Radiocommunications (Spectrum Licence Allocation — 3.6 GHz Band) Determination 2018
15Validity of bids
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15 Validity of bids
(1) A bid in a clock round is valid if all of the following apply in relation to the bid:
(a) except where subsection 50(2) applies, the bid is received by the auction system between the start time and end time of the clock round;
Note: Subsection 50(2) allows the auction manager to permit a bid to be made after a clock round has ended, in certain circumstances.
(b) for an increase bid or a decrease bid – the bid price is not less than the opening price and not greater than the clock price for the lots of a product for the clock round;
(c) for an increase bid or a decrease bid – the bid price is a multiple of one hundred;
(d) for an increase bid for lots of a product – the sum (when expressed in MHz) of:
(i) the total size of the lots of the product for the start demand of the bidder; and
(ii) the total size of the lots of the product for the increase bid of the bidder;
in the clock round does not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to the product (other than the Perth lower band product and the Perth upper band product) or applicable to the Perth combined products;
Note: The spectrum licence limits direction sets limits on the allocation of spectrum licences to a single person, or a specified group of persons, in the Perth area (among other areas). However, the lots in the Perth area are divided into two different products: the Perth lower band product and the Perth upper band product. For the purposes of the allocation limits, the two products are treated as just one product. For all other purposes, they are to be treated as two products. See subsection 11(2).
(e) for an increase bid for lots of a product – the sum of:
(i) the number of lots for the bidder’s start demand for the product; and
(ii) the number of lots for the bidder’s increase bid for the product;
in the clock round is not greater than the number of lots for the supply of the product;
(f) for an increase bid for lots of a product – for a bidder that selected a minimum spectrum requirement, if the number of lots for the bidder’s start demand for the product in the clock round is equal to zero, the number of lots for the bidder’s increase bid for the product in the clock round is at least the minimum spectrum requirement for the lots of the product;
(g) for a decrease bid for lots of a product – the difference between:
(i) the number of lots for the bidder’s start demand for the product; and
(ii) the number of lots for the bidder’s decrease bid for the product;