Division 8 Preparation for bidding and scheduling rounds of the auction
47 Preparation for bidding
The ACMA must give each bidder an opportunity to trial the auction system before the auction commences.
48 Security of the auction
(1) A bidder must ensure that any information and items provided to the bidder for the purpose of accessing the auction system are kept secure during the auction period.
(2) The bidder must notify the ACMA immediately if any information or item provided to the bidder for the purpose of accessing the auction system is lost or stolen during the auction period.
49 Auction rounds
(1) The rounds of the auction for the primary stage, secondary stage and assignment stage are to be scheduled.
(2) The first clock round of the primary stage of the auction starts on the date and time for that clock round set by the auction manager under paragraph 50(1)(a).
50 First and second clock rounds and pre-bidding phase before first clock round
(1) After the later of the eligibility deadline or extended eligibility deadline (if there is one), the auction manager must:
set the start date and start time of the first and second clock rounds of the primary stage of the auction; and
set a period of at least 3 hours (the pre-bidding phase), which must start not more than 48 hours before the start date and start time of the first clock round of the primary stage of the auction, within which a bidder may, using the auction system:
enter the bidder’s actual start demands, by changing or confirming the bidder’s provisional start demands, for the lots of each product for the first clock round of the primary stage; and
enter the bidder’s actual minimum spectrum requirements (if any), by changing or confirming the bidder’s provisional minimum spectrum requirements (if any), for the lots of each product for the primary stage.
(2) At least 10 working days before the start date of the first clock round of the primary stage of the auction, the auction manager must notify bidders of:
the start date and start time of the first and second clock rounds of the primary stage; and
the start date and start time of the pre-bidding phase.
Part 5—Auction procedures
Division 1 Procedures to be applied
51 Auction stages
(1) The auction consists of a primary stage, a secondary stage (if required) and an assignment stage.
Division Div 8 - Radiocommunications (Spectrum Licence Allocation — 26 GHz Band) Determination 2020 - Preparation for bidding and scheduling rounds of the auction | Zoe
(2) The primary stage is made up of:
the pre-bidding phase, for bidders to change or confirm their:
provisional start demands for the lots of each product; and
provisional minimum spectrum requirements (if any) for the lots of each product; and
one or more clock rounds for the making of bids on lots of a product and the results of that clock round; and
the determination of the final posted demands, as a result of the final clock round, for the lots of each product allocated to a primary winner and of the associated primary price, after all clock rounds are completed.
(3) The secondary stage, if required, is made up of:
one or more rounds for the making of bids on any residual lot of a product that is available in the secondary stage of the auction and the results of the round; and
the determination of the winning final high bids for any residual lot of a product allocated to a secondary winner and of the associated secondary price after all rounds for the secondary stage are completed.
(4) The assignment stage is made up of:
one or more assignment rounds for the making of bids for the assignment of frequency ranges to lots of a product (or group of products) that were allocated in the primary stage or secondary stage; and
the determination of the winning assignment bids (after an assignment round has ended) for the frequency ranges assigned to the lots of each product (or group of products) that were allocated to a primary winner or secondary winner and of the associated total assignment price after all assignment rounds are completed.
52 Procedures if only one bidder
(1) If there is only one bidder in the auction, the procedures to be applied for allocating lots of a product and assigning frequency ranges are as follows:
there will be a pre-bidding phase in which the bidder may enter start demands and minimum spectrum requirements as mentioned in paragraph 50(1)(b) and one clock round in the primary stage in which the bidder may make a bid for the lots of each product;
the assignment stage will be conducted as soon as possible after the primary stage to enable the bidder to indicate the frequency ranges the bidder wishes to have assigned.
Note: In this situation, the assignment prices will be zero: see subclause 8(2) of Schedule 3.
(2) The ACMA must notify the bidder as soon as reasonably practicable after the later of the eligibility deadline or extended eligibility deadline (if there is one) that it is the only bidder, and that the procedures in this section apply.
53 Rounds of the auction
(1) The clock rounds for the primary stage of the auction are to be conducted in accordance with the rules in Schedule 1.
(2) The rounds for the secondary stage of the auction, if required, are to be conducted in accordance with the rules in Schedule 2.
(3) The assignment rounds for the assignment stage of the auction are to be conducted in accordance with the rules in Schedule 3.
54 Auction manager’s discretion to accept entries and bids
(1) The auction manager may permit a bidder to make:
an entry in the pre-bidding phase of the primary stage; or
a bid for a round in the auction, in the primary stage or secondary stage or assignment stage;
by a method other than the auction system if the auction manager is satisfied that the bidder is not able to make an entry or a bid using the auction system.
(2) The auction manager may permit a bidder to make:
an entry in the pre-bidding phase of the primary stage; or
a bid for a round in the auction, in the primary stage or secondary stage or assignment stage;
after the end time of the pre-bidding phase or round if the auction manager is satisfied that the bidder could not make the entry during the pre-bidding phase or the bid during the round because of technical or communication problems.
(3) An entry or a bid permitted to be made by the auction manager under subsection (2) is taken to have been made during the pre-bidding phase or relevant round.
(4) The auction manager must not permit a bidder to make:
an entry under paragraph 2(a) after information about the outcome of the pre-bidding phase has been provided to bidders; or
a bid under paragraph (2)(b) after information about the outcome of the relevant round has been provided to bidders.
Note 1: See subclause 3(7) of Schedule 1 for details of the information about the outcome of the pre-bidding phase of the primary stage that will be provided to bidders.
Note 2: See clause 8 of Schedule 1, clause 5 of Schedule 2 and clauses 7 and 8 of Schedule 3 for details of the information about the outcome of a round of the auction that will be provided to bidders.
55 Action that auction manager may take in exceptional circumstances
(1) If the auction manager is satisfied that the auction is affected by exceptional circumstances, the auction manager may:
make corrections to:
entries made in the pre-bidding phase of the primary stage of the auction; and
the results of the round of the auction that last ended; and
information received by a bidder after that round; or
stop the pre-bidding phase of the primary stage of the auction and restart the pre-bidding phase; or
stop the current round of the auction and restart the round; or
cancel the results of one or more rounds of the auction and restart the auction from the point before those rounds; or
cancel the results of all the rounds of the auction in the primary stage or secondary stage or assignment stage and restart the auction from the first round of the relevant stage; or
stop the auction.
(2) For this section, exceptional circumstances include:
a significant technical difficulty with the auction system; or
a breach of the confidentiality obligation in section 17.
(3) Subsection (2) does not limit what might constitute exceptional circumstances.
(4) This section applies to the pre-bidding phase and clock rounds in the primary stage, rounds in the secondary stage and assignment rounds in the assignment stage of the auction.
Division 2 Affiliations during the auction
56 Affiliation between bidders during auction period not permitted
A bidder must not be affiliated with another bidder during the auction period.
Note: If the ACMA is satisfied that a breach of this provision has occurred, the ACMA may take action under section 75. Section 75 enables the ACMA to retain an eligibility payment if it is satisfied certain breaches of this instrument have occurred.
57 Requirement to report affiliation
If, at any time during the auction period, a bidder believes that it may be an affiliate of another bidder, the bidder must immediately tell the ACMA in writing the identity of the other bidder and give details of the affiliation.
58 Auction continues despite possible affiliation
If the ACMA becomes aware during the auction period that two or more bidders may be affiliated, the auction is to continue and the bidders may continue to participate in the auction.
59 ACMA consideration of affiliation
(1) If the ACMA has reason to believe that two or more bidders are affiliated during the auction period, the ACMA must, in writing, notify the bidders and tell them the basis on which the ACMA believes that the affiliation exists.
(2) If a bidder gave the ACMA information under section 57 and the ACMA does not consider that the affiliation exists, the ACMA must tell the bidder in writing that the ACMA does not consider the affiliation to exist.
Division 3 Statement by primary winners and secondary winners about affiliations
60 Primary winners and secondary winners to make statement about affiliations
(1) If subsection 59(1) applies before the end of the secondary stage (if there is one) or primary stage (if there is no secondary stage), then as soon as practicable after the end of the relevant stage and before the start of the assignment stage, the ACMA must:
give each primary winner and each secondary winner details about the identity of all other primary winners and all other secondary winners; and
ask those winners to make a statement whether the winner is an affiliate of another winner and, if so, identifying the other winner and giving details of the affiliation.
(2) The ACMA must state a deadline, at least 10 working days after the date of the request, before which the statement must be received by the ACMA.
(3) A primary winner or secondary winner must give the ACMA the statement by the deadline.
Note 1: Giving false or misleading information is a serious offence under section 137.1 of the Criminal Code Act 1995.
Note 2: Section 136.1 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 also makes it an offence to make a false or misleading statement in connection with an application for a licence.
61 Notification that winners are affiliated
If the ACMA is satisfied that two or more primary winners or secondary winners are affiliated after the end of the primary stage (if there is no secondary stage) or secondary stage (if there is one), the ACMA must, in writing, notify those winners and tell them the basis on which the ACMA is satisfied the winners are affiliated.
62 Consequences of affiliation between winners
(1) If the ACMA notifies two or more primary winners or secondary winners under section 61 that it is satisfied the winners are affiliated, the ACMA must not allocate spectrum licences to those winners that would exceed the allocation limits:
(a) applicable to a product, other than a lower band product and an upper band product; or
(b) applicable to any one of the combined products.
(2) If the allocation of spectrum licences to the affiliated primary winners or secondary winners for all the lots of a product (when expressed in MHz) those winners were allocated in the primary stage or secondary stage would exceed the allocation limits applicable to the product (other than a lower band product and an upper band product) or applicable to any one of the combined products, the winners may give a direction in writing to the ACMA specifying how spectrum is to be allocated between the winners up to the allocation limits applicable to the product (other than a lower band product and an upper band product) or applicable to any one of the combined products.
(3) The direction must be given jointly by the affiliated primary winners or secondary winners and must be given to the ACMA within 5 working days after the winners received notification under section 61.
(4) If the ACMA does not receive a direction within those 5 working days, the ACMA may, for any part of the spectrum where the lots of a product allocated to the affiliated primary winners or secondary winners exceed the allocation limits applicable to the product (other than a lower band product and an upper band product) or applicable to any one of the combined products, choose at its discretion how to allocate spectrum licences to each winner up to the allocation limits applicable to the product (other than a lower band product and an upper band product) or applicable to any one of the combined products.
(5) Spectrum in excess of the allocation limits:
(a) applicable to a product, other than a lower band product and an upper band product; or
(b) applicable to any one of the combined products;
that is not allocated under subsection (2) or (4) is taken to be unallocated.
(6) A winning bidder must pay the full balance of the winning price:
(a) for all lots allocated to the bidder in the primary stage or secondary stage, despite receiving a smaller allocation as a result of this section; and
(b) for all frequency ranges assigned to any of those lots in the assignment stage.
Note: The spectrum licence limits direction sets limits on the allocation of spectrum licences to a single person, or a specified group of persons, in designated areas. However, in the marketing plan, the lots in the Greater Perth, Hobart and Margaret River areas are each divided into two different products, such that each area has a lower band product and an upper band product. For the purposes of the allocation limits, the two products of each area are treated as just one product. For all other purposes, they are to be treated as two products.
Part 6—Procedures after auction
Division 1 Notices and refunds to withdrawn applicants and unsuccessful bidders
63 Notice and refunds to withdrawn applicants
(1) As soon as practicable after the end of the auction period, the ACMA must notify each applicant that withdrew, or was taken to have withdrawn its application, that the applicant’s confidentiality obligation under section 17 has ended.
(2) If an applicant that withdrew, or was taken to have withdrawn, its application made an eligibility payment, the ACMA on behalf of the Commonwealth must refund the eligibility payment no later than 6 months after giving the notice under subsection (1) unless the ACMA has made a decision to retain the eligibility payment under section 75.
Note: Section 75 enables the ACMA to retain an eligibility payment if it is satisfied certain breaches of this instrument have occurred.
64 Notice and refunds to unsuccessful bidders
(1) As soon as practicable after the end of the auction period, the ACMA must notify each bidder that is not a winning bidder that:
the bidder was unsuccessful in the auction; and
the bidder’s confidentiality obligation under section 17 will end when the ACMA announces or publishes the information mentioned in subsection 69(1).
(2) If the bidder made an eligibility payment, the ACMA on behalf of the Commonwealth must refund the eligibility payment no later than 6 months after giving the notice under subsection (1) unless the ACMA has made a decision to retain the eligibility payment under section 75.
Note: Section 75 enables the ACMA to retain an eligibility payment if it is satisfied certain breaches of this instrument have occurred.
Division 2 Winning prices, payment and issue of spectrum licences
Note: This Division is made under section 294 of the Act and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.
65 Winning price and balance of winning price
(1) For a winning bidder, the winning price is the total of:
the primary price for all lots allocated to the bidder in the primary stage; and
the secondary price (if any) for all lots allocated (if any) to the bidder in the secondary stage; and
the total assignment price (if any) for all frequency ranges assigned to those lots in the assignment stage.
Note: The winning price is the total spectrum access charge fixed under section 294 of the Act payable by a licensee for the issuing of spectrum licences to the licensee.
(2) For a winning bidder, the balance of the winning price is the winning price minus any eligibility payment made by the bidder under, or for the purposes of, section 36.
66 Results of the auction
(1) After the winning bidders and winning prices are determined, the auction manager must, by notice in writing, tell each winning bidder:
the number of lots of each product allocated to the winning bidder;
the frequency ranges assigned to the lots allocated to the winning bidder; and
the winning price to be paid by the winning bidder.
Note: The allocation of spectrum licences is complete when frequency ranges are assigned to lots of a product (allocated to a bidder in the primary stage or secondary stage) at the end of the assignment stage.
(2) After the winning bidders and winning prices are determined, the auction manager must tell all bidders in writing:
the names of all winning bidders in the auction; and
the frequency ranges for each product in relation to the lots allocated in the auction; and
the winning price paid, or to be paid, by each winning bidder in the auction.
(3) Unless all bidders agree in writing, the ACMA will not provide to all bidders any further information regarding the results of the auction other than that mentioned in subsection (2) and subclause 18(2) of Schedule 1 and subclause 18(2) of Schedule 2.
Note: For information about the auction that is announced or published after the end of the auction period, see subsection 69(1).
67 Sufficient eligibility payment – issue of spectrum licence without further payment
(1) If the balance of the winning price for a winning bidder is an amount less than zero:
the ACMA on behalf of the Commonwealth must refund the eligibility payment in excess of the winning price no later than 6 months after giving the notice under subsection 66(1) unless the ACMA has made a decision to retain the excess eligibility payment under section 75; and
the bidder is entitled to be issued a spectrum licence for each part of the spectrum assigned to the lots allocated to the bidder without further payment.
(2) If the balance of the winning price for a winning bidder is zero, the bidder is entitled to be issued a spectrum licence for each part of the spectrum assigned to the lots allocated to the bidder without further payment.
(3) For subsections (1) and (2), a winning bidder is taken to have elected to pay the winning price in full.
68 Payment of balance of winning price
If the balance of the winning price for a winning bidder is an amount greater than zero, it must be paid by the winning bidder to the ACMA on behalf of the Commonwealth in accordance with Schedule 4.
69 Publication of auction results
(1) The ACMA must announce or publish the following information about the auction after the end of the auction period:
the names of winning bidders;
the spectrum allocated to each winning bidder;
the winning price paid, or to be paid, by each winning bidder.
(2) Before the ACMA announces or publishes the information in subsection (1), the auction manager must notify each winning bidder, in writing, that:
the ACMA will announce or publish the information; and
the winning bidder’s confidentiality obligation under section 17 will end when the ACMA announces or publishes the information.
(3) Unless all bidders agree in writing, the ACMA will not announce or publish any further information regarding the results of the auction.
Part 7—Miscellaneous
70 Unallocated spectrum
Parts of the spectrum that are available in the auction but not allocated in the primary stage and not allocated in the secondary stage (if any), or taken to be unallocated under section 62 or 76, may be later made available for allocation by a procedure to be determined by the ACMA.
Note: The ACMA may make determinations under section 60 of the Act about allocations by auction or by other procedures.
71 Bidders must not misuse auction system
(1) A bidder must only access and use the auction system in accordance with the information about access and use provided under paragraphs 45(2)(c), (d) and (e).
(2) A bidder must not attempt to interfere with, disrupt or damage the auction system.
(3) A bidder must not use or attempt to use the auction system to breach a law of the Commonwealth.
72 ACMA may obtain information from applicants and bidders
(1) If the ACMA has reason to believe that an applicant or bidder has information or documents that are relevant to the performance of any of the ACMA’s functions or exercise of its powers under this instrument, the ACMA may, by written notice, require the applicant or bidder:
to give to the ACMA, within the period and in the manner and form specified in the notice, any such information; or
to produce to the ACMA, within the period and in the manner specified in the notice, any such documents.
Note: If a requirement in a notice given under this subsection is breached, the ACMA may take action under section 75.
(2) The ACMA may vary a notice given under subsection (1).
73 Use of information and documents by ACMA
(1) The ACMA may use information or documents it obtains in the performance of its functions or exercise of its powers under this instrument:
for the purposes of this instrument, including disclosing or publishing information or documents as provided for in this instrument; and
in relation to a spectrum licence to be issued, or issued, as a result of the auction.
(2) The ACMA may retain possession of a document or other item given to the ACMA for the purposes of this instrument for as long as necessary for the performance of the ACMA’s functions and exercise of its powers under this instrument or the Act.
(3) The ACMA may disclose information or documents in accordance with Part 7A of the Australian Communications and Media Authority Act 2005 or as otherwise authorised by law.
74 ACMA to provide information to ACCC on request
(1) The ACCC may make a request to the ACMA for information in relation to the auction or in relation to an applicant or bidder.
(2) The ACMA must provide the requested information to the ACCC if the ACMA has the information.
(3) Without limiting subsection (1), information that the ACCC may request includes the following:
completed application forms and completed eligibility nomination forms (including any updates to such forms);
deeds of confidentiality;
information about an applicant’s associates and affiliations (including statutory declarations and statements made under this instrument);
information about any breaches of confidentiality obligations;
information about bidding during the auction;
information about the outcomes of the procedures in Part 6.
75 Retention of eligibility payment or enforcement of deed of financial security for breach of auction procedures
(1) The ACMA on behalf of the Commonwealth may retain an eligibility payment made by an applicant or bidder, or enforce a deed of financial security given by an applicant or bidder, if:
the ACMA is satisfied that:
the applicant or bidder, or a related person of the applicant or bidder, or a contractor of the applicant or bidder, breached a provision of this instrument; and
the breach affected, or may have affected, the outcome of the auction; or
the ACMA is satisfied that the applicant or bidder, or a related person of the applicant or bidder, or a contractor of the applicant or bidder, breached the confidentiality obligation under section 17 before the confidentiality obligation came to an end; or
the ACMA is satisfied that the bidder breached section 56; or
the bidder is a primary winner or secondary winner who failed to give the statement, if required, under section 60; or
the bidder is a winning bidder who failed to:
pay the balance of the winning price in accordance with Schedule 4; or
comply with the requirements to pay the balance of the winning price in accordance with Schedule 4; or
the applicant or bidder failed to comply with a requirement in a notice given under subsection 72(1).
(2) The ACMA must, in writing, notify the applicant or bidder of a decision under subsection (1) and the nature of the breach or failure before the later of:
6 months after the end of the auction period; and
6 months after the day on which the breach or failure mentioned in subsection (1) occurred.
(3) An eligibility payment retained under this section, or an amount obtained through enforcement of a deed of financial security under this section, is forfeited to the Commonwealth unless the Federal Court orders the return of the amount under section 77.
76 Effect of retention on winning bidders
If the ACMA makes a decision under subsection 75(1) in relation to a winning bidder:
despite section 67 and clause 5 of Schedule 4, the ACMA must not issue a spectrum licence to the bidder; and
the spectrum assigned to the lots allocated to the bidder at auction is taken to be unallocated.
77 Application to Federal Court for return of retained amount
(1) An applicant or bidder who has been notified by the ACMA under subsection 75(2) may, within 1 year of receiving the notice, apply to the Federal Court for return of all or part of an eligibility payment or an amount obtained through enforcement of a deed of financial security.
(2) On application, the Federal Court may:
if the Court is not satisfied that the applicant or bidder committed the breach identified in the notice given by the ACMA – order the return of all of the amount retained by the ACMA; or
if the Court is satisfied that the applicant or bidder committed the breach, but considers that it would be disproportionate for the full amount to be retained – order the return of part of the amount retained by the ACMA.
(3) This section does not enable the Federal Court to order that a spectrum licence be issued to an applicant or bidder.
(4) This section does not remove any existing jurisdiction of a court.
78 No liability of the ACMA, etc.
Neither the ACMA, the Commonwealth, nor the auction manager is liable to pay damages or costs arising from an act or omission of any person in relation to the auction procedures set out in this instrument.
79 Other rights not affected
This instrument does not limit any other right of action or remedy which the ACMA or the Commonwealth has against a person.
80 Auction manager may delegate functions and powers
The auction manager may delegate any of the auction manager’s functions and powers under this instrument to:
a member within the meaning of the Australian Communications and Media Authority Act 2005; or
a member of the ACMA staff that:
holds, or is acting in, an Executive Level 1 or 2 position or an equivalent position; or
is an SES employee or acting SES employee.
Note: SES employee and acting SES employee are defined in the Public Service Act 1999 and referred to in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.
Schedule 1—Rules for the primary stage of the auction
(subsections 4(1) and 53(1))
This Schedule applies to all lots of each product that are available in the primary stage of the auction.
Note: If all lots of all products are allocated in the primary stage, there is no secondary stage. See also clause 1 of Schedule 2 as to a lot of a product that may be available in the secondary stage.
(1) In this Schedule:
active: see subclause 11(2).
activity target: see subclause 11(1).
aggregate demand, for lots of a product, means either:
for the first clock round – the total of the number of lots of the product recorded in the auction system as the start demands of all bidders under subclause 3(2); or
for any clock round other than the first clock round – the total of the posted demands for the lots of the product of all bidders.
bid, in a clock round, means:
an increase bid; or
a decrease bid; or
a maintain bid.
bid increment percentage: see subclause 4(1).
bid price, for a lot of a product for a clock round, means an amount that is:
equal to or greater than the opening price; and
less than or equal to the clock price.
clock price, for a lot of a product for a clock round, means the sum of:
the opening price for the lots of the product; and
the bid increment percentage for the lots of the product multiplied by that opening price;
clock round means a round for bids in the primary stage.
decrease bid means a request to decrease the start demand of a bidder for lots of a product, by entering a negative number for the demand change for the lots of the product, at a bid price.
Note: If a bidder with a start demand for the lots of a product for a clock round does not make a valid bid for the clock round, the bidder will be taken to have requested a decrease bid: see subclause 15(2).
eligibility points, in relation to a bidder, means the number of points the bidder may use in relation to bids on lots of each product for a clock round.
Note: For eligibility points, see clauses 11, 12 and 13.
eligibility requirement percentage: see subclause 4(4).
excess demand, for lots of a product for a clock round, means the difference between:
the aggregate demand; and
the supply.
Note: The excess demand may be a positive number or a negative number or zero.
final clock round: see clause 16.
increase bid means a request to increase the start demand of a bidder for lots of a product, by entering a positive number for the demand change for the lots of the product, at a bid price.
maintain bid means a request to maintain the start demand of a bidder for lots of a product in a clock round, which:
at the time the bid is requested – is taken to be for any price between the opening price and the clock price for the clock round; and
after the processing algorithm is given effect after the clock round – is taken to be at the posted price for the lots of the product for the clock round.
Note: The actual price will be the posted price for the current clock round.
opening price, for a lot of a product for a clock round, means either:
for the first clock round – the starting price for the lots of the product; or
Note: For starting prices, see paragraph 27(1)(a) or 37(1)(a).
for any clock round other than the first clock round – the posted price for the lots of the product for the previous clock round.
posted demand, for a bidder for lots of a product for a clock round, means:
for a bidder who requested an increase bid or a decrease bid for the lots of the product in the clock round – the number of lots of the product determined by the processing algorithm after the end time of the clock round;
for a bidder who requested a maintain bid for the lots of the product in the clock round – the start demand for the bidder for the lots of the product for that clock round.
posted price, for a lot of a product for a clock round, means the amount determined by the processing algorithm after the end time of the clock round, which must be:
equal to or greater than the opening price for the lots of the product for the clock round; and
less than or equal to the clock price for the lots of the product for the clock round.
Note: See subclause 2A(6).
price point, for a lot of a product for a clock round, means a percentage calculated as the quotient of:
the difference between the bid price and the opening price; and
the difference between the clock price and the opening price.
Note: Paragraph (a) is the numerator. Paragraph (b) is the denominator.
primary price: see subclause 17(3).
primary winner: see subclause 17(1).
processing algorithm: see clause 2A.
start demand, for a bidder for lots of a product for a clock round, means either:
for the first clock round – the number of lots of the product recorded in the auction system for the bidder under paragraph 3(2)(a) or 3(3)(a); or
for any clock round other than the first clock round – the posted demand of the bidder for the lots of the product for the previous clock round.
supply, for lots of a product before the first clock round or for a clock round, means the number of lots of the product that are available in the primary stage of the auction.
Note: For the definitions of size and total size, see subsection 5(2).
(2) In this Schedule, a reference to the total value of the lots, in eligibility points, is a reference to the sum of the lot ratings for the lots.
(3) In this Schedule, after a decrease bid is entered, a reference to the decrease bid or the number of lots for the decrease bid is a reference to the absolute value of the decrease bid or absolute value of the number of lots for the decrease bid.
Note: This means that after a negative number is entered for a decrease bid, the provisions in this Schedule use the positive value for that number.