Turn the raw legal text into a practical explanation grounded in Radiocommunications (Spectrum Licence Allocation – 850/900 MHz Band) Determination 2021.
A maintain bid requested by a bidder is applied in full, such that, for the clock round in which the maintain bid is requested, the bidder’s posted demand for lots of the product is equal to the bidder’s start demand for the lots of that product for the clock round.
Part 3 Arrangements for primary stage
3 Entries in the auction system before the first clock round – pre-bidding phase
Start demands
(1) Before the pre-bidding phase, the auction manager must enter in the auction system each bidder’s:
(a) provisional start demands for the lots of each product, as recorded in the register; and
(b) provisional minimum spectrum requirements (if any) for the lots of each product, as recorded in the register; and
(c) allocation limits, as recorded in the register, applicable to the major population products; and
(d) allocation limits, as recorded in the register, applicable to the regional products.
(2) If a set-aside participant is not entitled to bid during the primary stage and the secondary stage:
(a) that set-aside participant’s provisional start demands for the lots of each product is zero; and
(b) the bidder has no provisional minimum spectrum requirement for the lots of each product; and
(c) subsection (3) does not apply in relation to that set-aside participant.
Note: If a set-aside participant fails to comply with particular requirements in this instrument, they may not be entitled to bid during the primary stage and the secondary stage.
(3) During the pre-bidding phase, a bidder may, using the auction system:
(a) enter the bidder’s valid start demands, by changing or confirming the bidder’s provisional start demands, for the lots of each product for the first clock round; and
(b) enter the bidder’s actual minimum spectrum requirements (if any) for the lots of each product (other than a 900 lower product), by:
(i) for the 850 major population product or the 850 regional product – entering 2 lots as the minimum spectrum requirement, or removing the provisional minimum spectrum requirement; or
(ii) for the 900 upper major population product, if the bidder is not a set-aside participant – entering 2 lots as the minimum spectrum requirement, or removing the provisional minimum spectrum requirement; or
(iii) for the 900 upper regional product, if the bidder is not a set-aside participant – entering 2 lots as the minimum spectrum requirement, or removing the provisional minimum spectrum requirement.
Note: A bidder may also be taken to make an entry in the circumstances specified in section 64.
(4) A change or a confirmation made under subclause (3) does not have effect until the end of the pre-bidding phase.
Note: Subclause (3) allows a bidder to change a provisional start demand for lots of a product, or provisional minimum spectrum requirement for lots of a product, more than once during the pre-bidding phase. The start demand for lots of a product that is in the system at the end of the pre-bidding phase will be the bidder’s start demand for lots of that product for the first clock round. The minimum spectrum requirement for lots of a product that is in the system at the end of the pre-bidding phase will be the bidder’s minimum spectrum requirement for the lots of that product for the primary stage.
(5) If a bidder does not change or confirm the bidder’s provisional start demands for the lots of a product for the first clock round under subsection (3), the bidder’s provisional start demand for the lots of the product, as recorded in the register, is the bidder’s start demand for the lots of the product for the first clock round.
(6) If a bidder does not act under paragraph (3)(b), the bidder’s provisional minimum spectrum requirement (if any) for the lots of the product, as recorded in the register, is the bidder’s minimum spectrum requirement for the lots of the product.
Start demand validity rules – pre-bidding phase
(7) For the purposes of paragraph (3)(a), a start demand of a bidder for lots of a product is valid if all of the following apply in relation to the start demand:
(a) if the product is a major population product – the total size of the sum of:
(i) the start demand for the lots of the product; and
(ii) the start demand for lots of each other major population product; and
(iv) if the bidder is a set-aside participant – 1 set-aside lot of the 900 upper major population product;
does not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to the major population products;
(b) if the product is a regional product – the total size of the sum of:
(i) the start demand for the lots of the product; and
(ii) the start demand for lots of each other regional product; and
(iii) if the bidder is a set-aside participant – 1 set-aside lot of the 900 upper regional product;
does not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to the regional products;
(c) the number of lots for the bidder’s start demand of the product is not greater than the number of lots for the supply of the product.
Note 2: For the 900 upper products, supply depends upon whether one or more set-aside applicants have elected to take up set-aside lots.
(8) For the purposes of paragraph (3)(a), a start demand of a bidder for lots of a product is valid if the initial eligibility points for all start demands of the bidder for lots of any product, as recorded in the auction system (whether changed or confirmed under paragraph (3)(a) or taken to be entered under subclause (5)) is less than or equal to the maximum eligibility points of the bidder.
Note: Any attempt by a bidder to change a provisional start demand for lots of a product under paragraph (3)(a) will not be permitted if it would increase the initial eligibility points of the bidder above the maximum eligibility points of the bidder.
After the end of the pre-bidding phase
(9) After the end time of the pre-bidding phase, the auction manager must provide the following information to each bidder, using the auction system:
(a) the bidder’s start demand for the lots of each product for the first clock round;
(b) the bidder’s minimum spectrum requirement (if any) for the lots of each product;
(c) the bidder’s initial eligibility points.
Interpretation
(10) In this clause, initial eligibility points has the meaning given by paragraph 12(1)(a) of this Schedule.
4 Setting bid increment percentage and eligibility requirement percentage
Bid increment percentage
(1) Before the first clock round, the auction manager must set a percentage (bid increment percentage) for the lots of each product to be applied in calculating the clock price for the lots of a product in a clock round.
Note: The auction manager may vary the bid increment percentage set under this subclause: see clause 9.
(2) Before the first clock round, the auction manager must notify each bidder of the bid increment percentage for the lots of each product.
(3) The bid increment percentage:
(a) may be different for different products; and
(b) may be different for the same product for different clock rounds.
Eligibility requirement percentage
(4) Before the first clock round, the auction manager must set a percentage (eligibility requirement percentage) to be applied in calculating the activity target during a clock round.
Note: The auction manager may vary the eligibility requirement percentage set under this subclause: see clause 10.
(5) Before the first clock round, the auction manager must notify each bidder of the eligibility requirement percentage.
(6) The eligibility requirement percentage may be different for different clock rounds.
5 Schedule for clock rounds
(1) Clock rounds must start and end between 9:00 am and 5:00 pm on working days, other than a recess day.
(2) The auction manager must prepare an anticipated schedule for the clock rounds between those times.
(3) There is no maximum or minimum length for a clock round, and no maximum or minimum length for the interval between two clock rounds.
(4) There is no upper or lower limit on the number of clock rounds per day.
(5) Subject to section 59, the auction manager (using the auction system) will indicate to each bidder for the first clock round of a given day the anticipated schedule of clock rounds for that day at least 1 hour before the start time of the first clock round of the day. However, the auction manager may, at any time, modify the schedule of clock rounds. If this occurs, the auction manager must tell each bidder in writing of the change as soon as practicable.
6 Recess days
(1) The auction manager may declare a working day to be a recess day on which there will be no clock rounds.
(2) Before declaring a recess day, the auction manager must:
(a) give bidders an opportunity to comment on the proposed declaration; and
(b) take into account any comments received.
(3) If the auction manager decides to declare a working day to be a recess day, the auction manager must tell each bidder in writing.
7 Clock rounds
(1) Each lot of a product to which this Schedule applies is available for bidding:
(a) in the first clock round; and
(b) in each subsequent clock round until the final clock round.
Note: Bidding does not close on a single product – all products close together in the final clock round. The clock price, for lots of a product, pauses if excess demand is not greater than zero on lots of the product after the clock round and no decrease bid was applied in full or in part for lots of the product during the bid processing for the clock round.
(2) Subject to this Schedule, each bidder may make a bid on lots of a product available for bidding during a clock round.
Note: Clause 14 sets out the general rules for a bidder to make a bid in a clock round; not all bidders may be able to make a bid on lots of a product during a clock round. For the validity of bids, see clause 15.
8 Information available for clock rounds of the primary stage
(1) Before the start time of each clock round, the auction manager must provide the following information to each bidder for that clock round, using the auction system:
(a) the start time of the clock round;
(b) the end time of the clock round;
(c) for the lots of each product available for bidding:
(i) the opening price that will apply to the lots of the product in the clock round; and
(ii) the clock price that will apply to the lots of the product in the clock round;
(d) the excess demand for the lots of that product;
(e) the eligibility points of the bidder for the clock round;
(f) the bid increment percentage for the clock round;
(g) the eligibility requirement percentage for the clock round;
(h) any other information the auction manager considers necessary or convenient to conduct the primary stage of the auction.
(2) After the end time of each clock round, the auction manager must provide the following information to each bidder for that clock round, using the auction system:
(a) the posted prices for the lots of each product in the clock round;
(b) the posted demands of the bidder for the lots of each product in the clock round;
(c) any other information the auction manager considers necessary or convenient to conduct the primary stage of the auction.
9 Changing bid increment percentage
(1) The auction manager may, at any time during the primary stage, change the bid increment percentage for the lots of a product to be applied in calculating the clock price for the lots of a product in a clock round.
Note: For the bid increment percentage, see subclause 4(1).
(2) Before changing the bid increment percentage for the lots of a product, the auction manager must:
(b) give each bidder an opportunity to comment on the proposed change within the time (not less than 1 hour) set by the auction manager; and
(3) If the auction manager decides to change the bid increment percentage for the lots of a product, the auction manager must notify each bidder for the clock round when the change takes effect, before that clock round.
Note: The clock price for lots of a product could only be reduced if the primary stage of the auction is restarted either from the first clock round of the primary stage or from a previous clock round, under section 65.
10 Changing eligibility requirement percentage
(1) The auction manager may, at any time during the primary stage, change the eligibility requirement percentage to be applied in calculating the activity target during a clock round.
Note: For the eligibility requirement percentage, see subclause 4(4).
(2) Before changing the eligibility requirement percentage, the auction manager must:
(b) give each bidder an opportunity to comment on the proposed change within the time (not less than 1 hour) set by the auction manager; and
(3) If the auction manager decides to change the eligibility requirement percentage, the auction manager must notify each bidder for the clock round when the change takes effect, before that clock round.
Part 4 Bidding in the primary stage
11 Definitions
(1) In this Part, activity target, for a bidder for a clock round, means the figure obtained by multiplying:
(a) the amount of the bidder’s eligibility points for that clock round; by
(b) the eligibility requirement percentage applicable for that clock round;
rounded up to the nearest integer.
(2) In this Part, a bidder is active on lots of a product for a clock round if the bidder’s posted demand for the lots of the product, after the end time of a clock round, is greater than zero.
12 Eligibility points
(1) For a clock round, a bidder’s eligibility points are:
(a) for the first clock round – the total value of the lots of each product (in eligibility points) for the start demands of the bidder as recorded in the auction system under paragraph 3(3)(a) or subclause 3(5) (initial eligibility points); or
(b) for any other clock round – the lesser of:
(i) the bidder’s eligibility points in the previous clock round; and
(ii) the bidder’s eligibility points calculated in accordance with subclause 13(2).
Note: This means that, if a bidder’s posted demands for the lots of each product are zero for any clock round, the bidder’s eligibility points will become zero and the bidder will not be entitled to bid in subsequent clock rounds for the lots of any products.
(2) A bidder is not entitled to bid in a clock round in such a way that:
(a) the total value of the lots of each product, in eligibility points, for all the start demands of the bidder; plus
(b) the total value of the lots of each product, in eligibility points, for all the increase bids of the bidder; minus
(c) the total value of the lots of each product, in eligibility points, for all the decrease bids of the bidder;
is greater than the bidder’s eligibility points for that clock round.
13 Reduction in eligibility points
(1) If a bidder does not meet its activity target for a clock round (the current clock round), the bidder’s eligibility points for the following clock round (the next clock round) are calculated in accordance subclause (2).
Note: The application of subclause (2) always results in a reduction in eligibility points. There is nothing the bidder can do once the primary stage of the auction is under way to recover eligibility points.
(2) For subclause (1), the bidder’s eligibility points for the next clock round are calculated by the following formula:
E is the bidder’s eligibility points for the next clock round.
R is the greater of:
(a) the total value of the lots, in eligibility points, on which the bidder was active in the current clock round; or
(b) the result, in eligibility points, of:
(i) the total value of the lots of each product, in eligibility points, for all the start demands of the bidder; plus
(ii) the total value of the lots of each product, in eligibility points, for all the increase bids of the bidder; minus
(iii) the total value of the lots of each product, in eligibility points, for all the decrease bids of the bidder;
for the current clock round.
P is the eligibility requirement percentage that applied for the current clock round.
Example: A bidder’s eligibility points at the start of a clock round is 20,000. The eligibility percentage requirement that applies in the clock round is 60% (i.e. 12,000 eligibility points).
After the clock round, the bidder is active for only 10,000 eligibility points, based on all of its posted demands, so eligibility points will be reduced for the next clock round as a result of under-activity.
The bidder’s eligibility points for the next clock round (E) is its current activity (R = 10,000) divided by the eligibility requirement percentage (P = 60% or 0.6) that applied in the current clock round, which is 16,667 eligibility points.
14 Clock round bids
(1) A bidder, other than a bidder to which subclause (2) applies, is entitled to bid in a clock round if the bidder’s eligibility points for the clock round are greater than zero.
(2) If a set-aside participant is not entitled to bid during the primary stage and the secondary stage, that set-aside participant is not entitled to bid in any clock round.
(3) A bidder may not make more than one bid for the lots of each product in each clock round.
(4) Except where subsection 64(1) or 64(2) applies, a bidder’s bid in a clock round is taken to have been made when the bid has passed data validation checks that are performed by the auction system.
Note: Subsection 64(1) allows the auction manager to permit a bid to be made other than by using the auction system, in certain circumstances. Subsection 64(2) allows the auction manager to permit a bid to be made after a clock round has ended, in certain circumstances.
(5) A bidder may change, delete or replace a bid in the auction system during a clock round as often as desired, subject to the data validation checks performed by the auction system. The bid for the lots of a product that is treated as binding for a bidder is the bid in the auction system at the end time of the clock round.
Note: A bidder may also be taken to make a bid as permitted by section 64.
15 Validity of bids
(1) A bid in a clock round is valid if all of the following apply in relation to the bid:
(a) except where subsection 64(2) applies, the bid is received by the auction system between the start time and the end time of the clock round;
(b) for an increase bid or a decrease bid for lots of a product – the bid price is:
(i) not less than the opening price; and
(ii) not greater than the clock price;
for the lots of the product for the clock round;
(c) for an increase bid or a decrease bid – the bid price is a multiple of 1,000;
(d) for an increase bid for lots of a major population product – the result (when expressed in MHz) of:
(i) the sum of the total size of the lots of each major population product for the start demand of the bidder; plus
(ii) the total size of the lots of the product for that increase bid; plus
(iii) if, in the same clock round, the bidder made an increase bid for lots of one or both of the other major population products – the sum of the total size of the lots of each such major population product for those increase bids; plus
(iv) for a set-aside participant – the size of 1 set-aside lot of the 900 upper major population product; minus
(v) if, in the same clock round, the bidder made a decrease bid for the lots of one or both of the other major population products – the sum of the total size of the lots of each such product for those decrease bids;
in the clock round does not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to the major population products;
(e) for an increase bid for lots of a regional product – the result (when expressed in MHz) of:
(i) the sum of the total size of the lots of each regional product for the start demand of the bidder; plus
(ii) the total size of the lots of the product for that increase bid; plus
(iii) if, in the same clock round, the bidder made an increase bid for lots of one or both of the other regional products – the sum of the total size of the lots of each such product for those increase bids; plus
(iv) for a set-aside participant – the size of 1 set-aside lot of the 900 upper regional product; minus
(v) if, in the same clock round, the bidder made a decrease bid for the lots of one or both of the other regional products – the sum of the total size of the lots of each such product for those decrease bids;
in the clock round does not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to the regional products;
(f) for an increase bid for lots of a product – the sum of:
(i) the number of lots for the bidder’s start demand of the product; and
(ii) the number of lots for the increase bid for the product;
in the clock round is not greater than the number of lots for the supply of the product;
(g) for an increase bid for lots of a product – for a bidder that selected a minimum spectrum requirement, if the number of lots for the bidder’s start demand for the product in the clock round is equal to zero, the number of lots for the bidder’s increase bid for the product in the clock round is at least 2 lots of the product;
(h) for a decrease bid for lots of a product – the difference between:
(i) the number of lots for the bidder’s start demand for the product; and
(ii) the number of lots for the decrease bid for the product;
in the clock round is not less than zero;
(i) for a decrease bid for lots of a product – for a bidder that selected a minimum spectrum requirement, the difference between:
(i) the number of lots for the bidder’s start demand for the product; and
(ii) the number of lots for the decrease bid for the product;
in the clock round is either zero or at least 2 lots of the product;
(j) for an increase bid or decrease bid – the result, in eligibility points, of:
(i) the total value of the lots of each product, in eligibility points, for all the start demands of the bidder; plus
(ii) the total value of the lots of each product, in eligibility points, for all the increase bids of the bidder; minus:
(iii) the total value of the lots of each product, in eligibility points, for all the decrease bids of the bidder;
in the clock round is not greater than the eligibility points of the bidder for the clock round.
Note 1: For paragraphs (d) and (e), see section 7 of the spectrum licence limits direction.
Note 2: Subsection 64(2) allows the auction manager to permit a bid to be made after a clock round has ended, in certain circumstances.
(2) If a bidder does not make a bid, or does not make a valid bid for lots of a product in a clock round, the bidder is taken to have requested a decrease bid for the number of lots equal to the bidder’s start demand for lots of the product in that clock round, at the opening price for the lots of the product for that clock round.
Note 1: For subclause (2), the auction system places an automatic decrease bid for the relevant number of lots of the product for the clock round. This decrease bid is processed in accordance with clauses 2A and 2C, and may be applied in full, applied in part, or rejected. This may affect the bidder’s eligibility points for the next clock round.
Note 2: During the bid processing for a clock round, if a decrease bid for lots of a product is applied in part, leaving a remainder of the decrease bid, or a decrease bid is rejected, the bidder will still have a posted demand for lots of the product for the clock round in which the decrease bid was made.
Part 5 Determining the primary winners and primary prices
16 End of clock rounds
The clock rounds of the primary stage will end when there is a clock round in which, for every product, the excess demand is not greater than zero for the lots of the product (final clock round).
17 Determination of primary winners and primary prices
(1) A bidder who has posted demands for one or more lots of a product (allocated lots) as a result of the final clock round in the primary stage is a primary winner for those allocated lots.
(2) The total posted price, for a primary winner, for allocated lots of a product, is an amount equal to:
(a) the posted price for a lot of that product for the final clock round; multiplied by
(b) the number of allocated lots comprising the posted demand of the primary winner for that product.
(3) The primary price, for all the allocated lots of each product of a primary winner, is the sum of all the primary winner’s total posted prices.
Note: This clause relates to Division 2 of Part 6 of this instrument for the purposes of section 294 of the Act, and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.
Part 6 Bringing the primary stage to an end
18 Results of the primary stage
(1) The auction manager must tell each primary winner, in writing:
(a) the total number of allocated lots for the primary winner; and
(b) the total posted price for the allocated lots of each product for the primary winner; and
(c) the primary price for the allocated lots of each product for the primary winner.
(2) The auction manager must tell all bidders, in writing:
(a) the total number of primary winners; and
(b) the total number of allocated lots of each product for those primary winners.
(3) In this clause, allocated lots has the meaning given by subclause 17(1).
19 End of the primary stage
Immediately after the auction manager provides the results in accordance with clause 18, the auction manager must tell each bidder, in writing, that the primary stage is completed.
Schedule 3─Rules for the secondary stage of the auction
(subsections 4(1) and 63(2))
(1) This Schedule applies to a lot of a product that is available in the secondary stage of the auction determined in accordance with subclause (2) (the residual lot).
Note 1: If all lots of each product were allocated in in accordance with Schedule 1 and Schedule 2, there is no secondary stage.
Note 2: If, for each residual lot of a product available in the secondary stage, no bidder meets the minimum spectrum requirement test or no bidder can make a bid that is valid under paragraph 13(d) or 13(e), there is no secondary stage.
(2) If, for a product, after the final clock round of the primary stage, the excess demand for the lots of the product is equal to -1, there is only 1 residual lot of the product available in the secondary stage of the auction.
(3) If, for a product, after the final clock round of the primary stage, the excess demand for the lots of the product is not equal to -1, there is no residual lot of the product available in the secondary stage of the auction.
(4) In this clause, excess demand has the meaning given by subclause 2(1) of Schedule 2.
2 Bidders to choose between products
(a) there is a residual lot of each of 2 or each of 3 major population products (the affected lots); and
(A) the size of 2 of the affected lots (whether there are 2 or 3 affected lots); and
would exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to the major population products; and
(A) the size of one of the affected lots; and
would not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to the major population products;
(c) the auction manager must, in writing, notify each affected bidder that each of the affected lots is available for bidding in the secondary stage; and
(d) the auction manager must nominate a time and date, which is before the first round of the secondary stage, before which an affected bidder may make a nomination under subclause (5) (the nomination deadline).
(a) there is a residual lot of each of the 3 major population products (the affected lots); and
(A) the size of all of the affected lots; and
would exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to the major population products; and
(A) the size of 2 of the affected lots; and
would not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to the major population products;
(c) the auction manager must, in writing, notify each affected bidder that each of the affected lots is available for bidding in the secondary stage; and
(d) the auction manager must nominate a time and date, which is before the first round of the secondary stage, before which an affected bidder may make a nomination under subclause (5) (the nomination deadline).
(a) there is a residual lot of each of 2 or each of 3 regional products (the affected lots); and
(A) the size of 2 of the affected lots (whether there are 2 or 3 affected lots); and
would exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to the regional products; and
(A) the size of one of the affected lots; and
would not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to the regional products;
(c) the auction manager must, in writing, notify each affected bidder that each of the affected lots is available for bidding in the secondary stage; and
(d) the auction manager must nominate a time and date, which is before the first round of the secondary stage, before which an affected bidder may make a nomination under subclause (5) (the nomination deadline).
(4) If:
(a) there is a residual lot for each of the 3 regional products (the affected lots); and
(A) the size of all of the affected lots; and
would exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to the regional products; and
(A) the size of 2 of the affected lots; and
would not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to the regional products;
(c) the auction manager must, in writing, notify each affected bidder that each of the affected lots is available for bidding in the secondary stage; and
(d) the auction manager must nominate a time and date, which is before the first round of the secondary stage, before which an affected bidder may make a nomination under subclause (5) (the nomination deadline).
(5) Before the nomination deadline, an affected bidder mentioned in subclause (1), (2), (3) or (4) may nominate in writing, as follows:
(a) if subclause (1) applies to the affected bidder – to bid on the lot for one major population product specified by the bidder, and not to bid on a lot for any other major population product;
(b) if subclause (2) applies to the affected bidder – to bid on the lot for each of two major population products specified by the bidder, and not to bid on the lot for the other major population product;
(c) if subclause (3) applies to the affected bidder – to bid on the lot for one regional product specified by the bidder, and not to bid on a lot for any other regional product;
(d) if subclause (4) applies to the affected bidder – to bid on the lot for each of two regional products specified by the bidder, and not to bid on the lot for the other regional product.
Note: A bidder may be an affected bidder under two of subclauses (1), (2), (3) or (4). However, a bidder will not be an affected bidder under both subclauses (1) and (2), or under both subclauses (3) and (4).
(6) If an affected bidder nominates in accordance with subclause (5) to bid on the lot of a specified product or products, the bidder must not make a bid during the secondary stage on a lot of any other product for which the bidder is an affected bidder.
(7) If an affected bidder does not nominate in accordance with subclause (5), the bidder must not make a bid on any of the affected lots for which the bidder is an affected bidder.
Note 1: Paragraph 13(d) makes any bid on a single lot of a major population product invalid if it would exceed the bidder’s allocation limits. Paragraph 13(e) makes any bid on a single lot of a regional product invalid if it would exceed the bidder’s allocation limits.
Note 2: See section 7 of the spectrum licence limits direction.
(8) If 2 or more of subclauses (1), (2), (3) or (4) apply, the nomination deadline set under each subclause for each affected bidder must be the same time and date.
3 Interpretation
(1) In this Schedule:
bid means a bid made on a single lot during a round of the secondary stage, and includes a bid taken to be made on a single lot.
bid increment percentage: see subclause 4(7).
bidder, for a round of the secondary stage, means a bidder who may make a bid on a lot in that round in accordance with clause 11.
Note: Clause 11 sets out the general rules for a bidder to make a bid on a lot in a round of the secondary stage. Among other things, a bidder may only make a bid on a lot if the lot meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for the bidder.
continue bid, in relation to a lot, means a bid made on the lot in a round of the secondary stage that is equal to or greater than the specified price of the lot for that round.
exit bid, in relation to a lot, means a bid made on the lot in a round of the secondary stage that is:
(a) less than the specified price of the lot for that round; and
(b) either:
(i) in the first round of the secondary stage – equal to or greater than the starting price for the lot; or
(ii) in any other round of the secondary stage – equal to or greater than the specified price of the lot for the previous round of the secondary stage.
final high bid: see subclause 15(3).
Note: Subclause 16(3) may affect the meaning of final high bid.
final round for bids on a lot: see subclause 15(1).
final round of the secondary stage: see subclause 15(2).
lot, unless the contrary intention appears, means a residual lot of a product.
meets the minimum spectrum requirement test: see subclause (2).
recess day: see subclause 7(1).
residual price: see subclause 18(2).
round, for a lot, means a round for bids in the secondary stage.
secondary price: see subclause 18(3).
secondary winner: see subclauses 15(4) and 16(2).
specified price: see subclauses 9(2), 9(3) and 9(4)
(2) In this Schedule, in relation to a lot of a product, the lot meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for a bidder if:
(a) in relation to a lot of the 850 major population product or the 850 regional product – either:
(i) the bidder did not select 2 lots as the minimum spectrum requirement for the lots of that product; or
(ii) if the bidder selected 2 lots as the minimum spectrum requirement for the lots of that product – the bidder was allocated, in the primary stage, at least 2 lots of that product; or
(b) the lot is a lot of a 900 lower product; or
(c) in relation to a lot of the 900 upper major population product:
(i) if the bidder is not a set-aside participant – either:
(A) the bidder did not select a minimum spectrum requirement for the lots of the product; or
(B) if the bidder selected 2 lots as the minimum spectrum requirement for the lots of the product – the bidder was allocated, in the primary stage, at least 2 lots of the product; or
(ii) the bidder is a set-aside participant; or
(d) in relation to a lot of the 900 upper regional product:
(i) if the bidder is not a set-aside participant – either:
(A) the bidder did not select a minimum spectrum requirement for the lots of the product; or
(B) if the bidder selected 2 lots as the minimum spectrum requirement for the lots of the product – the bidder was allocated, in the primary stage, at least 2 lots of the product; or
(ii) the bidder is a set-aside participant.
Part 2 Arrangements for secondary stage
4 Schedule for rounds of the secondary stage and setting bid increment percentage
(1) There must be at least 24 hours between the final clock round of the primary stage and the first round of the secondary stage.
(2) Rounds of the secondary stage must start and end between 9:00 am and 5:00 pm on working days, other than a recess day.
(3) The auction manager must prepare an anticipated schedule for the rounds between those times.
(4) There is no maximum or minimum length for a round, and no maximum or minimum length for the interval between two rounds.
(5) There is no upper or lower limit on the number of rounds per day.
(6) The auction manager (using the auction system) will indicate to each bidder for the first round of a given day the anticipated schedule of rounds for that day at least 1 hour before the start time of the first round of the day. However, the auction manager may, at any time, modify the schedule of rounds. If this occurs, the auction manager must tell each bidder in writing of the change as soon as practicable.
(7) Before the first round of the secondary stage, the auction manager must set a percentage (bid increment percentage) for each residual lot, to be applied in calculating the specified price of each lot for each round.
Note: The auction manager may vary the bid increment percentage set under this subclause: see clause 10.
(8) Before the first round of the secondary stage, the auction manager must notify the bid increment percentage for each lot to each bidder for the first round of the secondary stage
(9) The bid increment percentage:
(a) may be different for different lots; and
(b) may be different for the same lot for different rounds of the secondary stage.
5 Rounds of the secondary stage
(1) Each residual lot is available for bidding:
(a) in the first round of the secondary stage; and
(b) in each subsequent round of the secondary stage until the final round for bids on that lot.
(2) Subject to this Schedule, during a round of the secondary stage, each bidder may make a bid on each lot that:
(a) is available for bidding during the round; and
(b) meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for the bidder; and
(c) is not a lot the bidder is prohibited from bidding on, in accordance with subclause 2(6) or 2(7).
Note 1: Each bid is made on a single lot: see the definition of bid in subclause 3(1),
Note 2: Subclauses 2(6) and 2(7) prevent some bidders from bidding on some lots.
Note 3: See also clause 8.
6 Information available during the secondary stage
(1) Before the start time of each round of the secondary stage, the auction manager must provide the following information to each bidder for that round, using the auction system:
(a) the start time of the round;
(b) the end time of the round;
(c) for each lot available for bidding in that round that meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for the bidder, and on which the bidder may make a bid:
(i) the specified price that will apply to the lot in the round; and
(ii) for the first round of the secondary stage – the starting price for the lot; and
(iii) for each round other than the first round of the secondary stage – the specified price that applied to that lot in the previous round of the secondary stage; and
(iv) the total number of bidders for whom:
(A) the lot meets the minimum spectrum requirement test; and
(B) allocation of the lot would not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits;
(d) any other information the auction manager considers necessary or convenient to conduct the secondary stage.
Note 1: Clause 11 sets out the general rules for a bidder to make a bid on a lot in a round of the secondary stage. Among other things, a bidder may only make a bid on a lot if the lot meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for the bidder.
Note 2: For sub-subparagraph (c)(iv)(B), see section 7 of the spectrum licence limits direction.
(2) After the end time of each round of the secondary stage, the auction manager must provide the following information to each bidder for that round, using the auction system:
(a) the bids (if any) made by the bidder during the round;
(b) if, as a result of the round, the bidder is the secondary winner for a lot – the secondary price for that lot;
(c) for each lot available for bidding in that round that meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for the bidder and on which the bidder may make a bid – the number of bidders remaining in the secondary stage of the auction for that lot after the end time of the round;
(d) any other information the auction manager considers necessary or convenient to conduct the secondary stage of the auction.
(3) Subclauses (1) and (2) do not prevent the auction manager or the ACMA from providing the information specified in those subclauses to other bidders at any time during the secondary stage.
7 Recess days
(1) The auction manager may declare a working day to be a recess day on which there will be no rounds of the secondary stage.
(2) Before declaring a recess day, the auction manager must:
(a) give bidders an opportunity to comment on the proposed declaration; and
(b) take into account any comments received.
(3) If the auction manager decides to declare a working day to be a recess day, the auction manager must tell each bidder in writing.
Part 3 Bidding in the secondary stage
8 When a bidder cannot make a bid on a lot
(1) If, in a round of the secondary stage:
(a) a bidder does not make a bid on a lot; or
(b) a bidder is an exit bidder in the circumstances set out in clause 14 in relation to a lot;
the bidder cannot make a bid on that lot in any subsequent round of the secondary stage.
Note 1: See clauses 12 and 14 for some specific rules about continue bids and exit bids.
Note 2: An exit bid made by the bidder may still be the final high bid for a lot, except where clause 14 applies.
(2) If a set-aside participant is not entitled to bid during the primary stage and the secondary stage, that set-aside participant is not entitled to bid in any round of the secondary stage.
Note: See also subclauses 2(6) and 2(7) for other circumstances when a bidder is not entitled to make bids during the secondary stage.
9 Starting price and specified price
(1) A bid on a lot for an amount less than the starting price for that lot will not be accepted.
Note: For starting prices, see paragraph 28(1)(a) and 43(1)(a) of this instrument. For the validity of bids, see clause 13.
(2) The specified price for a lot in the first round of the secondary stage is the sum of:
(a) the starting price for the lot; and
(b) the bid increment percentage for the lot multiplied by that starting price;
(3) The specified price for a lot in a round of the secondary stage, other than the first round, is the sum of:
(a) the specified price for the lot in the previous round of the secondary stage; and
(b) the bid increment percentage for the lot multiplied by that specified price;
(4) If a round in the secondary stage is the final round for bids on a lot, there is no later round of the secondary stage and, for the purposes of subclause (3), no specified price for the lot.
10 Changing bid increment percentage
(1) The auction manager may, at any time during the secondary stage, change the bid increment percentage for a lot to be applied in calculating the specified price for a lot in a round of the secondary stage.
Note: For the bid increment percentage, see subclause 4(7).
(2) Before changing the bid increment percentage for a lot, the auction manager must:
(b) give each bidder an opportunity to comment on the proposed change within the time (not less than 1 hour) set by the auction manager; and
(3) If the auction manager decides to change the bid increment percentage for a lot, the auction manager must notify each bidder for the round when the change takes effect, before that round.
11 General rules about bidding
(1) A bidder:
(a) may only make a bid on a lot if the lot meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for the bidder; and
(b) may only make a bid that is valid in accordance with clause 13; and
(c) must not make a bid on a lot if subclause 2(6) or 2(7), or clause 8 or 14, provides that the bidder cannot make, or is not entitled to make, a bid on the lot.
(2) Except where subsection 64(1) or 64(2) applies, a bidder’s bid in a round of the secondary stage is taken to have been made when the bid has passed data validation checks that are performed by the auction system.
Note: Subsection 64(1) allows the auction manager to permit a bid to be made other than by using the auction system, in certain circumstances. Subsection 64(2) allows the auction manager to permit a bid to be made after a clock round has ended, in certain circumstances.
(3) A bidder may change, delete or replace a bid in the auction system during a round of the secondary stage as often as desired, subject to the data validation checks performed by the auction system. The bid for the lot of a product that is treated as binding for a bidder is the bid in the auction system at the end time of the round.
Note: See clauses 12 and 14 for some specific rules about continue bids and exit bids. The definition of bid in subclause 3(1) includes a bid that is taken to be made.
12 Continue bid made at or greater than specified price
(1) A continue bid made on a lot in a round of the secondary stage (the relevant round) that is for an amount (the advance price) that is equal to or greater than the specified price for the lot in the relevant round will also constitute:
(a) in any round after the relevant round where the advance price is greater than or equal to the specified price for the lot in that round – a continue bid made on that lot in that round; and
(b) in the first round after the relevant round in which the advance price is less than the specified price for the lot in that round – an exit bid made on that lot in that round.
Note: The definition of bid in subclause 3(1) includes a bid that is taken to be made.
Example: During round N of the secondary stage, the specified price for a lot is $100,000. The bid increment percentage is 10%.
If a bidder makes a bid of $130,000 on the lot in round N, then:
(a) for round N+1, the specified price is $110,000, and the bid is taken to be a continue bid for round N+1;
(b) for round N+2, the specified price is $121,000, and the bid is taken to be a continue bid for round N+1;
(c) for round N+3, the specified price is $134,000, and the bid is taken to be an exit bid for round N+3.
(2) Subclause (1) is subject to any other bid made by a bidder on the lot in a round after the relevant round.
13 Validity of bids
A bid in a round of the secondary stage is valid if all of the following apply in relation to the bid:
(a) except where subsection 64(2) applies, the bid is received by the auction system between the start time and the end time of the round;
(b) either:
(i) if the round is the first round of the secondary stage for bids on a lot – the bid is not less than the starting price for the lot; or
(ii) if the round is for bids on a lot, other than the first round of the secondary stage – the bid is not less than the specified price of the lot in the previous round of the secondary stage;
(c) the bid is a multiple of 1,000;
(d) if the bid is for a lot of a major population product – the sum (when expressed in MHz) of:
(i) the size of the lot; and
(ii) the total size of the lots of major population products allocated to the bidder in the primary stage; and
(iii) if, in the same round, the bidder made at least one bid for a lot of a different major population product – the size of each such lot; and
(iv) if the bidder is a set-aside participant – the size of 1 set-aside lot of the 900 upper major population product;
does not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to major population products;
(e) if the bid is for a lot of a regional product – the sum (when expressed in MHz) of:
(i) the size of the lot; and
(ii) the total size of the lots of regional products allocated to the bidder in the primary stage; and
(iii) if, in the same round, the bidder made at least one bid for a lot of a different regional product – the size of each such lot; and
(iv) if the bidder is a set-aside participant – the size of 1 set-aside lot of the 900 upper regional product;
does not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to regional products;
(f) the bid is not prohibited by subclause 2(6) or 2(7).
Note 1: The effect of paragraph (a) is that to be valid, a bid must be either a continue bid or an exit bid.
Note 3: See subclauses 2(6) and 2(7), and clauses 8 and 14, for circumstances when a bidder may not be able to make a bid.
Note 4: For paragraphs (d) and (e), see section 7 of the spectrum licence limits direction.
14 Exit bids – exclusion from further participation
If, in a round of the secondary stage, both of the following occur:
(a) a bidder (the exit bidder) makes an exit bid on a lot (whether or not any other bidder also makes an exit bid on the lot); and
(b) two or more bidders make a continue bid on the lot;
the exit bidder cannot make a bid on the lot in any subsequent round of the secondary stage.
Note 1: For a round of the secondary stage where the only bids on a lot are exit bids, or only one continue bid is made in addition to any exit bids, see Part 4 of this Schedule.
Part 4 Determining the secondary winners and secondary prices
15 Final round for bids on a lot, final round of the secondary stage, secondary winners and final high bid
(1) The final round for bids on a lot is the first round of the secondary stage where one of the following applies:
(a) only one bid is made on the lot; or
(b) one or more exit bids, and no more than one continue bid, are made on the lot; or
(c) no bids are made on the lot.
Note 1: For rules about bidding, see clauses 11 to 14.
(2) If, in relation to a round of the secondary stage, both of the following apply:
(a) the round was a round for bids on one or more lots; and
(b) after the round, the final round for bids on a lot has occurred for each lot;
the round is the final round of the secondary stage.
(3) For a lot other than a lot for which no bids were made in the first round of the secondary stage, the final high bid is:
(a) if one bid was made on the lot in the final round for bids on the lot – that bid; or
(b) if one continue bid was made on the lot in the final round for bids on the lot – that continue bid; or
(c) if all of the following apply:
(i) no continue bid was made on the lot in the final round for bids on the lot;
(ii) two or more exit bids were made on the lot in the final round for bids on the lot;
(iii) one of those exit bids (the high exit bid) was greater than each of the other exit bids;
– the high exit bid; or
(d) in any other case – selected in accordance with clause 16.
(4) Subject to subclause 16(2), the bidder who made the final high bid on a lot is the secondary winner for that lot.
Note 1: An exit bid may have been a continue bid in a previous round of the secondary stage, in accordance with clause 12.
16 Tiebreaker for a lot
(1) This clause applies in relation to a lot if:
(a) no continue bid was made on the lot in the final round for bids on the lot; and
(b) two or more exit bids were made on the lot in the final round for bids on the lot; and
(c) of those exit bids:
(i) two or more of those exit bids were equal (the tied exit bids); and
(ii) the tied exit bids were greater than each other exit bid mentioned in paragraph (b).
(2) Where this clause applies, the secondary winner for the lot will be selected from the bidders who made the tied exit bids using a pseudorandom process. The pseudorandom process must be conducted before the next round of the secondary stage (if any).
(3) For the purposes of paragraph 15(3)(d), the final high bid on the lot is the amount of the last bid made by the secondary winner.
Part 5 Bringing the secondary stage to an end
17 End of rounds of the secondary stage
The rounds of the secondary stage will end immediately after:
(a) if:
(i) clause 16 applies in relation to a lot; and
(ii) for each other lot, either:
(A) there is a secondary winner for the lot; or
(B) there were no bids on the lot in the first round of the secondary stage;
– the pseudorandom process mentioned in subclause 16(2) occurs; or
(b) in any other case – the final round of the secondary stage.
18 Determination of secondary prices
(1) Each secondary winner for a lot is allocated that lot (allocated lot).
(2) The residual price for an allocated lot is an amount equal to:
(a) if there is only one bid on the lot in the secondary stage – the starting price for the lot; or
(b) if there is more than one bid on the lot in the secondary stage – the highest bid made for the lot by any other bidder, during any round of the secondary stage, other than the final high bid.
(3) The secondary price to be paid by a secondary winner for all the allocated lots of the secondary winner is the sum of all the secondary winner’s residual prices.
Note: This clause relates to Division 2 of Part 6 of this instrument for the purposes of section 294 of the Act, and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.
19 Results of the secondary stage
(1) The auction manager must tell each secondary winner, using the auction system:
(a) the lots allocated to the secondary winner; and
(b) the residual price for each allocated lot, and the secondary price to be paid by the secondary winner for all allocated lots.
(2) The auction manager must tell all bidders, in writing:
(a) the total number of secondary winners; and
(b) for each lot allocated to a secondary winner under this Schedule, the product to which the lot belongs.
(3) In this clause, allocated lots has the meaning given by subclause 18(1).
20 End of the secondary stage
(1) The auction manager must tell each primary winner, each secondary winner and each set-aside participant, the sum of:
(a) the primary price for the person; and
(b) the secondary price for the person; and
(c) if the person is a set-aside participant – the set-aside price for each set-aside lot allocated to the participant;
for the lots allocated to the person under Schedule 1, Schedule 2 or this Schedule.
(2) Immediately after the auction manager provides the results in accordance with clause 19, the auction manager must tell each bidder, in writing, that the secondary stage is completed and the auction will progress to the assignment stage.
Note: The assignment stage also deals with the allocation of the downshift metropolitan lot and the downshift regional lot.
Schedule 4─Rules for the assignment stage of the auction
(subsection 4(1), paragraphs 60(4)(c) and (d), subsection 63(3), paragraph 76(1)(c) and section 80)
(1) This Schedule applies to:
(a) the lots of each product that were allocated to a bidder in the primary stage; and
(b) the lots of each product that were allocated to a bidder in the secondary stage (if any); and
(c) if subsection 62(1) applies in relation to the auction – the set-aside lots; and
(d) the downshift metropolitan lot and the downshift regional lot.
(2) This Schedule is for:
(a) the assignment of frequency ranges to lots of a product (or group of products) that were allocated to a primary winner in the primary stage; and
(b) the assignment of frequency ranges to lots of a product (or group of products) that were allocated to a secondary winner in the secondary stage (if any); and
(c) the assignment of frequency ranges to each set-aside lot (if any); and
(d) allocation of the downshift metropolitan lot and the downshift regional lot.
In this Schedule:
assignment bidder, for an assignment round, means a person specified in subclause 4(1).
assignment round means a round for the making of assignment bids.
list of frequency range options includes a set of frequency range options.
results: see clause 12.
unallocated lot means
(a) for the 850 major population product, the 850 regional product, or a 900 lower product – a lot of the product that was not allocated in the primary stage or the secondary stage; or
(b) for a 900 upper product – a lot of the product, other than a set-aside lot, that was not allocated in the primary stage or the secondary stage.
winning assignment bid: see clause 7.
Note: For the definition of size and total size, see subsection 5(3).
Part 2 Arrangements for assignment stage
3 Schedule for assignment rounds
(1) After the completion of the secondary stage (or the primary stage, if there is no secondary stage), the auction manager must announce:
(a) the anticipated start time and end time of each assignment round; and
(b) the product or products that will be the subject of each assignment round.
(2) There must be at least 48 hours between the completion of the secondary stage (or primary stage, if there is no secondary stage), and the start of the first assignment round.
Note: See Division 3 of Part 5 of this instrument for things that may need to happen between the completion of the primary stage and secondary stage (if any), and the start of the first assignment round.
(3) Assignment rounds must start and end between 9:00 am and 5:00 pm on working days.
(4) The auction manager must prepare an anticipated schedule for the assignment rounds between those times.
(5) There is no maximum or minimum length for an assignment round, and no maximum or minimum length for the interval between two rounds.
(6) The auction manager must set the order in which the products are subjects of assignment rounds.
(7) Two or more products may be the subject of a single assignment round.
(8) A product must not be the subject of more than one assignment round.
(9) Despite anything else in this Schedule, a 900 lower product must not be the subject of an assignment round.
(10) This clause is subject to subclause 4(8).
Part 3 Bidding in the assignment stage
4 Frequency range options in assignment rounds
Generally
(1) Bidding in an assignment round is only open to:
(a) each bidder who was allocated in the primary stage at least one lot of a product that is the subject of the assignment round; and
(b) each bidder who was allocated in the secondary stage one lot of a product that is the subject of the assignment round; and
(c) if the 900 upper major population product is the subject of the assignment round – each set-aside participant; and
(d) if the 900 upper regional product is the subject of the assignment round – each set-aside participant;
(assignment bidders).
(2) For each product, other than a 900 lower product, the auction manager must determine a list of frequency range options available to each assignment bidder so that:
(a) the frequency ranges included within each option for an assignment bidder are a pair of contiguous frequency ranges, each frequency range corresponding in bandwidth to half of:
(i) the total size of the lots of the product that the assignment bidder was allocated in the primary stage; and
(ii) if the assignment bidder was allocated a lot of the product in the secondary stage – the size of that lot; and
(iii) if the applicant is a set-aside participant and the product is the 900 upper major population product – the size of 1 set-aside lot of the 900 upper major population product; and
(iv) if the applicant is a set-aside participant and the product is the 900 upper regional product – the size of 1 set-aside lot of the 900 upper regional product; and
(b) for each option in the list of frequency range options available to an assignment bidder, there exists at least one frequency range option for every other assignment bidder such that:
(i) each assignment bidder’s frequency range complies with paragraph (a); and
(ii) none of the frequency ranges overlap; and
(c) subclause (3) is satisfied.
Note: Where a set-aside participant has been allocated a set-aside lot of the 900 upper major population product and a set-aside lot of the 900 upper regional product, a different frequency range may be assigned to each set-aside lot as a result of this Schedule and the assignment bids made.
Example: A set-aside participant is allocated a set-aside lot of the 900 upper major population product and a set-aside lot of the 900 upper regional product, and no other lots of any product. As a result of this Schedule and the assignment bids made:
(a) the set-aside lot of the 900 upper major population product is assigned the frequency ranges 895 MHz to 900 MHz and 940 MHz to 945 MHz; and
(b) the set-aside lot of the 900 upper regional product is assigned the frequency ranges 910 MHz to 915 MHz and 955 MHz to 960 MHz.
Contiguity between 900 lower products and 900 upper products allocated to an assignment bidder
(3) If an assignment bidder has been allocated:
(a) both:
(i) the one lot of the 900 lower major population product; and
(ii) at least one lot of the 900 upper major population product (whether or not the lot is a set-aside lot); or
(b) both:
(i) the one lot of the 900 lower regional product; and
(ii) at least one lot of the 900 upper regional product (whether or not the lot is a set-aside lot);
then the auction manager must ensure that:
(c) if paragraph (a) applies – every frequency range option available to the assignment bidder for the 900 upper major population product includes:
(i) the frequency range 895 MHz to 900 MHz; and
(ii) the frequency range 940 MHz to 945 MHz; and
(d) if paragraph (b) applies – every frequency range option available to the assignment bidder for the 900 upper regional product includes:
(i) the frequency range 895 MHz to 900 MHz; and
(ii) the frequency range 940 MHz to 945 MHz.
Where one assignment round deals with more than one product
(4) If an assignment bidder is participating in an assignment round for two or more products, the auction manager must determine a list of frequency range options available to that bidder that deals with the products as a group, providing the requirements of subclauses (2) and (3) are met for each individual product in the group.
Where assignment round is unnecessary
(5) If, for an assignment round for a product, there is only one frequency range option available to each assignment bidder that is participating in the assignment round:
(a) subject to subclause (8), no assignment round for the product needs to be conducted; and
(b) this Schedule applies as if:
(i) subject to subclause (8), an assignment round for the product was conducted; and
(ii) each assignment bidder made an assignment bid with a bid price of zero for the only frequency range option available to the bidder.
Schedule of assignment rounds
(6) At least 24 hours before the start of the first assignment round, the auction manager must provide each assignment bidder participating in the assignment stage with the list of frequency range options available to the bidder in each of the assignment rounds for:
(a) the lots of a product that were allocated to the bidder in the primary stage or secondary stage; and
(b) if the assignment bidder is a set-aside participant and the assignment round is for the 900 upper major population product – 1 set-aside lot of the 900 upper major population product; and
(c) if the assignment bidder is a set-aside participant and the assignment round is for the 900 upper regional product – 1 set-aside lot of the 900 upper regional product.
(7) If subclause (5) applies in relation to a product, the auction manager must, at least 24 hours before the start of the first assignment round, inform each assignment bidder that is participating in the assignment round for that product;
(a) that no assignment round for the product needs to be conducted; and
(b) of the only frequency range option available to the bidder for that product; and
(c) that, for the purposes of this Schedule, the assignment bidder is taken to have made an assignment bid with a bid price of zero for that frequency range option.
(8) If subclause (5) applies in relation to each product (other than the 900 lower products):
(a) despite paragraph (5)(a) and subparagraph (5)(b)(i), one assignment round is conducted for all products (other than the 900 lower products); and
(b) that assignment round is scheduled in accordance with clause 3; and
(c) for each product, no assignment bidder who is participating in the assignment round in relation to that product may make an assignment bid other than the bid mentioned in subparagraph (5)(b)(ii).
Note: Assignment bidders will not use the auction system to make assignment bids during the assignment round mentioned in subclause (7). In this case, the assignment price for all bidders will be zero.
5 Assignment bids
(1) An assignment bid consists of:
(a) the frequency range option that is being bid on; and
(b) a bid price for that option that is a multiple of 1,000.
Note: If an assignment round is for two or more products, the frequency range option that is being bid on applies in relation to each of those products.
(2) An assignment bidder:
(a) may, for each option in the list of frequency range options provided to the bidder by the auction manager, make a single assignment bid on that option; and
(b) must not make an assignment bid on a frequency range that is not in the list of frequency range options.
Note: See subclauses (5) and (6) for when an assignment bid is taken to be made.
(3) Except where subsection 64(1) or 64(2) applies, an assignment bidder’s assignment bid in an assignment round is taken to have been made when the bid has passed data validation checks that are performed by the auction system.
Note: Subsection 64(1) allows the auction manager to permit an assignment bid to be made other than by using the auction system, in certain circumstances. Subsection 64(2) allows the auction manager to permit an assignment bid to be made after an assignment round has ended, in certain circumstances.
(4) An assignment bidder may change, delete or replace an assignment bid in the auction system during an assignment round as often as desired, subject to the data validation checks performed by the auction system. The assignment bid that is treated as binding for an assignment bidder is the assignment bid in the auction system at the end time of the assignment round.
Note: An assignment bidder may also be taken to make an assignment bid in accordance with section 64, or subclauses (5) or (6). See also subclause 4(7).
(5) In an assignment round, if there is a frequency range option in the list of frequency range options for an assignment bidder on which:
(a) no assignment bid is made by the bidder; or
(b) the bidder made an invalid assignment bid;
the assignment bidder is taken to have made an assignment bid on that frequency range option with a bid price of zero dollars.
(6) In any assignment round, if an assignment bidder does not make an assignment bid, the bidder is taken to have made an assignment bid on each frequency range option in the list of frequency range options for the bidder, with a bid price of zero dollars.
6 Validity of assignment bids
An assignment bid is valid if all of the following apply in relation to the bid:
(a) except where subsection 64(2) applies, the assignment bid is received by the auction system between the start time and the end time of the assignment round for a product or group of products;
(b) the assignment bid is for a frequency range in the list of frequency range options provided to the assignment bidder who made the bid;
(c) the bid price is a multiple of 1,000.
Note: Subsection 64(2) allows the auction manager to permit an assignment bid to be made after an assignment round has ended, in certain circumstances.
Part 4 Determining winning assignment bids and assignment prices
7 Determination of winning assignment bids
(1) After an assignment round has ended, the auction manager must tell each assignment bidder in the round its winning assignment bid.
(2) The winning assignment bids for an assignment round must be a combination of valid assignment bids such that:
(a) only one assignment bid is selected from each assignment bidder for the assignment round; and
(b) the frequency ranges included in any pair of winning assignment bids for a product, or group of products, do not overlap.
(3) Subject to subclause (4), the winning assignment bids are the assignment bids in the combination of valid assignment bids that:
(a) complies with subclause (2); and
(b) maximises the sum of the bid prices in the assignment bids
(4) If more than one combination of valid assignment bids (valid combinations) satisfies subclause (3), the winning assignment bids are the assignment bids in the valid combination selected by pseudorandom process from all those valid combinations.
Note: This clause relates to Division 2 of Part 6 of this instrument for the purposes of section 294 of the Act, and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.
8 Assignment of frequencies and determination of assignment prices
Generally
(1) After the end of an assignment round, the auction manager must tell each assignment winner in the assignment round its assignment price for the frequency range assigned to the lots of the product.
(2) If there is only one assignment bidder in an assignment round, then for that bidder the assignment price for a frequency range for the product the subject of that assignment round is zero.
(3) If there is more than one assignment bidder in an assignment round, then for each bidder the assignment price for a frequency range for the product the subject of that assignment round is worked out in accordance with subclauses (4) to (7).
Assignment price where more than one assignment bidder in an assignment round
(4) For an assignment bidder, the assignment price for a frequency range must be no more than the bid price in the assignment bid for that frequency range made by that winner.
(5) For an assignment bidder, the assignment price for a frequency range may be zero.
(6) Subject to subclause (4), the set of assignment prices in an assignment round must be such that:
(a) there is no alternative assignment bidder, or group of assignment bidders, who (based on their assignment bids) would pay more than any assignment winner or group of assignment winners for the assignment round; and
(b) if more than one set of assignment prices satisfies paragraph (a) – the sum of the assignment prices is minimised; and
(c) if more than one set of assignment prices satisfies paragraphs (a) and (b) – the set of assignment prices is the solution to the formula in subclause (7).
is the set of Vickrey prices for the assignment bidders, the price for each bidder j being:<br> (a) the sum of bid prices for the combination of assignment bids that would have been selected under subclause 7(3) if bidder j had made assignment bids of zero dollars for every frequency range option; less<br> (b) the sum of bid prices for all other winning assignment bids in the assignment round.
Note: For starting prices, see paragraph 28(1)(a) or 43(1)(a).
Assignment winners and total assignment price
(8) An assignment bidder who has assignment prices for winning assignment bids in an assignment round is an assignment winner in the assignment stage for an assignment of a frequency range, or frequency ranges, to lots of a product, or group of products.
(9) The total assignment price for assignment of a frequency range, or frequency ranges, to lots of a product, or group of products, in the assignment stage for an assignment winner is the amount equal to the sum of all the assignment prices for the assignment winner that are mentioned in subclause (2) or (3), and in clause 9.
(10) The assignment prices calculated under subclause (6) must be rounded to the nearest thousand.
Note: This clause relates to Division 2 of Part 6 of this instrument for the purposes of section 294 of the Act, and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.
9 Assignment of frequencies for 900 lower products
If a bidder was allocated the lot of a 900 lower product in the primary or secondary stage:
(a) immediately before the first assignment round, the lot is assigned the frequency ranges:
(i) 890 MHz to 895 MHz; and
(ii) 935 MHz to 940 MHz; and
(b) that bidder is an assignment winner for the lot of that product; and
(c) the assignment price for that lot is zero.
Note: Paragraph (c) relates to Division 2 of Part 6 of this instrument for the purposes of section 294 of the Act, and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.
Part 5 Allocation of downshift spectrum
10 Allocation of downshift spectrum
(1) If a bidder was allocated the lot of the 900 lower major population product in the primary or secondary stage, then, immediately before the first assignment round, the downshift metropolitan lot is allocated to that bidder.
Note: In accordance with the marketing plan, a licence for the downshift metropolitan lot will be issued to the relevant assignment winner as a separate spectrum licence to any other spectrum licence issued to that assignment winner as a result of this instrument.
(2) If a bidder was allocated the lot of the 900 lower regional product in the primary or secondary stage, then, immediately before the first assignment round, the downshift regional lot is allocated to that bidder.
Note: In accordance with the marketing plan, a licence for the downshift regional lot will be issued to the relevant assignment winner as a separate spectrum licence to any other spectrum licence issued to that assignment winner as a result of this instrument.
(3) For the avoidance of doubt, the operation of this clause does not affect any amount any person has to pay in accordance with this instrument.
11 Downshift spectrum not allocated
(1) If the lot of the 900 lower major population product is an unallocated lot, then both of the following parts of the spectrum in the downshift metropolitan area are taken to be unallocated, and section 80 applies to them:
(a) 824 MHz to 825 MHz; and
(b) 869 MHz to 870 MHz.
(2) If the lot of the 900 lower regional product is an unallocated lot, then both of the following parts of the spectrum in the downshift regional area are taken to be unallocated, and section 80 applies to them:
(a) 824 MHz to 825 MHz; and
(b) 869 MHz to 870 MHz.
(3) For the avoidance of doubt, the operation of this clause does not affect any amount any person has to pay in accordance with this instrument.
(4) In this clause:
downshift metropolitan area has the meaning given by subsection 5(1) of the marketing plan.
downshift regional area has the meaning given by subsection 5(1) of the marketing plan.
Part 6 Bringing the assignment stage to an end
12 Results of the assignment stage
(1) After the end of all assignment rounds, the auction manager must tell each assignment winner, in writing:
(a) the frequency ranges assigned to:
(i) the lots of each product that were allocated to the assignment winner in the primary stage or secondary stage (if any); and
(ii) if the assignment winner is a set-aside participant – the winner’s set-aside lots; and
(b) the assignment price for each such frequency range;
. (results).
(2) After the end of all assignment rounds, if subclause 10(1) applies in relation to an assignment winner, the auction manager must tell the assignment winner, in writing, that it has been allocated the downshift metropolitan lot.
(3) After the end of all assignment rounds, if subclause 10(2) applies in relation to an assignment winner, the auction manager must tell the assignment winner, in writing, that it has been allocated the downshift regional lot.
13 End of the assignment stage
The assignment stage is complete when the auction manager has, under clause 12:
(a) notified all assignment winners of the results of every assignment round; and
(b) if subclause 10(1) applies in relation to an assignment winner – notified that assignment winner that it has been allocated the downshift metropolitan lot; and
(c) if subclause 10(2) applies in relation to an assignment winner – notified that assignment winner that it has been allocated the downshift regional lot.
Schedule 5─Payment of balance of the winning price greater than zero, and issue of spectrum licences
(subparagraphs 10(4)(b)(i) and 10(4)(c)(i), sections 78 and 80, paragraphs 85(1)(e) and 86(a))
This Schedule applies to the balance of a winning price by a winning bidder that is greater than zero.
Note 1: Paragraph 294(1)(b) of the Act provides that the ACMA may, by written instrument, make determinations specifying the times when spectrum access charges are payable.
Note 2: This Schedule is made under section 294 of the Act, and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.
Note 3: For information on how an amount must be paid, see section 10.
In this Schedule, a winning bidder is a reference to a winning bidder that has a balance of the winning price that is greater than zero.
Note 1: For the definition of winning price, see subsection 75(1).
Note 2: For the definition of balance of the winning price, see subsection 75(2).
Part 2 Payment of winning price
3 Payment of balance of winning price
(1) The ACMA must notify a winning bidder, in writing, of the following:
(a) the winning price for the winning bidder;
(b) the effect on the winning price of any eligibility payments made under subsection 31(7), 38(7) or 48(4), in accordance with section 42, or of an additional eligibility payment made under subsection 46(4) for the purposes of section 42;
(c) that the balance of the winning price must be paid in full;
(d) the date by which the balance of the winning price must be paid to the ACMA.
(2) For paragraph (d), the date must be at least 20 working days after the ACMA notifies the winning bidder under subclause (1).
(3) If the ACMA becomes aware that a notice under subclause (1) contains a material error, the ACMA must give the winning bidder a revised notice.
(4) The ACMA must give a notice to a winning bidder under subclause (1) no later than 1 June 2024.
Note: A revised notice under subclause (3) may be given after 1 June 2024.
Part 3 Issue of spectrum licences
4 Issue of spectrum licences
If a winning bidder pays the balance of the winning price in accordance with the notice given under subclause 3(1), the winning bidder is entitled to be issued:
(a) a spectrum licence for each part of the spectrum assigned to the lots, other than the downshift metropolitan lot and the downshift regional lot, allocated to the bidder; and
(b) if the bidder was allocated the downshift metropolitan lot – a spectrum licence for the downshift metropolitan lot; and
(c) if the bidder was allocated the downshift regional lot – a spectrum licence for the downshift regional lot.
Note 1: In accordance with the marketing plan, a spectrum licence for the downshift metropolitan lot, and a spectrum licence for the downshift regional lot, will be issued to the relevant winning bidder as a separate spectrum licence to any other spectrum licence issued to that winning bidder as a result of this instrument.
Note 2: For the issue of spectrum licences, see section 62 of the Act.
5 Default
If a winning bidder does not pay the balance of the winning price in accordance with the notice given under subclause 3(1):
(a) spectrum licences are not allocated to the winning bidder under this instrument; and
(b) the allocation of spectrum licences in accordance with this instrument to other bidders is not affected; and
(c) section 80 applies to each lot (and associated spectrum assigned to each lot), including the downshift metropolitan lot and the downshift regional lot, that, but for this subclause, would have been included in a spectrum licence allocated to the winning bidder.
Note: See section 85 for when certain breaches of this instrument have occurred, and section 89 in relation to other rights of the ACMA and the Commonwealth.