Section 1A - Radiocommunications (Spectrum Licence Allocation — 3.6 GHz Band) Determination 2018 - Bidders to choose between Perth lots, or not to bid on Perth lots | Zoe
1A Bidders to choose between Perth lots, or not to bid on Perth lots
(1) If:
(a) this Schedule applies to both one lot for the Perth lower band product and one lot for the Perth upper band product (the two Perth lots); and
(b) there is at least one bidder (the affected bidder) for which:
(i) the sum (when expressed in MHz) of the size of the two Perth lots and the size of the lots of the Perth combined products allocated to the bidder in the primary stage would exceed the bidder’s allocation limits applicable to the Perth combined products; and
(ii) the sum (when expressed in MHz) of the size of one of those two Perth lots and the size of the lots of the Perth combined products allocated to the bidder in the primary stage would not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits applicable to the Perth combined products;
then, before the first round of the secondary stage:
(c) the auction manager must, in writing, notify all affected bidders that one lot for the Perth lower band product and one lot for the Perth upper band product are available for bidding in the secondary stage; and
(d) the auction manager must nominate a time and date, which is before the first round of the secondary stage, before which an affected bidder may make a nomination under subclause (2) (the nomination deadline).
(2) Before the nomination deadline, a bidder may nominate in writing either (but not both):
(a) to bid on the lot for the Perth lower band product; or
(b) to bid on the lot for the Perth upper band product.
(3) If a bidder nominates in accordance with subclause (2) to bid on the lot for the Perth lower band product, the bidder must not make a bid during the secondary stage on the lot for the Perth upper band product.
(4) If a bidder nominates in accordance with subclause (2) to bid on the lot for the Perth upper band product, the bidder must not make a bid during the secondary stage on the lot for the Perth lower band product.
(5) If a bidder does not nominate in accordance with subclause (2), the bidder must not make a bid on either of the two Perth lots.
Note 1: Paragraph 12(d) makes any bid on a single lot of the Perth lower band product or the Perth upper band product invalid if it would exceed the bidder’s allocation limits applicable to the Perth combined products.
Note 2: The spectrum licence limits direction sets limits on the allocation of spectrum licences to a single person, or a specified group of persons, in the Perth area (among other areas). However, the lots in the Perth area are divided into two different products: the Perth lower band product and the Perth upper band product. For the purposes of the allocation limits, the two products are treated as just one product. For all other purposes, they are to be treated as two products. See subsection 11(2).
(1) In this Schedule:
bid means a bid made on a single lot during the secondary stage, and includes a bid taken to be made on a single lot.
bid increment percentage: see subclause 3(7).
bidder, for a round of the secondary stage, means a bidder who may make a bid on a lot in that round in accordance with clause 10.
Note: Clause 10 sets out the general rules for a bidder to make a bid on a lot in a round of the secondary stage. Among other things, a bidder may only make a bid on a lot if the lot meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for the bidder.
continue bid, in relation to a lot, means a bid made on the lot in a round of the secondary stage that is equal to or greater than the specified price of the lot for that round.
exit bid, in relation to a lot, means a bid made on the lot in a round of the secondary stage that is:
(a) less than the specified price of the lot for that round; and
(b) either:
(i) in the first round of the secondary stage – equal to or greater than the starting price for the lot; or
(ii) in any round other than the first round of the secondary stage – equal to or greater than the specified price of the lot for the previous round of the secondary stage.
final high bid: see subclause 14(3).
Note: Subclause 15(3) may affect the meaning of final high bid.
final round for bids on a lot: see subclause 14(1).
final round of the secondary stage: see subclause 14(2).
lot means a residual lot of a product determined in accordance with subclause 1(2).
meets the minimum spectrum requirement test: see subclause (2).
recess day: see subclause 6(1).
residual price: see subclause 17(2).
round, for a lot, means a round for bids in the secondary stage.
secondary price: see subclause 17(3).
secondary winner: see subclauses 14(4) and 15(2).
specified price: see subclauses 8(2), 8(3) and 8(4).
Note: For the definition of size, see subsection 5(2) of this instrument.
(2) In this Schedule, in relation to a lot of a product, a lot meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for a bidder if either of the following applies:
(a) the bidder did not select a minimum spectrum requirement for the lots of that product; or
(b) if the bidder selected a minimum spectrum requirement for the lots of that product – the bidder was allocated in the primary stage at least the number of lots of that product equal to the minimum spectrum requirement.
Part 2—Arrangements for secondary stage
3 Schedule for rounds of the secondary stage and setting bid increment percentage
(1) There must be at least one working day between the final clock round of the primary stage and the first round of the secondary stage.
(2) Rounds of the secondary stage must start and end between 9.00 am and 5.00 pm on working days, other than a recess day.
(3) The scheduling of rounds between those times is at the auction manager’s discretion.
(4) There is no minimum or maximum length for a round, and no minimum or maximum length for the interval between rounds.
(5) There is no upper or lower limit on the number of rounds per day.
(6) The auction system will indicate to each bidder for the first round of a given day the anticipated schedule of rounds for that day at least 1 hour before the start time of the first round of the day. However, the auction manager may, at any time, modify the schedule of rounds. If this occurs, the auction manager must tell each bidder of the change as soon as practicable.
(7) Before the first round of the secondary stage, the auction manager must set a percentage (the bid increment percentage) for each lot as a percentage of the starting price for the lot for the first round of the secondary stage, and of the specified price for the lot in any other round of the secondary stage.
Note: The auction manager may vary the bid increment percentage set under this subclause, see clause 9.
(8) Before the first round of the secondary stage, the auction manager must notify the bid increment percentage for each lot to each bidder for the first round of the secondary stage.
(9) The bid increment percentage may be different for different lots and may be different for the same lot between different rounds of the secondary stage.
4 Rounds of the secondary stage
(1) Each lot is available for bidding in the first round of the secondary stage, and in each subsequent round of the secondary stage until the final round for bids on that lot.
(2) During a round of the secondary stage, and subject to this Schedule, each bidder for the round may make a bid on each lot that:
(a) is available for bidding during that round; and
(b) meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for the bidder.
Note: Each bid is made on a single lot: see the definition of bid in subclause 2(1).
(3) However, a bidder cannot bid on a lot of a product if allocation of that lot to the bidder would exceed the bidder’s allocation limits:
(a) applicable to the product, other than the Perth lower band product and the Perth upper band product; or
(b) applicable to the Perth combined products.
Note 1: Eligibility points are not required to bid in the secondary stage.
Note 2: The spectrum licence limits direction sets limits on the allocation of spectrum licences to a single person, or a specified group of persons, in the Perth area (among other areas). However, the lots in the Perth area are divided into two different products: the Perth lower band product and the Perth upper band product. For the purposes of the allocation limits, the two products are treated as just one product. For all other purposes, they are to be treated as two products. See subsection 11(2).
5 Information available during rounds of the secondary stage
(1) Before the start time of each round of the secondary stage, the auction manager must provide the following information for that round to each bidder, using the auction system:
(a) the start time of the round;
(b) the end time of the round;
(c) for each lot available for bidding in that round that meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for the bidder and on which the bidder may make a bid:
(i) the specified price that will apply to the lot in the round; and
(ii) for the first round of the secondary stage – the starting price for the lot; and
(iii) for each round other than the first round of the secondary stage – the specified price that applied to that lot in the previous round of the secondary stage; and
(iv) the total number of bidders for whom:
(A) the lot meets the minimum spectrum requirement test; and
(B) allocation of the lot as a unit of a product would not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits applicable to the product (other than the Perth lower band product and the Perth upper band product) or applicable to the Perth combined products;
(d) any other information the auction manager considers necessary or convenient to conduct the secondary stage of the auction.
Note 1: Clause 10 sets out the general rules for a bidder to make a bid on a lot in a round of the secondary stage. Among other things, a bidder may only make a bid on a lot if the lot meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for the bidder.
Note 2: The spectrum licence limits direction sets limits on the allocation of spectrum licences to a single person, or a specified group of persons, in the Perth area (among other areas). However, the lots in the Perth area are divided into two different products: the Perth lower band product and the Perth upper band product. For the purposes of the allocation limits, the two products are treated as just one product. For all other purposes, they are to be treated as two products. See subsection 11(2).
(2) After each round of the secondary stage, the auction manager must provide the following information for that round to each bidder, using the auction system:
(a) the bids made (if any) by the bidder during the round;
(b) if, as a result of the round, the bidder is the secondary winner for a lot – the secondary price for that lot;
(c) for each lot available for bidding in that round that meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for the bidder and on which the bidder may make a bid – the number of bidders remaining in the secondary stage of the auction for that lot after the end time of the round;
(d) any other information the auction manager considers necessary or convenient to conduct the secondary stage of the auction.
(3) Subclauses (1) and (2) do not prevent the auction manager or the ACMA from providing the information specified in those subclauses to other bidders at any time during the secondary stage.
6 Recess days
(1) The auction manager may declare a day to be a recess day (whether or not the day is a working day).
(2) Before declaring a recess day, the auction manager must give bidders an opportunity to comment on the proposed declaration and take into account any comments received.
(3) If the auction manager decides to declare a day to be a recess day the auction manager must tell each bidder of this.
Part 3—Bidding in the secondary stage
7 When bidder cannot make a bid on a lot
If, in a round of the secondary stage:
(a) a bidder does not make a bid on a lot; or
(b) a bidder is an exit bidder in the circumstances set out in clause 13 in relation to a lot;
the bidder cannot make a bid on that lot in any subsequent round of the secondary stage.
Note 1: A bidder makes a continue bid or exit bid on a lot in a round of the secondary stage in the circumstances specified in clause 11 or 13.
Note 2: An exit bid made by the bidder may still be the final high bid for a lot, except where clause 13 applies.
8 Starting price and specified price
(1) A bid on a lot for an amount less than the starting price for that lot will not be accepted.
Note: For starting prices, see paragraph 28(1)(d) of this instrument. For the validity of bids, see clause 12.
(2) The specified price for a lot in the first round of the secondary stage is the sum of:
(a) the starting price for the lot; and
(b) the bid increment percentage for the lot multiplied by that starting price;
(3) Subject to subclause (4), the specified price for a lot in a round of the secondary stage, other than the first round of the secondary stage, is the sum of:
(a) the specified price for the lot in the previous round of the secondary stage; and
(b) the bid increment percentage for the lot multiplied by that specified price;
(4) If a round in the secondary stage is the final round for bids on a lot, there is no specified price for the lot in any later round of the secondary stage.
9 Changing bid increment percentage
(1) The auction manager may, at any time during the secondary stage, change the bid increment percentage for a lot to be applied in calculating the specified price for a lot in a round of the secondary stage.
Note: For the bid increment percentage, see subclause 3(7).
(a) tell each bidder of the proposed change; and
(b) ask each bidder to provide comments on the proposal within the time (being not less than 1 hour) set by the auction manager; and
(c) take into account any comments on the proposal that are received within that time.
(3) The auction manager must notify each bidder for the round when the change takes effect before that round.
10 General rules about bidding
(1) A bidder:
(a) may only make a bid on a lot if the lot meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for the bidder; and
(b) may only make a bid that is valid in accordance with clause 12; and
(c) must not make a bid on a lot if clause 7 or 13 provides that the bidder cannot make a bid on the lot.
(2) Except where subsection 50(1) or 50(2) applies, a bidder’s bid is taken to have been made in a round of the secondary stage when the bid has passed data validation checks that are performed by the auction system.
Note: Subsection 50(1) allows the auction manager to permit a bid to be made other than by using the auction system, in certain circumstances. Subsection 50(2) allows the auction manager to permit a bid to be made after a round of the secondary stage has ended, in certain circumstances.
(3) A bidder may change, delete or replace a bid in the auction system during a round of the secondary stage as often as desired, subject to the data validation checks that are performed by the auction system. The bid for a lot that will be treated as binding for a bidder is the bid in the auction system at the end time of the round.
Note: A bidder makes a continue bid or exit bid on a lot in a round of the secondary stage in the circumstances specified in clause 11 or 13. The definition of bid in subclause 2(1) includes a bid that is taken to be made.
11 Continue bid made at or greater than specified price
(1) A continue bid made on a lot in a round of the secondary stage (the relevant round) that is for an amount (the advance price) that is equal to or greater than the specified price for the lot in the relevant round will also constitute:
(a) in any round after the relevant round where the advance price is greater than or equal to the specified price for the lot in that round – a continue bid made on that lot in that round; and
(b) in the first round after the relevant round in which the advance price is less than the specified price for the lot in that round – an exit bid made on that lot in that round.
Note: The definition of bid in subclause 2(1) includes a bid that is taken to be made.
Example: During round N of the secondary stage, the specified price for a lot is $100,000. The bid increment percentage is 10%.
If a bidder makes a bid of $130,000 on the lot in round N, then:
(a) for round N+1, the specified price is $110,000, and the bid is taken to be a continue bid for round N+1;
(b) for round N+2, the specified price is $121,000, and the bid is taken to be a continue bid for round N+2;
(c) for round N+3, the specified price is $133,100, and the bid is taken to be an exit bid for round N+3.
(2) Subclause (1) is subject to any other bid made by a bidder on the lot in a round after the relevant round.
12 Validity of bids
A bid in a round of the secondary stage is valid if all of the following apply to the bid:
(a) either:
(i) if the round is the first round of the secondary stage for bids on a lot – the bid is not less than the starting price for the lot; or
(ii) if the round is for bids on a lot, other than the first round of the secondary stage – the bid is not less than the specified price of the lot in the previous round of the secondary stage;
(b) subject to subsection 50(2), the bid is received by the auction system between the start time and end time of the round;
(c) the bid is a multiple of one hundred;
(d) for each product, other than the Perth lower band product and the Perth upper band product, the sum (when expressed in MHz) of:
(i) the size of the lot of the product bid for in the round of the secondary stage; and
(ii) the total size of the lots of the product allocated to the bidder in the primary stage;
does not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to the product;
(e) without limiting paragraph (f), for the Perth combined products, the sum (when expressed in MHz) of:
(i) the size of the lot of the Perth lower band product or the Perth upper band product bid for in the round of the secondary stage; and
(ii) for a lot that is a unit of the Perth lower band product – the size of the lot of the Perth upper band product already allocated to the bidder in the secondary stage; and
(iii) for a lot that is a unit of the Perth upper band product – the size of the lot of the Perth lower band product already allocated to the bidder in the secondary stage; and
(iv) the total size of the lots of the Perth lower band product and the Perth upper band product allocated to the bidder in the primary stage;
does not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to the Perth combined products;
(f) the bid is not prohibited by subclause 1A(3) or 1A(4) or 1A(5).
Note 1: The effect of paragraph (a) is that, to be valid, a bid must be either a continue bid or an exit bid.
Note 3: The spectrum licence limits direction sets limits on the allocation of spectrum licences to a single person, or a specified group of persons, in the Perth area (among other areas). However, the lots in the Perth area are divided into two different products: the Perth lower band product and the Perth upper band product. For the purposes of the allocation limits, the two products are treated as just one product. For all other purposes, they are to be treated as two products. See subsection 11(2).
13 Exit bids – exclusion from further participation
If, in a round of the secondary stage, both of the following occur:
(a) a bidder (the exit bidder) makes an exit bid on a lot (whether or not any other bidder also makes an exit bid on the lot); and
(b) two or more bidders make a continue bid on the lot;
the exit bidder cannot make a bid on the lot in any subsequent round of the secondary stage.
Note 1: For a round of the secondary stage where the only bids on a lot are exit bids, or only one continue bid is made in addition to any exit bids, see Part 4 of this Schedule.
Part 4—Determining the secondary winners and secondary prices
14 Final round for bids on a lot, final round of the secondary stage, and final high bid
(1) The final round for bids on a lot is the first round of the secondary stage where one of the following applies:
(a) only one bid is made on the lot; or
(b) one or more exit bids, and no more than one continue bid, are made on the lot; or
(c) no bids are made on the lot.
Note 1: For rules about bidding, see clauses 10, 11, 12 and 13.
(2) If, in relation to a round of the secondary stage, both of the following apply:
(a) the round was a round for bids on one or more lots; and
(b) after the round, the final round for bids on a lot has occurred for each lot;
the round is the final round of the secondary stage.
(3) For a lot other than a lot for which no bids were made in the first round of the secondary stage, the final high bid is:
(a) if one bid was made on the lot in the final round for bids on the lot – that bid;
(b) if one continue bid was made on the lot in the final round for bids on the lot – that continue bid;
(c) if all of the following apply:
(i) no continue bid was made on the lot in the final round for bids on the lot;
(ii) two or more exit bids were made on the lot in the final round for bids on the lot;
(iii) one of those exit bids (the high exit bid) was greater than each of the other exit bids;
– the high exit bid;
(d) in any other case – selected in accordance with clause 15.
(4) Subject to subclause 15(2), the bidder who made the final high bid on a lot is the secondary winner for that lot.
Note 1: An exit bid may have been a continue bid in a previous round of the secondary stage, in accordance with clause 11.
15 Tiebreaker for a lot
(1) This clause applies in relation to a lot if:
(a) no continue bid was made on the lot in the final round for bids on the lot; and
(b) two or more exit bids were made on the lot in the final round for bids on the lot; and
(c) of those exit bids:
(i) two or more of those exit bids were equal (the tied exit bids); and
(ii) the tied exit bids were greater than each other exit bid mentioned in paragraph (b).
(2) Where this clause applies, the secondary winner for the lot will be selected from the bidders who made the tied exit bids using a pseudorandom process. The pseudorandom process must be conducted before the next round of the secondary stage (if any).
(3) For the purposes of paragraph 14(3)(d), the final high bid on the lot is the amount of the last bid made by the secondary winner.
Part 5—Bringing the secondary stage to an end
16 End of rounds of the secondary stage
(1) The rounds of the secondary stage will end immediately after:
(a) if:
(i) clause 15 applies in relation to a lot; and
(ii) for each other lot, either:
(A) there is a secondary winner for the lot; or
(B) there were no bids on the lot in the first round of the secondary stage;
– the pseudorandom process mentioned in subclause 15(2) occurs;
(b) in any other case – the final round of the secondary stage.
(2) After the rounds of the secondary stage end, the auction manager must tell each bidder, using the auction system, that the rounds of the secondary stage have ended and that the auction will progress to the assignment stage.
17 Determination of secondary winners and secondary prices
(1) Subject to subclause 15(2), a bidder who has the final high bid for a lot (the allocated lot), in accordance with subclause 14(4), as a result of the final round for bids on a lot in the secondary stage is a secondary winner in the secondary stage for the lot of the product.
(2) For the purposes of subclause (3), the residual price for an allocated lot of a product in the secondary stage is an amount equal to:
(a) if there is only one bid on the lot – the starting price for the lot; or
(b) if there is more than one bid on the lot – the highest bid made for the lot by any bidder, during any round of the secondary stage, other than the final high bid.
(3) The secondary price to be paid by a secondary winner for all the allocated lots of each product of the secondary winner is the sum of all the secondary winner’s residual prices.
(4) The secondary price calculated under subclause (3) must be rounded up to the next hundred.
Note: This clause relates to Division 2 of Part 6 of this instrument for the purposes of section 294 of the Act and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.
18 Results of the secondary stage
(1) After the secondary winners and secondary prices are determined, the auction manager must tell each secondary winner, using the auction system:
(a) the lots of each product allocated to the secondary winner; and
(b) the residual price for the allocated lot of each product and the secondary price to be paid by the secondary winner for all allocated lots.
(2) After the secondary winners and secondary prices are determined, the auction manager must tell all bidders (in the primary stage and secondary stage):
(a) the total number of secondary winners; and
(b) whether a lot of a product has been allocated to secondary winners.
19 End of the secondary stage
(1) The auction manager must tell each primary winner and each secondary winner, the sum of:
(a) the primary price; and
(b) the secondary price;
(c) for all the allocated lots, in the primary stage or secondary stage, of each product of that winner.
(2) Immediately after the auction manager provides the results in accordance with subclauses 18(1) and 18(2), the auction manager must tell each bidder that the secondary stage is completed.
Schedule 3—Rules for the assignment stage of the auction
(subsections 4(1) and 49(3))
This Schedule applies to the lots of each product that were allocated to a bidder in the primary stage or secondary stage.
Note: There is only a secondary stage if there is at least 1 product for which there was only 1 unallocated lot after the primary stage.
In this Schedule:
assignment bid: see subclauses 5(1), 5(5) and 5(6).
assignment price means an amount charged for the assignment of a particular frequency range.
assignment round means a round in the assignment stage for the making of assignment bids for the assignment of frequency ranges to the lots of each product that were allocated to a bidder in the primary stage or secondary stage.
assignment winner: see subclause 8(7).
list of frequency range options includes a set of frequency range options.
results: see clause 9.
total assignment price: see subclause 8(8).
Note: For the definition of size, see subsection 5(2) of this instrument.
Part 2—Arrangements for assignment stage
3 Schedule for assignment rounds of the assignment stage
(1) After the completion of the primary stage and secondary stage (if any), the auction manager must announce:
(a) the anticipated start time and end time of each assignment round; and
(b) the product or products that will be the subject of each assignment round.
(2) There must be at least 2 working days between the completion of the primary stage and secondary stage (if any) and the first assignment round.
(3) Assignment rounds must start and end between 9.00 am and 5.00 pm on working days.
(4) The scheduling of assignment rounds between those times is at the auction manager’s discretion.
(5) The start time and end time of each assignment round must be announced at least 1 hour before the assignment round starts.
(6) The auction manager has discretion over the duration of assignment rounds.
(7) The auction manager has discretion over the order of the products that are to become the subject of an assignment round.
(8) Two or more products may be the subject of a given assignment round. A product must not be the subject of more than one assignment round.
Part 3—Bidding in the assignment stage
4 Frequency range options in assignment rounds
(1) Bidding in an assignment round is only open to bidders who were allocated, in the primary stage or secondary stage, at least one lot of a product that is the subject of the assignment round.
(2) Subject to subclauses (3) and (4), for each product, the auction manager must determine a list of frequency range options available to each bidder so that:
(a) the frequency range included within each option for a bidder is a contiguous frequency range corresponding in bandwidth to the total size of the lots of the product that the bidder was allocated in the primary stage or secondary stage; and
(b) for each option in the list of frequency range options, there exists at least one frequency range option for every other bidder so that:
(i) each bidder’s frequency range complies with paragraph (a); and
(ii) none of the frequency ranges overlap.
(3) If some lots of a product were not allocated in the primary stage or secondary stage (if any), the auction manager must, in determining the frequency range options available to each bidder, ensure that the frequency range assigned to:
(a) the unallocated lots of the product, other than the Perth lower band product, will be a contiguous frequency range corresponding in bandwidth to the total size of those unallocated lots and adjacent to the frequency 3700 MHz;
(b) the unallocated lots of the Perth lower band product will be a contiguous frequency range corresponding in bandwidth to the total size of those unallocated lots.
(4) If, in the primary stage or secondary stage:
(a) one or more lots of the Perth upper band product (the upper band lots); and
(b) one or more lots of the Perth lower band product (the lower band lots);
were allocated to a bidder, the auction manager must, in determining the frequency range options available to each bidder:
(c) if only one bidder was allocated lower band lots and upper band lots, ensure that the frequency ranges assigned to the lower band lots and the upper band lots will each be a contiguous frequency range corresponding in bandwidth to the size of the lower band lots and the upper band lots, as the case may be, and be adjacent to each other;
(d) if two or more bidders were allocated lower band lots and upper band lots, ensure that, for the bidder who was allocated the most lower band lots and upper band lots, the frequency ranges assigned to the lower band lots and the upper band lots will each be a contiguous frequency range corresponding in bandwidth to the size of the lower band lots and the upper band lots, as the case may be, and be adjacent to each other;
(e) if two or more bidders were allocated lower band lots and upper band lots and the total number of those lots is the same for each bidder, but the number of upper band lots is not the same, ensure that, for the bidder who was allocated the most upper band lots, the frequency ranges assigned to the lower band lots and the upper band lots will each be a contiguous frequency range corresponding in bandwidth to the size of the lower band lots and the upper band lots, as the case may be, and be adjacent to each other;
(f) if two or more bidders were allocated lower band lots and upper band lots and were allocated the same number of lower band lots and the same number of upper band lots:
(i) the lower band lots and the upper band lots are each to become the subject of an assignment round; and
(ii) subclause (6) is to apply.
Note: For assignment rounds arising under paragraph (f), a frequency range assigned to lower band lots may not necessarily be adjacent to a frequency range assigned to upper band lots.
(5) If a bidder is participating in a given assignment round for more than one product, the auction manager may determine frequency range options available to the bidder that deal with the products as a group, providing the requirements of subclause (2) (subject to subclauses (3) and (4)) are met for each individual product in the group.
(6) At least 2 working days before the start of the first assignment round, the auction manager must provide each bidder participating in the assignment stage with the list of frequency range options available to the bidder in each of the assignment rounds for the lots of a product that were allocated to the bidder in the primary stage or secondary stage.
5 Assignment bids
(1) An assignment bid consists of:
(a) the frequency range option that is being bid for; and
(b) a bid price for the frequency range option that is a multiple of one hundred.
(2) A bidder may submit a single assignment bid for any option in the list of frequency range options provided by the auction manager. A bidder is not permitted to bid for any other frequency range.
(3) Except where subsection 50(1) or 50(2) applies, a bidder’s assignment bid is taken to have been made in an assignment round when the assignment bid has passed data validation checks that are performed by the auction system.
Note: Subsection 50(1) allows the auction manager to permit an assignment bid to be made other than by using the auction system, in certain circumstances. Subsection 50(2) allows the auction manager to permit an assignment bid to be made after an assignment round has ended, in certain circumstances.
(4) A bidder may change, delete or replace an assignment bid in the auction system during an assignment round as often as desired, subject to the data validation checks that are performed by the auction system. The assignment bid that will be treated as binding for a bidder is the assignment bid in the auction system at the end time of the assignment round.
(5) Any frequency range option for which no assignment bid is received, or for which an invalid assignment bid is received, is taken to have an assignment bid with a bid price of zero dollars.
(6) If a bidder does not submit any assignment bid, the bidder will be taken to have bid zero dollars for every frequency range option.
6 Validity of assignment bids
An assignment bid is valid if:
(a) except where subsection 50(2) applies, the assignment bid is received between the start time and end time of the assignment round for the product or group of products; and
(b) the assignment bid is for a frequency range option made available to the bidder; and
(c) the amount bid for the frequency range option is a multiple of one hundred.
Note: Subsection 50(2) allows the auction manager to permit an assignment bid to be made after an assignment round has ended, in certain circumstances.
Part 4—Determining winning assignment bids and assignment prices
7 Determination of winning assignment bids
(1) After an assignment round has ended, the auction manager must determine the winning assignment bids for each product or group of products bid for in the assignment round and tell each winning assignment round bidder its winning assignment bid.
(2) The winning assignment bids must be a combination of valid assignment bids such that:
(a) exactly one assignment bid (whether a submitted assignment bid or an assignment bid of zero dollars taken to have been made under subclause 5(5) or 5(6)) is selected from each bidder; and
(b) the frequency ranges included in any pair of winning assignment bids for a product or group of products do not overlap; and
(c) if relevant, the frequency range of any unallocated lots of a product is assigned in accordance with subclause 4(3); and
(d) if relevant, subclause 4(4) is applied.
(3) Subject to the constraints in subclause (2), the assignment bids selected must maximise the sum of the assignment bid prices.
(4) If more than one combination of assignment bids meets the criterion in subclause (3), the winning combination must be selected by a pseudorandom process.
Note: This clause relates to Division 2 of Part 6 of this instrument for the purposes of section 294 of the Act and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.
8 Determination of assignment prices
(1) The auction manager must determine the assignment price for each winning assignment bid in an assignment round and tell each winning assignment round bidder its winning assignment price.
(2) If there is only one bidder in an assignment round, then the assignment price must be zero. Otherwise, the auction manager must determine the assignment price in accordance with the following subclauses.
(3) The assignment price must be no more than the assignment bid price.
(4) The assignment price may be zero.
(5) Subject to the constraint in subclause (3), a set of assignment prices in the assignment round must be selected so that:
(a) there is no alternative bidder, or group of bidders, who (based on their assignment bids) would pay more than any winning assignment round bidder or group of winning assignment round bidders; and
(b) if more than one set of assignment prices satisfies paragraph (a) – the sum of the assignment prices is also minimised; and
(c) if more than one set of assignment prices satisfies paragraphs (a) and (b) – it is the solution to the formula in subclause (6).
is the set of Vickrey prices for the bidders, the price for each bidder j being:<br> (a) the sum of bid prices for the combination of assignment bids that would have been selected under subclause 7(3) if bidder j had submitted assignment bids of zero dollars for every frequency range option; less<br> (b) the sum of bid prices for all other winning assignment bids in the assignment round.
Note: For starting prices, see paragraph 28(1)(d) of this instrument.
(7) A bidder who has assignment prices for winning assignment bids in an assignment round is an assignment winner in the assignment stage for an assignment of a frequency range or frequency ranges to lots of a product or group of products.
(8) For the purposes of subclause (9), the total assignment price for assignment of a frequency range or frequency ranges to lots of a product or group of products in the assignment stage is an amount equal to the sum of the assignment prices for the assignment of all frequency ranges of the assignment winner.
(9) The total assignment price is to be paid by the assignment winner.
(10) The assignment prices calculated under subclause (5) must be rounded up to the next hundred.
Note: This clause relates to Division 2 of Part 6 of this instrument for the purposes of section 294 of the Act and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.
Part 5—Bringing the assignment stage to an end
9 Results of the assignment stage
After the end of all assignment rounds, the auction manager must tell each winning assignment round bidder:
(a) the frequency ranges assigned to the lots of each product that were allocated to the bidder in the primary stage or secondary stage; and
(b) any assignment price for the frequency ranges assigned.
10 End of the assignment stage
The assignment stage is complete when the auction manager has notified all bidders of the results of every assignment round.