Australia Acts (Request) Act 1985

The Act introduces a cluster of constitutional devices and declarations that alter the legal relationships among the United Kingdom Parliament, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the State Parliaments. The concepts that practitioners must keep visible when analysing the instrument are: termination of external legislative competence, State legislative plenary power (including extra‑territoriality), removal of English legal repugnancy constraints, finality of domestic judicial decisions, preservation of the Commonwealth constitutional order, manner‑and‑form entrenchment for State constitutional laws, and a special amending formula for the Act itself and the Statute of Westminster in Australian law.

Termination of external legislative competence: Schedule 1, s 1 and Schedule 2, s 1 declare that no Act of the UK Parliament passed after commencement will extend to the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory as part of their law. That is a categorical textual cut‑off: future UK Acts will not operate as part of Australian law.

State plenary power and extra‑territoriality: Schedule 1, s 2(1) (and Schedule 2, s 2(1)) “declare and enact” that each State Parliament’s legislative powers include full power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the State that have extra‑territorial operation. Schedule 1, s 2(2) (and Schedule 2, s 2(2)) further declares that State Parliaments include all legislative powers that the UK Parliament could have exercised pre‑commencement for the State’s peace, order and good government. These are declaratory acts that widen the textual scope for State lawmaking in respect of extraterritorial operation and revocation of certain historical limits.

Removal of repugnancy to English law and Colonial Laws Validity Act: Schedule 1, s 3(1) repeals the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 in relation to post‑commencement State laws. Schedule 1, s 3(2) (and Schedule 2, s 3(2)) then provide that no law made by a State after commencement shall be void or inoperative on the ground it is repugnant to the law of England, or to provisions of any existing or future Act of the UK Parliament. This extinguishes a historic common law and statute constraint that rendered colonial laws invalid if they were repugnant to the law of England.

Finality of judicial decisions and Privy Council appeals: Schedule 1, s 11 (and Schedule 2, s 11) remove, subject to narrow savings, appeals to Her Majesty in Council from or in respect of decisions of Australian courts and repeal a list of UK enactments that enabled such appeals (the Australian Courts Act 1828 s 15, Judicial Committee Acts 1833 & 1844, Australian Constitutions Act 1850 s 28, Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 s 6). The section preserves limited grandfathering for appeals instituted before commencement, or where leave had been granted before commencement (s 11(4)).

Preservation of the Commonwealth Constitution and Statute of Westminster: Schedule 1, s 5 (and Schedule 2, s 5) expressly state that the new State powers are subject to the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act and the Australian Constitution, and do not operate to give force to State provisions that would repeal or be repugnant to this Act, the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, the Constitution, or the Statute of Westminster 1931. This places a check on State plenary claims by reference to superior constitutional instruments.

Manner and form: Schedule 1, s 6 (and Schedule 2, s 6) impose a qualitative requirement: a law made after commencement by a State Parliament respecting the constitution, powers or procedure of that Parliament shall be of no force unless made in such manner and form as required by law made by that Parliament. This allows, and arguably contemplates, State laws setting out internal entrenchment procedures.

Special amendment route: Schedule 1, s 15 (and Schedule 2, s 15) require that this Act or the Statute of Westminster insofar as part of Australian law may be repealed or amended only by a Commonwealth Act passed at the request or with the concurrence of the Parliaments of all the States, except where constitutional alteration under s 128 of the Commonwealth Constitution is utilised. The section also treats any Commonwealth Act repugnant to this Act as, to the extent of the repugnancy, deemed to repeal or amend the Act or Statute, creating a mechanism tying amendment to a joint Commonwealth‑States process.

Representative and gubernatorial mechanics: Schedule 1, s 7 (and Schedule 2, s 7) fix the Governor as Her Majesty's representative in each State, provide that the Governor exercises Her Majesty’s powers in respect of the State (with exceptions for appointment/termination of the Governor), and require that advice to Her Majesty on exercise of those powers be tendered by the State Premier.

Definitions and savings: Schedule sections contain interpretation clauses (s 16) that define “appeal”, “Australian court”, “Governor”, “State”, and cross‑references that vary slightly between the Schedules (e.g. treatment of Territories in Schedule 2). They also save certain pre‑commencement appeals and institutional arrangements (s 11(4)).

These concepts reposition legislative, executive and judicial authority within the federal structure by removing historic ties to English law and Privy Council appeals, while explicitly recognising limits imposed by the Australian Constitution and reserving special amendment pathways.

Primary institutional subjects are Parliaments and Governments at three tiers: the Parliament of the United Kingdom (declaratively curtailed), the Commonwealth Parliament, and each State Parliament and Government. The Act’s changes are expressed in terms of legal competence and institutional mechanics; consequentially, a range of actors and private parties are affected through the change in legal architecture.

State Parliaments and Governments: The Act expressly affects the legislative capacity of each State Parliament, expanding declared powers (Schedule 1, s 2(1)-(2)) and removing former legal constraints (Schedule 1, s 3). It also alters the executive mechanics in a State by specifying that the Governor is Her Majesty’s representative and that advice to Her Majesty shall be tendered by the Premier (Schedule 1, s 7(1), (5)). State executives lose any residual procedural channel to the UK Government for disallowance, reservation or suspension of State Acts (Schedule 1, ss 8-10).

Commonwealth institutions: The Commonwealth Parliament is affected in two ways. First, the South Australian Act is a formal request (s 2) that the Commonwealth enact the Australia Act text (Schedule 1), and a request/consent to enact Schedule 2. Second, the Commonwealth’s constitutional supremacy remains a constraint on State lawmaking by operation of Schedule 1, s 5 which preserves the Commonwealth Constitution and the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act as superior instruments. The Commonwealth is also expressly vested with the exclusive statutory route for repeal or amendment of the Australia Act or Statute of Westminster insofar as part of Australian law when such amendments are to be done by Commonwealth Act with the request/concurrence of all State Parliaments (Schedule 1, s 15).

United Kingdom Parliament and Government: The Act purports to terminate the capacity of the UK Parliament to make laws extending to Australia post‑commencement (Schedule 1, s 1), and to remove responsibility of the UK Government for State matters (Schedule 1, s 10). The South Australian instrument records the State's request/consent to a UK Act in the terms of Schedule 2 (s 3). Practically, subject to the limits of the text, it displaces the UK as a legislative and residual constitutional actor in relation to Australian States.

Judiciary and litigants: The Act ends, with limited savings, appeals to Her Majesty in Council from Australian courts (Schedule 1, s 11). This directly affects litigants who previously might seek final determination in the Privy Council and changes the appellate landscape by removing that route (with savings for appeals brought or leave granted before commencement).

Private persons and businesses: The instrument changes the regulatory environment by allowing States to make laws with extra‑territorial effect (Schedule 1, s 2(1)) and removing the repugnancy constraint to English law (Schedule 1, s 3(2)). Businesses operating across state borders, or engaged in activities that were formerly constrained by English law or subject to Privy Council precedents, face potential shifts: they may encounter new State laws with cross‑border effects and a domestic final appellate forum. Merchant shipping interests are implicated to the extent ss 735 and 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 as part of State law are repealed (Schedule 1, s 4), potentially altering State‑level maritime provisions.

Governors and vice‑regal offices: The Act clarifies the Governor’s place as Her Majesty’s representative (Schedule 1, s 7(1)-(2)) while preserving the Crown’s personal capacity to exercise powers when present in the State (Schedule 1, s 7(4)) and not removing the power to appoint or terminate Governors from Her Majesty (Schedule 1, s 7(3)). It also removes instruments that purported to require withholding of assent or reservation of State bills (Schedule 1, s 9).

Territories and the High Court: The Schedules’ definitions limit their immediate textual reach to “State” (Schedule 1, s 16), while Schedule 2 explicitly defines “Territory” in s 16; the instrument’s main operative statements focus on States. The Act does not expressly alter the High Court’s jurisdiction in these texts but removes external appellate routes, affecting finality.

In short, the instrument’s mechanics principally reallocate institutional powers: it removes a historic external constraint (the UK), enlarges and clarifies State lawmaking authority within the framework of the Constitution, and alters the appellate and vice‑regal mechanics that directly affect governments, courts and regulated private actors.

This statute is not a regulatory code imposing operational duties on private persons; rather, it redefines constitutional rights and institutional duties. The Act creates or records duties and rights across different actors, many of which are obligations or immunities tied to constitutional mechanics.

Rights and immunities of State Parliament and Government:

• Legislative competence: Each State Parliament is declared to have full power to enact laws for the peace, order and good government of the State with extra‑territorial operation (Schedule 1, s 2(1)). That is a right of legislative competence, subject to the Commonwealth Constitution and the Statute of Westminster (Schedule 1, s 5).
• Freedom from English repugnancy constraints: State laws made after commencement cannot be void or inoperative on the basis they are repugnant to English law, or provisions of UK Acts (Schedule 1, s 3(2)). This removes a prior limitation on the effectiveness of State statutes.
• Immunity from Royal disallowance and suspension: An Act of a State that has received the Governor’s assent shall not, after commencement, be subject to disallowance by Her Majesty nor have its operation suspended pending Her Majesty’s pleasure (Schedule 1, s 8). This is an immunity from a further stage of external review.

Duties and limits on State Parliaments:

• Manner and form requirement: A law made after commencement by a State Parliament “respecting the constitution, powers or procedure of the Parliament of the State” shall be of no force unless it is made in the manner and form required by a law made by that Parliament (Schedule 1, s 6). This imposes a duty on State legislators to comply with any internal entrenchment or procedural rules adopted by their Parliament.
• Subject to Commonwealth Constitution: The newly declared State powers are expressly subject to the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act and the Constitution (Schedule 1, s 5). State acts cannot validly repeal, amend or be repugnant to those higher instruments.

Duties and rights concerning the Governor and the Crown:

• Governor as representative: The Act specifies that Her Majesty's representative in each State is the Governor (Schedule 1, s 7(1)) and that powers and functions of Her Majesty in respect of a State are exercisable only by the Governor (Schedule 1, s 7(2)), with the exception of appointment/termination of Governors (s 7(3)). That establishes a duty for the Governor to exercise those powers when appropriate, subject to constitutional convention and State law.
• Advice channel: Advice to Her Majesty regarding the exercise of powers in respect of a State is to be tendered by the Premier of the State (Schedule 1, s 7(5)). This codifies the domestic ministerial channel for advice to the Crown on State matters.

Judicial finality and rights of litigants:

• Termination of Privy Council appeals: The right to appeal to Her Majesty in Council from Australian court decisions is terminated subject to narrow exceptions (Schedule 1, s 11). For litigants, this removes an external appellate remedy established by UK statute or prerogative, thereby concentrating final appellate rights within Australian courts.
• Savings: Appeals already instituted, or where leave was granted before commencement, are preserved (Schedule 1, s 11(4)). Those who had already secured leave retain that procedural right.

Amendment procedures and limitations:

• Special amendment route: The Act and the Statute of Westminster (as part of Australian law) may be repealed or amended by a Commonwealth Act passed at the request or with concurrence of the Parliaments of all the States and, subject to s 15(3), only in that manner (Schedule 1, s 15(1)-(2)). That creates a procedural duty on the Commonwealth and States to coordinate for such amendments.
• Constitutional alteration exception: Section 15(3) saves the Parliament of the Commonwealth exercising powers conferred by an alteration to the Constitution made under s 128, thereby recognising the supreme constitutional route for change.

No criminal sanctions or administrative fines are created in the text; duties are structural and constitutional rather than penal. The primary remedies against non‑compliance are institutional or judicial: a court may conclude a State law lacks force or is void for failure to comply with the Constitution or other operative provisions (e.g. a law not made in the required manner and form per s 6 may be "of no force or effect").

In operational terms, the Act shifts rights (legislative competence and immunity from royal disallowance) to State Parliaments while preserving duties (adherence to the Commonwealth Constitution; compliance with manner and form where prescribed). It also places final appellate authority within Australian institutions by removing the external Privy Council route, affecting litigants’ practical rights to appeal.

The statute does not create discrete criminal offences or administrative penalty regimes. Enforcement of the Act’s effects is structural and judicial rather than penal. The mechanisms by which the Act’s commands will be given practical effect are predominantly declaratory, procedural and adjudicative.

Judicial enforcement and remedy:

• Voidness and inoperability: Several provisions operate by rendering certain acts or requirements of no force or effect. For example, s 3(2) of Schedule 1 declares that no State law made after commencement shall be void or inoperative on the ground of repugnancy to the law of England; conversely, s 6 declares that certain State laws shall be of no force or effect unless made in specified manner and form. Enforceability thus lies in judicial determination of whether a law is void or of no force (Schedule 1, ss 3(2), 6).
• Adjudication of competence and repugnancy: Courts will be the appropriate forum to determine whether a State law is within the declared State powers, whether it contravenes the Commonwealth Constitution, or whether a law has been properly enacted in required manner and form. Schedule 1, s 5 explicitly states the new State rights are subject to the Commonwealth Constitution, implying judicial review against constitutional standards.

Appeals and jurisdictional enforcement:

• Removal of Privy Council appeals: Schedule 1, s 11 removes appeals to Her Majesty in Council from Australian courts. Enforcement of that removal is practical: courts will refuse to entertain or to forward appeals to the Privy Council post‑commencement (subject to savings in s 11(4)). That is an enforceable procedural bar executed through judicial practice and administrative processes of courts and registries.
• Repeal of enabling UK enactments: The Schedules repeal UK Acts or provisions that had enabled external jurisdiction (Schedule 1, s 11(2)-(3)), thereby removing statutory pathways for external enforcement; the effect is enforced by domestic courts recognising the absence of those external statutory bases.

Political and constitutional procedures:

• Limits on Crown powers: The instrument removes mechanisms allowing the exercise of Crown or UK Government control such as disallowance and reservation (Schedule 1, ss 8-9). The enforcement of those removals is political and administrative: a Governor and State Government will simply no longer be bound to withhold assent or reserve a Bill because of a purported UK requirement that is “of no force or effect” (Schedule 1, s 9). Should an official purport to act contrary to the Act, the remedy is again judicial or political (judicial review or political remedy such as censure or removal).

Amendment safeguards and procedural compliance:

• Special process for amendment/repeal of Act and Statute of Westminster: The text creates a required process for repeal or amendment through a Commonwealth Act passed with the request/concurrence of all State Parliaments (Schedule 1, s 15). Enforcement of that procedural rule would be political and judicial: a purported repeal by ordinary Commonwealth process inconsistent with s 15 could be subject to challenge and declared ineffective to the extent inconsistent, given s 15(2) contemplates deeming inconsistent Commonwealth acts as effecting the repeal only when passed in the special mode.

No express criminal liability, civil sanctions, or administrative penalty provisions are contained. The Act relies on constitutional ordering and court enforcement: courts will apply the provisions to determine validity and resolve disputes about competence, method of enactment, and appeal rights. Practitioners should therefore expect judicial processes , constitutional litigation and declaratory relief , to be the primary route for enforcing and interpreting the Act’s provisions.

The statute is framed as an overlay to existing constitutional instruments and to the corpus of State, Commonwealth and historical UK laws. The Schedules contain express saving clauses and repeal clauses that shape interaction with prior sources and future laws.

Supremacy and subordination: The Act expressly preserves the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act and the Constitution of the Commonwealth as superior instruments. Schedule 1, s 5(a) states that the declarations in ss 2 and 3(2) are subject to these instruments; s 5(b) provides they do not operate so as to give effect to a State provision that would repeal, amend or be repugnant to this Act, the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, the Constitution, or the Statute of Westminster 1931. Practically, this positions the changes as subordinate to the Commonwealth constitutional order, signalling that State legislative expansion is bounded by federal constitutional limits.

Colonial Laws Validity Act and English law: Schedule 1, s 3(1) repeals the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 in its application to State laws made after commencement, and s 3(2) declares that State laws post‑commencement shall not be void for repugnancy to English law. This removes a historic statutory constraint and the common law rule vindicating English legal supremacy within Australian colonial law, permitting State legislation even where divergent from English law, subject to federal constitutional limits.

Statute of Westminster: The Act repeals specific sections of the Statute of Westminster 1931 insofar as they are part of Australian law (Schedule 1, s 12), and s 15 contains a special amending/repeal procedure for the Statute as incorporated into Australian law. The Statute of Westminster remains relevant because s 5 explicitly limits the new State powers in that they cannot override the Statute of Westminster insofar as in force, until amended or repealed under the special procedure.

UK enactments enabling appeals: Schedule 1, s 11(2) and (3) repeal certain UK enactments in their application to Australian law (Australian Courts Act 1828 s 15; Judicial Committee Acts 1833 and 1844; Australian Constitutions Act 1850 s 28; Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 s 6). This excises statutory bases for appeals to Her Majesty in Council.

Commonwealth law and repugnancy: Schedule 1, s 15(2) contains a statutory interaction rule: a Commonwealth Act repugnant to this Act or the Statute of Westminster as part of Australian law will be deemed, to the extent of repugnancy, an Act to repeal or amend the Act, Statute or provision to which it is repugnant. That provides an internal statutory mechanism by which Commonwealth legislation can be treated as effecting amendment when it conflicts, but s 15(1) requires that repeal or amendment of the Act or the Statute of Westminster in Australian law be by Commonwealth Act passed at the request or with concurrence of all State Parliaments, subject to s 15(3). The combined effect is to complicate interaction between Commonwealth legislative supremacy and the entrenchment of the Australia Act and Statute of Westminster.

State lawmaking and internal constitutional laws: Schedule 1, s 6 establishes a cross‑interaction between State laws: laws that affect the constitution, powers or procedure of a State Parliament must be made in the manner and form required by law of that Parliament. This gives each State the capacity to regulate and potentially entrench its own constitutional amendment procedures; it also means State internal laws can condition the validity of subsequent State enactments, creating internal regulatory hierarchies.

Merchant shipping and admiralty sources: Schedule 1, s 4 repeals ss 735 and 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 insofar as they are part of State law. That interacts with maritime law and any Commonwealth maritime statutes. The text does not itself prescribe the new legislative or jurisdictional allocation but removes two specific provisions from the application of UK merchant shipping law to State law.

Territories and the High Court: Schedule 2 contains slightly different interpretation provisions (s 16 refers expressly to “Territory” and the “High Court of Australia” in the definition of Australian court). Those definitions affect how the Schedules operate with respect to Territories and federal judicial institutions.

Taken together, these interaction rules create a latticework where State legislative freedom is increased vis‑à‑vis historical English law but remains bound by the Commonwealth Constitution and by special amendment procedures. Practitioners should read any State law that exercises extra‑territorial effect or departs from English precedents against the Commonwealth Constitution and check for whether a State law affecting parliamentary procedure has complied with any local manner‑and‑form requirements.

The South Australian instrument is titled Australia Acts (Request) Act 1985 and the legislative notes attached record the principal Act as year 1985, No 95, with assent and commencement dated 31 October 1985. The Schedule texts set out two related Acts' drafts: the Australia Act (Schedule 1) and the Australia (Request and Consent) Act (Schedule 2). Each Schedule contains its own citation and commencement rules: Schedule 1 (Australia Act) provides it may be cited as the Australia Act 1986 and that it shall come into operation on a day and at a time fixed by proclamation (Schedule 1, s 17(1)-(2)); Schedule 2 (Australia (Request and Consent) Act) provides it may be cited as the Australia (Request and Consent) Act 1985 and that it shall come into operation on the day on which it receives Royal Assent (Schedule 2, ss 1-2). The South Australian Act itself records its short title at s 1 and records that the State requests and consents as specified (ss 2-4).

The text includes a procedural entrenchment on amendments and repeal for this Act and the Statute of Westminster insofar as part of Australian law. Schedule 1, s 15(1) and Schedule 2, s 15(1) provide that the Australia Act or the Statute of Westminster, as part of Australian law, may be repealed or amended only by a Commonwealth Act passed at the request or with the concurrence of the Parliaments of all the States and, subject to s 15(3), only in that manner. Section 15(3) saves changes effected in accordance with s 128 of the Constitution (i.e. referendum amendment), thereby leaving the constitutional amendment route open. Section 15(2) provides a statutory rule that a Commonwealth Act repugnant to this Act shall to the extent of repugnancy be deemed an Act to repeal or amend it; that is an internal amending treatment. These are built‑in constraints on ordinary repeal.

The legislative history block attached at the end of the source records the principal Act’s year and assent/commencement dates for the South Australian enactment (1985 No 95; assent 31.10.1985; commencement 31.10.1985). The Schedules’ own commencement rules indicate that their operation depended on separate proclamation or Royal Assent events.

No subsequent amendments to the South Australian Act are reflected in the text you provided. The text anticipates future amendment routes: either by Commonwealth Act passed with request/concurrence of all State Parliaments (Schedule 1, s 15(1)) or by constitutional alteration under s 128 (Schedule 1, s 15(3)). Practitioners working with this instrument should therefore note the higher bar created for altering the Australia Act or the incorporated portions of the Statute of Westminster in Australian law, and should consult the legislative histories of the Commonwealth and UK counterparts when considering later changes, as those Schedules contemplate separate operational steps (e.g. proclamation or UK Royal Assent).

The text supplied contains no reported judicial decisions, case law references, or litigation history. The Schedules list historical UK Acts (for repeal in relation to appeals), but they do not include or cite any judicial authority or proceedings concerning the operation or interpretation of the provisions.

Because the Act reorganises constitutional relationships and creates potential points of legal uncertainty (for example, the scope of State extra‑territorial legislative power in s 2, the interpretation of “manner and form” requirements in s 6, or the effect of s 15 on amendment routes), the text is manifestly susceptible to constitutional litigation. The potential areas of contest, apparent from the instrument, include:

• Whether a State law purporting to exercise broad extra‑territorial effect falls within s 2(1) and remains consistent with the Commonwealth Constitution (Schedule 1, s 2(1); s 5 saves the Constitution).
• Whether a given State procedural or constitutional law satisfies the “manner and form” requirements imposed by s 6, and whether those requirements themselves can be altered or entrenched by the State in a way that affects validity.
• Whether the repeal of repugnancy to English law (s 3(2)) affects the application of pre‑existing common law doctrines insofar as they are part of Australian law.
• The legal effect and justiciability of s 15’s special amending route for this Act and for the Statute of Westminster insofar as part of Australian law, including whether a Commonwealth Act inconsistent with s 15 can be treated as an effective amendment in the absence of the specified request/concurrence.
• The practical consequences of s 11’s abolition of Privy Council appeals and the interpretation of the savings in s 11(4) as to which appeals survive.

Statutory language in the Schedules signals likely judicial engagement on interpretation (for example, definitions in s 16), but no cases are identified within the text. For practitioners advising clients or conducting litigation, these are the points to monitor and to raise in any constitutional challenge or advisory opinion. Absent case law in the provided text, the legal arguments and outcomes must be developed by reference to the constitutional framework present in the instrument and to the likely processes of judicial review.

This instrument hides several practical traps for drafters, litigators and public officials; they arise from textual choices that create ambiguous boundaries or new procedural hurdles.

Manner and form circularity: Schedule 1, s 6 declares that a law made after commencement by a State Parliament respecting the constitution, powers or procedure of that Parliament shall be of no force or effect unless made in such manner and form as may from time to time be required by a law made by that Parliament, whether made before or after commencement. That gives each State Parliament the power to prescribe, and later alter, the manner and form for such laws. The circularity lies in allowing a Parliament to set its own procedural entrenchment rules which could be later altered by ordinary majority unless a prior entrenching law had itself required a change in a more rigorous manner. Practitioners must not assume that s 6 creates predictable entrenchment; the actual rigidity depends entirely on what manner and form rules a State has enacted (or will enact), and on whether a State’s entrenchment law itself is vulnerable to subsequent ordinary amendment.

Scope of “extra‑territorial operation”: Schedule 1, s 2(1) declares that State Parliaments have full power to make laws having extra‑territorial operation. That is a broad textual grant but s 2(2) simultaneously clarifies that nothing in s 2(2) confers any capacity that the State did not have immediately before commencement to engage in relations with countries outside Australia. The two clauses must be read together: States gain extra‑territorial legislative reach for peace, order and good government, but do not by this instrument acquire independent foreign relations capacity. Practitioners should not assume that s 2 permits a State to pursue foreign policy or enter into international agreements in a way incompatible with federal competence; the practical boundary is the Commonwealth Constitution and other federal law (see Schedule 1, s 5).

Repugnancy to English law removed, but Commonwealth Constitution preserved: Schedule 1, s 3(2) removes the repugnancy rule; however, s 5(a) and (b) expressly make ss 2 and 3(2) subject to the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act and the Constitution of the Commonwealth. A State law that departs from English‑derived common law or statute will survive s 3(2) but may still be invalid if repugnant to the Commonwealth Constitution. Do not treat s 3(2) as an unconstrained green light to create laws conflicting with federal powers.

Amendment and repeal complexity: Section 15 creates a requirement that the Act or the Statute of Westminster in Australian law may only be repealed or amended by a Commonwealth Act passed at the request or with the concurrence of the Parliaments of all the States. That special procedure can be a barrier to future reform. However, subsection (3) explicitly preserves the constitutional amendment route under s 128. Advisers should not assume ordinary Commonwealth legislative supremacy will suffice to alter these instruments; a coordinated Commonwealth‑States procedure or constitutional referendum may be required.

Privy Council savings: Section 11(4) saves appeals instituted before commencement and appeals where leave had been granted before commencement. Practitioners must carefully examine the timing of leave applications and of initiation of appeals. A client who obtained leave before commencement may retain the Privy Council route; late applications will not revive it.

No direct penalty regime: Because the Act relies on structural change enforced by courts and institutions rather than penalties, enforcement is slower and driven by litigation or political process. Parties relying on the Act for rights should be prepared for declaratory litigation rather than immediate administrative remedies.

Governor appointment/termination exception: Schedule 1, s 7(3) specifically states subsection (2), which confines exercise of Her Majesty's powers to the Governor, does not apply to the power to appoint or terminate the appointment of the Governor. This preserves a residual Crown prerogative or UK involvement on appointment/termination. Practitioners advising on gubernatorial succession or disputes should note that s 7(3) leaves that field distinct from the general confinement of Crown powers to Governors.

Merchant shipping changes are limited: Schedule 1, s 4 repeals specified sections of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 insofar as part of State law. The scope is narrow , limited to two sections , and should not be read as wholesale transfer of maritime regulatory competence. Maritime practitioners must map the remaining maritime statutes to see the precise effects.

Definitions matter: Schedule 1, s 16 includes specific definitions (e.g. “Australian court” excludes the High Court; “appeal” includes petitions and complaints in the nature of an appeal). Slight differences between the Schedules in definitions (Schedule 2 explicitly defines “Territory” and “the Commonwealth”) can produce interpretive consequences. Close reading of the definitions is essential.

In sum, the “gotchas” are about procedural detail (manner and form), timing (savings for prior appeals), and the interplay between broad declaratory grants and existing constitutional constraints. Practitioners should avoid treating the Schedule declarations as unconstrained transfers of power; the operative boundaries are in the definitions and preservation clauses.

Compliance obligations fall mainly on governments, draftsmen, and courts rather than on private businesses, because the Act restructures constitutional competences. The practical checklist below is grounded in the Act's text and highlights steps to ensure legal validity of laws, State procedures, and litigation strategy.

For State Parliaments and drafters:

• When drafting laws that “respect the constitution, powers or procedure” of the State Parliament, check whether the State has enacted a manner‑and‑form law and comply precisely with its requirements (Schedule 1, s 6). If such a law requires special majorities, referenda, or other formalities, ensure those precepts are strictly followed; failure renders a law “of no force or effect” under s 6.
• For laws intended to have extra‑territorial effect, analyse the scope of s 2(1): draft express territorial application and assess whether the law is within State competence and not inconsistent with the Commonwealth Constitution (Schedule 1, s 2(1)-(2); s 5).
• When revising existing State laws to take advantage of the removal of the repugnancy doctrine (s 3(2)), check for potential conflicts with Commonwealth legislative powers or constitutional guarantees. The removal of English repugnancy does not insulate a law from invalidity under the Constitution (Schedule 1, s 5).
• If State parliaments wish to entrench their own amendment procedures, enact clear “manner and form” provisions well before relying on them to validate later constitutional or procedural laws; avoid circular drafting that could be attacked as self‑serving or inadequate.

For State executives, Governors and Premiers:

• The Governor remains Her Majesty’s representative and exercises Crown powers in the State; exercise vice‑regal powers with awareness that advice to Her Majesty concerning State matters is to be tendered by the Premier (Schedule 1, s 7(1)-(2), (5)). Maintain records of advice and communications to avoid procedural challenges.
• Do not rely on or act upon any purported UK Government or Crown instructions that claim authority to disallow, reserve or suspend State Acts; Schedule 1, ss 8-9 render such instruments of no force or effect in so far as they purport to require withholding of assent or reservation.

For Commonwealth drafters and counsel:

• If proposing amendments to the Australia Act or to the Statute of Westminster insofar as part of Australian law, ensure compliance with s 15: obtain the request or concurrence of all State Parliaments or proceed by constitutional amendment under s 128 where appropriate (Schedule 1, s 15(1), (3)).
• When passing Commonwealth Acts that may be repugnant to the Australia Act, be aware of s 15(2) which deems a repugnant Commonwealth Act to be an Act to repeal or amend the subject Act to the extent of repugnancy. Plan the legislative strategy accordingly and secure the necessary State concurrence if the drafters intend to alter the machinery.

For litigators and court registries:

• Where an appeal to Her Majesty in Council is contemplated, check timing: appeals instituted or leave granted before commencement remain possible under s 11(4). Document dates of applications and leave decisions.
• For constitutional challenges to State laws, prepare arguments on whether the law was enacted in the required manner and form (s 6), whether it impermissibly contravenes the Commonwealth Constitution (s 5), and whether it purports to expand State foreign relations beyond the pre‑commencement capacity (s 2(2)).
• For cases invoking merchant shipping provisions, identify whether ss 735 and 736 Merchant Shipping Act 1894 remain part of State law or have been repealed insofar as applicable (s 4).

For businesses and regulated entities:

• If operating across State borders or internationally, review exposure to new State laws that purport to have extra‑territorial application (s 2(1)). Map compliance obligations across jurisdictions and update compliance programs where states have enacted divergent substantive rules post‑commencement.
• For entities affected by the removal of Privy Council appeal routes, note that finality of dispute resolution lies within the Australian court system post‑commencement (s 11). Legal strategies, especially in constitutional litigation or matters of national significance, should anticipate this altered appellate landscape.

Record‑keeping and transitional issues:

• Maintain contemporaneous records of enactment, assent and proclamation dates. The Schedules have differing commencement mechanics (Schedule 1 requires proclamation; Schedule 2 comes into operation on Royal Assent). Precise timing can be determinative for savings and transitional rights (e.g. s 11(4)).

In short, compliance under this Act is about procedural correctness, federal constitutional alignment and careful timing. Entities must align drafting and legislative strategy with the manner and form rules, respect the preserved supremacy of the Commonwealth Constitution, and track commencement and leave timelines for appellate matters.