Radiocommunications (Spectrum Licence Allocation – Multi-band Auction) Determination 2017
67Consequences of affiliation between winning bidders, or between winning bidders and existing licensees — 1800 MHz lots
Start here
Get a plain-English read of 67
Turn the raw legal text into a practical explanation grounded in Radiocommunications (Spectrum Licence Allocation – Multi-band Auction) Determination 2017.
67 Consequences of affiliation between winning bidders, or between winning bidders and existing licensees – 1800 MHz lots
(1) If: (a) the ACMA notifies one or more winning bidders under subsection 66(1) that it is satisfied the winning bidders are affiliated with an existing 1800 MHz licensee; and (b) the existing 1800 MHz licensee is not also a winning bidder for a 1800 MHz lot; and (c) the number of lots won by the winning bidders, when the lot size of those lots is aggregated with the part or parts of the spectrum that the existing 1800 MHz licensee, or the specified group of persons that includes the existing 1800 MHz licensee, may use in the 1800 MHz band, exceeds the 1800 MHz allocation limits; the ACMA: (d) must not issue spectrum licences to the winning bidders that would exceed the 1800 MHz allocation limits; and (e) must not issue spectrum licences to the winning bidders except in accordance with this section. (2) If: (a) the ACMA notifies two or more winning bidders under subsection 66(2) that it is satisfied the winning bidders are affiliated; and (b) the number of lots won by the winning bidders, when the lot size of those lots is aggregated with a part or parts of the spectrum that the winning bidders, or the specified group of persons that includes the winning bidders, may use in the 1800 MHz band, exceeds the 1800 MHz allocation limits; the ACMA: (c) must not issue spectrum licences to the winning bidders that would exceed the 1800 MHz allocation limits; and (d) must not issue spectrum licences to the winning bidders except in accordance with this section.
Note: One of the winning bidders may also be an existing 1800 MHz licensee.
(3) For each winning bidder, the ACMA must identify, in relation to the 1800 MHz lots for which the bidder is a winning bidder (the total lots), each lot where the aggregate of: (a) the lot size of the lot; and (b) the part or parts of the spectrum that the applicant, or the specified group of persons that includes the applicant, may use in the 1800 MHz band; does not exceed the 1800 MHz allocation limits. (4) If, for a winning bidder, the ACMA identifies one or more of total lots under subsection (3): (a) subject to this instrument, the winning bidder is entitled to be issued a spectrum licence for those lots; and (b) the ACMA must not issue a spectrum licence for the remaining total lots to the winning bidder.
Note: The winning bidder must still pay the balance of the winning price before being issued the spectrum licence, in accordance with Division 4. The balance of the winning price is calculated on the basis of the lots for which the bidder is the winning bidder, regardless of the effect of this section.
(5) If no lot can be identified under subsection (3), the ACMA must not issue a spectrum licence for any 1800 MHz lot to that bidder. (6) If, as a result of the operation of this section, a spectrum licence is not issued for a lot for which there is a winning bidder, section 76 applies to that lot.