1A Bidders to choose between lots of a combined product, or are not to bid on lots of a combined product
For each lower band product, if:
this Schedule applies to both one lot for the lower band product and one lot for its related upper band product (the two related lots); and
there is at least one bidder (the affected bidder) for which:
the sum (when expressed in MHz) of the size of the two related lots and the size of the lots of the relevant combined products allocated to the bidder in the primary stage would exceed the bidder’s allocation limits applicable to those combined products; and
the sum (when expressed in MHz) of the size of one of those two related lots and the size of the lots of the relevant combined products allocated to the bidder in the primary stage would not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits applicable to those combined products;
then, before the first round of the secondary stage:
the auction manager must, in writing, notify all affected bidders that one lot for the lower band product and one lot for the related upper band product are available for bidding in the secondary stage; and
the auction manager must nominate a time and date, which is before the first round of the secondary stage, before which an affected bidder may make a nomination under subclause (2) (the nomination deadline).
Before the nomination deadline, a bidder may nominate in writing either (but not both):
to bid on the lot for the lower band product; or
to bid on the lot for the related upper band product.
If a bidder nominates in accordance with subclause (2) to bid on the lot for the lower band product, the bidder must not make a bid during the secondary stage on the lot for the related upper band product.
If a bidder nominates in accordance with subclause (2) to bid on the lot for the related upper band product, the bidder must not make a bid during the secondary stage on the lot for the lower band product.
If a bidder does not nominate in accordance with subclause (2), the bidder must not make a bid on either of the two related lots.
Note 1: Paragraph 12(e) makes any bid on a single lot of a lower band product or an upper band product that are related products invalid if it would exceed the bidder’s allocation limits applicable to the combined products to which the related products belong.
Section 1A - Radiocommunications (Spectrum Licence Allocation — 26 GHz Band) Determination 2020 - Bidders to choose between lots of a combined product, or are not to bid on lots of a combined product | Zoe
Note 2: The spectrum licence limits direction sets limits on the allocation of spectrum licences to a single person, or a specified group of persons, in designated areas. However, in the marketing plan, the lots in the Greater Perth, Hobart and Margaret River areas are each divided into two different products, such that each area has a lower band product and an upper band product. For the purposes of the allocation limits, the two products of each area are treated as just one product. For all other purposes, they are to be treated as two products.
(1) In this Schedule:
bid means a bid made on a single lot during the secondary stage, and includes a bid taken to be made on a single lot.
bid increment percentage: see subclause 3(7).
bidder, for a round of the secondary stage, means a bidder who may make a bid on a lot in that round in accordance with clause 10.
Note: Clause 10 sets out the general rules for a bidder to make a bid on a lot in a round of the secondary stage. Among other things, a bidder may only make a bid on a lot if the lot meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for the bidder.
continue bid, in relation to a lot, means a bid made on the lot in a round of the secondary stage that is equal to or greater than the specified price of the lot for that round.
exit bid, in relation to a lot, means a bid made on the lot in a round of the secondary stage that is:
less than the specified price of the lot for that round; and
either:
in the first round of the secondary stage – equal to or greater than the starting price for the lot; or
in any round other than the first round of the secondary stage – equal to or greater than the specified price of the lot for the previous round of the secondary stage.
final high bid: see subclause 14(3).
Note: Subclause 15(3) may affect the meaning of final high bid.
final round for bids on a lot: see subclause 14(1).
final round of the secondary stage: see subclause 14(2).
lot, unless the contrary intention appears, means a residual lot of a product determined in accordance with subclause 1(2).
meets the minimum spectrum requirement test: see subclause (2).
recess day: see subclause 6(1).
residual price: see subclause 17(2).
round, for a lot, means a round for bids in the secondary stage.
secondary price: see subclause 17(3).
secondary winner: see subclauses 14(4) and 15(2).
specified price: see subclauses 8(2), 8(3) and 8(4).
Note: For the definition of size, see subsection 5(2) of this instrument.
(2) In this Schedule, in relation to a lot of a product, a lot meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for a bidder if either of the following applies:
the bidder did not select a minimum spectrum requirement for the lots of that product; or
if the bidder selected a minimum spectrum requirement for the lots of that product – the bidder was allocated in the primary stage at least the number of lots of that product equal to the minimum spectrum requirement.
Part 2—Arrangements for secondary stage
3 Schedule for rounds of the secondary stage and setting bid increment percentage
(1) There must be at least 24 hours between the final clock round of the primary stage and the first round of the secondary stage.
(2) Rounds of the secondary stage must start and end between 9.00 am and 5.00 pm on working days, other than a recess day.
(3) The scheduling of rounds between those times is at the auction manager’s discretion.
(4) There is no minimum or maximum length for a round, and no minimum or maximum length for the interval between rounds.
(5) There is no upper or lower limit on the number of rounds per day.
(6) The auction system will indicate to each bidder for the first round of a given day the anticipated schedule of rounds for that day at least 1 hour before the start time of the first round of the day. However, the auction manager may, at any time, modify the schedule of rounds. If this occurs, the auction manager must tell each bidder of the change as soon as practicable.
(7) Before the first round of the secondary stage, the auction manager must set a percentage (the bid increment percentage) for each lot as a percentage of the starting price for the lot for the first round of the secondary stage, and of the specified price for the lot in any other round of the secondary stage.
Note: The auction manager may vary the bid increment percentage set under this subclause, see clause 9.
(8) Before the first round of the secondary stage, the auction manager must notify the bid increment percentage for each lot to each bidder for the first round of the secondary stage.
(9) The bid increment percentage may be different for different lots and may be different for the same lot between different rounds of the secondary stage.
4 Rounds of the secondary stage
(1) Each lot is available for bidding in the first round of the secondary stage, and in each subsequent round of the secondary stage until the final round for bids on that lot.
(2) During a round of the secondary stage, and subject to this Schedule, each bidder for the round may make a bid on each lot that:
is available for bidding during that round; and
meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for the bidder.
Note: Each bid is made on a single lot: see the definition of bid in subclause 2(1).
(3) However, a bidder cannot bid on a lot of a product if allocation of that lot to the bidder would exceed the bidder’s allocation limits:
applicable to the product, other than a lower band product and an upper band product; or
applicable to any one of the combined products.
Note 1: Eligibility points are not required to bid in the secondary stage.
Note 2: The spectrum licence limits direction sets limits on the allocation of spectrum licences to a single person, or a specified group of persons, in designated areas. However, in the marketing plan, the lots in the Greater Perth, Hobart and Margaret River areas are each divided into two different products, such that each area has a lower band product and an upper band product. For the purposes of the allocation limits, the two products of each area are treated as just one product. For all other purposes, they are to be treated as two products.
5 Information available during rounds of the secondary stage
(1) Before the start time of each round of the secondary stage, the auction manager must provide the following information for that round to each bidder, using the auction system:
the start time of the round;
the end time of the round;
for each lot available for bidding in that round that meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for the bidder and on which the bidder may make a bid:
the specified price that will apply to the lot in the round; and
for the first round of the secondary stage – the starting price for the lot; and
for each round other than the first round of the secondary stage – the specified price that applied to that lot in the previous round of the secondary stage; and
the total number of bidders for whom:
(A) the lot meets the minimum spectrum requirement test; and
(B) allocation of the lot as a unit of a product would not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits applicable to the product (other than a lower band product and an upper band product) or applicable to any one of the combined products;
any other information the auction manager considers necessary or convenient to conduct the secondary stage of the auction.
Note 1: Clause 10 sets out the general rules for a bidder to make a bid on a lot in a round of the secondary stage. Among other things, a bidder may only make a bid on a lot if the lot meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for the bidder.
Note 2: The spectrum licence limits direction sets limits on the allocation of spectrum licences to a single person, or a specified group of persons, in designated areas. However, in the marketing plan, the lots in the Greater Perth, Hobart and Margaret River areas are each divided into two different products, such that each area has a lower band product and an upper band product. For the purposes of the allocation limits, the two products of each area are treated as just one product. For all other purposes, they are to be treated as two products.
(2) After each round of the secondary stage, the auction manager must provide the following information for that round to each bidder, using the auction system:
the bids made (if any) by the bidder during the round;
if, as a result of the round, the bidder is the secondary winner for a lot – the secondary price for that lot;
for each lot available for bidding in that round that meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for the bidder and on which the bidder may make a bid – the number of bidders remaining in the secondary stage of the auction for that lot after the end time of the round;
any other information the auction manager considers necessary or convenient to conduct the secondary stage of the auction.
(3) Subclauses (1) and (2) do not prevent the auction manager or the ACMA from providing the information specified in those subclauses to other bidders at any time during the secondary stage.
6 Recess days
(1) The auction manager may declare a day to be a recess day (whether or not the day is a working day).
(2) Before declaring a recess day, the auction manager must give bidders an opportunity to comment on the proposed declaration and take into account any comments received.
(3) If the auction manager decides to declare a day to be a recess day the auction manager must tell each bidder of this.
Part 3—Bidding in the secondary stage
7 When bidder cannot make a bid on a lot
If, in a round of the secondary stage:
a bidder does not make a bid on a lot; or
a bidder is an exit bidder in the circumstances set out in clause 13 in relation to a lot;
the bidder cannot make a bid on that lot in any subsequent round of the secondary stage.
Note 1: A bidder makes a continue bid or exit bid on a lot in a round of the secondary stage in the circumstances specified in clause 11 or 13.
Note 2: An exit bid made by the bidder may still be the final high bid for a lot, except where clause 13 applies.
8 Starting price and specified price
(1) A bid on a lot for an amount less than the starting price for that lot will not be accepted.
Note: For starting prices, see paragraphs 27(1)(a) and 37(1)(a) of this instrument. For the validity of bids, see clause 12.
(2) The specified price for a lot in the first round of the secondary stage is the sum of:
the starting price for the lot; and
the bid increment percentage for the lot multiplied by that starting price;
(3) The specified price for a lot in a round of the secondary stage, other than the first round of the secondary stage, is the sum of:
the specified price for the lot in the previous round of the secondary stage; and
the bid increment percentage for the lot multiplied by that specified price;
(4) If a round in the secondary stage is the final round for bids on a lot, there is no later round of the secondary stage and, for the purposes of subclause (3), no specified price for the lot.
9 Changing bid increment percentage
(1) The auction manager may, at any time during the secondary stage, change the bid increment percentage for a lot to be applied in calculating the specified price for a lot in a round of the secondary stage.
Note: For the bid increment percentage, see subclause 3(7).
tell each bidder of the proposed change; and
ask each bidder to provide comments on the proposal within the time (being not less than 1 hour) set by the auction manager; and
take into account any comments on the proposal that are received within that time.
(3) The auction manager must notify each bidder for the round when the change takes effect before that round.
10 General rules about bidding
(1) A bidder:
may only make a bid on a lot if the lot meets the minimum spectrum requirement test for the bidder; and
may only make a bid that is valid in accordance with clause 12; and
must not make a bid on a lot if clause 7 or 13 provides that the bidder cannot make a bid on the lot.
(2) Except where subsection 54(1) or 54(2) applies, a bidder’s bid is taken to have been made in a round of the secondary stage when the bid has passed data validation checks that are performed by the auction system.
Note: Subsection 54(1) allows the auction manager to permit a bid to be made other than by using the auction system, in certain circumstances. Subsection 54(2) allows the auction manager to permit a bid to be made after a round of the secondary stage has ended, in certain circumstances.
(3) A bidder may change, delete or replace a bid in the auction system during a round of the secondary stage as often as desired, subject to the data validation checks that are performed by the auction system. The bid for a lot that will be treated as binding for a bidder is the bid in the auction system at the end time of the round.
Note: A bidder makes a continue bid or exit bid on a lot in a round of the secondary stage in the circumstances specified in clause 11 or 13. The definition of bid in subclause 2(1) includes a bid that is taken to be made.
11 Continue bid made at or greater than specified price
(1) A continue bid made on a lot in a round of the secondary stage (the relevant round) that is for an amount (the advance price) that is equal to or greater than the specified price for the lot in the relevant round will also constitute:
in any round after the relevant round where the advance price is greater than or equal to the specified price for the lot in that round – a continue bid made on that lot in that round; and
in the first round after the relevant round in which the advance price is less than the specified price for the lot in that round – an exit bid made on that lot in that round.
Note: The definition of bid in subclause 2(1) includes a bid that is taken to be made.
Example: During round N of the secondary stage, the specified price for a lot is $100,000. The bid increment percentage is 10%.
If a bidder makes a bid of $130,000 on the lot in round N, then:
(a) for round N+1, the specified price is $110,000, and the bid is taken to be a continue bid for round N+1;
(b) for round N+2, the specified price is $121,000, and the bid is taken to be a continue bid for round N+2;
(c) for round N+3, the specified price is $133,100, and the bid is taken to be an exit bid for round N+3.
(2) Subclause (1) is subject to any other bid made by a bidder on the lot in a round after the relevant round.
12 Validity of bids
A bid in a round of the secondary stage is valid if all of the following apply to the bid:
either:
if the round is the first round of the secondary stage for bids on a lot – the bid is not less than the starting price for the lot; or
if the round is for bids on a lot, other than the first round of the secondary stage – the bid is not less than the specified price of the lot in the previous round of the secondary stage;
subject to subsection 54(2), the bid is received by the auction system between the start time and end time of the round;
the bid is a multiple of one hundred;
for each product, other than a lower band product and an upper band product, the sum (when expressed in MHz) of:
1. the size of the lot of the product bid for in the round of the secondary stage; and
2. the total size of the lots of the product allocated to the bidder in the primary stage;
does not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to the product;
without limiting paragraph (f), for each of the combined products, the sum (when expressed in MHz) of:
the size of the lot of a lower band product or an upper band product bid for in the round of the secondary stage; and
for a lot that is a unit of a lower band product – the size of the lot of the related upper band product already allocated to the bidder in the secondary stage; and
for a lot that is a unit of an upper band product – the size of the lot of the related lower band product already allocated to the bidder in the secondary stage; and
the total size of the lots of the lower band product and the related upper band product allocated to the bidder in the primary stage;
does not exceed the bidder’s allocation limits (when expressed in MHz) applicable to those combined products;
(f) the bid is not prohibited by subclause 1A(3) or 1A(4) or 1A(5).
Note 1: The effect of paragraph (a) is that, to be valid, a bid must be either a continue bid or an exit bid.
Note 3: The spectrum licence limits direction sets limits on the allocation of spectrum licences to a single person, or a specified group of persons, in designated areas. However, in the marketing plan, the lots in the Greater Perth, Hobart and Margaret River areas are each divided into two different products, such that each area has a lower band product and an upper band product. For the purposes of the allocation limits, the two products of each area are treated as just one product. For all other purposes, they are to be treated as two products.
13 Exit bids – exclusion from further participation
If, in a round of the secondary stage, both of the following occur:
a bidder (the exit bidder) makes an exit bid on a lot (whether or not any other bidder also makes an exit bid on the lot); and
two or more bidders make a continue bid on the lot;
the exit bidder cannot make a bid on the lot in any subsequent round of the secondary stage.
Note 1: For a round of the secondary stage where the only bids on a lot are exit bids, or only one continue bid is made in addition to any exit bids, see Part 4 of this Schedule.
Part 4—Determining the secondary winners and secondary prices
14 Final round for bids on a lot, final round of the secondary stage, and final high bid
(1) The final round for bids on a lot is the first round of the secondary stage where one of the following applies:
only one bid is made on the lot; or
one or more exit bids, and no more than one continue bid, are made on the lot; or
no bids are made on the lot.
Note 1: For rules about bidding, see clauses 10, 11, 12 and 13.
(2) If, in relation to a round of the secondary stage, both of the following apply:
the round was a round for bids on one or more lots; and
after the round, the final round for bids on a lot has occurred for each lot;
the round is the final round of the secondary stage.
(3) For a lot other than a lot for which no bids were made in the first round of the secondary stage, the final high bid is:
if one bid was made on the lot in the final round for bids on the lot – that bid;
if one continue bid was made on the lot in the final round for bids on the lot – that continue bid;
if all of the following apply:
no continue bid was made on the lot in the final round for bids on the lot;
two or more exit bids were made on the lot in the final round for bids on the lot;
one of those exit bids (the high exit bid) was greater than each of the other exit bids;
– the high exit bid;
in any other case – selected in accordance with clause 15.
(4) Subject to subclause 15(2), the bidder who made the final high bid on a lot is the secondary winner for that lot.
Note 1: An exit bid may have been a continue bid in a previous round of the secondary stage, in accordance with clause 11.
15 Tiebreaker for a lot
(1) This clause applies in relation to a lot if:
no continue bid was made on the lot in the final round for bids on the lot; and
two or more exit bids were made on the lot in the final round for bids on the lot; and
of those exit bids:
two or more of those exit bids were equal (the tied exit bids); and
the tied exit bids were greater than each other exit bid mentioned in paragraph (b).
(2) Where this clause applies, the secondary winner for the lot will be selected from the bidders who made the tied exit bids using a pseudorandom process. The pseudorandom process must be conducted before the next round of the secondary stage (if any).
(3) For the purposes of paragraph 14(3)(d), the final high bid on the lot is the amount of the last bid made by the secondary winner.
Part 5—Bringing the secondary stage to an end
16 End of rounds of the secondary stage
(1) The rounds of the secondary stage will end immediately after:
if:
clause 15 applies in relation to a lot; and
for each other lot, either:
(A) there is a secondary winner for the lot; or
(B) there were no bids on the lot in the first round of the secondary stage;
– the pseudorandom process mentioned in subclause 15(2) occurs;
in any other case – the final round of the secondary stage.
(2) After the rounds of the secondary stage end, the auction manager must tell each bidder, using the auction system, that the rounds of the secondary stage have ended and that the auction will progress to the assignment stage.
17 Determination of secondary winners and secondary prices
(1) Subject to subclause 15(2), a bidder who has the final high bid for a lot (the allocated lot), in accordance with subclause 14(4), as a result of the final round for bids on a lot in the secondary stage is a secondary winner in the secondary stage for the lot of the product.
(2) For the purposes of subclause (3), the residual price for an allocated lot of a product in the secondary stage is an amount equal to:
if there is only one bid on the lot – the starting price for the lot; or
if there is more than one bid on the lot – the highest bid made for the lot by any bidder, during any round of the secondary stage, other than the final high bid.
(3) The secondary price to be paid by a secondary winner for all the allocated lots of each product of the secondary winner is the sum of all the secondary winner’s residual prices.
(4) The secondary price calculated under subclause (3) must be rounded up to the next hundred.
Note: This clause relates to Division 2 of Part 6 of this instrument for the purposes of section 294 of the Act and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.
18 Results of the secondary stage
(1) After the secondary winners and secondary prices are determined, the auction manager must tell each secondary winner, using the auction system:
the lots of each product allocated to the secondary winner; and
the residual price for the allocated lot of each product and the secondary price to be paid by the secondary winner for all allocated lots.
(2) After the secondary winners and secondary prices are determined, the auction manager must tell all bidders (in the primary stage and secondary stage):
the total number of secondary winners who have been allocated a lot of a product; and
for each lot allocated to a secondary winner, the product to which the lot belongs.
19 End of the secondary stage
(1) The auction manager must tell each primary winner and each secondary winner, the sum of:
the primary price; and
the secondary price;
for all the allocated lots, in the primary stage or secondary stage, of each product of that winner.
(2) Immediately after the auction manager provides the results in accordance with subclauses 18(1) and 18(2), the auction manager must tell each bidder that the secondary stage is completed.
Schedule 3—Rules for the assignment stage of the auction
(subsections 4(1) and 53(3))
This Schedule applies to the lots of each product that were allocated to a bidder in the primary stage or secondary stage.
Note: There is only a secondary stage if there is at least 1 product for which there was only 1 unallocated lot after the primary stage and there is at least 1 bidder who can make a bid on that lot.
In this Schedule:
assignment bid: see subclauses 5(1), 5(5) and 5(6).
assignment price means an amount charged for the assignment of a particular frequency range.
assignment round means a round in the assignment stage for the making of assignment bids for the assignment of frequency ranges to the lots of each product that were allocated to a bidder in the primary stage or secondary stage.
assignment winner: see subclause 8(7).
list of frequency range options includes a set of frequency range options.
results: see clause 9.
total assignment price: see subclause 8(8).
Note: For the definitions of size and total size, see subsection 5(2).
Part 2—Arrangements for assignment stage
3 Schedule for assignment rounds of the assignment stage
(1) After the completion of the primary stage and secondary stage (if any), the auction manager must announce:
the anticipated start time and end time of each assignment round; and
the product or products that will be the subject of each assignment round.
(2) There must be at least 24 hours between the completion of the primary stage and secondary stage (if any) and the start of the first assignment round.
(3) Assignment rounds must start and end between 9.00 am and 5.00 pm on working days.
(4) The scheduling of assignment rounds between those times is at the auction manager’s discretion.
(5) The auction manager (using the auction system) will indicate to all bidders, before the first assignment round of a given day, the anticipated schedule of assignment rounds for that day at least 1 hour before the start time of the first assignment round of the day. However, the auction manager may, at any time, modify the schedule of assignment rounds. If this occurs, the auction manager must tell all bidders in writing of the change as soon as practicable.
(6) The auction manager has discretion over the duration of assignment rounds.
(7) The auction manager has discretion over the order of the products that are to become the subject of an assignment round.
(8) Two or more products may be the subject of a given assignment round. A product must not be the subject of more than one assignment round.
Part 3—Bidding in the assignment stage
4 Frequency range options in assignment rounds
(1) Bidding in an assignment round is only open to bidders who were allocated, in the primary stage or secondary stage, at least one lot of a product that is the subject of the assignment round.
(2) Subject to subclauses (3) and (4), for each product, the auction manager must determine a list of frequency range options available to each bidder so that:
the frequency range included within each option for a bidder is a contiguous frequency range corresponding in bandwidth to the total size of the lots of the product that the bidder was allocated in the primary stage or secondary stage; and
for each option in the list of frequency range options, there exists at least one frequency range option for every other bidder so that:
each bidder’s frequency range complies with paragraph (a); and
none of the frequency ranges overlap.
(3) If some lots of a product were not allocated in the primary stage or secondary stage (if any), the auction manager must, in determining the frequency range options available to each bidder, ensure that the frequency range assigned to:
the unallocated lots of the product, other than the lower band products, will be a contiguous frequency range corresponding in bandwidth to the total size of those unallocated lots and adjacent to the frequency 27.5 GHz;
the unallocated lots of any one of the lower band products will be a contiguous frequency range corresponding in bandwidth to the total size of the unallocated lots of that product.
(4) For each upper band product, if, in the primary stage or secondary stage:
one or more lots of the upper band product (the upper band lots); and
one or more lots of the related lower band product (the lower band lots);
were allocated to a bidder, the auction manager must, in determining the frequency range options available to each bidder:
if only one bidder was allocated lower band lots and upper band lots, ensure that the frequency ranges assigned to the lower band lots and the upper band lots will each be a contiguous frequency range corresponding in bandwidth to the size of the lower band lots and the upper band lots, as the case may be, and be adjacent to each other;
if two or more bidders were allocated lower band lots and upper band lots, ensure that, for the bidder who was allocated the most lower band lots and upper band lots, the frequency ranges assigned to the lower band lots and the upper band lots will each be a contiguous frequency range corresponding in bandwidth to the size of the lower band lots and the upper band lots, as the case may be, and be adjacent to each other;
if two or more bidders were allocated lower band lots and upper band lots and the total number of those lots is the same for each bidder, but the number of upper band lots is not the same, ensure that, for the bidder who was allocated the most upper band lots, the frequency ranges assigned to the lower band lots and the upper band lots will each be a contiguous frequency range corresponding in bandwidth to the size of the lower band lots and the upper band lots, as the case may be, and be adjacent to each other;
if two or more bidders were allocated lower band lots and upper band lots and were allocated the same number of lower band lots and the same number of upper band lots, ensure that the lower band lots and the upper band lots each become the subject of an assignment round, however, the frequency ranges to be assigned for the lower band lots and the upper band lots need not be adjacent to each other.
Note: For assignment rounds arising under paragraph (f), a frequency range assigned to lower band lots may not necessarily be adjacent to a frequency range assigned to upper band lots.
(5) If a bidder is participating in a given assignment round for more than one product, the auction manager may determine frequency range options available to the bidder that deal with the products as a group, providing the requirements of subclause (2) (subject to subclauses (3) and (4)) are met for each individual product in the group.
(6) At least 24 hours before the start of the first assignment round, the auction manager must provide each bidder participating in the assignment stage with the list of frequency range options available to the bidder in each of the assignment rounds for the lots of a product that were allocated to the bidder in the primary stage or secondary stage.
5 Assignment bids
(1) An assignment bid consists of:
the frequency range option that is being bid for; and
a bid price for the frequency range option that is a multiple of one hundred.
(2) A bidder may submit a single assignment bid for any option in the list of frequency range options provided by the auction manager. A bidder is not permitted to bid for any other frequency range.
(3) Except where subsection 54(1) or 54(2) applies, a bidder’s assignment bid is taken to have been made in an assignment round when the assignment bid has passed data validation checks that are performed by the auction system.
Note: Subsection 54(1) allows the auction manager to permit an assignment bid to be made other than by using the auction system, in certain circumstances. Subsection 54(2) allows the auction manager to permit an assignment bid to be made after an assignment round has ended, in certain circumstances.
(4) A bidder may change, delete or replace an assignment bid in the auction system during an assignment round as often as desired, subject to the data validation checks that are performed by the auction system. The assignment bid that will be treated as binding for a bidder is the assignment bid in the auction system at the end time of the assignment round.
(5) Any frequency range option for which no assignment bid is received, or for which an invalid assignment bid is received, is taken to have an assignment bid with a bid price of zero dollars.
(6) If a bidder does not submit any assignment bid, the bidder will be taken to have bid zero dollars for every frequency range option.
6 Validity of assignment bids
An assignment bid is valid if:
except where subsection 54(2) applies, the assignment bid is received between the start time and end time of the assignment round for the product or group of products; and
the assignment bid is for a frequency range option made available to the bidder; and
the amount bid for the frequency range option is a multiple of one hundred.
Note: Subsection 54(2) allows the auction manager to permit an assignment bid to be made after an assignment round has ended, in certain circumstances.
Part 4—Determining winning assignment bids and assignment prices
7 Determination of winning assignment bids
(1) After an assignment round has ended, the auction manager must determine the winning assignment bids for each product or group of products bid for in the assignment round and tell each winning assignment round bidder its winning assignment bid.
(2) The winning assignment bids must be a combination of valid assignment bids such that:
exactly one assignment bid (whether a submitted assignment bid or an assignment bid of zero dollars taken to have been made under subclause 5(5) or 5(6)) is selected from each bidder; and
the frequency ranges included in any pair of winning assignment bids for a product or group of products do not overlap; and
if relevant, the frequency range of any unallocated lots of a product is assigned in accordance with subclause 4(3);
if relevant, subclause 4(4) is applied.
(3) Subject to the constraints in subclause (2), the assignment bids selected must maximise the sum of the assignment bid prices.
(4) If more than one combination of assignment bids meets the criterion in subclause (3), the winning combination must be selected by a pseudorandom process.
Note: This clause relates to Division 2 of Part 6 of this instrument for the purposes of section 294 of the Act and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.
8 Determination of assignment prices
(1) The auction manager must determine the assignment price for each winning assignment bid in an assignment round and tell each winning assignment round bidder its winning assignment price for the frequency range.
(2) If there is only one bidder in an assignment round, then the assignment price must be zero. Otherwise, the auction manager must determine the assignment price in accordance with the following subclauses.
(3) The assignment price must be no more than the assignment bid price.
(4) The assignment price may be zero.
(5) Subject to the constraint in subclause (3), a set of assignment prices in the assignment round must be selected so that:
there is no alternative bidder, or group of bidders, who (based on their assignment bids) would pay more than any winning assignment round bidder or group of winning assignment round bidders; and
if more than one set of assignment prices satisfies paragraph (a) – the sum of the assignment prices is also minimised; and
if more than one set of assignment prices satisfies paragraphs (a) and (b) – it is the solution to the formula in subclause (6).
is the set of Vickrey prices for the bidders, the price for each bidder j being:<br> (a) the sum of bid prices for the combination of assignment bids that would have been selected under subclause 7(3) if bidder j had submitted assignment bids of zero dollars for every frequency range option; less<br> (b) the sum of bid prices for all other winning assignment bids in the assignment round.
Note: For starting prices, see paragraph 27(1)(a) or 37(1)(a).
(7) A bidder who has assignment prices for winning assignment bids in an assignment round is an assignment winner in the assignment stage for an assignment of a frequency range or frequency ranges to lots of a product or group of products.
(8) For the purposes of subclause (9), the total assignment price for assignment of a frequency range or frequency ranges to lots of a product or group of products in the assignment stage is an amount equal to the sum of the assignment prices for the assignment of all frequency ranges of the assignment winner.
(9) The total assignment price is to be paid by the assignment winner.
(10) The assignment prices calculated under subclause (5) must be rounded to the nearest hundred.
Note: This clause relates to Division 2 of Part 6 of this instrument for the purposes of section 294 of the Act and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.
Part 5—Bringing the assignment stage to an end
9 Results of the assignment stage
After the end of all assignment rounds, the auction manager must tell each winning assignment round bidder in writing:
the frequency ranges assigned to the lots of each product that were allocated to the bidder in the primary stage or secondary stage; and
any assignment price for the frequency ranges assigned.
10 End of the assignment stage
The assignment stage is complete when the auction manager has, under clause 9, notified all those bidders of the results of every assignment round.
Schedule 4 —Payment of balance of the winning price greater than zero and issue of spectrum licence
(subparagraphs 9(3)(b)(i) and 9(3)(c)(i), section 68, subparagraphs 75(1)(e)(i) and 75(1)(e)(ii) and paragraph 76(a))
This Schedule applies to the payment of the balance of the winning price by a winning bidder that is greater than zero.
Note 1: The Minister has given a direction to the ACMA, under subsection 294(2) of the Act, to permit payment of a spectrum access charge in instalments, subject to the terms set out in the direction and so long as the precondition set out in the direction is met. See the spectrum access charges direction, available on the Federal Register of Legislation which may be accessed free of charge at www.legislation.gov.au.
Note 2: Paragraph 294(1)(b) of the Act provides that the ACMA may, by written instrument, make determinations specifying the times when spectrum access charges are payable.
Note 3: This Schedule is made under section 294 of the Act and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.
Note 4: For information on how an amount must be paid, see section 9.
In this Schedule, a reference to a winning bidder is a reference to a winning bidder that has a balance of the winning price that is greater than zero.
Note 1: For the definition of winning price, see subsection 65(1).
Note 2: For the definition of balance of the winning price, see subsection 65(2).
Part 2—Election of winning bidder for payment of winning price
3 Payment of balance of the winning price
(1) If the balance of the winning price for a winning bidder is an amount greater than zero, the ACMA must notify the bidder, in writing, of the following:
the winning price;
the effect on the winning price of any eligibility payments made under subsection 28(2) or 34(6) or 41(2) in accordance with section 36, or of an additional eligibility payment made under subsection 39(3) for the purposes of section 36;
that the balance of the winning price may be paid in full;
the date on which the balance of the winning price must be paid to the ACMA on behalf of the Commonwealth;
that the winning price may be paid in 5 instalments in accordance with clause 4;
the amount for each of the 5 instalments;
the effect on an instalment amount of any eligibility payments made under subsection 28(2) or 34(6) or 41(2) in accordance with section 36, or of an additional eligibility payment made under subsection 39(3) for the purposes of section 36;
the dates on which the 5 instalments must be paid to the ACMA on behalf of the Commonwealth;
the date, not earlier than 10 working days after the date of the notice, by which the winning bidder must give the ACMA written notice whether it elects to pay the winning price:
in full; or
in instalments.
(2) If, by the date mentioned in paragraph (1)(i), a winning bidder gives the ACMA written notice that the bidder elects to pay the winning price in full, the ACMA must notify the bidder:
that the ACMA has received the winning bidder’s election; and
the date by which the balance of the winning price must be paid by the winning bidder to the ACMA on behalf of the Commonwealth.
(3) If, by the date mentioned in paragraph (1)(i), a winning bidder gives the ACMA written notice that the bidder elects to pay the winning price in instalments, the ACMA must notify the bidder that:
the ACMA has received the winning bidder’s election; and
the instalment amounts must be paid by the winning bidder to the ACMA on behalf of the Commonwealth in accordance with clause 4; and
a bank guarantee must be given to the ACMA on behalf of the Commonwealth, at the time and on the terms set out in the marketing plan, as a precondition to reaching an agreement with the ACMA for the payment of the winning price in instalments in accordance with clause 4.
Note: Under subsection 62(2) of the Act, the ACMA is not required to issue a spectrum licence unless the person to whom it is allocated either pays the spectrum access charge for issuing the licence, or reaches an agreement with the ACMA for the payment of that charge.
(4) If the ACMA becomes aware that a notice under subclause (1) contains a material error, the ACMA must give the winning bidder a revised notice.
(5) If a revised notice is given under subclause (4):
the ACMA must include in the revised notice a date, not later than 10 working days after the date of the revised notice, by which the winning bidder may give the ACMA written notice whether it has elected to pay the winning price:
in full; or
in instalments; and
subclauses (2) and (3) apply as if the date mentioned in paragraph (1)(i) were the date included in the revised notice; and
any previous notice given by the winning bidder under subclauses (2) or (3) is of no effect.
(6) If, by the date mentioned in paragraph (1)(i), a winning bidder does not give the ACMA written notice whether it elects to pay the winning price in full or in instalments, the bidder is taken to have given the ACMA written notice that it elects to pay the winning price in full.
(7) If, by the date mentioned in paragraph (1)(i), a winning bidder gives the ACMA written notice that it elects to pay the winning price in instalments, the winning bidder is not entitled to be issued a spectrum licence unless the winning bidder gives the ACMA on behalf of the Commonwealth the bank guarantee in accordance with subclause 3(3).
Note 1: If the winning bidder fails to pay an instalment other than the first instalment, the winning bidder, as the licensee of a spectrum licence, may contravene relevant licence conditions, as set out in the marketing plan, that are required to be included in the spectrum licence by section 67 of the Act.
Note 2: If any of the second instalment, third instalment, fourth instalment or fifth instalment are not paid in accordance with clause 4, the ACMA or the Commonwealth may require the authorised deposit-taking institution (within the meaning of the Banking Act 1959) that has issued the bank guarantee to pay the amount secured by the bank guarantee.
(8) If a spectrum licence is issued to a winning bidder in accordance with subclause 5(2), each of the first instalment, second instalment, third instalment, fourth instalment and fifth instalment is not refundable in any circumstances.
(9) If a bank guarantee is given to the ACMA on behalf of the Commonwealth by email before the time set out in the marketing plan, the original guarantee must be received by the ACMA no later than 3 working days after that time (or, if the ACMA agrees to a later time, the agreed time) for the bank guarantee to be taken to have been given to the ACMA on behalf of the Commonwealth.
4 Terms of payment by instalments
(1) If a winning bidder elects to pay the winning price in instalments:
the full amount of the winning price must be paid in 5 instalments; and
each instalment must equal 20.32% of the winning price; and
each instalment must be paid in accordance with the timeframes set out in subclauses (2) to (4).
(2) The first instalment minus any eligibility payments already made by the winning bidder must be paid prior to the issue of a spectrum licence to the winning bidder.
(3) The second instalment must be paid by:
if the spectrum licence comes into force on the day on which it is issued—the day which is 12 months from that day; or
if the spectrum licence comes into force later than the day on which it is issued—a day which is no earlier than 12 months from the day the spectrum licence is issued but no later than 12 months from the day the spectrum licence comes into force.
(4) Each of the third, fourth and fifth instalments must be paid by:
for the third instalment—the first anniversary of the day by which the second instalment was payable;
for the fourth instalment—the second anniversary of the day by which the second instalment was payable;
for the fifth instalment—the third anniversary of the day by which the second instalment was payable.
Example 1: For a spectrum licence proposed to be issued and to come into force on 1 August 2021, and for which the winning price is $1,000,000, the instalments would be the following amounts payable by the following times, if an election to pay in instalments is made:
(a) a first instalment of $203,200 minus any eligibility payments already made, by 31 July 2021;
(b) a second instalment of $203,200 by 1 August 2022;
(c) a third instalment of $203,200 by 1 August 2023;
(d) a fourth instalment of $203,200 by 1 August 2024;
(e) a fifth instalment of $203,200 by 1 August 2025.
If, in relation to the first instalment, there is a remainder for eligibility payments already made, the remainder will be deducted from the second instalment and any subsequent instalments (if necessary): see subclause 4(5).
Example 2: For a spectrum licence proposed to be issued on 1 August 2021 and to come into force on 1 November 2021, the date by which the second instalment must be paid must be no earlier than 1 August 2022 but no later than 1 November 2022. If the due date of payment of the second instalment is 31 October 2022, each of the third, fourth and fifth instalments must be paid by 31 October each year in 2023, 2024 and 2025, respectively.
(5) If any eligibility payments already made exceed the first instalment, the remainder will be deducted from the second instalment and, if necessary, any further remainders will be deducted from subsequent instalments.
Part 3—Issue of spectrum licences
5 Issue of spectrum licence
(1) If a winning bidder:
elects to pay the winning price in full; and
pays the balance of the winning price in accordance with subclause 3(2);
the winning bidder is entitled to be issued a spectrum licence for each part of the spectrum assigned to the lots allocated to the bidder in the auction.
(2) If a winning bidder:
elects to pay the winning price in instalments; and
pays the first instalment in accordance with subclause 4(2); and
gives the ACMA on behalf of the Commonwealth the bank guarantee in accordance with subclause 3(3);
the winning bidder is entitled to be issued a spectrum licence for each part of the spectrum assigned to the lots allocated to the bidder in the auction.
6 Default
(1) If a winning bidder:
elects to pay the winning price in full; and
does not pay the balance of the winning price in accordance with subclause 3(2);
then:
the spectrum licence is not allocated to the winning bidder; and
the allocation of spectrum licences under this instrument to other bidders is not affected; and
section 70 applies to each lot (and associated spectrum assigned to each lot) that, but for this subclause, would have been included in a spectrum licence allocated to the winning bidder.
(2) If a winning bidder:
elects to pay the winning price in instalments; and
either, or both:
does not pay the first instalment in accordance with subclause 4(2); or
does not give the ACMA on behalf of the Commonwealth the bank guarantee in accordance with subclause 3(3);
then:
the spectrum licence is not allocated to the winning bidder; and
the allocation of spectrum licences under this instrument to other bidders is not affected; and
section 70 applies to each lot (and associated spectrum assigned to each lot) that, but for this subclause, would have been included in a spectrum licence allocated to the winning bidder.
Note 1: If the winning bidder fails to pay an instalment other than the first instalment, the winning bidder, as the licensee of a spectrum licence, may contravene relevant licence conditions, as set out in the marketing plan, that are required to be included in the spectrum licence by section 67 of the Act.
Note 2: If any of the second instalment, third instalment, fourth instalment or fifth instalment are not paid in accordance with clause 4, the ACMA or the Commonwealth may require the authorised deposit-taking institution (within the meaning of the Banking Act 1959) that has issued the bank guarantee to pay the amount secured by the bank guarantee.
Note 3: See section 75 for when certain breaches of this instrument have occurred and section 79 in relation to other rights of the ACMA and the Commonwealth.