation creates a specific access regime for this document, but the GIPA Act may apply as a supplementary mechanism. The fee determined by the committee must be reasonable, but if it is set high, an applicant could seek access under GIPA at a lower cost.

Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998: The disclosure record may contain personal information about members’ pecuniary interests. The committee must comply with privacy laws when making the record available.

The Screen and Digital Games Industries (Advisory Committee) Regulation 2025 (SL 2025-0323) is a new instrument. It commences on the same day as the Screen and Digital Games Industries Act 2025. As at the time of writing, there have been no amendments. The regulation is likely to be amended if the Act is amended, or if experience reveals practical issues with the committee’s operation. Potential future amendments could address the gap about who presides in the chair’s absence, clarify the grounds for Ministerial removal, adjust the composition requirements, or prescribe additional functions. The six-year term limit for members under clause 7(2) may also be revisited if continuity becomes an issue. No amendment history is provided in the source text.

The source text does not reference any litigation. The regulation is new, so there are no decided cases interpreting its provisions. However, potential grounds for future litigation can be identified.

First, the Minister’s power to remove a member under clause 9(d) without stated grounds could be challenged on administrative law grounds such as Wednesbury unreasonableness or improper purpose. If the Minister removes a member for refusing to follow a direction or for speaking critically, the member may seek judicial review. The absence of criteria may actually make the power easier to challenge because there is no statutory standard to satisfy; the court would examine the Minister’s reasons if given.

Second, decisions by the Secretary on funding allocation that follow or ignore the committee’s advice could be challenged by unsuccessful applicants. The weight given to the committee’s advice would be a factor. If the Secretary simply rubber-stamps the committee’s recommendations without independent assessment, a court could find the decision was made under dictation or failed to take into account relevant considerations. Conversely, if the Secretary ignores the committee’s advice without reasons, that might also be reviewable.

Third, the requirement that the deputy chair must not have significant industry expertise could be challenged as arbitrary or irrational, but given the regulation is made under delegated legislation, the court would likely defer to the Minister’s policy choice unless it is ultra vires the Act.

Fourth, disputes about whether a member was properly absent from four consecutive meetings or properly excused could lead to proceedings for a declaration that the office has not become vacant. The committee’s internal decisions on excuses may be reviewable.

Fifth, a decision by the committee to deny access to the disclosure record or to set an unreasonable fee could be challenged under the GIPA Act or for jurisdictional error.

The deputy chair must not have significant industry expertise. This is a perverse qualification. If the chair is unavailable, the meeting is presided over by the one member who is affirmatively selected to lack industry knowledge. That person will have the casting vote. No provision addresses who presides if both chair and deputy are absent. The regulation does not allow the committee to elect an acting chair from among other members. This could paralyse meetings.

The Minister may remove a member without cause. Clause 9(d) simply says a member’s office becomes vacant if the member “is removed from office by the Minister under this section.” The section does not specify any grounds. This makes fixed terms illusory. A member appointed for three years could be dismissed the next day. This deters qualified people from serving if they fear political interference. It also makes the committee vulnerable to capture: members may avoid criticising government policy to keep their seats.

A contravention of the interest disclosure rules does not invalidate a committee decision. Clause 11(9) is a trap for those relying on the integrity of the committee’s advice. If a member with a pecuniary interest participates and votes, and that vote affects the outcome, the decision still stands. The only consequence is potential removal of the member. This weakens the regime compared to similar provisions in other legislation where non-disclosure can invalidate decisions. Industry participants cannot rely on the purity of the committee’s recommendations.

The committee sets the fee for inspecting the disclosure record. There is no cap. The committee could set a high fee to deter inspection, undermining transparency. The regulation requires the fee to be “reasonable,” but that is subjective and may be challenged only through litigation.

The quorum is only four out of ten members, including the chair. That means a minority of the committee can provide advice that directs millions of dollars in funding. There is no requirement for geographic or sectoral balance at a meeting. If the only digital games member or the only Indigenous member is absent, their perspective is not represented.

The subcommittee managing funding allocation need not include the chairperson of the main committee. That subcommittee could operate with its own rules, potentially excluding the main chair’s oversight. The regulation gives the main committee power to decide subcommittee procedures, but if the subcommittee is established with members who are not the chair, there is a risk of mission creep.

The regulation does not require public notice of meetings, agendas, or minutes. The disclosure record is the only document required to be publicly available. This opacity means industry participants cannot monitor the committee’s deliberations, making it harder to predict funding decisions.

There is no prohibition on a member advising the Secretary or Minister outside of committee meetings. The functions are vested in the committee, but individual members could exert influence informally, circumventing the group process. Conflicts that are disclosed during meetings might still be acted upon in private conversations.

For individuals considering or holding appointment as a member:

First, verify eligibility under the composition rules. If you are appointed as deputy chair, you must affirm that you do not have significant experience or expertise in the screen or digital games industry. If you later gain such expertise, you may not be disqualified, but you should inform the Minister. If appointed as chair, ensure your industry background meets the standard. If you are an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person, or a regional industry participant, you satisfy those slots.

Second, upon appointment, make any blanket disclosures of interests under clause 11(3) as soon as practical. For example, if you are a director of a production company, disclose that at the first meeting. This covers you for all subsequent matters involving that company. Keep a copy of the disclosure.

Third, for each meeting, review the agenda for any matter in which you have a direct or indirect pecuniary interest. If an interest appears to raise a conflict, disclose it at the meeting as soon as the facts come to your knowledge. After disclosure, do not be present or vote unless the Minister or the committee determines otherwise. If the committee is about to consider that determination, you must not be present or vote on that sub-question.

Fourth, attend meetings. Keep a record of meeting dates. If you cannot attend, request leave in advance from the committee. If you miss four consecutive meetings, apply for an excuse within four weeks after the last of the four meetings. Otherwise, your office automatically becomes vacant.

Fifth, if you are the chairperson or a member of a subcommittee managing funding allocation, be aware that decisions on conflicts apply equally. The subcommittee must also keep a disclosure record.

For the Secretary and Minister:

Ensure appointments comply with the composition requirements. Determine remuneration only after consultation with the Public Service Commissioner. When receiving advice from the committee, maintain a record of how the advice was considered to avoid administrative law challenges. If you decide to depart from the advice, document reasons.

For industry participants:

Monitor the committee’s activities through the disclosure record. Contact the committee to inquire about the fee for inspection. If the fee appears unreasonable, consider seeking access under the Government Information (Public Access) Act. If you seek funding, you may wish to make submissions to the committee or raise issues with your local member. Understand that the committee’s advice is not binding, so focus your advocacy on the Secretary and Minister directly.

For subcommittees:

The Advisory Committee sets the procedures. Ensure that any member who participates in a subcommittee meeting understands the disclosure rules and applies them. Record minutes and decisions. The subcommittee chair has a deliberative and casting vote.