The regulation is built around a small set of operational concepts that recur through its parts. For practitioners, the necessary core concepts and how the regulation defines them are:

• Approved form (s 3). Many steps require use of an approved form (notably notices of appeal, applications for extension of time and applications for suspension of the operation of the decision). The regulation does not itself publish the form content; it makes use of the concept to require formality and consistency in filings (see s 5(5), s 6(3), s 7(2), s 20(2), s 21(1), s 10(2), s 10(5)).

• Secretary (s 3). The regulation assigns the administrative office, “Secretary”, differently according to the code of racing involved. For thoroughbred appeals a Minister‑designated member of staff of Racing NSW or a responsible department is Secretary; for greyhound appeals it is a member of staff of the Greyhound Welfare and Integrity Commission or a department; for harness appeals it is HRNSW or a department. The Secretary’s specific duties include receiving notices/applications and forwarding them to the Tribunal and other persons as soon as practicable (s 8; s 11).

• Appellable decision (s 4; s 9). The regulation draws tight boundaries around what decisions can be appealed under the Act. For thoroughbred and harness racing (Part 2, s 4) appeals are confined to warnings off, suspensions (subject to thresholds by duration and by which subsection of the Act the appeal is made), disqualifications, licence cancellations, and fines above amounts that depend on the statutory subsection (s 4(1)). For greyhound racing (Part 3, s 9) the list is broader and includes refusals or conditions on registration for persons, greyhounds, litters and racing clubs/trial tracks, suspensions of greyhounds beyond a set period, fines of at least $200, cancellations of registrations for greyhounds/litters, disqualifications of greyhounds when in conjunction with a penalty imposed on a person, and appeals concerning the code of practice deeming housing areas to comply (s 9(1)(a)-(k)). The regulation also specifies that a “person” for Part 2 excludes harness racing clubs and race clubs (s 4(4)(a)-(b)), and that “rules” for purposes of s 4 come from the Rules of Racing under the relevant Acts (s 4(4)(b)).

• Transcript (s 5(5); s 6(4)-(5); s 8(1)(b); s 11(1)(b)). The regulation emphasises the evidentiary record: when Racing NSW or HRNSW lodge an appeal they must accompany the notice with a transcript of evidence at the original hearing, if available (s 5(5)). Likewise, an appellant whose decision arose from a hearing may request a transcript; the Secretary must provide it as soon as practicable (s 6(4)-(5); s 10(3)-(4)). The Secretary must provide transcripts to respondents and to the Tribunal where available (s 8(1)(b), s 8(5); s 11(1)(b), s 11(4)).

• Time limits and extensions (s 5-7; s 10). The regulation differentiates time limits by who is appealing and by which code of racing is involved. Racing NSW has two months in some categories (s 5(1)); HRNSW seven days in others (s 5(3)); other persons generally have seven days for many appeals (s 6(1); s 10(1)). The Tribunal may extend time on application but only where special or exceptional circumstances exist (s 7(3); s 10(6)).

• Tribunal’s procedural powers (Parts 4 and 5). The Tribunal may make directions about conduct (s 12), fix hearing dates and locations and give minimum notices (s 13), permit representation (s 14), hear ex parte (s 15), and permit affected third parties to appear in defined circumstances (s 16). It is not bound by strict rules of evidence and may require oath/statutory declaration (s 17). It may amend documents where doing so determines the real questions or corrects defects (s 18). It may suspend a decision pending appeal, impose conditions on that suspension and revoke suspension where conditions are not met (s 20).

• Costs and financial mechanics (s 21-22). A lodgement fee of $250 is payable by appellants other than Racing NSW or HRNSW (s 21(1)-(2)); the Tribunal may refund the fee in whole or in part (s 21(3)). Parties ordinarily bear their own costs (s 22(1)), but the Tribunal can order a party to pay another’s costs on limited grounds (frivolous or vexatious appeal, unreasonable delay, or conduct causing unreasonable costs) and unpaid ordered costs may be recovered as a debt (s 22(2)-(4)).

• Repeal and savings (s 23). The Regulation expressly repeals the 2015 regulation and preserves continuity by savings for acts/matters that had effect immediately before repeal (s 23).

These concepts structure who can appeal what, within what deadlines, using what procedural form, and subject to what financial exposures and Tribunal discretions.

The regulation allocates rights, duties and costs across a defined set of actors in New South Wales racing and those who interact with its disciplinary and registration systems. The principal affected parties are:

• Appellants (persons). Individuals and entities who are the subject of an appellable decision under the Act (s 4; s 9). For many appeal categories ordinary persons have seven days to lodge a notice (s 6(1); s 10(1)(a)). The regulation expressly excludes harness racing clubs and race clubs from the meaning of “person” for Part 2 appeals (s 4(4)(a)-(b)), which alters standing for those entities in certain thoroughbred and harness contexts.

• Industry regulators and bodies: Racing NSW, HRNSW and the Greyhound Welfare and Integrity Commission. Each has both defensive and offensive roles under the regulation. Racing NSW may itself appeal in some situations and has different time limits and procedural options (s 5). HRNSW has time-limited appeal rights (s 5(3)-(4)). The Greyhound Welfare and Integrity Commission is identified as the agency to be the Secretary for greyhound appeals where designated (s 3).

• Owners of horses and greyhounds. Where the placing of an animal may be affected by an appeal, the Secretary must give a copy of the notice of appeal to the owner if the owner is not the respondent (s 8(3) for horses; s 11(2) for greyhounds). This creates a notification obligation that may alter market and competition consequences for owners (for example, ownership or betting interests affected by placements).

• Respondents. The party against whom the appeal is made must receive a copy of the notice of appeal as soon as practicable from the Secretary (s 8(1)(a); s 11(1)(a)).

• Appeal Panels and racing associations. The regulation addresses situations where an Appeal Panel or racing association failed to commence a hearing within one month of an appeal being lodged or notified that it would not hear the appeal, creating additional windows for Racing NSW, HRNSW or other persons to lodge appeals (s 5(2), s 5(4), s 6(2)). This affects the conduct and incentives of internal appeals and upstream bodies.

• The Tribunal. The Racing Appeals Tribunal receives notices, decides on extensions, makes procedural directions, hears appeals (including ex parte), handles evidence and decides costs and suspension applications (see Parts 4 and 5). The Tribunal’s discretion is central to outcomes.

• Interested third parties. A person who may be affected by a Tribunal decision in relation to appeals under s 4(1)(e) (thoroughbred/harness disqualification of a horse made in conjunction with a penalty imposed on a person) or s 9(1)(j) (greyhound disqualifications analogous) may, with the Tribunal’s leave, appear and give evidence or make submissions (s 16). Owners, trainers, breeders and other commercial stakeholders could fit this description.

• Legal representatives and other authorised representatives. A party may be represented by another person, including an Australian legal practitioner, but only with the Tribunal’s leave (s 14). That affects cost and access-to-law dynamics.

• Courts of competent jurisdiction for recovery of unpaid cost orders. The regulation permits costs ordered under s 22 to be recovered as a debt in a court of competent jurisdiction (s 22(4)), which involves the wider legal system in enforcement.

Financial exposures are concentrated on appellants who are not Racing NSW or HRNSW,they must pay the lodgement fee (s 21) and face cost orders if the Tribunal finds one of the threshold conditions (frivolous, vexatious, unreasonable delay or conduct causing unreasonable costs) (s 22(2)-(3)). Administrative obligations fall on the Secretary and the Tribunal, with specific timing and forwarding duties (s 8; s 11).

The regulation distributes specific duties and rights across actors. The operative obligations and entitlements that practitioners should note are:

Duties of the Secretary

• Forward notices and related materials to respondents and the Tribunal as soon as practicable on receipt of a notice of appeal (s 8(1), s 8(4)-(5); s 11(1), s 11(3)-(4)). If Racing NSW or HRNSW lodge the appeal, provide the respondent with a copy and, if available, a transcript (s 8(1)(a)-(b)).
• Provide transcripts to appellants who request them where the decision appealed arose from a hearing or inquiry (s 6(4)-(5); s 10(3)-(4)).
• Notify owners where the placing of a horse/greyhound may be affected (s 8(3); s 11(2)).

Time-limited rights to appeal (who may appeal and when)

• Racing NSW may appeal certain decisions under the Act s 15(2)(a) or (b) within two months of notification (s 5(1)). For certain delayed or refused hearings, Racing NSW has an extended set of time windows tied to the Panel’s failure to commence or refusal to hear the internal appeal (s 5(2)).
• HRNSW has a seven‑day appeal window for certain decisions (s 5(3)) and further specific windows where an Appeal Panel failed to commence or declined to hear the appeal (s 5(4)).
• Other persons have seven days for many categories (s 6(1); s 10(1)(a)), but for some categories an extended window arises if an Appeal Panel failed to commence the appeal within one month or refused to hear it (s 6(2); s 10(1)(b)-(c)).

Right to request transcripts and the Secretary’s duty to comply

• Where the decision arose from a hearing/inquiry, the appellant may request a transcript, and the Secretary must provide it as soon as practicable (s 6(4)-(5); s 10(3)-(4)).

Right to apply for an extension

• An appellant may apply to the Tribunal to extend a time for lodging a notice of appeal (s 7(1)); applications must be in the approved form and given to the Secretary (s 7(2)). The Tribunal may grant an extension only if satisfied special or exceptional circumstances exist (s 7(3); s 10(6)).

Tribunal procedural powers and parties’ obligations

• The Tribunal may give directions about conduct and parties must comply with them (s 12).
• It may set hearing dates and must provide at least seven days written notice to parties and other persons it thinks fit (s 13(1)-(2)); it can shorten or extend this minimum notice period in defined circumstances (s 13(3)).
• The Tribunal must commence hearing an appeal as soon as practicable within 28 days of receiving the notice unless it determines otherwise (s 13(5)).
• Parties may be represented with the Tribunal’s leave (s 14) and the Tribunal may hear appeals in a party’s absence (s 15).
• A person who may be affected by the Tribunal’s decision on certain horse/greyhound-related appeals may, with leave, appear to make submissions or give evidence (s 16).

Evidence and document management rights

• The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence and may inform itself as it thinks fit, consistent with natural justice (s 17(1)). It can require witnesses to be examined on oath or affirmation and require statutory declarations to verify evidence (s 17(2)).
• The Tribunal may amend documents or grant leave to a party to do so at any stage, but only to determine the real questions in the proceedings or to correct defects (s 18(1)-(2)). The concept of “document” in s 18 excludes certificates, judgments or orders (s 18(3)).

Suspension rights and conditions

• An appellant may apply to suspend the operation of the orders in the decision appealed against pending determination of the appeal; such applications must be in approved form and lodged with the Secretary (s 20(1)-(3)). Suspension orders may be conditional (s 20(4)), and non-compliance with conditions means the order is treated as not in force for the period of non-compliance (s 20(4)(b)). Suspension remains in force until revoked, withdrawn, dismissed or the appeal determined (s 20(5)).

Financial duties and rights

• Lodgement fee: appellants other than Racing NSW or HRNSW must pay $250 with a notice of appeal, unless deferred by the Tribunal (s 21(1)-(2)). The Tribunal may order repayment of the fee in whole or part after withdrawal or determination (s 21(3)).
• Costs: ordinarily each party bears its own costs (s 22(1)). The Tribunal may order one party to pay another party’s costs if satisfied the appeal was frivolous or vexatious, caused unreasonable delay, or was conducted in a way that caused unreasonable costs (s 22(2)). The Tribunal may impose costs as a condition when granting leave to withdraw (s 22(3)). Unpaid ordered costs are recoverable as a debt (s 22(4)).

Withdrawals and amendment restrictions

• A duly lodged appeal may not be withdrawn except with the leave of the Tribunal (s 19), and amendments to documents are permissible only for narrow purposes (s 18(2)). These rules limit unilateral procedural manoeuvring after lodgement.

Collectively, the regulation sets out a formalised, timetabled administrative appeal procedure with explicit duties on a Secretary, and discretionary but strictly circumscribed powers for the Tribunal (for example the special/exceptional circumstances standard for extensions, s 7(3) and s 10(6)).

This regulation itself does not create new criminal offences or substantive sanctions beyond setting when certain penalties are subject to appeal and by whom. However it establishes enforcement mechanics, financial exposure and practical enforcement routes:

Appellable penalties and thresholds

• The regulation sets which penalties are open to appeal (s 4; s 9). For thoroughbred and harness appeals, for example, fines below specified thresholds are not appellable (s 4(1)(d) sets $2,000 for appeals under certain subsections and $200 under others). For greyhound appeals, fines of at least $200 are appellable (s 9(1)(g)). The regulation therefore gates Tribunal jurisdiction by monetary and categorical thresholds and by whether the penalty was imposed with another sanction (for example where a greyhound is disqualified in conjunction with a person being penalised, s 9(1)(j)).

Financial enforcement: lodgement fee and costs

• A lodgement fee of $250 applies to notices of appeal by persons other than Racing NSW or HRNSW (s 21(1)). The fee is payable on lodgement unless the Tribunal consents to deferral (s 21(2)). The Tribunal may direct the fee be repaid in whole or part following withdrawal or determination (s 21(3)). This creates a financial barrier and a mechanism for partial recuperation.
• Costs orders: the default rule is each party pays its own costs (s 22(1)), but the Tribunal can order a party to pay another’s costs if the appeal is frivolous or vexatious, involved unreasonable delay, or caused another to incur unreasonable costs (s 22(2)). The Tribunal may attach costs conditions when granting leave to withdraw (s 22(3)), and unpaid ordered costs may be recovered as a debt in a court of competent jurisdiction (s 22(4)). This creates an enforceable civil debt procedure to recover costs ordered by the Tribunal.

Operational enforcement via the Tribunal’s conditional orders

• Suspension orders are explicitly subject to conditions and lapse when those conditions are not met (s 20(4)). That provides an enforcement mechanism where the Tribunal can grant interim relief but tie it to ongoing compliance; non‑compliance renders the order not in force during the period of breach (s 20(4)(b)).
• Compliance with Tribunal directions is mandatory: a party must comply with directions given under s 12(2). The regulation does not set out explicit sanctions for non-compliance, but non-compliance can be expected to affect the Tribunal’s procedural decisions, including imposition of costs under s 22.

Method of recovery

• Cost orders can be enforced as debts through a court of competent jurisdiction (s 22(4)). The regulation thus creates civil, not criminal, enforcement for unpaid cost orders.

Limits on enforcement powers

• The regulation’s powers are procedural and interlocutory; the Tribunal’s authority is to determine appeals under the Act with specified procedural tools. It does not create independent policing or criminal enforcement mechanisms for breaches of the regulation itself beyond normal civil recovery for unpaid costs.

In summary, enforcement consequences under this regulation are primarily financial and procedural. The regulation emphasises the Tribunal’s ability to condition interim relief, to require compliance with procedural directions, and to deter unfounded or obstructive appeals through costs orders recoverable as debts (s 20, s 12, s 22).

The regulation expressly ties itself to a suite of primary statutes and subordinate instruments, and cross-references them to delimit meanings, jurisdiction and institutional responsibilities. Its interactions are primarily definitional and procedural.

Primary statutes referenced

• Racing Appeals Tribunal Act 1983 (the Act). The regulation operates under and provides procedural rules for appeals under the Act; numerous provisions explicitly state they are “for the Act, section 18(1)(a)” or similar (for example Parts 2-4). The regulation therefore implements and fills out procedural detail delegated by the Act (see s 3 definition noting “the Act means the Racing Appeals Tribunal Act 1983”).
• Thoroughbred Racing Act 1996. The regulation borrows defined language and rule references for appeals relating to thoroughbred racing. For example, s 4(4)(b) defines “rules” for appeals under the Act, s 15(1), as the Rules of Racing within the meaning of the Thoroughbred Racing Act 1996.
• Harness Racing Act 2009. The regulation refers to the Harness Racing Act definitions and establishes HRNSW’s role in appeals under s 15B(1) of the Act (s 3; s 4(4)(a), s 5(3)-(4)).
• Greyhound Racing Act 2017. Part 3 appeals refer to meanings in the Greyhound Racing Act 2017 and the rules within the meaning of that Act (s 9(2)). The Greyhound Welfare and Integrity Commission is recognised in s 3 as the body whose staff may be designated by the Minister as Secretary for greyhound appeals.
• Interpretation Act 1987. The regulation notes that the Act and the Interpretation Act 1987 contain definitions and provisions that affect interpretation (s 3 Note). That interaction means general canons of statutory interpretation and machinery provisions are applicable.
• Subordinate Legislation Act 1989. The commencement note observes that the 2015 regulation would otherwise have been repealed on 1 September 2024 by section 10(2) of the Subordinate Legislation Act 1989, and the current regulation repeals and replaces the 2015 regulation (commencement note; s 23). This ties the lifecycle of subordinate legislation to the Subordinate Legislation Act.

Operational interactions

• Rules of Racing and code of practice. The regulation ties Tribunal jurisdiction and the meaning of “rules” to the Rules of Racing under the Thoroughbred Racing Act 1996 and to rules under the Harness Racing Act 2009 and the Greyhound Racing Act 2017 (s 4(4)(b); s 9(2)). For example, the greyhound regime specifically includes appeals about the code of practice deeming certain greyhound housing areas to comply with the code (s 9(1)(k)). Practitioners must therefore read those primary Acts and their subsidiary rules together with this regulation to determine jurisdiction and substantive context.

• Internal appeal mechanisms (Appeal Panels and racing association processes). The regulation interacts with existing internal appeal and disciplinary processes. It creates contingent time windows for external appeals to the Tribunal when internal Appeal Panels or racing associations fail to commence hearings within one month of an appeal or inform the appellant they will not hear the appeal (s 5(2), s 5(4), s 6(2), s 10(1)(b)). This adds a procedural backstop to internal processes by enabling external appeal where internal paths deadlock or are delayed.

• Administrative law and natural justice. Section 17(1) explicitly requires the Tribunal to act subject to natural justice while allowing it to be flexible about evidentiary rules. That situates Tribunal proceedings within administrative law constraints governed by the Act and the Interpretation Act 1987.

• Civil procedure for enforcement. Costs ordered by the Tribunal may be recovered as debts in courts of competent jurisdiction (s 22(4)). That links the Tribunal to the civil enforcement architecture.

Continuity with prior subordinate instrument

• The regulation repeals the 2015 Regulation and saves acts/matters that had effect under the earlier regulation (s 23(1)-(2)). The repeal/savings provision is important to avoid gaps in the legal regime for ongoing proceedings and existing rights.

In practical terms, anyone litigating or advising on appeals to the Racing Appeals Tribunal must read the relevant primary Act (the Act), the relevant code Act (Thoroughbred Racing Act 1996, Harness Racing Act 2009, or Greyhound Racing Act 2017), the relevant Rules of Racing or code of practice, and this regulation together. The regulation supplies the procedural rules that interlock with substantive rules and internal appeal mechanisms contained in those other statutes and subordinate instruments.

The regulation’s own text provides the following amendment and lifecycle particulars:

• Repeal and replacement. Section 23(1) expressly repeals the Racing Appeals Tribunal Regulation 2015. Section 23(2) contains a savings provision that preserves any act, matter or thing that had effect under the 2015 regulation immediately before its repeal so that those acts continue to have effect under the 2024 regulation (s 23(2)).

• Commencement timing and connection to the Subordinate Legislation Act. The commencement provision states that the regulation commences on the day it is published on the NSW legislation website (s 2). The commencement note explains that the regulation repeals and replaces the 2015 regulation, which would otherwise have been repealed on 1 September 2024 by s 10(2) of the Subordinate Legislation Act 1989. That indicates the 2024 instrument was designed to provide a successor regime in place of automatic repeal (commencement note; s 2).

• Structural continuity. The regulation preserves the procedural architecture of the earlier regulation while updating and consolidating procedural rules across thoroughbred, harness and greyhound appeals. The inclusion of a savings clause (s 23(2)) means existing matters under the 2015 regulation are not left in limbo.

What the regulation does not say about amendment history

• The text supplied does not include a schedule of prior amending instruments, ministerial reasons, Explanatory Notes, or a version history beyond the express repeal and replacement of the 2015 regulation. The regulation therefore provides no internal record of incremental amendments between 2015 and 2024 inside its text. The regulation’s repeal of the 2015 instrument and its own commencement date are the only historical data points contained in the document.

Practical implications for drafters and practitioners

• Because the regulation uses the phrase “approved form” without reproducing the forms, the existence and any subsequent amendment to those approved forms will be an important operational amendment pathway not visible in the regulation text itself. Forms can be updated administratively and are likely to be a locus for subsequent change.
• Any amendments to the primary statutes it interacts with (the Act, the Thoroughbred Racing Act 1996, the Harness Racing Act 2009, the Greyhound Racing Act 2017, or the Subordinate Legislation Act 1989) may produce necessary consequential amendments to this regulation’s definitions, thresholds or procedural windows. The regulation cross-references those Acts for meanings (s 3; s 4(4); s 9(2)).

In short, the regulation replaces the 2015 instrument, preserves continuity by savings, and leaves forms and inter‑instrument dependencies as likely vectors for subsequent administrative or legislative change.

The regulation itself does not record or cite any judicial or Tribunal decisions; it is a procedural instrument that prescribes practice before the Racing Appeals Tribunal. The text contains no named cases, no citations to precedent, and no express summary of prior litigation. Consequently:

• The regulation provides no internal litigation history or examples of how its provisions have been interpreted by courts or the Tribunal. There is no list of decisions referenced or incorporated.
• The practical litigation footprint to expect from the regulation derives from the categories of appeal it governs. That is, disputes that are likely to be litigated under this procedural regime include appeals about warnings off, suspensions (with specified duration thresholds), licence revocations or cancellations, fines at or above the stated thresholds, registration refusals and conditions (especially for greyhound racing where registration and breeding purposes are expressly included), and disputes connected to the code of practice as it applies to housing areas (s 9(1)(k)). The regulation’s time limits, extension standards and evidentiary rules will shape litigation strategy and timing.
• The regulation creates potential points of procedural contest that might generate litigation or judicial review: the Tribunal’s exercise of discretion to extend time only for “special or exceptional circumstances” (s 7(3); s 10(6)); the Tribunal’s discretion to hear ex parte (s 15) or to admit evidence outside the rules of evidence subject to natural justice (s 17(1)); and the Tribunal’s cost orders under s 22. These are standard discretionary settings that in practice invite judicial review questions about reasonableness or procedural fairness, but the regulation itself contains no cases or prior judicial interpretations to rely on.

For practitioners advising clients or representing them before the Tribunal, the absence of litigation citations in the regulation means counsel must consult Tribunal decisions and any relevant judicial review authorities outside the instrument to understand how these procedural discretions have been exercised. The regulation supplies the statutory framework; case law will be found in external decision repositories, not in the instrument.

The regulation contains several procedural traps and points where a misstep can have significant practical consequences. These are concrete mechanisms, cited to the relevant provisions, that practitioners and clients should watch for.

Short and varying time limits

• Many appeal windows are short: most persons have seven days to lodge a notice of appeal for a range of categories (s 6(1); s 10(1)(a)). Racing NSW and HRNSW have different clocks (Racing NSW two months in some instances, HRNSW seven days in others; s 5(1), s 5(3)). Misunderstanding which clock applies can forfeit the right to appeal.

Transcript dependencies

• Racing NSW or HRNSW lodging a notice must provide a transcript of the evidence from the original hearing “if available” (s 5(5)). Conversely, other appellants must request a transcript and the Secretary must provide it as soon as practicable (s 6(4)-(5); s 10(3)-(4)). Delays in obtaining a transcript can affect ability to prepare grounds and file timely appeal material, but the regulation imposes strict time frames for lodging without accommodating transcript delays unless the Tribunal grants an extension on special or exceptional grounds (s 7(3)).

Stringent extension standard

• The Tribunal may extend the time for lodging a notice only when satisfied special or exceptional circumstances exist (s 7(3); s 10(6)). This is a high threshold, and reliance on it is a procedural risk. Practitioners should not assume extensions will be granted for ordinary or merely inconvenient circumstances.

Lodgement fee and refund discretion

• A $250 lodgement fee applies to appellants other than Racing NSW or HRNSW (s 21(1)), payable on lodgement unless deferred by the Tribunal (s 21(2)). The Tribunal has discretion to repay the fee in whole or part after withdrawal or determination (s 21(3)). That discretionary repayment is not guaranteed and creates financial exposure on lodgement.

Costs exposure beyond “each party pays own costs”

• Although s 22(1) states ordinarily each party pays their own costs, the Tribunal may order costs against a party where the appeal was frivolous or vexatious, caused unreasonable delay, or caused another to incur unreasonable costs (s 22(2)). Costs may be recovered as a debt (s 22(4)). A litigant who pursues marginal or delay‑based appeals risks an adverse costs order which could be enforced through the courts.

Suspension conditions and non-compliance consequences

• Suspension of the operation of the orders appealed against can be granted, but suspension orders may be conditional and non-compliance with conditions means the order “is taken not to be in force during the period of non‑compliance” (s 20(4)(b)). An appellant relying on suspension should ensure compliance with any conditions to avoid unintended reactivation of the appealed decision.

Mandatory compliance with Tribunal directions

• The Tribunal’s directions as to conduct must be complied with by the parties (s 12(2)). Failure to comply can attract cost orders or affect the Tribunal’s procedural rulings, but the regulation does not specify discrete sanctions; the risk is practical rather than statutory.

Limited third‑party attendance

• The scope for interested third parties to appear is narrow and only applies to appeals described in s 16 (appeals under s 4(1)(e) or s 9(1)(j), that is, appeals involving disqualifications of horses/greyhounds made with associated penalties on persons). Practitioners should not assume a broad right for affected third parties to appear without the Tribunal’s leave (s 16(1)).

Definition differences and exclusions

• The meaning of “person” excludes certain entities for Part 2 purposes (s 4(4)(a)-(b)). Practitioners advising clubs or associations must not assume they have the same standing as individuals or licensees in Part 2 appeals.

Tribunal not bound by evidence rules but subject to natural justice

• The Tribunal may admit evidence flexibly (s 17(1)(a)) and require oath or statutory declaration (s 17(2)). Flexibility does not eliminate procedural fairness obligations; parties must be prepared to meet non‑formal evidence standards and to produce verified evidence where requested.

Approved form requirement

• Many filings must be in an approved form (s 3; s 5(5); s 6(3); s 7(2); s 10(5); s 20(2); s 21(1)). The regulation does not reproduce the forms; failure to use the approved form may lead to procedural rejection or delay. Practitioners should obtain the approved forms early.

Repercussions from internal appeal panel failures

• The regulation creates contingent external appeal windows where Appeal Panels or racing associations fail to commence hearings within one month, or inform that they will not hear the appeal (s 5(2), s 5(4), s 6(2), s 10(1)(b)). Parties should carefully track internal appeal timelines to preserve or trigger external appeal rights.

No explicit speedy trial equivalents for certain delays

• Although the Tribunal must commence hearings as soon as practicable within 28 days of receiving a notice (s 13(5)), the phrase “as soon as practicable” is flexible and the Tribunal can determine a longer period if warranted. Practitioners should not treat 28 days as an absolute guarantee of a hearing date.

In short, the principal practical “gotchas” are short and differing time limits, the strict extension standard, the lodgement fee and cost risk, the need to obtain and provide transcripts promptly, mandatory use of approved forms, conditional suspensions and the scope limits on third‑party attendance. Each of these is tied directly to the sections cited above.

The regulation sets out clear procedural steps and discrete requirements. The following is a practical compliance checklist for advisers and parties preparing or defending appeals, mapped to the relevant sections.

1. Determine whether the decision is appellable

• Check the specific category that applies: thoroughbred/harness (Part 2, s 4) or greyhound (Part 3, s 9). Confirm the nature of the sanction (warning off, suspension, fine, licence cancellation, registration refusal, etc.) and the monetary or temporal thresholds in the regulation (for example fines of at least $2,000 or $200 in s 4(1)(d); $200 for greyhound fines in s 9(1)(g); suspensions thresholds in s 4(1)(b) and s 9(1)(e)).

2. Identify who is the appellant and applicable time limit

• If Racing NSW or HRNSW is the appellant, use the timeframes in s 5 (Racing NSW two months for some decisions, HRNSW seven days for others, and special windows where internal Appeal Panels failed to proceed - s 5(2)-(4)).
• If any other person, apply s 6 (most categories have seven days) or s 10 for greyhound appeals (s 10(1)(a) seven days unless extended by the Tribunal).

3. Use the approved form

• Obtain and complete the approved form required for a notice of appeal or extension application (s 3 definition; s 5(5); s 6(3); s 7(2); s 10(5); s 20(2); s 21(1)). The regulation requires approved forms for lodgements and extension applications.

4. Transcript management

• If the original decision resulted from a hearing/inquiry, request a transcript from the Secretary as soon as practicable (s 6(4)-(5); s 10(3)-(4)). If Racing NSW or HRNSW is lodging the appeal, ensure the notice is accompanied by the transcript, if available (s 5(5)).
• The Secretary must provide transcripts to respondents and to the Tribunal when forwarding notices (s 8(1)(b), s 8(5); s 11(1)(b), s 11(4)). Factor in the time required to obtain and review any transcript before finalising grounds.

5. Pay or apply for deferral of lodgement fee (if applicable)

• If the appellant is not Racing NSW or HRNSW, include the $250 fee on lodgement or obtain the Tribunal’s consent to deferred payment (s 21(1)-(2)). Consider the Tribunal’s discretion to repay the fee in whole or in part after outcome (s 21(3)), but do not assume refund is automatic.

6. File any application for extension promptly if necessary

• If a notice would otherwise be late, file an application for extension in the approved form with the Secretary and be prepared to show special or exceptional circumstances because the Tribunal may grant extension only on that basis (s 7(1)-(3); s 10(5)-(6)).

7. Serve and monitor Secretary’s obligations

• On lodging, the Secretary must forward copies to respondents and to the Tribunal as soon as practicable (s 8(1)(a); s 8(4); s 11(1)(a); s 11(3)). Confirm the Secretary has served the required notices to respondents and owners where the placing of a horse/greyhound may be affected (s 8(3); s 11(2)). Keep records of such service.

8. Consider applying for suspension pending appeal

• If the appellant seeks to suspend the operation of the decision pending the appeal, prepare an application in the approved form and lodge it with the Secretary (s 20(1)-(3)). Be ready for conditions and ensure strict compliance with any conditions because non-compliance renders the suspension not in force during the breach period (s 20(4)).

9. Prepare for hearing timelines and notice requirements

• The Tribunal must give written notice of hearing at least seven days before the hearing to parties and other persons it thinks fit (s 13(2)). However, the Tribunal can shorten the minimum notice period with the appellant’s consent where urgent or extend it where appropriate (s 13(3)). The Tribunal must commence the hearing as soon as practicable within 28 days of receiving the notice (s 13(5)). Plan evidence and representation accordingly.

10. Evidence preparation

• Because the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence but must observe natural justice (s 17(1)), prepare admissible and verifiable evidence. Be ready to verify key evidence by statutory declaration or to have witnesses examined on oath or affirmation if required (s 17(2)).

11. Representation and third parties

• Apply for leave if the client wishes to be represented by counsel or another person (s 14). If third parties (e.g. owners) may be affected and wish to appear, make an application for leave under s 16 where the appeal falls within the scope of s 16’s definition of “relevant appeal” (s 16(1)-(2)).

12. Document amendment and withdrawal

• If an amendment to a document is necessary, apply to the Tribunal; the permissible purposes are limited to determining the real questions or correcting defects (s 18(1)-(2)). If contemplating withdrawal, remember that withdrawal requires the Tribunal’s leave (s 19), and the Tribunal may attach costs conditions (s 22(3)).

13. Manage costs risks

• Advise the client that ordinarily each party bears its own costs (s 22(1)), but that a costs order may be made against a party that advanced a frivolous or vexatious appeal, caused unreasonable delay, or caused another party to incur unreasonable costs (s 22(2)). Unpaid ordered costs are recoverable as a debt (s 22(4)). Consider proportionality and merits carefully before lodging appeals likely to provoke cost orders.

14. Recordkeeping and enforcement

• Keep copies of all approved forms, payment receipts for lodgement fees, records of Secretary communications and copies of transcripts provided. If the Tribunal makes a costs order and the losing party fails to pay, prepare to recover via court action as a debt under s 22(4).

15. Cross-check with the relevant primary Act and rules

• For substantive grounds and for definitions of “rules” or other statutory terms, consult the relevant primary Act (the Act, Thoroughbred Racing Act 1996, Harness Racing Act 2009, Greyhound Racing Act 2017) because the regulation frequently defers to those statutes for meaning (s 3; s 4(4); s 9(2)).

Following these steps, with timely action on short timeframes and strict adherence to the approved form and transcript requirements, will align practice with the regulation’s procedural demands.