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Radiocommunications (Spectrum Licence Allocation—3.4/3.7 GHz Bands) Determination 2023
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Radiocommunications (Spectrum Licence Allocation—3.4/3.7 GHz Bands) Determination 2023
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142 Assignment rounds in which bidding is not required
(1) This section applies if, for an assignment round for a product, there is only one frequency range option available to each assignment bidder (an affected bidder) who was allocated at least one lot of the product.
(2) If this section applies:
(a) bidders do not make bids using the auction system in the assignment round for the product; and
(b) instead, each affected bidder is treated as having made an assignment bid with a bid price of zero dollars for the only frequency range option available to the bidder.
(3) If this section applies, the auction manager must, at least 24 hours before the start of the first assignment round, inform each affected bidder using the auction system of the effect of subsection (2).
Subdivision D—Bringing the assignment stage to an end
143 Determination of winning assignment bids for an assignment round
(1) After an assignment round ends, the auction manager must tell each assignment bidder in the round the frequency range option in its winning assignment bid.
Note: This section relates to Division 7 of Part 5 of this instrument for the purposes of section 294 of the Act, and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.
(2) A winning assignment bid for a product for an assignment round is an assignment bid in the combination of assignment bids for the assignment round that meets the following requirements:
(a) only one assignment bid is selected from each assignment bidder for the assignment round;
(b) the frequency ranges included in any pair of winning assignment bids for a product, or group of a products, do not overlap;
(c) the sum of the bid prices in the assignment bids is maximised;
(d) if any lots of a product were not allocated in the primary stage or secondary stage (if any), the unassigned frequency range that will result from those unallocated lots is a contiguous frequency range.
(3) If more than one combination of assignment bids satisfies subsection (2), the combination that is used to determine the winning assignment bids will be selected using a pseudorandom process.
(4) The assignment winner for a frequency range for a product for an assignment round is the assignment bidder whose winning assignment bid was for that frequency range.
144 Determination of assignment price for an assignment round
(1) After the end of an assignment round, the auction manager must tell each assignment winner in the round the assignment price for its winning assignment bid.
Note: This section relates to Division 7 of Part 5 of this instrument for the purposes of section 294 of the Act, and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.
(2) The assignment price for a winning assignment bid is the price determined by the auction manager in accordance with this section.
(3) The assignment price for a winning assignment bid:
(a) must not exceed the bid price for the bid; and
(b) may be zero; and
(c) if there is only one assignment bidder in the assignment round—must be zero.
(4) Subject to paragraphs (3)(a) and (c), a set of assignment prices in the assignment round must be selected so that:
(a) there is no alternative assignment bidder, or group of assignment bidders, who (based on their assignment bids) would pay more than any assignment winner or group of assignment winners, disregarding any assignment bids that could not form part of a combination of assignment bids that satisfies subsection 143(2); and
(b) if more than one set of assignment prices satisfies paragraph (a)—the sum of the assignment prices is also minimised; and
(c) if more than one set of assignment prices satisfies paragraphs (a) and (b)—it is the solution to the formula in subsection (5).
(5) For paragraph (4)(c), the formula is:
subject to The set of assignment pricessatisfying paragraphs (4)(a) and (4)(b),
where:
| A set of assignment prices. | is a set of assignment prices. |
|---|---|
| The index of each assignment bidder in an assignment round. | is the index of each assignment bidder (j) in the set of all assignment bidders participating in the assignment round (J). |
| The set of starting prices of allocated lots for assignment bidders. | is the set of prices the assignment bidders’ allocated lots would have had at the starting prices for the lots. |
| The set of Vickrey prices for assignment bidders. | is the set of Vickrey prices for the assignment bidders, the price for each bidder j being:<br>(a) the sum of bid prices for the combination of assignment bids that would have been selected under subsection 143(2) if bidder j had made assignment bids of zero dollars for every frequency range option; less<br>(b) the sum of bid prices for all other winning assignment bids in the assignment round. |
Note: For starting prices, see paragraphs 22(d) and 25(1)(a).
(6) The assignment price for a winning assignment bid must be rounded to the nearest hundred dollars.
145 3.4 GHz auction—allocation of leftover lots to assignment winners
(1) This section applies to the 3.4 GHz auction, if one or more leftover lots of a product were not directly allocated under Division 1 of Part 5 of this instrument.
(2) The assignment winner of a frequency range option that includes the frequency range of a leftover lot (see subsection 135(5)) is allocated the leftover lot.